Out for Change

THE DATA IS OUT

The Annual Report on Leaving Haredi Society

2025

Editors: Zvika Deutsch, Adar Anisman

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Editors

Zvika Deutsch and Adar Anisman
Text editing: Keren Gliklich | Graphic design: Shira Elk

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Foreword

This is the fifth consecutive year that we are publishing "The Data is Out", a report that brings together data and insights on a story that is relevant to all of us, yet one that most of us have never heard: the story of those leaving (Yotzim) Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) society. Today, one in seven young men born into a Haredi home – and one in nine young women – courageously choose to leave the world they know and integrate into Israeli society: in the military, in education, in employment, and in civilian life.

Admittedly, this story does not make headlines. Yet, year after year, under the radar, thousands of young individuals make a fateful decision that transforms their lives entirely and has a profound impact not only on their own future, but on the future of the State of Israel as a whole.

The data presented in this annual report show that in 2025, the trend of increased engagement among those leaving Haredi society continued - quite literally. We see a rise in military service and in participation in reserve duty, alongside an increase in integration into the high-tech sector and a general decline in unemployment, in line with broader trends in the Israeli economy.

At first glance, this may sound promising. However, delving deeper into the figures shows that this represents only a fraction of the immense potential embodied by this population: young men and women with exceptionally high motivation and a deep desire to fully partake in Israeli society, overcome significant gaps, and build happy, fulfilling lives as an integral part of the broader social fabric.

Indeed, these gaps cannot be ignored. There are hardly any Yotzim I have met who do not face challenges and gaps in their journey toward integration into Israeli society - gaps that stem from Haredi education, including educational and cultural gaps, alongside challenges inherent to the process of leaving itself, including loneliness and economic hardship.

These gaps are especially striking considering the limited public investment in the Yotzim population, particularly given its enormous potential. While most attention and resources are directed toward helping those who remain Haredi, those who have chosen to integrate into the general society are often left out of public discourse and systemic efforts. This represents a significantly missed opportunity. **This group is not asking for special treatment, but for a fair opportunity, targeted support, and an initial boost that can help them overcome early obstacles on a long and demanding road,** while staying afloat during the completion of matriculation exams, English studies, and other complex life challenges.

To be clear, Yotzim in 2025 are far better than in 2021, when the first edition of this annual report was published. Today, more dedicated programs exist for Yotzim, and many organizations have joined this effort with professionalism and commitment. Still, we are only at the beginning of the journey. There is reason to hope that the positive steps currently being taken within parts of the government will continue to deepen and expand, reflecting a thoughtful investment in our shared future, especially on the day after.

Finally, I would like to express my personal thanks to the exceptional research team which consistently produces work of this caliber, combining analytical rigor and creativity drawn from both the world of the yeshiva and the world of academia: Zvika Deutsch and Dr. Adar Anisman, who together led the creation of this annual report, and Shani Kaplan and Lila Oks, who worked alongside them to ensure the accessibility of the data and findings to the broader public.

With great appreciation,
Nachi Pasikov
CEO, Out for Change

I am very proud to present the 2025 edition of "The Data is Out" annual report, published for the fifth consecutive year.

This annual report offers new, rich, and up-to-date information on the Exit movement, the product of a year-long effort by the Out for Change team of researchers. As you read, you will gain a full and comprehensive overview of the number of Yotzim, exit trends, various identification methodologies, as well as the differences among Yotzim and the common characteristics that unite them.

As in previous years, the data presented in this annual report tell a complex story about those leaving Haredi society. The figures prove that Yotzim constitute a heterogeneous group, reflecting the complexity and diversity of Israeli society itself: men and women, secular and religious, Mizrahi and Ashkenazi, right- and left-leaning. What they all have in common is a strong desire to integrate into mainstream society and the active steps they take to make that integration possible.

The data help us gain a deeper understanding of the barriers, challenges, and difficulties faced by Yotzim. At the same time, they point to the considerable potential embodied by this group, its aspirations, and its strength, and, consequently, to the great hope inherent in its successful integration into Israeli society.

The findings indicate that the Exit movement continues to grow, and that the proportion of Yotzim who integrate into Israeli society is significantly higher than their proportion in the population as a whole. Although recent years have seen a positive trend in state institutions' engagement and a growing recognition of this group's potential, the road ahead remains long and the work substantial. The data once again demonstrate that the integration of Yotzim is clearly in the State of Israel's economic and security interests, and no less importantly, in its social resilience.

To conclude, I wish to thank the dedicated team that, year after year, produces such outstanding publication: Zvika Deutsch, Dr. Adar Anisman, Shani Kaplan, and Lila Oks.

Dr. Shmulik Hess,
Chairman, Out for Change

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Introduction

The Data is Out annual report aims to present a representative, comparative, and comprehensive picture of those leaving Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) society (also: "formerly Haredi"), focusing on their demographic, educational, and employment characteristics. Existing research data is limited, since other than the data published each year in this annual report, which is based on the Central Bureau of Statistics' (CBS) representative databases, almost no representative data on former Haredim has been published, and the little data that has been published does not present a comprehensive and comparative snapshot of their characteristics. This annual report serves to fill the gap by analyzing the Central Bureau of Statistics' (CBS) data and comparing the data on former Haredim to other groups classified based on their past and present affiliation.

The term "former Haredim" is used rather than the commonly used term "those who went off the derech," both due to the desire to represent all those who left Haredi society, i.e. those who currently define themselves as secular, traditional, or otherwise religious, and because the term "those who went off the derech" is not used exclusively for those who left Haredi society. In this annual report, the term **Yotzim**, a shortened form of the term "former Haredim" ("yotzei hachevra haharedit" in Hebrew), will be used to refer to this population.

The groups analyzed in this report are defined based on their current affiliation (whether or not they are currently Haredi) and their past affiliation (whether or not they are from a Haredi background). Current affiliation is indicated using the term "today" (e.g., "Haredi today" or "degree of religiosity today"), while past affiliation refers to whether an individual has a Haredi background.

The intersection of past and present affiliations creates four distinct subgroups (Table 1). **Yotzim** (former Haredim) are individuals with a Haredi background who are not Haredi today (i.e. those who have left Haredi society); **Haredi from home/ HFH** is a term for individuals with a Haredi background who remain Haredi today (i.e., those raised in Haredi homes who continue to identify as Haredi); **Joiners (became Haredi)** are individuals with a non-Haredi background who are Haredi today, including ba'alei teshuva (returnees to religious observance) and those from non-Haredi religious backgrounds who have become Haredi; and **non-Haredim**, individuals with a non-Haredi background who are not Haredi today (i.e., non-Haredi Jews).

Table 1: Analysis of groups as a cross between present and past affiliation

		Current Groups	
	All Jews	Haredim today	Non-Haredim Today
Past Groups	Those with Haredi backgrounds	HFH[1]	Yotzim[2]
	Those with non-Haredi backgrounds	Joiners[3]	Non-Haredim[4]

1. HFH: short for Haredim from Haredi homes
2. Yotzim (formerly Haredi) - short for those who have left the Haredi community
3. Joiners (became Haredi) - short for those who joined the Haredi community
4. Non-Haredim - short for Jews who are not Haredi

All of the analyses (except outliers) are based on data from the Central Bureau of Statistics - the Labor Force Survey for the years 2021 - 2024 and the Social Survey for the years 2017 - 2024. Two methods were used to identify past and present Haredi religiosity in the databases, based on the nature of the data contained within each of them. The first method, whose data was presented in the previous two annual reports, is the Deutsch, Shenfeld, and Tirosh Method (the Dashat method), which uses the Labor Force Survey data to identify those with a Haredi background - men who self-report as graduates of Haredi yeshivas and Haredim today - Haredim by self-identification (Self-identification in the LFS is at the household level). This method enables the identification of a Haredi background among men only and was primarily used by our team to analyze labor market integration and educational characteristics for men.

The second method relies on data from the Social Survey, and identifies individuals based on self-identification, including those with a Haredi background (raised in a Haredi family at age 15) and those who are Haredi today, both men and women. This method was used to analyze trends in rates of exit from Haredi society, as well as to examine the demographic, economic, and emotional well-being of those who leave, compared to both Haredi and non-Haredi populations.

Chapter A outlines trends in the rates of individuals leaving Haredi society, including data on their current religiosity and the age at which they leave.

Chapter B examines the characteristics of those leaving Haredi society: areas of residence, family status, military or civilian service participation, and educational attainment.

Chapter C focuses on employment trends among men: trends in labor market integration indices such as employment and unemployment rates, as well as data on the vocations of those employed, with a particular emphasis on the high-tech sector.

Chapter D explores the broader characteristics of those leaving, including family-related factors, economic well-being indicators such as satisfaction with their financial situation and standard of living, and measures of emotional well-being, such as feelings of loneliness and depression.

Chapter E examines changes in the composition of Haredi society, reviewing the waves of entry into Haredi society and its demographic makeup, and considers how these shifts affect Yotzim and the process of leaving Haredi society**.** This is accompanied by an **online appendix** that includes an expanded glossary of terms, a methodological discussion on the identification method used in the Social Survey and the Labor Force Survey using the "Dashat" method, an overview of the Integration Survey conducted by Out for Change, and an explanation of the relative sampling error, which guided the decision on whether to publish certain data or not.

A. Trends in Exiting Haredi Society

Groups and Data Sources

Groups

The analysis groups are classified based on current affiliation (currently Haredim or not) versus past affiliation (whether they are from a Haredi background or not).

Subgroups

Yotzim (former Haredim): Individuals with a Haredi background who are not Haredi today (short for those who left the Haredi community).

Haredim from home (HFH): Those with a Haredi background who are Haredim today - short for those from a Haredi home.

Joiners ("Became Haredim"): Those with a non-Haredi background who are currently Haredi - short for those who have joined the Haredi community.

Non-Haredim: Those with a non-Haredi background who are not currently Haredi - short for non-Haredi Jews.

Data Sources and Identification Methods (*)

The Central Bureau of Statistics Social Survey for the years 2007-2012 and 2017-2024, Jews (women and men) aged 20 - 64.

Identification of a Haredi background: raised (at age 15) in a Haredi family by self-identification (this variable is not available in data before 2007 and in the years 2013-2016); Identification of Haredi today: by self-identification

The Central Bureau of Statistics Labor Force Survey (LFS) for the years 2021-2024, Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25 - 64.

Identification of Haredi background: Graduate of Haredi yeshiva according to self-reporting (Dashat method); Identification of Haredi today: by self-identification (Household level)

(*) For more on the data sources, see the online appendix.

A-1 Introduction

The rates of leaving and joining Haredi society have fluctuated over time. After the establishment of the State of Israel, many young people raised in Haredi families left their communities and assimilated into mainstream society, while those from mainstream backgrounds chose to leave and join the Haredi community. Since the 1970s, Haredi society has intensified its processes of isolation and separation, leading to a decline in the rates of those leaving. In the last two decades, these rates have started to rise again.

Identifying exit rates and trends over time can help offer an estimate of the number of young men and women who have graduated from Haredi education and wish to integrate into military service, higher education, and employment with/within the general population, rather than in segregated environments. This information can also assist stakeholders in pinpointing the necessary responses to support their optimal integration. However, aside from the studies by Regev and Gordon (2021), Deutsch, Shenfeld

and Anisman (2025) and works published in previous editions of this annual report, to the best of our knowledge, the number of representative quantitative studies or large-scale surveys examining trends in exit rates over time, is limited. Other studies have examined exit rates based on the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) Social Survey, but did not analyze trends over time.

This chapter of the annual report builds on the analyses presented in previous editions of the annual report (Deutsch, 2024; Deutsch and Shenfeld, 2023), examining trends in the rates of individuals leaving Haredi society. The analysis is primarily based on data from the Central Bureau of Statistics' Social Survey for the years 2007-2024, which enables the identification of individuals who self-define as having a Haredi background (those raised in a Haredi family) and those who identify as Haredi today. The exit rate is defined as the proportion of individuals who have left Haredi society relative to the total number of people with a Haredi background, including both those who remain Haredi ("Haredim from home") and those who have left ("Yotzim").[1]

Section A-2 outlines the methods used to identify individuals with a Haredi background (past Haredim) and those currently identifying as Haredi. Section A-3 provides current estimates of exit rates, broken down by gender and age groups. Section A-4 explores trends in exit rates, examining variations by age, gender, time periods, and birth cohorts or age groups. Section A-5 presents the distribution of religiosity levels among those who have left Haredi society, while Section A-6 compares the age distribution of those leaving with other subgroups - non-Haredim, Haredim from home, and those who have joined. Furthermore, the chapter includes a boxed section presenting findings from a study examining changes in transition trends - both out of and into Haredi society - over time (Deutsch et al., 2025). The appendix to the chapter (A-2) offers a comparison of exit rates between the Social Survey and the Labor Force Survey (LFS), utilizing the Dashat method (Deutsch et al., 2024), as well as the calculation of estimated exit rates.

A-2 Overview – Methods for Identifying Affiliation with Haredi Society in the Past and Present

Using different data sources and methods to identify individuals with a Haredi background and those currently identifying as Haredi results in differing estimates of exit rates. The current estimates of exit rates are derived from two primary sources: the Social Survey data and the Labor Force Survey (LFS) data. Both sources enable the current identification of affiliation with Haredi society based on self-identification, but the Social Survey identifies individuals at the personal level, while the LFS relies on self-identification at the household level.[2]

When it comes to identifying a Haredi background, different methods are employed. The Social Survey allows for the identification of a family's religiosity through self-identification;[3] the LFS data utilized the Dashat (Deutsch, Shenfeld, & Tirosh, 2024) method to identify a Haredi background among men only. This method is based on self-reported attendance at a Haredi yeshiva.[4]

1. This method was used by Sarel and Gilboa (2017), Shenfeld (2020), and was also mentioned in Weinreb and Blass (2018). For further information on the method, see the online appendix.

2. The question in the Social Survey was: "Do you consider yourself: Haredi, religious, traditional-religious, traditional and not so religious, not religious/secular." And in the LFS: "What is the main religious lifestyle of the people living in the household: secular, traditional, religious, ultra-religious, Haredi, mixed lifestyle (household with at least two people with different religious lifestyles)?"

3. The question in the Social Survey was: "When you were 15, was the household in which you grew up: Haredi, religious, traditional-religious, traditional and not so religious, or not religious/secular."

4. Since 2016, Jewish men have been asked: "What type of yeshiva does he or did he study in: yeshiva ketana, yeshiva tichonit, yeshiva gedola, yeshiva gevoha, kollel, hesder yeshiva." This method defines an "ultra-Orthodox yeshiva graduate" - that is, someone

Regev and Gordon (2021) developed an initial tool for estimating exit rates based on a combination of LFS data with other administrative data. They identified as having a Haredi background as anyone who grew up in a family where most of the children were sent to educational institutions that they classified as Hared.[5] Haredi classification is currently based on self-identification (at the household level), as described above.

Identification at the household level has disadvantages, as the assumption that all individuals are similar in terms of their lifestyle (Haredi or not) is mainly appropriate for adults and less so for young people under the age of 25, who sometimes live in their parents' homes despite differences in lifestyle. Another limitation concerns mainly those who are still Haredi: the data in the LFS do not include boarding school students, whose rates are high among Haredi men under the age of 25. This leads to an underrepresentation of Haredi men in this age group.[6] For this reason, we chose to include in the analyses based on the LFS, only individuals aged 25 and over.

Moreover, with respect to estimates of the numbers of Haredi Jews today and of those with Haredi backgrounds, the LFS data presents unexplained trends, which were only found in that data and not in the Social Survey (Deutsch et al., 2024). This difference may be rooted in the survey's methodological structure, which is designed to track employment trends rather than changes in population sizes (see the online appendix for further details). These limitations are shared by both methods that rely on this dataset: the Regev and Gordon method and the Dashat method.

A-3 Rates of Exit from Haredi Society

In this section we present current estimates of exit rates from Haredi society, shown as upper and lower ranges and broken down by gender. These estimates are based on data from the LFS and the Social Survey.

As mentioned, the use of different data sources to identify individuals with a Haredi background yields different estimates of exit rates. As such, the estimates entail a degree of uncertainty regarding the precise exit rates; therefore, in this section we present upper and lower bounds for exit rates.

According to the data, the current exit rates for individuals aged 20-64 range from 10.7% (lower estimate) to 14.1% (upper estimate) and are higher among men (12.1.%-14.9%), compared to women (9.2% to 13.3%). When focusing on the younger age group (20-34), the range narrows down, particularly among men, and therefore, the level of uncertainty among younger individuals is lower.

with a haredi background - as someone who reported studying in a yeshiva ketana or yeshiva gedola, but did not report studying in a hesder yeshiva.

5. In cases where a family sends exactly 50% of its children to Haredi educational institutions, the authors applied a rule: if at least half of the children attended first grade in an institution under Haredi supervision, the family is classified as "Haredi"; otherwise, it is classified as "non-Haredi." If no information is available, the family's data is excluded from the database.

6. Thus, although in the 18-24 age group, Haredi men are supposed to make up 51% of the population (Fran and Klinger, 2018), in the LFS data for the years 2020-2022, the average percentage of men is only 40%.

Figure A-1: Exit rates based on gender and age – lower and upper estimate



Source: Estimates based on the Social Survey data for the years 2017-2024, the LFS using the Dashat method for the years 2020-2024. For a presentation of the calculation method, see Appendix A-2.

The upper-range values are derived from the estimated exit rates based on the LFS (for men), while the lower-range values are also drawn from the Social Survey (for both men and women). Exit rates calculated based on LFS data are higher among older age groups; however, it should be noted that this data source is less suitable for the analysis of population trends due to its sampling methodology (for further discussion, see Deutsch et al., 2025). Figure A-1 presents data that reflect a weighting of these ranges; i.e., the overall exit rate for women and men combined is calculated as the average of the exit rates for men and for women. For a detailed explanation of the calculation method and tables containing all estimates, refer to Appendix A-2.

A-4 Trends in Exit Rates

So far, we have presented the most up-to-date estimates of exit rates. In this section, we shift our focus to examining trends in exit rates over time. In this analysis, we assume that although it is not currently possible to determine which estimates from the various sources most accurately reflect the true exit rate, the Social Survey data provides a dependable basis for identifying overall trends in exit rates.

This section analyzes trends in exit rates using the Social Survey data, categorized by age and gender. To examine these trends, we first present a descriptive overview of exit rates for the years 2017 - 2024, broken down by age and gender groups. Next, we present trends in exit rates over time: first, trends in exit rates across birth cohorts by gender, and subsequently, exit trends by age group across survey years.[7] In both analyses, we calculate two key metrics: (1) the exit rate, which represents the proportion of individuals leaving from the source population (all those with a Haredi background - Yotzim and HFH), and (2) the integration rate, which measures the proportion of individuals transitioning into the target population (all non-Haredim today - Yotzim and non-Haredim).

All analyses are based on Social Survey data from 2007 to 2024, excluding the years 2013 -2016, when

7. Analyzing exit trends based on birth cohorts has the advantage of highlighting the periods in which changes to exit rates occur. However, this approach is less reliable than analyzing exit rates by specific age groups, because in this approach, people who exit at a later age or return to Haredi society will be recorded as fluctuations in exit rates (even when the overall trend remains stable over time). For further reading, see Deutsch et al., 2025.

the relevant question was not asked.[8] Consequently, analyses spanning multiple calendar years are divided into two periods: 2007-2012 and 2017-2024.

A-4.1 Exit Rates According to Age and Gender

An analysis of recent Social Survey data by age group reveals that exit rates are higher among those in the younger age group compared to those in the mid-range age group.

Between 2020 and 2024, an average of 11.2% of individuals aged 20-49 with a Haredi background, both men and women, no longer identified as part of the Haredi community (Figure A-2). When broken down by age, exit rates were higher among younger adults, vs. older ones: 11.6% and 10.1%, respectively. The difference between age groups exists among both men and women.

In all age groups, exit rates of women are lower than those of men. Among young adults, the gap between men and women is 3.9 percentage points (13.5% compared to 9.6%) and among adults - 2.7 percentage points (11.5% compared to 8.8%).

Figure A-2: Exit rates from the Haredi community - according to gender and age groups (2021-2024)



Source: Social Survey data (2021-2024), individuals with a Haredi background aged 20-49.
Exit rate: The proportion of individuals who have left (Yotzim) out of the total population with a Haredi background (including HFH and Yotzim).

These findings, which indicate higher exit rates among younger individuals, suggest a general increase in exit rates, assuming that return to Haredi society among those who have left is not a significant phenomenon. The next section examines trends in exit rates over time for these two age groups, helping to rule out the possibility that the observed differences are due to returning to Haredi society. If the age-related differences were primarily caused by individuals returning after having left, we would see a consistent gap over time rather than a gradual increase in exit rates within each age group.

8. The variable "Level of household religiosity at age 15," which allows for identification of those with a Haredi background, is not available before 2007 or from 2013-2016.

A-4.2 Trends in Exit Rates

Trends in exit rates by age over birth cohorts

An analysis of exit rate trends across birth cohorts is presented, revealing a significant increase in the exit rate among both men and women (Figure A-3a). Compared to those born in the late 1960s and 1970s, who had an exit rate of approximately 7%, the rate rose to approximately 9-10% for those born in the 1980s, and 11% for those born in the 1990s. Among those born in the late 1990s and early 2000s, exit rates are even higher - about 12%.

Figure A-3: Trends in exit rates across birth cohorts - by gender



Source: Social survey data (2007-2012 and 2017-2024), Jews (men and women) aged 20-64. In the Social Survey, age data is categorized into quintiles. To estimate the year of birth, the median age within each age group was used as the reference point.

As the exit rate from the source population (individuals with a Haredi background) rises, a corresponding increase can be observed in the integration rate (the proportion of Yotzim within the target population - all those who are non-Haredi today). Among individuals born in the 1970s or earlier, Yotzim make up less than 1% of the non-Haredi population. In contrast, among those born in 1997 or later, they account for approximately 2.7% of the population (Figure A-4b).

Trends in exit rates by age over time (survey years)

In this section, due to the limited number of observations per year, we analyze trends in exit rates using a moving average with two-year time windows (Figure A-3).

The analysis is presented separately for two age groups: Younger adults (20-34) and mid-range aged adults (35-49) and spanning two periods: 2007-2012 and 2017-2024. The analysis by calendar periods provides a complementary picture of the transition and integration rates across age groups.

The findings of the analysis indicate that in the first period there is generally no significant change in exit rates between the beginning and the end of the period; however, the data are unstable. In contrast, from 2017 onward, a consistent upward trend in exit rates is evident in the mid-range age group (35-49), with relative stability in the younger age group. Throughout the entire period, exit rates in the younger age group (20-34) are higher (10.7%-12.8%) than those in the mid-range age group (5%-11%). The lower exit rates in the mid-range age group were partly driven by a decline in exit rates among men and women born in the 1970s.

The observed rise in exit rates among the mid-range age group since 2017 further supports the notion of a general increase in exit rates. The data captures only the year in which the survey was conducted, not the exact year of exit. Thus, individuals who were aged 25-34 in 2009-2010 and part of the younger age group (with an exit rate of approximately 7%-8%) moved into the mid-range age group by 2019-2020, where their exit rate remained relatively similar (around 8%-9%).

Figure A-4: Trends in exit rates throughout the years of the survey, according to age group (women and men)



Source: Social Survey data for the years indicated in the Figure, for men and women.
The variable "Level of household religiosity at age 15" is unavailable in the data prior to 2007 and for the years 2013-2016.
The red vertical line indicates a methodological change in the Social Survey regarding the Haredi sample (see the online appendix for details).
For data broken down by gender, see Figure A-N-1 in Appendix A-1.

As the rate of Yotzim (both men and women) from all those with Haredi background increases, a corresponding rise can be observed in their proportion among the non-Haredi population today (rate of integration into the target population). Among mid-range aged individuals, the integration rate is approximately 1%, whereas in the younger age group, it approaches 3%. This rate is expected to continue to rise over time.

Analysis of the data by birth cohorts reveals a consistent increase in exit rates, with a slowdown in the pace of growth among the most recent cohorts. In contrast, the exit rates data across survey years present a picture that may be interpreted as a pause in the increase in exit rates. Notably, analyses by survey year may be influenced by year-to-year fluctuations, such as social factors that led to lower response rates or affected the self-identification of one of the groups, for example the conduct of Haredi institutions during the COVID-19 period. An analysis by birth cohorts mitigates such effects, as each birth year is given equal weight in every survey year. Accordingly, if the peak observed in 2021-2022 resulted from a one-time event that affected both age groups (such as the COVID-19 pandemic), it would shape the trend when analyzed by survey year, but would not alter the pattern observed across birth cohorts. Although trend analysis by birth cohorts has its disadvantages in that it does not capture exits at older ages, the impact of this limitation is minor relative to exit rate estimates (for further discussion, see Box A-5). To the extent that this limitation affects the estimates, it is expected to mitigate the increase and reduce the estimated trends in exit rates across later birth cohorts. Despite the expectation that this analysis would lead to lower estimates, in practice, analysis of trends across birth cohorts shows an increase in exit rates. It is therefore likely that the decline observed in the trend analysis by survey years is mainly due to period effects stemming from related to survey and does not reflect a genuine decline in exit rates.

Research Summary: Transitions – from and into Haredi society

Zvika Deutsch, Moshe Shenfeld, and Adar Anisman

Background

The study examined trends in leaving and joining Haredi society in Israel, focusing on how the age at the time of transition (leaving or joining at a later age) affects estimates of transition rates. The key limitation in analyzing the existing data is that the Central Bureau of Statistics' (CBS) datasets do not contain direct information on the age at which the transition occurred.

To address this challenge, the present study analyzes exit and joining rates by birth cohorts, while considering respondents' age at the time the survey was conducted, based on data from the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) Social Survey for 2007-2012 and 2017-2023. This analysis enables the identification of age-related patterns of change for each birth cohort, despite the absence of direct information on age at transition. A multivariate analysis was also conducted to examine trends over time while controlling age, gender differences, and other background characteristics.

The findings indicate an increase in the rate of leaving Haredi society in recent decades, as well as higher exit rates among younger individuals. By contrast, the results suggest a decline in the rate of joining Haredi society; however, when controlling for age at the time of response, the trend remains stable. This is because most of those joining Haredi society do so after age 25, a factor that may affect the estimates, as they include younger respondents at the time of the survey.

Analysis of exiting and joining trends by age at the time of response

Trend analysis of exiting and joining by age at the time of response shows that estimates of exit trends are not affected by including respondents under age 25. In contrast, estimates of joining trends are influenced by the inclusion of the latter. Figures A-T-1 and A-T-2 present exiting and joining trends across broad age groups. The groups differ in the youngest age included in the estimation: a baseline group of all respondents aged 20-69 at the time of response, a group of respondents aged 25-69 at the time of response, and a more restricted group aged 30-69 at the time of response.

A notable finding concerns joining trends among individuals born in the late 1980s and thereafter. A marked decline in joining rates is evident among the broader age group under 30, suggesting that entry into Haredi society is indeed in decline. However, excluding respondents under 30 (i.e., including only 30-69-year-olds) reveals a different picture: the decline becomes more moderate and, in some cases, disappears altogether, even though there is no change in the underlying birth cohorts. By contrast, exit rate estimates are not sensitive to age at the time of response, even upon inclusion of younger respondents aged 20-24. The reason for this is that most exits occur by age 25.

Figures A-T-2: Trends in joining rates by respondents' age



Figures A-T-2: Trends in joining rates by respondents' age



Source: Social Survey data (2007-2012 and 2017-2023), Jews aged 20-69 (at the time of response). 2023 data are until October 7. In the Social Survey, age data is categorized into quintiles. To estimate the year of birth, the median age within each age group was used as the reference point.

It should be noted that joining estimates are sensitive to the definition of age at the time of response only with respect to Joiner rates from the source group (i.e., Joiners among those with a non-Haredi background), but not with respect to their share among the total population of Haredim today. This share is declining across all age groups, even when the joining rate remains constant, because the relative proportion of Joiners within the Haredi population is decreasing due to its rapid growth. Joining Haredi society at older ages may moderate the decline in the share of Joiners within the total population of Haredim today, but it does not alter the overall trend. For further details on the possible implications of changes in the demographic composition of Haredi society on leaving Haredi society, see Chapter 5.

Estimation of trends using multivariate analysis

Changes in exit and joining trends were estimated using linear regression as a function of birth cohort (Figure A-T-3).

The first model examines exiting and joining trends across birth cohorts, with those born in 1972-1981 serving as the reference group for comparison. To this end, two analyses were conducted: a first analysis without controlling age, and a second analysis with such control, since some respondents were surveyed at a young age and may not yet have completed their transitions. The greater the prevalence of later-in-life transitions, the larger the expected differences between the two analyses.

Figure A-T-3: Estimated change in exiting and joining rates relative to those born from 1972-1981 – with and without controlling for age (change in percentage points)



Source: Social Survey data (2007-2021 and 2017-2023), Jews aged 20-64 (at the time of response). 2023 data are until October 7. In the Social Survey, age data is categorized into quintiles. To estimate the year of birth, the median age within each age group was used as the reference point.

The analysis showed that the increase in exit rates among younger individuals, beginning with those born in the 1980s, is statistically significant, both with and without controlling for age. This finding reinforces previous research indicating that most exits occur at younger ages and that age at the time of response does not affect exit rates.

From a broader historical perspective (in the model controlling for age), the highest exit rates were found among those born up to 1961. Exit rates among those born between 1962-1971 are similar to those of individuals born in the 1970s (the baseline cohorts). After the baseline cohorts, exit rates increase; however, they remain lower than among those born in the early years of the State of Israel.

In contrast, joining rates decline significantly, but only in the analysis that does not control for age. When controlling for age, a small increase is observed, which is not statistically significant. This finding indicates that entry into Haredi society often continues into relatively older ages, and therefore, estimates that include younger age groups tend to underestimate joining rates.

In conclusion, the statistical estimation points to two key trends. First, exit rates from Haredi society have risen steadily over time, particularly among the younger generation. Second, in contrast to the dynamic pattern observed in exit rates, joining rates have remained relatively stable throughout the period of the study. These findings illustrate how failing to consider age can lead to incorrect conclusions, especially when examining young age groups.

A-5 Current Religiosity Levels Among Yotzim

Leaving Haredi society is widely regarded as a sociological phenomenon rather than merely a religious one (e.g., Horowitz, 2018). Indeed, the data show that most men and women who leave the Haredi community become traditional or religious. However, the data sources - the Social Survey and the LFS - differ in their classification of religiosity today[9], leading to some variation in estimates of the religiosity of Yotzim. Nevertheless, when religiosity is grouped into two broad categories - religious and non-religious - these differences are minimal.[10] For clarity and consistency, most of the analysis in this section is based on data from the Social Survey, which includes both men and women, while the appendix provides supplementary findings using data from the LFS (Figures A-N-2 and A-N-3).

Overall, the data indicate that leaving Haredi society is not necessarily accompanied by abandoning religion (Figure A-5). About two thirds of Yotzim identify as religious or traditional-religious, with nearly half religious (46%) and about another fifth traditional-religious (20%), compared with about a third who are not religious (secular or traditional but not very religious).The rate of those with a religious orientation is higher among younger respondents (69%) than among older respondents (59%), with no notable difference between men and women.

9. The Social Survey and the LFS differ primarily in their classification of religious and traditional identities. In the Social Survey, the categories are: religious, traditional-religious, and traditional but not very religious. In contrast, LFS classifies respondents as very religious, religious, and traditional. Another difference stems from the fact that the question in the LFS is at the household level, and therefore it includes a unique classification of a mixed lifestyle (a household with at least two persons with different religious lifestyles).

10. Despite differences in classification, both sources show a high degree of similarity in the proportion of individuals identified as religious. According to the Social Survey (Figure B-4), 66% are classified as religious or traditionall-religious (69% among young people and 61% among adults). Data from the LFS (Figure A-N-3) indicate that 64% are categorized as religious or very religious (72% among young people and 58% among adults).

Figure A-5: Distribution of current religiosity levels of Yotzim (men and women), broken down by age group and gender (%)

Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024), Yotzim aged 20-64.

The analysis of LFS data for men using the Dashat method likewise shows a consistent negative correlation between religiosity and age (Figure A-6).).[11] Whereas about three-quarters of younger Yotzim (aged 25-34) live in a religious or ultra-religious household, this percentage drops to about two-thirds among 35-44-year-olds and to roughly half in the two age groups of 45-64. It should be noted that despite the similar proportions of religious individuals in the two older age groups (52%-53%), the distribution of levels of religiosity differs between them: in the younger of the older groups (ages 45-54), about 16% are very religious compared with 8% in the older group (ages 55-64).[12]

11. Due to the methodology, which relies on data from Haredi educational institutions, the LFS data is available only for men. For further details, see the online appendix.

12. Comparing the LFS data using the Dashat method (2024) with data from Regev and Gordon (2021), which are also based on LFS data (using a different identification methodology), reveals a relative similarity in the distributions. Specifically, Regev and Gordon report that 64% of Yotzim are religious or very religious, and 24% are traditional or secular, whereas the LFS data shows 58% and 34%, respectively (Figure A-N-2).

Figure A-6: Distribution of the religiosity levels of male Yotzim, broken down by age group (%)



Source: Labor Force Survey data (2021-2024), Israel-born Yotzim aged 25-64.
Level of religiosity - the religious lifestyle of those living in the household.
4%-9% of households with a mixed lifestyle (a household with more than one person who has more than one religious lifestyle) were omitted.

There are several explanations for the lower prevalence of religious households among older Yotzim. One possibility is that at later ages Yotzim tend to be less religious. Another explanation is that the characteristics of Yotzim have changed over time, meaning the difference may not necessarily reflect a change in religiosity as people age, but depicts different populations of Yotzim.[13] A thorough examination of these differences and their underlying causes would require more in-depth research.

A-6 Age group distribution by subgroups

The age distribution of Yotzim is influenced by two trends. The first is demographic growth within Haredi society: when the exit rate remains constant, the number of individuals leaving will increase as the Haredi population grows. This trend impacts both Yotzim and HFH. The second trend affecting the age distribution of Yotzim is changes in exit rates.

Figure A-7, which illustrates the age distribution across four subgroups (Yotzim, HFH, non-Haredim, and Joiners) among individuals aged 20-54, reveals that Yotzim, like HFH, have a high proportion of young people, although the prevalence of young people is even higher among Yotzim. Approximately half (50%) of Yotzim are aged 20-29, a higher proportion than that of HFH (45%) and significantly higher than among non-Haredim (29%). On the other hand, only 16% of Yotzim are over 40, which is slightly lower than the 22% of HFH in this age group and much lower than the 41% among non-Haredim. The high percentage of young people among Haredi Jews, compared to non-Haredi Jews, is attributed to higher fertility rates. However, the relatively high proportion of young people among Yotzim, compared to HFH, aligns with data indicating an increase in exit rates.

13. With respect to the LFS data, which examine religiosity at the household level, the larger difference may be explained by the fact that at younger ages, Yotzim tend to reside in households with a more religious lifestyle, whereas at older ages individuals are more likely to live with others who are similar to themselves.

Figure A-7: Age distribution among 20-54-year-olds (men and women), broken down by subgroups (%)



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews (women and men) aged 20-54.
The data do not add up to 100% due to rounding.

By contrast, Joiners and non-Haredim tend to be older compared to both other groups. Like Yotzim, the age distribution among Joiners is influenced by the rates at which individuals from non-Haredi backgrounds join Haredi society, as well as demographic trends within non-Haredi populations. The low prevalence of young individuals among Joiners may suggest a decline in the rate of those joining Haredi society from non-Haredi backgrounds, if, indeed, most individuals join before the age of 25. However, an analysis of the age distribution of Joiners within the 25-54 age group reveals a notable similarity between the age distributions of Joiners and the non-Haredi population, indicating that the differences likely stem from the age at which individuals join (see Figure A-N-4 in Appendix A-1). For further reading, see Chapter 5 and Deutsch, Schoenfeld, and Anisman (2015).

Comparing the age distribution by gender for individuals aged 20-64 (Figure A-8) reveals a fairly high degree of similarity between men and women across all four subgroups.

Figure A-8: Age distribution among 20-64 year-olds, broken down by gender and sub-groups (%)



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews aged 20-64.
The data do not add up to 100% due to rounding.

The appendix also presents the age distribution of Yotzim and Joiners based on Regev and Gordon (2021), along with a comparison between the LFS data (Dashat method) and the Social Survey for men from 2017 to 2023 (Figure A-N-5). It is important to note that the sources differ in their representation of the age distribution of Yotzim and Joiners. This discrepancy arises because the LFS - which Regev and Gordon (2021) also rely on - is designed to represent the number of households in Israel rather than the number of individuals (as in the Social Survey). In our assessment, the Social Survey provides a more reliable representation of age group distribution (for further details, see the online appendix).[14]

14. Age distribution of Joiners based on the Social Survey data is relatively similar to the distribution derived from the LFS (Dashat method) but differs substantially from the distribution reported by Regev and Gordon (2021) (Figure A-N-5). Regarding male Yotzim, there are differences between the Social Survey data and the LFS (Dashat method), but these are smaller than the differences between Regev and Gordon and the Social Survey.

A - Sources

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A - Appendices

Appendix A-1 Data Completion

Figure A-N-1: Trends in Haredi exit rates over the survey years among individuals aged 20-64, by gender



Source: Social Survey data for the years indicated in the Figure.
The variable "Level of household religiosity at age 15" is unavailable in the data prior to 2007 and for the years 2013-2016.
The red vertical line indicates a methodological change in the Social Survey regarding the Haredi sample (see the online appendix for details).

Figure A-N-2: Distribution of current religiosity levels of Yotzim, broken down by CBS classification based on both methods (%)



Sources: Regev and Gordon - Regev and Gordon's processing (2021) of the 2017 LFS data, women and men aged 20-64; Dashat method - Labor Force Survey data (2021-2024), men aged 25-64.
Level of religiosity - the religious lifestyle of those living in the household.
Mixed lifestyle - A household with at least two people of different religious lifestyles

Figure A-N-3: Distribution of the religiosity levels of Yotzim (men), according to the LFS (%)



Sources: Labor Force Survey data (2021-2024), Israel-born men aged 25-64. Yotzim in households with a mixed lifestyle (defined as having at least two members with different religious lifestyles) are excluded, accounting for 7.4% of the total (8.5% among young people and 6.7% among adults)
Level of religiosity - the religious lifestyle of those living in the household.

Figure A-N-4: Age distribution according to the LFS and the Social Survey - men aged 25-64 (%)



The Social Survey: Data from the Social Survey that identifies individuals with a Haredi background and Haredim today based on self-identification. Labor Force Survey: Data from the LFS for Israeli-born individuals, identifying those with a Haredi background as graduates of Haredi yeshivas (self-reported) (Dashat, 2024) and Haredim today by self-identification. Both sources are for men aged 25-64 for the years 2017-2024.

Figure A-N-5: Age group distribution of Yotzim and Joiners aged 25 - 64, using three methods (%)



References:

The Social Survey: Data from the 2017-2024 survey for women and men, identifying individuals with a Haredi background and current Haredim based on self-identification.

LFS: Data from the 2017-2023 Labor Force Survey for Israeli-born men, identifying individuals with a Haredi background as graduates of Haredi yeshivas (self-reported) (Dashat, 2024) and Haredim today by self-identification.

Regev and Gordon: Analysis of LFS data for 2017 by Regev and Gordon (2021) for women and men.

Appendix A-2 Rate of Exit from Haredi Society - Upper and Lower Range Estimation

Current estimates are based on exit rate estimations obtained from the Social Survey data, and the LFS data for men using the Dashat method (Deutsch et. al., 2024). The differences in findings between the sources are likely due to variations in sampling methods and group identification rather than sampling errors. While the Social Survey has a higher margin of error, the observed differences between age groups remain consistent even when data are averaged over multiple years, significantly reducing the margin of error.[15]

Based on the estimates from the two surveys, we present exit rate estimation, shown as upper and lower ranges, and broken down by gender. This presentation does not rely on the Regev and Gordon (2021) data, since their findings relate to 2017 - nearly a decade prior to the writing of this appendix - and are therefore not up to date and do not include the youngest cohorts. Furthermore, Regev and Gordon's data generally do not affect the upper and lower estimates, since their estimates fall within the mid-range between those based on the Social Survey and those based on the LFS using the Dashat method, except among the very young (under age 25). For this group, Regev and Gordon's estimates are higher than the upper range; however, their method is subject to limitations for this age group, as it relies on LFS data, where information on respondents under the age of 25 is more limited.

The Social Survey

On average, for the years 2020-2024, the Social Survey reports an exit rate of 10.8% for individuals aged 20-64. Among young people (aged 20-29 or 20-34), the exit rate ranged from 11.4% to 11.6%, while among older individuals (aged 35-64), it was 9.6%.

A comparison between men and women reveals that women's exit rates are lower than men's in both age groups. Among young people, the gap between men and women was 4 percentage points, while among older individuals, the gap was less than 1 percentage point.

Table N-A-1: Estimates of exit rates according to the Social Survey

Age	Men and Women	Men	Women	Difference between men and women
Age 20-64	10.8	12.1	9.4	2.7
Age 20-29	11.4	13.5	9.2	4.3
Age 20-34	11.6	13.5	9.6	3.9
Age 35-64	9.6	10.0	9.2	0.8

Source: Social Survey data (2021-2024).

15. In the Labor Force Survey, current level of religiosity is classified at the household level, whereas in the Social Survey, classification is at the individual level. Additionally, the LFS identifies an individual with a Haredi background based on self-reported yeshiva education (men only), while the Social Survey relies on self-identification.

Exit rates - LFS Estimates

Exit rates based on LFS data using the Dashat method were calculated for 2021-2024 for individuals aged 25-54 and broken down by age groups - younger adults (25-34) and older adults (35-54) (Table N-A-2).[16] According to this estimate, the exit rate is 15% among young men (25-34) and 15.5% among adults (35-54).

Because the LFS data using the Dashat method are available only for men, estimates for women alone, and for men and women combined, were calculated under the assumption that the gender gap is 2 percentage points at younger ages and 1 percentage point at older ages.[17]

Table N-A-2: Estimates of exit rates according to the LFS Survey using the Dashat method

	Total	Men	Women (Estimate)	Estimate as to differences between men and women
Age 25-34	14.1	14.6	13.6	1
Age 35-54	**14.9**	**15.4**	**14.4**	**1**
Age 25-54	14.5	15.0	14.0	1
Age 25-34	**13.6**	**14.6**	**12.6**	**2**
Age 35-54	14.4	15.4	13.4	2
Age 25-54	14.0	15.0	13.0	2
Age 25-54	**14.2**	**15.0**	**13.4**	**1.6 - 2 for younger individuals, 1 for older individuals**

Highlighted lines: The data used in the final model.
Source: Labor Force Survey data (2021-2024) among Israeli-born men aged 25-54. The rate among women is derived from the rate among men by applying the difference shown in the leftmost column. The average calculation of 25-54 year olds is based on the assumption that among the young Haredim, 25-34 year olds constitute 60% of the total population.

16. In this analysis, data on individuals under 25 were not used, as the LFS underrepresents young Haredi men (who often reside in boarding schools) and poses limitations for identifying the religiosity of young people living in their parents' households (see Section A-2).

17. Regev and Gordon (2021) presented a difference of 1 percentage point among individuals aged 20-64, and of 3.9 percentage points among the very young - aged 19-25 (beyond that, the researchers did not present estimates of exit rates by age and gender). Larger differences are observed in the Social Survey data (an average of 2.7 percentage points: 3.9 percentage points among younger individuals and 0.8 percentage points among older individuals). Since the LFS is used to calculate the upper boundary, an intermediate gap value was assumed, which can be considered a conservative estimate.

According to the data, the upper estimate is drawn from the LFS Survey (14.2%), and the lower estimate (10.7%) is drawn from the Social Survey data.

Table N-A-3: Summary of estimates from three sources - Social Survey, LFS Survey using the Dashat method,

		Men and Women	Men	Women
Total	The Social Survey	10.8	12.1	9.4
	The LFS using the Dashat method	14.2	15.0	13.4
	Lower value	**10.7**	**12.1**	**9.4**
	Upper value	**14.2**	**15.0**	**13.4**
Young	The Social Survey	11.4-11.6	13.5	9.2-9.6
	The LFS using the Dashat method	13.6	14.6	12.6
	Lower value	**11.4**	**12.8**	**10.5**
	Upper value	**13.6**	**14.6**	**12.6**
Adults	The Social Survey	9.6	10.0	9.2
	The LFS using the Dashat method	14.9	15.4	14.4
	Lower value	**9.6**	**10.0**	**9.2**
	Upper value	**14.9**	**15.4**	**14.4**

B. Characteristics of Yotzim

Groups

The analysis groups are categorized based on current affiliation (currently Haredi or not), against past affiliation (whether they come from a Haredi background or not).

Subgroups

Yotzim (former Haredim): Individuals with a Haredi background who are not Haredi today (short for those who left the Haredi community).

Haredim (short for those from a Haredi home).

Joiners ("Became Haredim"): Those with a non-Haredi background who are currently Haredi (short for those who have joined the Haredi community).

Non-Haredim: Those with a non-Haredi background who are not currently Haredi (short for non-Haredi Jews).

Data Sources and Identification Methods (*)

The Central Bureau of Statistics Social Survey for the years 2007-2012 and 2017-2024, Jews (women and men) aged 20 - 64.

Identification of a Haredi background: raised (at age 15) in a Haredi family by self-identification (this variable is not available in data before 2007 and in the years 2013-2016); Identification of Haredi today: by self-identification.

The Central Bureau of Statistics Labor Force Survey (LFS) for the years 2021-2024, Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25 - 64.

Identification of Haredi background: Graduate of Haredi yeshiva according to self-reporting (Dashat method); Identification of Haredi today: by self-identification (Household level)

The Integration Survey - an online survey conducted by Out for Change in May-June 2025.

Identification of a Haredi background: raised (at age 15) in a Haredi family by self-identification; Identification of non-Haredi today: non-Haredi today by self-identification.

(*) For more on the data sources, see the online appendix.

B-1 Introduction

Those who leave Haredi society are a heterogeneous group in terms of their characteristics: they come from different Haredi communities; they leave for different reasons and do so at different stages of life. To the extent that they can be considered a single group, their defining commonality is the transition from Haredi society to mainstream society. As internal immigrants, they often find themselves in an intermediate position between the two worlds - Haredi and non-Haredi.

This chapter explores this diversity by comparing the fundamental traits of men and women who leave Haredi society (Yotzim). It examines their areas of residence, country of origin, and family status. Their participation in military or national service, and levels of education are also presented, all with gender-based breakdowns. In all topics, data about Yotzim are presented in comparison with three other subgroups: HFH (Haredim from home), Joiners (into Haredi society), and non-Haredim (non-Haredi Jews), and, in some cases, also by age group and gender.

Most of the analyses in this chapter are based on data from the Social Survey, covering both men and women. However, for men's education data, the analysis also incorporates information from the Labor Force Survey (LFS) using the Dashat method (2024). The larger sample size in the LFS enables more in-depth analyses, but it only allows for the identification of men who have left Haredi society (according to the Dashat method).

Section B-2 explores the residential distribution of Yotzim, including regional migration patterns and country of origin. Section B-3 examines their family status, and the box in this chapter explores the connection between leaving Haredi society and the family status of Yotzim. Section B-4 presents data on participation in national and military service, and Section B-5 provides insights into higher education, presenting key indicators and comparative analyses by gender.

B-2 Area of Residence

Many Haredim live in segregated areas with a distinct Haredi character, typically in neighborhoods within cities that have a high concentration of Haredi residents, or in cities where the majority of the population is Haredi. A particularly high proportion of Haredim reside in Jerusalem. This residential pattern sets Haredim apart from non-Haredi Jews, who primarily live in the Tel Aviv and central districts. Yotzim - a group that migrated from Haredi society to mainstream society - represent an intermediate model: like HFH, many Yotzim live in Jerusalem, while others, following a pattern similar to that of non-Haredi Jews, are concentrated in the central regions.

B-2.1 Residential Districts

A high concentration of Yotzim resides in the Jerusalem District.

Like Non-Haredi Jews and HFH, approximately two-thirds of Yotzim reside in three main districts in Israel: The Jerusalem District, the Tel Aviv District, and the Central District.[18] The key difference between these groups lies in the proportion of Yotzim residing in each district. Approximately 35% of HFH and 23% of Yotzim live in Jerusalem, compared to just 7% of non-Haredi Jews (Figure 1). Conversely, only approximately one tenth of HFH live in the central regions, compared to one quarter (24%) of Yotzim and a third of non-Haredim (32%). The Tel Aviv District, which includes Bnei Brak, is home to 23% of HFH, 21% of non-Haredi Jews and 16% of Yotzim.

18. Major cities with large concentrations of Haredim in these districts are Jerusalem and Beit Shemesh, in the Jerusalem District; Bnei Brak in the Tel Aviv District; Elad, Petah Tikva, Netanya, and Rehovot in the Central District. Cities with a high Haredi concentration outside these districts include Ashdod in the South, and Beitar Illit and Modi'in Illit in Judea and Samaria.

Figure B-1: Distribution of residential districts, broken down by sub-groups (%)



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.
For data on additional groups, and breakdown by gender, see Table B-1.
The data do not add up to 100% due to rounding.

Since Yotzim were born in areas with a large concentration of Haredim, the question arises: Is there a high migration rate of Yotzim out of Haredi population centers? It is reasonable to assume that a large proportion would live in Jerusalem at a young age, with the number of Yotzim in Jerusalem decreasing as they age. However, the data did not show any notable differences in the residential districts between younger Yotzim (aged 20-34) and older Yotzim (aged 35-64) (Figure B-2). In both age groups, 40% reside in the Tel Aviv and Central districts, while a fifth live in the Jerusalem district.

Figure B-2: Distribution of residential districts of Yotzim, broken down by age (%)



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.

The percentage of Yotzim in the Tel Aviv and Central districts increases with age.

Despite the overall similarity in residential districts between these two age groups, a more detailed analysis by specific age groups reveals a trend of migration from the Jerusalem district to the Tel Aviv and Central districts, reflected in an increase in those residing in the Tel Aviv and Central districts among individuals aged 45 and over. This increase may, at first glance, be related to broader changes in the geographic distribution of the Haredi population. However, the data indicate that among HFH, the older age group shows an increase in the share residing in Jerusalem. Since this analysis is based on a relatively small number of observations, further in-depth research is needed to better understand this phenomenon.

Figure B-3: Percentage of residents in the Jerusalem District and the Tel Aviv and Central Districts, broken down by age groups and divided into subgroups



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3. Missing value - sampling error exceeds 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.

B-2.2 Seniority within the locality and the apartment

Yotzim do not frequently move between localities, similar to non-Haredim

The similarity between the residential areas of young Yotzim and Yotzim as a whole is also evident in the findings on movement between localities. Like other subgroups, Yotzim tend to stay in their current locality, with about 60% having lived in their locality for over a decade, even at younger ages. Furthermore, these data are similar to those of non-Haredim (Figure B-4).

Figure B-4: Percentage of people (women and men) who have lived in the same locality for more than a decade, broken down by age group



Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.

Another analysis showed that more than a quarter of Yotzim aged 20-34 (26%) have lived in their current apartment for over a decade (Figure B-5). This is lower than the rate for those aged 35-54 (36%) and for non-Haredi individuals in these age groups (36%). This lower rate may be due to the fact that Yotzim can no longer live in their parents' home, as doing so would require them to maintain a Haredi lifestyle.

Figure B-5: Percentage of people living in the same apartment for more than a decade, broken down by age group



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.

B-2.3 Country of origin

Yotzim are similar to HFH in that about half of them were born to parents who were born abroad. Approximately one-tenth of the Yotzim were not born in Israel, which is lower, compared to about one-fifth of non-Haredim and Joiners (Figure B-6). This proportion is influenced to some extent by the older age group - like the other subgroups, a higher proportion of young Yotzim are third generation Israel-born.

Figure B-6: Country of origin - born abroad or parents born abroad (%)



Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.
For data on additional groups, see Table B-2.

While it has been suggested that exit rates from Haredi society are significantly higher among those born abroad (Horowitz, 2018), these data do not support that claim (Figure B-7). It seems that Yotzim are between non-Haredim and HFH: in both the younger and older age groups, the rate of Yotzim who were born abroad is higher than their rate among the HFH, but lower than that of non-Haredim. In the general population, the proportion of those with non-native origin is decreasing.

Figure B-7: Percentage of individuals born abroad (either born abroad or children of parents born abroad), broken down by age groups (%)



Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.
Parents born abroad: At least one parent was born abroad.

B-3 Family Status

The family characteristics of Yotzim are generally similar to those of

Former Haredi neb and women transition from a society whose characteristics are very different from the society to which they migrate, a society where most adults are married, it is customary to marry at a young age, and divorces are unacceptable. In contrast, they transition into a society where the age of marriage is constantly rising, as is the proportion of singles, the phenomenon of divorce is common, and the number of children is decreasing. The data reveal that most Yotzim leave Haredi society at a young age and adopt the marriage and family norms of non-Haredi society (Figure B-7).

About 75% of Yotzim are considered non-single (married in the past or present), which is similar to non-Haredim, but significantly lower than the percentage of singles among Haredim. Despite the similarity within the unmarried groups, there may be differences between the groups of married individuals. For example, 56% of Yotzim are married, slightly less than the 67% of non-Haredi individuals, and much lower than the high marriage rates within Haredi society (94% among HFH and 89% among Joiners).

Figure B-8: Percentage of non-singles (currently and formerly married) among 25-64-year-olds



Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.
For data on additional groups, and breakdown by age group, see Table B-3.
Divorced: Includes those who are separated.

A gender-based analysis (Figure B-9a) shows a clear difference between men and women: the percentage of non-singles among male Yotzim is lower than among non-Haredi men, whereas among former Haredi women, the rate is similar to that of non-Haredi women. However, despite this similarity, the percentage of divorced former Haredi women is higher than among non-Haredi women (for more details see Figure T-B-2 in the box). As noted earlier, since Yotzim tend to be younger, adjusting for age reveals an even greater underlying gap.

An age-group analysis (Figure B-9b) reveals that the percentage of non-singles among Yotzim is higher than among non-Haredim in the younger age group (25-34), 60% compared to 49%. In the older age group (35-64), the rates are identical (90%). However, despite this similarity, the percentage of divorced individuals among Yotzim is higher in both age groups, possibly due to leaving after marriage and divorce.

Figure B-9: Rate of non-singles (currently and formerly married), broken down by age and gender



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.
Divorced or widowed: Includes those who are separated.

Differences in family status are also reflected in the household structure of Yotzim (Figure B-10): while among younger individuals (aged 25-34) the Yotzim resemble non-Haredim in the proportion of those living with a partner and in the proportion of those residing in family households, among older age groups (35-64) the rates for Yotzim on both indicators are lower than those observed among non-Haredim. This gap likely reflects the younger average age of Yotzim, but also, apparently, their higher divorce rate on the one hand and their lower marriage rate on the other.

Figure B-10: Percentage of those living with a partner and in a family household, broken down by age



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.

When comparing the subgroups, the proportion of parents with children is similar between Yotzim and non-Haredim (Figure B-11).

Figure B-11: Percentages of parents of children (women and men)



Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.

When segmenting the proportion of parents by gender, it appears that the similarity between the two groups stems mainly from the high similarity among women - the proportion of former Haredi women who are mothers is similar to the proportion of mothers among non-Haredi women. In contrast, among men, the proportion of parents of children among Yotzim is slightly lower than their proportion among non-Haredi men. It appears that part of this gap stems from the young age of Yotzim.

Figure B-12: Percentages of parents of children, broken down by gender



Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.

The similarity between Yotzim and Non-Haredim in all aspects of family status is also evident in an examination of the data on Yotzim based on their current level of religiosity (Figure B-13). The percentage of singles among religious Yotzim today (81%) is relatively close to that of religious (non-Haredi) Jews (85%) and lower than that of HFH (96%) (Figure B-8 above).

Figure B-13: Rate of non-singles (currently and formerly married) among Yotzim and non-Haredim, broken down by religiosity today



Source: Social Survey data (2017-2023), Jews (women and men) aged 25-64.
Divorced or widowed: Includes those who are separated.

Box B-1: Marriage before Exiting Haredi Society

Leaving Haredi society is akin to migration into a new society: Yotzim are required to complete military or national service, acquire fundamental education and certifications, integrate into post-secondary studies and the workforce, all while bridging cultural gaps and adapting to new social norms. These processes require time and resources and may therefore influence the timing at which Yotzim start a family.

At the same time, Yotzim are also shaped by the norms of Haredi society, where marriage rates approach 100% and the customary age of marriage is the lowest in Israel: Jewish women overall marry at an average age of 26, Muslim women at an average age of 24, but Haredi women marry at an average age of 22 (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2024). This datum is especially important given that most Yotzim leave Haredi Society between the ages of 17-25 (Deutsch et al., 2025; Horowitz, 2018), i.e., during the acceptable marriage period in this society.

This raises the following question: to what extent are Haredi background and age at exit associated with the current family status of Yotzim and the continuation of their family life?

The percentage of divorced individuals among Yotzim is higher than the percentage of divorced non-Haredim, reflecting a pattern of leaving Haredi society after marriage

Although the rate of non-singles is similar between Yotzim and non-Haredim, the internal distribution is different: among non-Haredim, the rate of married people is higher, while among Yotzim, the rate of divorced people is higher. Consistent with the young marriage age in Haredi society, particularly among women, the high divorce rate is especially prominent among former Haredi women, and likely reflects the high percentage of women who married before leaving Haredi society (Figure T-B-1): about a quarter of former Haredi women aged 25-64 are divorced, a high rate compared to Yotzim (12%) and non-Haredi women (16%).

Figure T-B-1: Rate of divorced or separated individuals, broken down by gender



Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews aged 25-64.
Divorced or separated: including widowers.

These findings support the hypothesis that the higher divorce rate among Yotzim is associated with their Haredi background and their family status at the time of leaving Haredi society. An examination of the percentage of divorcees further reinforces this interpretation: the proportion of divorced Yotzim is consistently higher than among the other population groups, across both age groups, and particularly among women (Figure T-B-2).

Figure T-B-2: Rate of Divorcees, broken down by gender and age group



Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews aged 25-64.
Divorced at some time: Including divorced, separated, and widowed.

This issue was examined in a survey conducted in May-June 2025, with the participation of 939 former Haredi men and women ("Integration Survey 2025").

Of the 631 respondents who were 25 and over at the time of the survey, 55% were non-singles: 38% were married, and 17% were divorced or separated.

Figure T-B-3: Rate of non-singles, broken down by gender (Integration Survey 2025)



Source: The Integration Survey - an online survey distributed by the Out for Change organization in May-June 2025 among 631 Yotzim (men and women with a Haredi background who are not Haredi today by self-identification).
Divorced or separated: including widowers.

As noted, the proportion of non-singles found in the Integration Survey is low compared to the representative sample in the Social Survey (55% vs. 74%). Despite this difference, even in the Integration Survey data, the rate of divorced women was twice as high as the rate of divorced men (Figure T-B-3). However, it should be noted that the population of respondents in the Integration Survey is very young - even among respondents who are aged 25 and over, approximately two-thirds are under the age of 35.

An analysis of family status by age revealed that even at older ages, the rate of non-singles is slightly lower compared to the representative CBS data: Among individuals aged 30 and over, about 45% are married, while the rate of divorces increases with age (Figure T-B-4).

Figure T-B-4: Rate of non-singles, broken down by age (Integration Survey 2025)



Source: The Integration Survey - an online survey distributed by the Out for Change organization in May-June 2025 among 939 Yotzim (men and women with a Haredi background who are not Haredi today by self-identification).
Divorced or separated: including widowers.

A well-known phenomenon in research is that respondents to questionnaires distributed by associations and groups that assist those leaving Haredi society represent a population with diverse needs and many challenges (Deutsch and Anisman, 2024). Therefore, the gaps between the survey respondents and the Central Bureau of Statistics' data may suggest that the group of divorcees has more needs. In this box, we examine the relationship between family status at the time of exit and upon response to the Integration Survey, to identify markers of these needs in family life. The analyses presented below are of all non-single respondents - those who were married at the time they responded to the Survey (currently married) or those who were formerly married.

Among survey respondents, there is an evident connection between current family status and family status at the time of exit: among those who married only after leaving Haredi society, over 90% were married upon responding to the survey, which is similar to respondents in the Social Survey. In contrast, only about half of the men and a third of the women who married for the first time before leaving were currently married, and the rest were divorced or separated (Figure T-B-5).

Figure T-B-5: Rate of married individuals amongst those who are non-single, according to family status upon exit, broken down by gender (Integration Survey)



Source: The Integration Survey - an online survey distributed by the Out for Change organization in May-June 2025 among Yotzim (men and women with a Haredi background who are not Haredi today by self-identification). Respondents: 173 non-single men and 164 non-single women.

There is a connection between the family status at the time of leaving Haredi society and the household established by the Yotzim

Family status at the time of leaving Haredi society is also related to the couple's background. In both groups, approximately 40% of respondents reported that their (current or former) partners are Yotzim. Among Yotzim who left as singles, nearly two-thirds (62%) of the partners are non-Haredim, compared to only 10% among those who first married before leaving Haredi Society (Figure 1-2-6).

Figure T-B-6: Last partner of the Yotzim - by family status upon exit (Integration Survey)



Source: The Integration Survey - an online survey distributed by the Out for Change organization in May-June 2025 among Yotzim (men and women with a Haredi background who are not Haredi today by self-identification). Respondents: 173 non-single men and 164 non-single women.
The columns do not add up to 100% because the data for married Joiners has been omitted.
Married - refers to current partner; Divorced and Separated - refers to partner from last marriage.

Among those who first married before leaving Haredi society, 44% reported that their partners were HFH. In this group, a high proportion are currently divorced (over 60%), and their divorce is likely related to their choice to leave Haredi society.

Among those who first married before leaving Haredi society and are still married today, a significant group is married to individuals with a Haredi background (Yotzim and HFH). These may be Yotzim who left together as a couple, or those whose partners remained Haredim but chose to continue living as a family rather than separate after their partner left Haredi society.

As can be seen in Figure 7, this phenomenon is particularly pronounced in the younger age group (18-34): about two-thirds of respondents of these ages who have ever married were married at the time of response - 48% were married to someone with an ultra-Orthodox background (Yotzim and HFH) and about 18% were married to someone from a non-◦Haredi background. Among the divorced (a third of all respondents), 28% are divorced from an individual with a Haredi background and a small minority from an individual with a non-Haredi background. In the older age group (aged 35 and over), the rate of married individuals is slightly lower (57%) and the rate of divorcees is slightly higher (43%). In this group, the rate of those married to individuals with a Haredi background is lower - approximately 24% of all non-singles are currently married to individuals with a Haredi background, and 31% of all non-singles were married to an individual with a Haredi background.

The differences between age groups may indicate that, among survey respondents, more young couples are choosing to leave Haredi society together or remain married even after one spouse leaves Haredi society, and that the divorce rate is therefore not necessarily related to leaving Haredi society. Another possibility is that a higher proportion of Yotzim married to people with a Haredi background will divorce over time, and the proportion of divorced individuals remains similar because some will remarry with partners who are not from a Haredi background. Further research is needed to examine whether this is a new phenomenon or a change in family status over time.

Figure T-B-7: partners from a Haredi background among non-singles, broken down by partners' background and by age groups (Integration Survey)



Source: The Integration Survey - an online survey distributed by the Out for Change organization in May-June 2025 among Yotzim (men and women with a Haredi background who are not Haredi today by self-identification). Respondents: 173 non-single men and 164 non-single women.
Last partner: current spouse for those who are married; last partner for those who are divorced.

One interesting question regarding Yotzim is which educational system they choose for their children and to what extent they can choose a school system that matches their preferences and values. As mentioned, there is a connection between the time one leaves Haredi society and a spouse's background. Most Yotzim who first marry after leaving Haredi society, marry non-Haredim or Yotzim; conversely, among those who first married when they were still Haredim, a high proportion divorced or married to partners from Haredi backgrounds (HFH or Yotzim). These gaps are evident when examining the education systems to which Yotzim choose to send their children.

Nearly all respondents who are married to someone from a non-Haredi background send all of their children to non-Haredi schools. By contrast, among those married to someone from a Haredi background, about two-thirds send all of their children to non-Haredi institutions, while one-third send at least one child to a Haredi institution. Couples in this situation may fall into several groups: couples who married as Haredim and left Haredi society together gradually; couples in which one spouse left Haredi society while the other remained Haredi and they chose to continue living as a family; or couples in which both spouses have left and met after leaving. Among respondents who are divorced from someone with a Haredi background, 42% report sending their children to non-Haredi institutions, meaning that most send their children to Haredi schools. (Figure T-B-8).

Figure T-B-8: Rate of those sending their children to non-Haredi institutions, broken down by partner affiliation group (Integration Survey)



Source: The Integration Survey - an online survey distributed by the Out for Change organization in May-June 2025 among Yotzim (men and women with a Haredi background who are not Haredi today by self-identification). Respondents: 173 non-single men and 164 non-single women.

This rate was even higher among participants in a dedicated study survey conducted by the Steps Program, which assists Yotzim involved in divorce disputes as a result of their departure from Haredi society. Among respondents to this survey, only 29% send their children to state and state-religious schools, while almost two-thirds send their children to Haredi schools, usually because of a rabbinical court order or a divorce agreement.

An intermediate rate was found among Integration Survey respondents sampled via iPanel, a sample focused on those leaving Haredi society who are currently religious and not affiliated with any organizations. In this group, approximately 56% send their children to non-Haredi institutions, relatively similar to the average of 65% in the Integration Survey.

Discrepancies across the groups suggest that, when given the opportunity, most Yotzim prefer to integrate into non-Haredi society, including integrating their children into the state and state-religious education systems. Most of those who leave Haredi society and continue to send their children to Haredi schools do so because of the requirements or preferences of the other parent (Figure T-B-9).

Figure T-B-9: Percentage of those sending their children to non-Haredi institutions - by partner affiliation group (various surveys)



Source: The Integration Survey is an online survey distributed by the Out for Change organization in May-June 2025 among 291 Yotzim (with a Haredi background who are not Haredi today by self-identification), who are parents to children aged 3 - 18.
IPanel: The integration survey conducted via the iPanel platform in June-July 2025. A total of 194 Yotzim (those with a Haredi background who are not Haredi today, by self-identification) responded to the survey.
Divorced in intense conflict: 156 respondents to a survey conducted in June 2025 by the Steps Program, which assists Yotzim from Haredi society; parents of children who divorced against the backdrop of leaving Haredi society and are in an intense divorce conflict with the spouse who remained Haredi.
Send their children to a non-Haredi educational institution - all children who study in the state or state-religious educational system (as reported by the parent who left Haredi society). The question was asked identically in all surveys.
It is not known what proportion of respondents responded to more than one survey.

B-4 Military Service

In Haredi society there is strong opposition to military service for both men and women. Therefore, the rate of men from a Haredi background enlisting in the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) each year is low and stands at about 12% at younger ages. As a result, in the younger age group (20-29), Yotzim constitute 60%-70% of all service members from Haredi backgrounds (Yotzim and HFH) who enlist in the IDF (chart B-14).

Figure B-14: Share of Yotzim among individuals from a Haredi background serving in the military



Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jewish men aged 20-64 (Yotzim and HFH). Identification of Haredi background today by self-identification, and military service by self-reporting.

59% of male Yotzim served in the IDF – compared to 8% of Haredi men.

In contrast, in non-Haredi society, military service is not only considered a national necessity and a significant milestone in the lives of young Israelis but is also often seen as a gateway into Israeli society, particularly for those on the social periphery. The desire to integrate is evident in the conscription rates of male Yotzim (Figure B-15a): 59% served in the IDF, a rate lower than in non-Haredi society (88%) but significantly higher than among HFH (8%). As expected, the rate of those serving in the military among Joiners is also high - 66%.

Compared to men, the proportion of former Haredi women who served in the IDF is relatively low. When combined with the rate of women who performed national service, it stands at 27% of former Haredi women, of which about one-third served in the IDF, and about two-thirds performed national service (Figure B-15b). The low conscription rate is primarily due to the exemption granted on a religious basis to women who attended Haredi schools, as well as the broader reality that military service for women is not accepted in Haredi society.

Figure B-15: Percentage of those serving in the IDF or performing national service



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3. Missing value - sampling error exceeds 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jewish men aged 20-64.
For data on additional groups, see Table B-4.

An analysis of IDF service rates among individuals with a Haredi background by age group (Figure B-16) reveals differences between Yotzim and HFH. Among Yotzim, service rates are similar across the two age groups - 61% among individuals aged 20-34 and 55% among individuals aged 35-64. In contrast, among HFH there is a gap between age groups: 5% of individuals aged 20-34 served in the IDF, compared with 12% of individuals aged 35-64. This pattern could stem from conscription at an older age among HFH or from a decrease in the percentage of those serving at younger ages.

Figure B-16: Rate of service in the IDF among men, broken down by age groups



Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jewish men aged 20-64.

Finally, no differences in service rates between religious and non-religious men were found among non-Haredi men (Figure B-17). In contrast, the percentage of non-religious Yotzim who serve in the IDF, is higher than among the religious Yotzim. One explanation is that religious Yotzim tend to maintain Haredi social norms regarding enlistment in the IDF. Another explanation is that religious Yotzim have better connections with their parents than non-religious Yotzim, because they have not abandoned religion despite the change in their lifestyle. They may avoid enlisting due to concerns that this step would jeopardize their relationship with their parents.

Figure B-17: Percentage of men serving in the IDF, broken down by religiosity level (aged 25-64)



Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jewish men aged 25-64.
The data are presented for individuals aged 25 and over, to identify conscription patterns at older ages, which are likely more common among religious populations.

The events of October 7 intensified the discourse on Haredi recruitment, a subject that has for years been a focal point of friction between non-Haredi Jewish society and Haredi society. An analysis of service rates by period suggests that, following the Iron Swords war, there may have been a modest increase in the percentage of male Yotzim serving in the military. However, these findings are not conclusive, and the issue should be revisited in the coming years. On the other hand, no differences were found among HFH in the percentages of those serving in the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) during the various periods.

Figure B-18: Percentage of men aged 20-44 serving in the IDF (Israel Defense Forces), broken down by period



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3.
Source: Social Survey data (2018-2024), Jewish men aged 20-64.
Before the war: 2021 until October 7, 2023; After the outbreak of the war: After October 7, 2023.
For data on additional groups, see Table B-5.

The events of October 7 and the Iron Swords war are also reflected in the rate of participation in army reserve duty (Figure B-19). Since October 7th, 4.8% of Yotzim men aged 25-44 and 6.4% of non-Haredi men served in the reserves, compared to rates of about 1.1%-1.2% before October 7 (in both groups). On the other hand, the rate of those serving from Haredi society is very low, even after October 7, both among HFH and among Joiners (below 1.5%).

Figure B-19: Percentage of men in military reserve service, broken down by time period



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3. Maximum value was marked when the relative sampling error was greater than 0.3 (for further details, see the online appendix).
Source: The Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) Labor Force Survey data (2017-2024), Jewish men aged 25-44.
After the outbreak of the war: 2024 and 2023 after October 7.

The share of Yotzim serving in the reserves among all non-Haredi Jews is consistently about 2%, similar to their share of the population.By contrast, among all individuals with a Haredi background who serve in the reserves, Yotzim constitute approximately 53%-59%, consistent with the higher conscription rates among them, compared with HFH (Figure B-20).

Figure B-20: Percentage of Yotzim among all reservists, broken down by period



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: The Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) Labor Force Survey data (2017-2024), Jewish men aged 25-44.
After the outbreak of the war: 2024 and in 2023 after October 7.

B-5 Higher Education

Yotzim and HFH are graduates of an education system in which core subjects are rarely taught. In the Yeshiva Ketana, where most men attended high school, the curriculum is exclusively focused on religious studies, with no instruction in subjects like math or English.[19]

The percentage of academic degree holders among Yotzim, men and women, is very low.

Unlike men, most girls in the Haredi education system study core subjects almost fully. However, their eligibility rate for a matriculation certificate remains significantly lower than that of graduates from the state education system. Most female students take external exams, such as the matriculation or Szold exams, on a partial basis, and receive a Szold certificate, which the Ministry of Education recognizes as equivalent to 11 units of study (for more details, see Kaplan and Anisman, 2024).[20] After finishing high school, the majority of women continue to grades 13-14 (seminary) for post-secondary certifications such as a teacher's certificate or engineering certificate from Mahat (the Governmental Institute of Technological Education and Training). Overall, data indicate that the percentage of academic degree holders among Yotzim – men and women – is very low compared to non-Haredi populations and closer to that of HFH.

B-5.1 Highest Certificate Among Women

A comparison of the education levels among women in the four subgroups (Figure B-21) reveals differences between those with an academic degree and those with other educational qualifications. The proportion of women with an academic degree is similar among both former Haredi and female HFH (33% and 31%, respectively). However, when it comes to higher post-secondary certificates (from either academic institutions or post-secondary institutions), 68% of female HFH reported holding such a certificate, compared to approximately 46% of former Haredi women.

19. In 2022, only 6% of 12th grade boys in Haredi-supervised education were eligible for a high school matriculation certificate. The actual rates may be even lower, as some 12th grade boys in Haredi education are not registered with the State Ministry of Education (Cahaner & Malach, 2025).

20. Szold certificates are awarded based on external exams administered by the Henrietta Szold Institute at the Beit Yaakov Seminaries. The exact percentage of girls eligible for these certificates is not known, but it is likely that a significant proportion of all girls who graduate from Haredi education receive them. 77% of female graduates of the Haredi education system took at least one matriculation (bagrut) exam, but only 25% earned a full matriculation certificate, compared with 89% in the state education system (Kahner & Malach, 2025).

Figure B-21: Distribution of highest educational qualification among women aged 25-64 (%)



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: The Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) Labor Force Survey data (2017-2024), Jewish women aged 25-64.
For data on additional groups, and breakdown by age group, see Table B-6.
The data do not add up to 100% due to rounding.

In addition, among HFH women, the percentage of those with a matriculation certificate as their highest qualification (7%) is lower than that among former Haredi women (26%). This gap may be due to a combination of factors, including a higher rate of former Haredi women among graduates of Haredi schools who attempt to complete a full matriculation, and a higher rate of former Haredi women who leave Haredi educational institutions before finishing their seminary studies (grades 13-14), which typically lead to a vocational certificate.

An examination of degree attainment rates by age group (Figure B-22) shows that the majority of women acquire an academic degree before the age of 35, across all groups. Among former Haredi women, the percentage of degree holders is higher among the younger cohort (aged 25-34) than among the older cohort, a finding that may indicate an increase in the proportion of women pursuing higher education. However, this finding should be interpreted with appropriate caution, as the analysis is based on a limited number of observations.

Figure B-22: Women with academic degrees, broken down by age group (%)



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: The Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) Labor Force Survey data (2017-2024), Jewish women aged 25-64.

B-5.2 Highest certificate among men

In contrast to the data on women, which are only available from the Social Survey, the analysis of the data on men's education is derived from both the Social Survey and the LFS. The findings from both sources present a relatively similar picture: Yotzim have significantly lower levels of education compared to non-Haredi men but higher levels than HFH men: about 57% of male Yotzim do not hold a post-secondary certificate, compared to approximately 80% of HFH men and about 25% of non-Haredi men (Figure 23).

Accordingly, the proportion of Yotzim who attain an academic degree is lower than among non-Haredi men (41%-43%) but higher than among HFH men (8%). However, there is a discrepancy between the sources: The LFS estimates that 14% of Yotzim have an academic degree, while the Social Survey estimates this figure at 21%. Notably, the LFS data indicate a higher rate of individuals with a high school diploma compared to the Social Survey. Despite these differences, the combined rate of individuals with either a high school diploma or an academic degree is quite similar between the two sources - 31% according to the LFS and 32% according to the Social Survey.

Figure B-23: Distribution of highest educational qualification among men aged 25-64 - according to two data sources (%)



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Sources: **Social Survey** - The Social Survey data (2017-2024), identifying Haredi background and Haredi today by self-identification; **LFS** - Labor Force Survey data (2021-2024), Israeli-born Jews, identifying Haredi background as graduate of Haredi yeshiva according to self-identification, and Haredi today by self-identification.
For data on additional groups, see Table B-7.
The data do not add up to 100% due to rounding.

A comparison of academic degree holders by age group, based on LFS data (Figure B-2a3), shows that after age 30, approximately 14-17% of Yotzim hold an academic degree, compared to 5%-11% of HFH. When including individuals currently pursuing an academic degree (Figure B-24b)[21], the percentage rises to 24% among male Yotzim aged 30-34.

This rate exceeds the percentage of academic degree holders in older age groups, which may suggest one of two possibilities: either a growing number of Yotzim are pursuing higher education, or there is a high dropout rate among Yotzim who enroll. In any case, it is important to qualify that the elevated rate is observed in a single age group (30-34) only; additional data are therefore required to substantiate these findings.

21. The academic studies stage is defined as individuals who, in the labor force survey, reported both being currently enrolled in studies and that their most recent educational institution offers programs leading to an academic degree.

Figure B24: Men with academic degree, broken down by age group (%)



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3. Missing value - sampling error exceeds 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: Labor Force Survey data (2021-2024), Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-64.
Students - Those who reported that they are currently studying and also reported that their most recent educational institution was an institution leading to an academic degree.

B - Tables

The following tables provide expanded data on the four subgroups discussed in the chapter: **Yotzim (former Haredim)** - those with a Haredi background who are no longer Haredi today; **Haredi from home (HFH)** - those from a Haredi background who remained Haredi; **Joiners ("became Haredi")** - individuals with a non-Haredi background who have become Haredi; **Non-Haredim** - those from a non-Haredi background who are not Haredi today.

In addition, data are presented for the two broader analytical groups defined by past and present affiliation:

- **All those with a Haredi background** (HFH and Yotzim)
- **All Haredim today** (HFH and Joiners)

The tables omitted the data for the entire **Non-Haredim today** group (which includes both non-Haredim and Yotzim), because they are very similar to the data of Non-Haredim.

Table B-1: District of residence, broken down by gender and age groups (%)

	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with a Haredi background	All Haredim today
Men and Women						
Jerusalem	7	23	35	22	33	32
Central District	32	24	10	22	12	13
Tel Aviv	21	16	23	17	22	21
Haifa and the North	22	15	7	16	8	9
Southern District	15	12	11	15	11	12
Judea and Samaria	4	10	14	7	14	13
Men						
Jerusalem	7	22	35	20	33	31
Central District	31	21	11	23	12	14
Tel Aviv	21	18	22	19	22	21
Haifa and the North	21	(15)	8	16	9	10
Southern District	15	(13)	10	15	11	11
Judea and Samaria	4	(11)	14	(7)	14	12
Women						
Jerusalem	7	24	34	24	33	32
Central District	32	27	10	21	11	12
Tel Aviv	21	(13)	23	16	22	22
Haifa and the North	22	(16)	7	15	8	9
Southern District	14	(11)	12	16	12	13
Judea and Samaria	4	(8)	14	(8)	14	13
Aged 20-34 (men and women)						
Jerusalem	8	24	34	19	33	32
Central District	29	23	11	20	12	12
Tel Aviv	21	15	21	19	20	21
Haifa and the North	21	17	9	18	10	10
Southern District	16	11%	11	17	11	12
Judea and Samaria	5	(10)	14	(7)	13	13

Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024) among 20-64-year-olds.

Table B-2: Individuals of overseas origin, including those born abroad or children to parents born abroad (%)

	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with a Haredi background	Haredim today
Men and Women						
Born abroad	22	12	8	22	8	11
Parents born abroad [1]	45	38	36	51	36	40
Total born abroad	67	50	44	74	44	51
Men						
Born abroad	21	(8)	7	20	7	10
Parents born abroad [1]	46	35	36	55	36	41
Total born abroad	66	44	44	74	44	51
Women						
Women born abroad	23	(17)	8	26	9	12
Parents born abroad [1]	45	42	36	47	37	38
Total born abroad	68	59	44	73	45	51
20-34						
Born abroad	14	(9)	5	15	5	6
Parents born abroad [1]	32	30	28	36	28	29
Total born abroad	45	39	32	51	33	35
35-64						
Born abroad	26	(18)	12	25	13	17
Parents born abroad [1]	53	53	49	57	49	52
Total born abroad	79	71	61	82	62	69

1. At least one parent was born abroad.

Table B-3: Family status among individuals aged 25-64, broken down by gender (%)

	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with a Haredi background	All Haredim today
Men and Women						
Singles	21	26	4	5	7	5
Married	67	56	94	89	90	92
Divorced, separated, widowed	12	18	2	6	4	3
Parents of children	77	70	93	91	90	92
Divorced or widowed	16	23	3	11	5	6
Men						
Singles	25	33	5	(7)	8	5
Married	67	54	93	87	89	91
Divorced, separated, widowed	9	(12)	(2)	(6)	3	3
Fathers of children	72	60	92	89	88	91
Divorced or widowed	13	(17)	(3)	10	5	5
Women						
Single women	18	(16)	4	(3)	5	4
Married	67	59	94	91	91	93
Divorced, separated, widows	16	25%	(2)	(6)	4	3
Mothers of children	81	82	94	94	93	94
Divorced or widowed	19	32	(3)	13	6	6

Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024)

Table B-4: Share of individuals serving in the IDF or in National Service, broken down by gender and age groups

	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with a Haredi background	All Haredim today
Men and Women						
Military Service	76	38	4	49	8	15
National Service	7	(9)	3	9	4	4
Total military or national service	83	47	7	58	11	19
Men						
Military Service	88	59	8	66	14	23
National Service	1	5>	4	2>	4	4
Total military or national service	88	63	12	67	18	26
Women						
Military Service	65	(10)	1>	27	(1)	6
National Service	13	(17)	(1)	19	3	5
Military or national service	77	27	(1)	46	4	11
Aged 20-34 (women and men)						
Military Service	80	38	3	42	7	8
National Service	10	(10)	3	(11)	3	4
Military or national service	91	49	5	53	10	11

Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3. Missing value - sampling error exceeds 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024) among 20-64-year-olds.

Table B-5: Share of men serving in the IDF, broken down by age and period (%)

	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with a Haredi background	Haredim today
Total	88	59	8	66	14	23
By age						
20-34	89	61	5	57	12	12
35-64	87	55	12	70	16	34
By period						
2018-2020	87	56	8	60	14	22
2021 - until the outbreak of the war	89	56	(7)	67	13	21
October 7, 2023, until 2024	88	64	(7)	67	14	22

Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3. Missing value - sampling error exceeds 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024) among 20-64-year-olds.

Table B-6: Breakdown of highest diploma received – women aged 25-64 (%)

	Non-Haredi women	former Haredi women	HFH women	Female Joiners	All women with Haredi background	All Haredi women today
Up to completion of high school	18	29	26	27	26	26
Matriculation Certificate	19	(23)	7	20	8	10
Post-secondary certificate	11	(15)	37	17	35	32
Academic Degree	51	33	31	37	31	32

Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3.
Social Survey data (2017-2024).

Table B-7: Breakdown of highest diploma received, men aged 25 - 64, according to data sources (%)

	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with a Haredi background	All Haredim today
The Social Survey[1]						
Up to completion of high school	26	57	81	48	78	71
Matriculation Diploma	18	(10)	4	21	5	9
Post-secondary certificate	15	(12)	7	13	8	9
Academic Degree	41	21	8	19	9	11
Labor Force Survey[2]						
Up to completion of high school	23	57	77	57	74	72
Matriculation Certificate	22	18	5	18	7	8
Post-secondary certificate	12	12	10	13	11	11
Academic Degree	43	14	8	13	9	9

Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3.
References:
1. Social Survey data (2017-2024), identifying Haredi background and current Haredi status based on self-identification.
2. LFS data (2021-2024) for Israeli-born men, identifying Haredi background through self-reported studies in a Haredi yeshiva and current Haredi status based on self-identification.

Table B-8: Share of academic degree holders - men, broken down by age group

Age groups	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with a Haredi background	All Haredim today
Academic Degree Holders						
25-29	24	7>	(2)	5>	(2)	(2)
30-34	48	(16)	(5)	(11)	7	6
35-44	52	(17)	12	18	13	13
45-54	47	(14)	11	(16)	12	12
55-64	34	(14)	(13)	(12)	13	12
Students[1] or Holders of an Academic Degree						
25-29	46	(15)	(3)	(7)	5	(4)
30-34	51	(24)	7	(11)	10	8
35-44	53	(20)	13	18	14	14
45-54	48	(14)	11	16	12	13
55-64	35	(14)	(13)	(13)	13	13

Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3.
Source: Labor Force Survey (LFS) data (2021-2024), Israeli-born men
Student: An individual who reported being currently enrolled in studies and indicated that their most recent educational institution was one leading to an academic degree.

B - Sources

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B- Appendices

Appendix B-1 Supplementary Data

Figure B-N-1: Distribution of residential districts of Yotzim (women and men), broken down by age - according to two data sources (%)



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).

Sources: **The Social Survey** - Social Survey data for the years 2017-2023 (men and women), identifying Haredi background and Haredi today by self-identification; **LFS** - LFS data for the years 2020-2023, Israeli-born men, identifying Haredi background as graduates of Haredi yeshivas according to self-identification, and Haredi today by self-identification.

C. Men's employment

Groups and Data Sources

Groups

The analysis groups are classified based on current affiliation (currently Haredim or not) versus past affiliation (whether they are from a Haredi background or not).

Subgroups

Yotzim (former Haredim): Individuals with a Haredi background who are not Haredi today (short for those who left the Haredi community).

Haredim from home (HFH): Those with a Haredi background who are Haredim today - short for those from a Haredi home.

Joiners (became Haredim): Those with a non-Haredi background who are currently Haredi - short for those who have joined the Haredi community.

Non-Haredim: Those with a non-Haredi background who are not currently Haredi - short for non-Haredi Jews.

Data Sources and Identification Methods (*)

The Central Bureau of Statistics Labor Force Survey (LFS) for the years 2021-2024, Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25 - 64.

Identification of Haredi background: Graduate of Haredi yeshiva according to self-reporting (Dashat method); Identification of Haredi today: by self-identification (Household level)

(*) For more on the data sources, see the online appendix.

C-1 Introduction

This chapter presents representative and comparative data on employment indicators among Yotzim (former Haredim) and other groups. It examines trends in workforce participation and occupational fields and provides an in-depth analysis of employment patterns among those with a Haredi background.

While the employment rate of Haredi women has already met the government's 2030 target and is comparable to that of non-Haredi Jewish women, the employment rate of Haredi men remains significantly below the government target,[22] and the scope of their work is significantly lower than that of non-Haredi Jews (CBS, 2024). The low employment rate among Haredi men, as well as the quality of their employment - reflected in factors such as weekly working hours and salary levels - can be attributed to both cultural differences and educational gaps (see Section B-5).

Yotzim, having been educated within the same system, also contend with educational gaps, particularly in the first years after leaving. This makes it especially important to analyze their employment characteristics. There is little information or research examining the employment patterns of both male and female Yotzim, so data limitations necessitated reliance on the Labor Force Survey (LFS)

22. According to government decision 198, the government target is 65% for Haredi men and 81% for Haredi women for individuals aged 25-66 (the 36th government, 2021). In the first half of 2024, the current employment rate of Haredi women today stood at 80.1% and at 82.4% among non-Haredi women today. Among men, the employment rate was 53.9% among those who are Haredi today and 86.8% among those who are non-Haredi (Central Bureau of Statistics [CBS], 2024).

conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) for employment analysis, and therefore this report focuses exclusively on men (as noted, the LFS data, using the Dashat method (2024), allows only for the identification of men with a Haredi background, based on their yeshiva education).

This chapter presents employment data for male Yotzim, in comparison to three other subgroups: HFH (those raised in a Haredi household who are Haredim today), Joiners (those who were not raised Haredi but have joined the Haredi community), and non-Haredi Jews. The findings indicate that Yotzim closely resemble non-Haredim in all aspects under their control and generally adopt labor market norms prevalent among non-Haredi society. Overall, their employment indicators are high - only slightly lower than that of non-Haredim - as reflected in their strong workforce participation and weekly working hours. However, male Yotzim also have notably high unemployment rates. Additionally, Yotzim tend to have lower levels of education and employee productivity, which is evident in their limited integration into high-skilled professions.

Section C-2 presents workforce integration indicators: rates of participation in the workforce, employment rates, unemployment levels, and weekly working hours. Section C-3 examines the primary fields of occupation among Yotzim, including academic professions and roles in scientific and high-tech sectors. Section C-4 analyzes the proportion of Yotzim in the workforce amongst all individuals with a Haredi background (Yotzim and HFH).

C-2 Workforce Integration Indicators

This section presents manpower data by examining labor market participation rates, employment and unemployment levels, and weekly working hours among employed individuals. The analysis is divided into four subgroups: non-Haredim, Yotzim, HFH, and Joiners. Additionally, the appendix provides supplementary tables for the broader categories of all individuals with a Haredi background and those who are Haredim today.

C-2.1 Employment rate and workforce participation

Workforce integration was assessed using two common indicators: the **employment rate** and the **labor force participation rate**. The employment rate reflects only those who are currently employed, while the labor force participation rate also includes individuals actively seeking work (for definitions, see Appendix C-2). Trends within these indicators are first analyzed over the years 2016-2024, followed by a comparison of these figures across two age groups, based on the average for 2021-2024.

The employment rate of Yotzim is approximately 77%, compared to 88% among non-Haredim and 51% among HFH

As seen in Figure C-1A, the employment rate remained relatively stable throughout the period, with minor declines during the COVID-19 years (2020-2021). In 2023, there was an increase in employment among HFH individuals and a sharp rise among Joiners, followed by a slight decline in 2024. Employment rates were higher among non-Haredim (approximately 88%) and Yotzim (ranging from 77% to 81%). Among Yotzim, the employment rate declined in 2023-2024, but only when the fourth quarter (Q4), impacted by the Iron Swords war, was included. Otherwise, the employment rate among Yotzim remained stable (see Figure C-N-1).

From the existing data, it is impossible to determine whether the war indeed caused the decrease in the

employment rate of Yotzim in 2023, or whether it is a decrease originating from a sample error due to the sample size among the Yotzim.[23]

Compared to Yotzim, the employment rate among Haredim today is much lower: until 2022, the employment rate among HFH stood at 47%-51%, while among the Joiners it was 60%-61%, except for a slight decline during the COVID years. Over time, the gap between these two groups is 10-12 percentage points.

Figure C-1: Employment integration trends over time



Source: Labor Force Survey (LFS) data (2016-2024), Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-64.
For additional demographic groups and a breakdown by age, see Table C-1.

23. The war may have impacted labor demand in industries that employ a high number of Yotzim, similar to the rise in unemployment rates among Yotzim during the COVID-19 period (see Deutsch, Shenfeld, and Tirosh, 2024). Another possibility is that Yotzim who served in the military reserves had lower response rates to the LFS. Since employment calculations exclude those actively serving, a higher employment rate among reservists would result in a greater number being omitted from the data, thereby skewing the overall employment rate downward.

As shown in Figure C-1b, trends in labor force participation rates closely mirror those observed in employment rates.

Yotzim enter the labor market at a relatively young age, and HFH at a relatively older age

An analysis of employment integration, divided into young adults (ages 25-34) and older adults (ages 35-64), reveals that young Haredim enter the workforce at even lower rates than their older counterparts (Figure C-2). For example, although the employment rate for non-Haredim is similar in both age groups, the gap in employment rates between non-Haredim and HFH stands at approximately 45 percentage points in the younger age group and 30 percentage points in the older age group.

Figure C-2: Employment integration, broken down by age groups (%)



Source: Labor Force Survey data (2021-2024), Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-64.
For data on additional groups, and breakdown by age group, see Table C-2.

The gap at a young age is due to the late entry of Haredim into the labor market, even among those who eventually join it. In contrast to Non-Haredim and Yotzim, who have similar employment rates among younger and older adults, HFH have a labor force participation rate of 43% among young people, which is 18 points lower than the 61% rate among older adults.

C-2.2 Unemployment (job seekers)

A jobseeker is an unemployed person who has actively looked for work in the four weeks preceding the survey. Individuals in this group are interested in joining the labor market and are willing to invest effort to do so. The **unemployment rate** is typically calculated as the percentage of jobseekers among all workforce participants (both employed persons and jobseekers). This metric reflects the proportion of those who wish to work but are unable to integrate into the workforce (for more details, see Appendix C-2).

Given the low labor force participation rate among Haredi men, however, comparing their unemployment rate to that of other groups does not provide a complete picture, since their low participation rate increases

the unemployment rate. To offer a more comprehensive picture, we also analyze the rate of j**obseekers as a share of the total population** (including both workforce participants and non-participants) and examine the percentage of individuals within **the entire population who have given up looking for work** (Figure C-3).

Figure C-3: Unemployment rates over time - comparison of unemployment indices (presented as a moving average, %)



Source: Labor Force Survey (LFS) data (2016-2024), Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-64.
For definitions see Appendix C-1.

As shown in Figure C-3, over time the highest unemployment levels are observed among Yotzim, and the share of job seekers out of the total population – not only among those participating in the labor force – is particularly high.[24]

In 2024, a decrease in unemployment rate was recorded for the first time among the Yotzim as well

In 2024, for the first time, there was a decrease in the unemployment rate among Yotzim, apparently as part of a general trend of decreasing unemployment levels in the economy in all sectors, including both Jews and Arabs (see Figure C-N-2).

In the two years prior, there was a decrease in unemployment rates in all groups, except among Yotzim. In 2023-2024, the unemployment rate for Yotzim within the labor force stood at 4.1%, compared to 2.8% among non-Haredim and 3.7%-3.8% among Haredim today.

The same pattern appears in the proportion of job seekers within the total population, with declines in every group except Yotzim.

In 2023-2024, the rate of job seekers among Yotzim was 3.3%, compared to 2.6% among non-Haredim and 2% among HFH.

Unemployment rates of older Yotzim are relatively high compared to all groups.

An age-based analysis of these indicators reveals that among Yotzim, unemployment levels are higher among older adults, whereas among non-Haredim, they are higher among younger people (Figure C-4). Since young adulthood is typically the stage of entry into the workforce, a naturally higher proportion of job seekers, and consequently higher unemployment rates - is expected in this group. The elevated unemployment rate among older Yotzim suggests challenges in integrating into the labor market over time.

Figure C-4: Unemployment rate, broken down by age group



Source: Labor Force Survey data (2021-2024), Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-64.
For data on additional groups, and breakdown by age group, see Table C-2.

24. Among Joiners, the unemployment rate is volatile: in some years the rate as a share of the total workforce is high compared to Yotzim, and in other years it is lower.

It should be noted that the estimates for Yotzim and Joiners are more susceptible to sampling errors due to the relatively small number of observations in these groups. However, the data align with previous trends, showing consistently high unemployment rates among Yotzim. Moreover, their re-integration into the Labor market tends to be slower following periods of unemployment, as seen in the slow recovery to low employment rates only in 2024.

C-2.3 Scope of Work (Full-time and Part-time Work)

The job scope of employed individuals was assessed by analyzing their **average weekly working hours** and **the percentage of employed individuals who typically work full-time**. Full-time employment was defined in two ways: according to the CBS standard (35 or more hours per week) and the OECD standard (30 or more hours per week).

Figure C-5: Average working hours over time



Source: Labor Force Survey (LFS) data (2016-2024), Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-64.
Average working hours are measured among those who are actually employed.

Yotzim have similar weekly work hours to non-Haredim, which are higher than Haredim

On average, Yotzim work 40-42 hours per week, which is slightly less than the average of 43-44 hours per week among Non-Haredim (Figure C-5). The rate for Haredim is currently lower, with HFH working 34-35 hours per week and Joiners working about 37 hours per week on average (throughout most of the period).

In 2024, apparently due to the impact of the war, a decline was recorded in the scope of employment in all groups.

During most years of the examined period (2016-2024), there was relatively high stability in the scope of employment, mainly among non-Haredim. By contrast, in 2024 there was a significant decline in the scope of employment in

all groups, except for HFH, where it was more moderate. Among Yotzim, the decline in the scope of employment began in 2023 and continued in 2024. The decline observed in 2024 across all groups appears to be related to the war and also affected Yotzim.An analysis of the differences by age group for the years 2021-2024 reveals that, on average, working hours are similar across both age groups, with the older age group tending to work slightly more hours (Figure C-6): for non-Haredim, the average is three hours higher in the older age group, for Yotzim it is two hours higher, and for Haredim (both groups), it is one hour higher.

Figure C-6: Average weekly working hours, broken down by age groups



Source: Labor Force Survey data (2021-2024), Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-64 who were employed.
For data for additional groups and a breakdown by age group, see Table C-3.

An analysis of the rate of full-time employment (Figure C-7) reveals relatively low full-time worker rates among those who are Haredi today, particularly HFH. While 82%-85% of young Yotzim and non-Haredi individuals work 35 hours or more per week, only 62% of HFH and 67% of Joiners work full-time. Among older adults across all groups, the full-time employment rates are 6-7 percentage points higher than those of young people, except for HFH, where the full-time worker rate is similar for both younger and older adults.

Figure C-7: Rate of full-time employment, broken down by age group



Source: Labor Force Survey data (2021-2024), Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-64 who were employed.
For data for additional groups and a breakdown by age group, see Table C-3.
Full- time employment usually entails at least 30 weekly hours (according to the OECD definition) or at least 35 weekly hours (according to the CBS definition).

C-3 Occupational Fields

This section presents data on the occupational fields of Yotzim (occupation, regardless of their workplace) and industry (the workplace field of business, regardless of the individual's actual role).[25] It begins with a general overview of employment by skill level, followed by a detailed breakdown of professions based on required skill levels, and concludes with an analysis of employment rates across industries and occupations in high-Tech.[26]

The data indicate that a significant proportion of Yotzim work as manual laborers and drivers, and in general in occupations that do not require academic or professional training. The percentage of Yotzim employed in professions requiring academic or professional training is similar to that of HFH, however Yotzim are more likely to work in technology and science, whereas HFH are more commonly employed in teaching and law. Among non-Haredim, employment in science and technology is especially prominent.

C-3.1 Skill levels of employees

Occupations were first broken down into four levels based on the skill required for the job (see Appendix C-2). However, since a significant proportion of Haredim (23%, compared to less than 5% among Yotzim and non-Haredim) work in teaching - a profession categorized as a high-level academic occupation (even though teaching in a yeshiva does not require academic training) - this level was further divided into two subcategories: Level 4 excluding teaching and Level 4 teaching only.

25. Data is also included for individuals who were not employed at the time of the survey but had worked within the two years prior and reported their occupational fields. This approach ensures a more reliable depiction of occupational distribution, even in periods marked by declines in employment rates, including after October 7 and during the COVID-19 years (2020-2021).

26. For a list of industries and occupations classified as high-tech, see Tables C-N-1 and C-N-2 in Appendix C-2.

A comparison of occupations by skill level (Figure C-8) reveals that 58% of Yotzim and 48% of Joiners were employed in professions classified within the two lower skill levels, whereas this was true for only 34% of HFH and 35% of all non-Haredim.

Figure C-8: Distribution of employed individuals based on skill level required for the profession (%)



Source: Labor Force Survey data (2021-2024), Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-64, who were employed in the two years preceding the survey and reported an occupation.

The proportion of Yotzim employed in high-skill professions (excluding teaching) is 20%, comparable to that of HFH (23%) but significantly lower than that of non-Haredim (43%).

The data also indicate a correlation between employment in high-skill occupations and level of education (Figure C-9). Among non-Haredim, approximately 40% work in high-skill occupations, a rate closely aligned with the share of those holding an academic degree. Among Yotzim, there was also a similarity between the proportion engaged in these professions (17%-21%) and the proportion of among them who hold an academic degree (14%). Among HFH, around one-quarter (21%-28%) work in high-skill occupations, though only one-eighth (7%-12%) hold an academic degree.

Only about one-fifth of Yotzim and HFH are employed in high-skill occupations (excluding teaching), compared to more than 40% among non-Haredim.

Both Yotzim and HFH are graduates of Haredi yeshivas and, due to the absence of core studies, face educational gaps and a lack of essential skills, primarily in English and mathematics, needed to integrate into higher-quality employment. These gaps likely contribute to their lower participation in higher education and in professions requiring advanced skills.

Figure C-9: Proportion of people with an academic degree, employed at a high skill level profession, broken down by age group



Source: Labor Force Survey data (2021-2024), Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-64.
The proportion of highly skilled employees is calculated based on individuals who were employed in the two years prior to the survey and reported their occupation. Definition of occupation with high-level skills: Employment in managerial roles (excluding hospitality) or professions requiring an academic degree (excluding teaching).

C-3.2 Professional Occupations Requiring an Academic Degree and Skilled Occupations

Beyond educational differences, the groups also vary in the types of professions they work in, both at higher and lower skill levels. Among HFH, 21% of those employed in high-skill professions work in law and social sciences - a slightly higher proportion than among Joiners (16%) and significantly higher than among Yotzim (8%) and non-Haredim (7%) (Figure C-10). In contrast, the opposite is true for representation in the science and technology professions: about 26% of employed non-Haredim work in these fields, compared to only 10% of Yotzim, 9% of Joiners, and just 4% of HFH. Among those working in high-skill professions outside of teaching and management, nearly half of non-Haredim and about a third of Yotzim are employed in science and technology, compared to about one quarter of Joiners and only an eighth of HFH.

Figure C-10: Employed in professional occupations requiring an academic degree and self-employed, broken down by type of occupation (%)



Source: Labor Force Survey data (2021-2024), Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-64 who were employed in the two years preceding the survey and reported an occupation.
The data represent a combination of individuals employed in professions requiring an academic degree (Level 4) and those working as engineers, technicians, and related fields (Level 3). For detailed breakdowns and additional groups, see Table C-4.
Minor discrepancies in totals are due to rounding.

Regarding employment in lower-level jobs, nearly 60% of Yotzim work in professions that fall within the two lowest tiers, which pay a lower average wage (in 2021, the average salary in these jobs was less than NIS 10,000 per month). This is significantly higher than the percentage of HFH and non-Haredim in these roles (33%-36% in both groups) These professions are primarily divided into three categories: craftsmen (manual labor), drivers (including mobile machine operators), and basic office jobs (including salespeople).

Among professional employees, approximately one quarter (24%) of Yotzim work as skilled tradespeople, compared to just 11% of HFH and 13% of non-Haredim (Figure C-11). The rate of those employed as drivers (including machine operators) is also relatively high among Yotzim (13%), compared to 4%, 7%, and 8% among HFH, non-Haredim, and Joiners, respectively. Employment rates in sales and office work show relative similarity across the groups.

Figure C-11: Employed as professional workers, broken down by type of occupation (%)



Source: Labor Force Survey data (2021-2024), Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-64 who were employed in the two years preceding the survey and reported an occupation.
The discrepancy between the numbers and Table C-4 results from the rounding of figures.

In summary, a relatively high percentage of Yotzim work as skilled tradespeople, manual laborers, and drivers, as well as in professions that do not require academic or professional training. Teaching and law are prominent professions among the Haredim in

general and among the HFH in particular. These employment patterns differ from those of non-Haredim, who are more represented in science and technology-related professions. (For a more detailed breakdown of occupations and economic sectors, see Tables C-4 and C-5 below).

C-3.3 Work in High-tech

Yotzim integrate into High-tech businesses and professions (for definitions, see Appendix C-1) at a lower rate than non-Haredim but higher than that of HFH.

Among Yotzim, the proportion of those employed in High-tech is lower than that of non-Haredim and slightly higher than the rate among Haredim.

Between 2020 and 2023, only 8.4% of Yotzim were employed in High-tech-related occupations, a significantly lower rate than among non-Haredim (21.3%), but relatively close to that of Joiners (7.3%) and notably higher than HFH (3.1%) (Figure C-12). Additionally, the share of Yotzim working in High-tech industries closely mirrors their proportion in High-tech occupations, in contrast to other groups, where the proportion is slightly lower.

Figure C-12: Rate of employment in the High-tech sector



Source: Labor Force Survey data (2020-2023), Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-64 who were employed in the two years preceding the survey and reported an occupation - according to the Economic Sector and Occupation Index.
For data for additional groups and broken down by age group, see Table C-6.

Across all subgroups, except for Joiners, the rate of employment in high-tech fields is higher among young people. Among Yotzim, the rate among 25-34-year-olds was 10.3% compared to 7% among older adults, while among HFH it was 4.6% among young people compared to 2.2% among older adults. The rate among non-Haredim is also higher among young people (25.9% compared to 19.7%).

Figure C-13: Rate of employment in high-tech occupations, broken down by age groups



Source: Labor Force Survey data (2020-2023), Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-64 who were employed in the two years preceding the survey and reported having an occupation.
For data for additional groups, see Table C-6.

In recent years, there has been a steady increase in the rate of Yotzim working in the fields of science and high-tech, in contrast to the relative stability in the share employed in occupations requiring high skill levels (Figure C-14). This increase is sharper than the one observed among Haredim from birth, and as a result, the share of Yotzim working in science and high-tech is higher than among Haredim from birthIn contrast, there is a relative similarity between the two groups in the proportion of employees in high-skilled jobs (other than teaching).

Some of the differences may stem from sampling errors. Still, since the increase was recorded across all age groups and is consistent, it is likely higher among Yotzim. As for the similarity between the two groups in the proportion of high-skilled professionals, this can be explained by the choice of occupation. Among HFH, most applicants for positions requiring an academic degree and self-employed individuals choose to practice law, and only a minority apply for scientific and technological positions, unlike the Yotzim, many of whom, in recent years, prefer working in technology and the sciences.

Figure C-14: Trends in High-tech employment - among 25-44-year-olds



Source: Labor Force Survey data (2016-2024), Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-64 who were employed in the two years preceding the survey and reported an occupation.

Since all those from a Haredi background - Yotzim and HFH - share similar gaps in core education, which pose a barrier to working in the high-tech sector, additional factors likely contribute to the lower representation of HFH in scientific and technological professions. One possible explanation is differences in weekly working hours: Yotzim tend to work longer hours, which may facilitate their entry into these fields.

C-4 Proportion of Yotzim in the labor force among men from a Haredi background

Section C-2 presented data pertaining to the degree of integration into the labor market over time of (male) Yotzim compared to the degree of integration of non-Haredim and HFH. Overall, male Yotzim are similar to non-Haredi men in all aspects of labor (employment, job search and weekly work hours), adopting the norms prevalent in the non-Haredi job market. These findings have two key indirect implications. First, Yotzim contribute to higher overall employment rates among men with a Haredi background, that is, graduates of Haredi yeshivas. Second, their representation in the labor force and their overall labor input exceeds their proportion within this group.

Yotzim make up a quarter of the workforce of men from a Haredi background, even though they only account for about 15% of this group

This section provides a direct calculation of the relative share of Yotzim in the labor force among men from a Haredi background aged 25-54 (Figure C-15)[27] The analysis reveals that although Yotzim comprise only 15% of this population, they account for 22% of all employed men from a Haredi background and 27% of all men from a Haredi background actively seeking work. When factoring in working hours of those who are employed, Yotzim contribute 29% of the total labor input of men from a Haredi background.

Figure C-15: Rate of Yotzim out of all men with a Haredi background in the labor market - 25-54 years-old (%)



Source: LFS data, average for 2021-2024, Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-54.

27. In this analysis, which compares Haredim and Yotzim, a limited group of 25-54 year olds was used, because the ratio of Yotzim among those aged 54-64 is relatively high. The reason for this is not sufficiently clear.

Analysis by age groups reveals differences in these rates between younger and older individuals (Figure C-16). Among young people from a Haredi background (aged 25-34), the Yotzim constitute a quarter of all those employed and all those seeking work, a rate similar to the average of those aged 25-64. Furthermore, although they constitute only 15% of all individuals with a Haredi background, Yotzim constitute 37% of those from a Haredi background who have an academic degree, and since HFH's scope of work is relatively small, they are responsible for 29% of all work outputs among Yotzim.

As for older individuals with a Haredi background (35-54), among employees, Yotzim have a relatively similar rate to their share in the population (19% vs. 16%), while among job seekers, their rate is significantly higher (29%), which may indicate greater difficulties in finding employment at older ages.

By contrast, among academic degree-holders from a Haredi background, the share of Yotzim is indeed higher than their share in the overall population (21%), but it is still lower than among younger adults, who make up 37% of all young degree-holders from a Haredi background. This finding may point to earlier entry into higher education or to growth in the share of degree-holders in recent years (see the discussion in Section B-6).

Figure C-16: Proportion of Yotzim out of all men with a Haredi background in the workforce, broken down by age groups



Source: LFS data, average for 2021-2024, Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-54.

C- Tables

The following tables provide expanded data on the four subgroups discussed in the chapter: **Yotzim (former Haredim)** - those with a Haredi background who are no longer Haredi today; **Haredi from home (HFH)** - those from a Haredi background who remained Haredi; **Joiners ("became Haredi")** - individuals with a non-Haredi background who have become Haredi; **Non-Haredim** - those from a non-Haredi background who are not Haredi today.

Additionally, data are presented for two broader analytical groups based on past and present affiliation:

- **All those with a Haredi background** (HFH and Yotzim)
- **All Haredim today** (HFH and Joiners)

The tables omitted the data for the entire **Non-Haredim today** group, because they are very similar to the data of Non-Haredim.

Table:C-1: Rate of Employment

Year	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with a Haredi background	All Haredim today
2016	87	77	48	60	55	52
2017	88	77	48	60	54	51
2018	88	82	47	60	54	51
2019	88	81	50	61	55	53
2020	87	81	50	59	55	52
2021	86	77	49	57	53	51
2022	88	78	51	61	55	53
2023	88	77	52	67	56	55
2024	87	77	51	64	55	54

Labor Force Survey data (2016-2024), Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-64.

Table C-2: Employment rate, by age group (%)

	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with a Haredi background	All Haredim today
Age 25-34						
Participation in the labor force	88.3	83.8	43.2	53.4	49.2	44.9
Employment	84.0	80.0	41.1	50.5	46.8	42.7
Unemployment (from the labor force)	4.9	4.6	4.8	5.5	4.8	5.0
Job seekers (from the population)	4.3	3.8	2.1	2.9	2.3	2.2
Job seekers or discouraged (from the population)	4.5	4.1	2.3	3.4	2.6	2.5
Age 35-64						
Participation in the labor force	91.5	79.6	61.1	70.5	64.3	63.7
Employment	89.0	75.4	58.6	67.8	61.5	61.1
Unemployment (from the labor force)	2.8	5.3	4.1	3.8	4.4	4.0
Job seekers (from the population)	2.6	4.2	2.5	2.7	2.8	2.6
Job seekers or discouraged (from the population)	2.7	4.6	2.8	3.1	3.1	2.8
Aged 25-64						
Participation in the labor force	90.7	81.3	53.0	65.2	57.6	55.8
Employment	87.6	77.3	50.7	62.5	55.0	53.4
Unemployment (from the labor force)	3.3	5.0	4.4	4.3	4.5	4.4
Job seekers (from the population)	3.0	4.0	2.3	2.8	2.6	2.4
Job seekers or discouraged (from the population)	3.2	4.4	2.6	3.2	2.9	2.7

Labor Force Survey (LFS) data (2021-2024), Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-64.

Table C-3: Weekly work hours by age group

	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with a Haredi background	All Haredim today
Age 25-34						
Average working hours	41.0	39.5	33.1	35.1	34.7	33.5
30 hrs./week or more (%)	87.9	85.5	68.1	72.1	72.3	68.9
35 hrs./week or more (%)	85.5	81.9	61.6	66.2	66.7	62.5
Age 35-64						
Average working hours	43.4	41.4	34.1	36.6	35.6	34.8
30 hrs./week or more (%)	94.1	90.8	70.1	76.3	74.4	71.9
35 hrs./week or more (%)	92.2	88.5	63.5	71.9	68.8	66.0
Aged 25-64						
Average working hours	42.8	40.6	33.7	36.3	35.3	34.4
30 hrs./week or more (%)	92.5	88.6	69.3	75.2	73.6	70.9
35 hrs./week or more (%)	90.4	85.7	62.8	70.5	68.0	64.8

Labor Force Survey (LFS) data (2021-2024), Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-64.
Average working hours - average weekly working hours in the last week among those actually employed.
Worked 35/30 hours - proportion of those employed who usually work 35/30 hours per week.

Table C-4: Occupations - 2020-2023

	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with a Haredi background	Haredim today
Managers	13.9	10.2	7.0	8.4	7.7	7.4
including:						
Legislators, officials and senior managers	2.6	2>	(1.1)	2>	(1.1)	(1.2)
General Managers[1]	9.1	(6.1)	4.1	(4.9)	4.5	4.3
Managers in hospitality, commerce and services	2.2	(2.9)	(1.8)	(1.9)	(2.1)	(1.9)
Professionals with academic degrees	**34.8**	**15.6**	**40.3**	**26.5**	**34.9**	**36.7**
including:						
Information and Communication Technologies[2]	20.1	(6.4)	3.7	(4.9)	4.3	4.0
Teaching	3.7	(3.0)	22.6	10.4	18.3	19.4
Business, Administration and Other	5.7	2>	(1.8)	(2.7)	(1.7)	(2.1)
Law, Social and Culture	5.3	(5.1)	12.3	8.5	10.7	11.3
Practical engineers, technicians, etc.	**16.0**	**16.4**	**18.7**	**16.8**	**18.2**	**18.2**
including:						
Information and Communication Technologies[2]	5.5	(3.6)	(1.7)	(3.5)	2.1	2.2
Business, Administration and Other	8.2	(9.7)	8.2	(6)	8.5	7.6
Law, Social and Culture	2.2	(3.2)	8.9	7.4	7.6	8.5
Clerical and office workers	**4.3**	**(6.0)**	**5.5**	**(6.8)**	**5.6**	**5.8**
Service and sales workers	**11.4**	**16**	**14.4**	**17**	**14.7**	**15.0**
including:						
Personal service workers	4.6	(7.2)	9.3	9.1	8.8	9.3
Salespersons	3.5	(4.6)	4.8	(6.1)	4.7	5.1
Security personnel	3.3	(3.8)	1>	2>	(1.1)	(0.6)
Professionals	**10.7**	**18.5**	**7.3**	**12.3**	**9.7**	**8.6**
including:						
Agriculture and other trades people	2.7	(3.9)	(2.6)	(4.1)	2.9	3.0
Construction and related trades (other than electricians)	2.8	(6.2)	(2.7)	(2.8)	3.5	2.7
Metal workers, machinery and related trades	2.6	(4.5)	1>	(2.3)	(1.3)	(0.9)
Electrical and electronics	2.6	(3.9)	(1.5)	(3.1)	(2.0)	(1.9)
Drivers, plant and machine operators	**6.8**	**12.6**	**3.6**	**7.7**	**5.6**	**4.7**
Non-professional workers	**2.2**	**(5.2)**	**3.3**	**(5.1)**	**3.7**	**3.7**

Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3. Missing value - sampling error exceeds 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).

Labor Force Survey (LFS) data (2021-2024), Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-64.

1. Administrative managers, sales, marketing and development managers, production managers and managers in the field of professional services.
2. Including science, engineering, and health.

Table C-5: Breakdown of industries of those employed - 2020-2023

	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with a Haredi background	Haredim today
Manufacturing[1]	16.3	12.9	7.7	9.8	8.9	8.3
Construction	6.5	11.8	3.8	(6.7)	5.5	4.6
Retail trade and motor vehicle repair	11.6	15.9	11.1	13.9	12.1	11.8
Transportation, storage and courier services	6.0	(8.3)	4.6	7.2	5.4	5.3
Hospitality and food services	3.5	(4.7)	(2.8)	(2.7)	3.2	2.8
Information and communication	13.1	(7.2)	3.5	(4.4)	4.3	3.7
Finance and real estate	5.6	(3.7)	3.4	(2.1)	3.5	3.0
Professional, scientific and technical services	11.1	(5.4)	3.5	(6.2)	3.9	4.2
Administrative and support services	3.8	(5.3)	(2.2)	(6.1)	2.8	3.2
Local and public administration	8.5	(8.0)	2.8	(4.5)	3.9	3.2
Education	5.8	(6.4)	35.5	18.8	29.2	31.1
Health, welfare and care services	4.1	(4.1)	8.6	(5.6)	7.6	7.8
Other	4.2	(6.3)	11	12	9.7	11.0

Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Labor Force Survey data (2021-2024), Israel-born men aged 25-64.
Includes agriculture, mining and quarrying, manufacturing and foundries, electricity, and water supply

Table C-6: Rate of employment in the High-tech sector by age group - 2020-2023

Age	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with a Haredi background	Haredim today
Tech industries						
25-34	21.6	10.3	3.1	3.8	4.8	3.2
30-44	22.7	9.3	2.5	6.2	3.7	3.3
35-64	17.5	7.9	1.3	5.0	2.7	2.4
25-64	18.6	9.0	2.0	4.7	3.5	2.7
Tech occupations						
25-34	25.9	10.3	4.6	6.9	5.9	5.0
30-44	26.0	9.0	4.1	10.9	5.0	5.6
35-64	19.7	7.0	2.2	7.5	3.2	3.7
25-64	21.3	8.4	3.1	7.3	4.3	4.2

Labor Force Survey (LFS) data (2020-2023), Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-64.

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C- Supplementary Data

Figure C-N-1: Trends in employment rates among individuals aged 25-64



The 2024 data include the wartime quarter of 2023.

Figure C-N-2: Trends in unemployment rates, broken down by sector: Jews, Arabs, and Haredim (Men Aged 25-66)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (2025), based on the Labor Force Survey data, men aged 25-66.

C - Appendices

Appendix C-1: Glossary of Employment Terms

1. 1 **Labor force participant**: employed or actively seeking work.

1.1. **Employed**: an individual who worked at least one hour in the week preceding the survey or an individual who was temporarily absent from work.

1.1.1. **Actively employed**: Worked at least one hour in the week before the survey.

1.1.2. **Temporarily absent from work**: Temporarily absent due to illness, vacation, reserve duty, a reduction in work hours, a labor dispute, or a temporary work interruption (up to 30 days). Individuals absent for up to a month or up to a year with a guaranteed return to the same employer are still considered employed.

1.2. **Job seeker (Unemployed)**: A person who did not work but actively sought employment in the four weeks preceding the survey and is available and willing to begin working if offered a suitable job.

2. Not participating in the labor force

2.1. **Discouraged jobseeker**: A person who is not working and who searched for work within the past year but not in the past four weeks, believing they would not find a suitable job in their field or location. Despite this, they are still available and willing to work if offered a suitable position.

3. Scope of Work

3.1. **Weekly work hours**: The number of hours worked across all workplaces in the week before the survey, including preparation hours (for teachers and artists).

3.2. **Normal weekly work hours**: The average number of hours worked per week across all workplaces, including preparation hours (for teachers and artists).

3.3. **Full-time employee:** Normally works 35 hours or more per week (CBS definition); 30 hours or more per week (OECD definition).

3.4. **Part-time employee:** Normally works 1-34 hours per week (CBS definition); 1-30 hours per week (OECD definition).

4. Areas of Work

4.1. **Occupation**. The set of activities and tasks an employee performs in the workplace, regardless of their field of study, if they are not working in it. Classification follows the 2011 Classification of Occupations (CBS, 2015a), based on the International Labor Organization's ISCO-08 standard.

4.2. **Industry**. The industry to which the enterprise or institution ("classification unit") belongs, where the employee works, as defined by the 2011 Classification of Induustries (CBS, 2015b). This classification follows the UN's ISIC (Rev. 4) standard for the uniform categorization of industries. 4).

5. Employed in High-Tech

5.1. **Employed in the high-tech sector:** Employed in one of the economic industries listed in Table C-N-1.

5.2. **Employed in a high-tech occupation:** employed in one of the job categories listed in Table C-N-2.

Table C-N-1: List of Industries Classified as High-Tech

Classification Code	Category Description
21	Manufacture of medicines, including homeopathic medicines
26	Manufacture of computers, electronic and optical equipment
303	Manufacture of aircraft, spacecraft and related equipment
62	Computer programming, computer consulting and other related services
631	Data processing, storage and related services
720	Research and development centers
721	Engineering and natural science research and development centers

Table C-N-2 List of Occupations Classified as High-Tech

Classification Code	Category Description
133	Service managers in the information and communications technology (ICT) industries
211	Physical and earth science professionals
212	Mathematicians, actuaries and statisticians
213	Life science professionals
214	Engineering professionals (except electrical and electronics engineering)
215	Electrical and electronics engineers
251	Software developers and application analysts
252	Database and network professionals
311	Practical engineers and technicians in physical sciences and engineering
314	Life science practical engineers and technicians and related associate professionals
315	Electrical and Electronics Engineers
351	Operations engineer and technician and user support engineer and technician in the information and communications technology (ICT) industries

Appendix C-2: Occupations by Skill Levels

The Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS, 2015a) classifies occupations into four skill levels, based on the expertise required for optimal performance in a given occupation.

- **Level 1**: Jobs involving simple and routine physical or manual tasks. Examples include: Cleaning, digging, manually carrying or transporting materials, sorting, storing, or manually assembling products, as well as manually picking fruits and vegetables.
- **Level 2**: Jobs requiring basic technical skills. For example: operating machinery and electronic equipment, driving vehicles, or maintaining and repairing electrical and mechanical equipment.
- **Level 3**: Jobs involving complex technical tasks requiring extensive practical, technical, and procedural knowledge in the field. For example: preparing detailed estimates of quantities and costs of materials and labor for specific projects, coordinating, supervising, and overseeing the activities of other employees, or performing technical tasks under professional guidance.
- **Level 4:** Jobs involving solving complex problems through the exercise of judgment and creativity. For example: analysis and research, diagnosing and treating diseases, educating others, or designing buildings, machines, and production processes. Examples of occupations classified at this level include sales and marketing managers, civil engineers, secondary education teachers, musicians, operating room nurses, and information systems analysts.

D. Well-being and Attitude Indicators

Groups

The analysis groups are categorized based on current affiliation (currently Haredi or not), against past affiliation (whether they come from a Haredi background or not).

Subgroups

Yotzim (former Haredim): Individuals with a Haredi background who are not Haredi today (short for those who left the Haredi community).

Haredim from home (HFH): Those with a Haredi background who are Haredim today - short for those from a Haredi home.

Joiners ("Became Haredim"): Those with a non-Haredi background who are currently Haredi - short for those who have joined the Haredi community.

Non-Haredim: Those with a non-Haredi background who are not currently Haredi - short for non-Haredi Jews.

Data Sources and Identification Methods (*)

The Central Bureau of Statistics Social Survey for the years 2007-2012 and 2017-2024, Jews (women and men) aged 20 - 64.

Identification of a Haredi background: raised (at age 15) in a Haredi family by self-identification (this variable is not available in data before 2007 and in the years 2013-2016); Identification of Haredi today: by self-identification

The Central Bureau of Statistics Labor Force Survey (LFS) for the years 2021-2024, Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25 - 64.

Identification of Haredi background: Graduate of Haredi yeshiva according to self-reporting (Dashat method); Identification of Haredi today: by self-identification (Household level)

(*) For more on the data sources, see the online appendix.

D-1 Introduction

Leaving Haredi society typically occurs at a young age, a critical period for integrating into higher education and employment. During this transition, Yotzim often face financial insecurity, and frequently devoid of family support. While most maintain contact with their families, it is more limited compared to other groups and their reliance on their family for financial assistance is minimal. As a result, these young individuals find themselves navigating this crucial stage without the education that could facilitate entry into quality employment, and without financial support from family that could provide a buffer during the transition or allow them to enroll in higher education. Consequently, compared to other subgroups, Yotzim are less able to cover their monthly expenses, report lower satisfaction with their financial situation, and are more likely to perceive themselves as poor. Despite these challenges, Yotzim at the beginning of their transition remain optimistic about their ability to improve their circumstances.

This chapter examines indicators related to overall standard of living, financial satisfaction, and well-being among Yotzim. These indicators are also presented in comparison with three other subgroups: HFH (Haredim from home), Joiners (those who have joined Haredi society), and non-Haredi Jews. The analyses are based on data from the Social Survey and, unless otherwise specified, include both men and women.

Below is a description of the sections: Section D-2 explores indicators related to family relationships. Section D-3 analyzes economic well-being: subjective measures such as financial satisfaction, perceptions of poverty, and the ability to make ends meet; objective living standards, such as homeownership rates, percentages of people with a driver's license and satisfaction with one's home and residential area. Section D-4 focuses on emotional well-being, examining feelings of loneliness, depression, and stress. Additionally, this section includes a special analysis comparing well-being indicators from the Social Survey with data from surveys conducted by organizations that support Yotzim.

D-2 Family Relationships

Most Yotzim leave Haredi society at a young age, with the majority doing so by the age of 25. During the period following their exit, Yotzim are financially unstable and frequently have limited family support; although most maintain contact with their families, they are generally unable to rely on them for financial assistance. This reality is reflected in their satisfaction with family relationships (Figure D-1a). Since married individuals or those with children may base their responses on the family they have built rather than their family of origin, the analysis distinguishes between singles (including those who are divorced and widowed without children) and non-singles.

Overall, although Yotzim (both women and men) report satisfaction with their family relationships, their level of satisfaction is lower compared to other subgroups. Among single Yotzim, only about half (47%) express high satisfaction with their family relationships - a lower rate than that found among both non-Haredim (70%) and HFH (82%). However, non-singles report slightly higher satisfaction levels, 62%, although this is still lower than among non-Haredim (69%).

Figure D-1: Family relationship indices (women and men), broken down by current family status (%)



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: Social Survey data for the years 2018-2024, Jews aged 20-64.
Singles - including divorced or widowed individuals without children.
Satisfaction with family relationships:
When asked "Are you satisfied from your relationships with family members?", respondents answered:
High - "Very satisfied"
Medium - "Satisfied"
Feeling appreciated by family:
When asked "To what extent do you feel that the members of your family appreciate you?", respondents answered:
High - "A great extent"; Medium: "Some extent".
For data on additional groups and breakdowns by age, see Tables D-1 and D-2.

Figure D-2: Family relationship indicators, broken down by measure and gender (among unmarried respondents)



Source: Social Survey data (2018-2024), Jews aged 20-64 - singles (including divorced/widowed who are not parents to children).
The figure presents a weighted index (in %) of satisfaction with family relationships and perceived appreciation from family members.
Responses to each question are measured on a four-point scale, ranging from "very satisfied"/ " a great extent" to "not satisfied at all"/"not at all."
In the weighted index, each level was assigned a relative score between 1 and 0 as follows: a score of 1 for the highest level ("very satisfied"/ "a great extent"); 2/3 for the second level ("satisfied"/ "some extent"); 1/3 for the third level ("not very satisfied"/"not so much"); and 0 for the lowest level ("not satisfied at all"/"not at all").
For data on additional groups, see Tables D-1 and D-2.

The differences between Yotzim and other subgroups are also evident in how valued they feel by their families (Figure D-1b). About two-thirds (68%) of single Yotzim reported feeling highly valued by their family, compared to 85% of non-Haredim and 89% of HFH. On this measure, married Yotzim also

reported a higher sense of appreciation from their families, compared with single Yotzim.

Generally, the distinction between singles and married individuals is more pronounced among Yotzim than in other subgroups. As mentioned, singles necessarily refer to their family of origin, whereas married individuals or those with children may be reflecting on the family they have built rather than their family of origin. It is also possible that married individuals experience greater overall satisfaction with their family of origin, either as a result of the time that passed since they left or because of a shift in their family's attitude after they established their own household.

The differences between the groups on these measures lie primarily in the share reporting high levels of satisfaction and appreciation, as opposed to moderate levels.To weight the level of satisfaction and the level of perceived family appreciation into a single measure, an analysis is presented using a weighted index based on the reported degree (Figure D-2). Unlike the binary measure of overall satisfaction (or appreciation), which assigns equal weight (score of 1) to responses of "very satisfied" ("a great extent") and "satisfied" ("some extent"), and equal weight (score of 0) to responses of "not very satisfied" ("not so much") and "not satisfied at all" ("not at all").

Figure D-2 presents an index that weights the degree of satisfaction and family appreciation by assigning a partial score that reflects partial satisfaction. Thus, for the two intermediate categories, a score of 2/3 is assigned for satisfaction to those who responded "satisfied" (" some extent") instead of a full score, and a score of 1/3 is assigned to those who responded "not very satisfied" ("not so much") instead of a zero score.

The analysis shows that, on average, 77% of Yotzim are satisfied with their family relationships and 85% are satisfied with the appreciation they receive from their families, compared with 88% and 94% among non-Haredim, respectively. These levels are relatively similar among men and women, in both groups. These findings point to the complexity of the relationships Yotzim have with their families: perceived appreciation from family members is an important indicator, but not the only factor shaping their satisfaction with family relationships.

D-3 Indicators of Economic Well-being

As noted, leaving Haredi society typically occurs at a young age, a critical period for integrating into education and employment. However, young Yotzim often lack the educational background necessary to integrate into higher education or secure quality employment, and in most cases they do not receive family support that could have enabled a period of adjustment. This reality is reflected in the findings, which show that young Yotzim report higher rates of perceived poverty and financial hardship. Over time, these economic disparities are also evident in lower homeownership rates among Yotzim compared to other groups.

D-3.1 Satisfaction with One's Financial Situation

Overall, Yotzim report higher levels of financial hardship, reflected in several ways: fewer report being able to cover their monthly expenses, they express less satisfaction with their economic situation, and they are more likely to describe themselves as experiencing poverty. However, despite these challenges, Yotzim tend to be optimistic about their financial future, perhaps because they view their current struggles as a temporary phase in their transition, undertaken to improve their long-term prospects. Another possible explanation may have to do with age: within each age group, Yotzim tend to be younger on average than the same age group in other subgroups, and this young age may be the source of their optimism.

Young Yotzim report higher rates of financial hardship

With respect to income and expenses (Figure D-3), Yotzim struggle more to cover their monthly expenses, compared to other subgroups. In the middle and older age groups, the rate of Yotzim who are able to cover their monthly expenses is lower than that of HFH, despite similarities in terms of employment levels (Chapter C) and family characteristics (Chapter B). At older ages, Yotzim are more similar to HFH, despite the higher employment levels among Yotzim compared to Haredim and fewer children.

Only 68% of young Yotzim (ages 20-29), and 61% of those in the middle group (ages 30-44), reported being able to cover their monthly expenses (Figure D-3). By contrast, among non-Haredim, 83% of young individuals and 73%-74% of middle and older age groups reported similar success; and among the HFH, 78% of young individuals and 62%-68% of middle and older age group.

Figure D-3: Percentage of those who manage to cover monthly expenses



Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.
Successful - responded "Yes, without any difficulty" or "Yes, [but with some difficulty]"1 in covering all monthly household expenses (including expenses for food, electricity, telephone, etc.).

Analysis by year shows that, while the other three groups display relative stability in their ability to cover monthly expenses, Yotzim experience fluctuations without any clear trend.

Yotzim report higher rates of perceived poverty compared to both Haredim and non-Haredim

In addition to the lower proportion of Yotzim who successfully cover their monthly expenses, their self-perception of poverty is also notably higher (Figure D-4), a finding which supports their claim that they face significant financial difficulties. Approximately half of Yotzim (48%) considered themselves poor at some point in their adult lives (from age 15 onward), compared to about a third of non-Haredim and HFH (29%) and slightly more than one-third of Joiners (36%).

Figure D-4: Rate of perceived poverty (women and men) - at three time points



Source: CBS Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews aged 20-64.

It is possible that poverty within the family increases the likelihood of leaving the Haredi community, or that leaving the Haredi community may influence one's perception of past poverty. However, a significant portion of the disparity likely stems from how Yotzim perceive their current financial situation. This is evident from the persistent gap in perceptions of poverty over the past five years and the past year (although the difference has somewhat narrowed).

The perception of poverty among Yotzim is notably higher compared with both the younger age group (20-29) and the older group (30-44). This finding reinforces the idea that the perception of poverty is primarily a post-departure phenomenon (Figure D-5).

Figure D-5: Perception of poverty in the last five years, broken down by gender and age (%)



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3. Missing value - sampling error exceeds 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.

Despite their dissatisfaction with their financial situation, Yotzim are optimistic and believe that their financial situation will improve in the coming years

In addition to the data on experiences of poverty and difficulties in covering monthly expenses, only half of Yotzim (55%) are satisfied with their financial situation. This is lower than the satisfaction rates among non-Haredim (66%) and HFH (73%) (Figure D-6). [28]

28. The phenomenon of reported satisfaction is prevalent among Haredim (Rier et al., 2008), probably due to cultural patterns of social desirability. This bias has been noted in classic studies on the subject (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Edwards, 1953), which suggest that the more a behavior is deemed socially desirable, the more respondents are inclined to attribute it to themselves.

However, despite their financial hardships, heightened sense of poverty, and greater financial dissatisfaction, Yotzim exhibit a high level of optimism about improving their financial situation in the coming years (74%), compared to non-Haredim (59%) and HFH (67%). Part of this gap may be attributed to the fact that Yotzim tend to be younger on average, and since younger individuals generally have greater potential for financial change, their optimism is likely higher.

Figure D-6: Percentage of those satisfied with their financial situation and those optimistic about the future



Source: CBS Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews aged 20-64.
Believe that their financial situation will improve in the coming years - estimate that in the coming years, compared to today, their economic situation will be better (respondents who said "don't know" were defined as those who do not estimate an improvement).
Satisfied with their financial situation: Responded "very satisfied" or "satisfied" with their financial situation.

Analysis by gender shows that in all groups, women are slightly less satisfied with their financial situation compared to men (Figure D-7a). In this area, Yotzim are similar to the other groups, and this gender difference may reflect the wage gap between men and women. Examination of satisfaction levels by age yielded no substantial differences between older and younger individuals (Figure D-7b).

Figure D-7: Satisfied with their financial situation, broken down by gender and age (%)



Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews aged 20-64.

An analysis of levels of optimism regarding future financial improvement among age groups (Figure D-8) reveals that the rate among young Yotzim (82%) is similar to that of non-Haredim and Joiners (78%). In all three groups, this optimism exceeds that of HFH (72%). Among older individuals, optimism rates are lower: 57%-60% among Yotzim, HFH and Joiners, compared to 48% among the older non-Haredim. This is because among the non-Haredi, the average age in the adult group is also relatively higher.

Figure D- 8: Percentage of people who believe their financial situation will improve in the future, broken down by age groups



Source: CBS Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews aged 20-64.
Percentage of those who believe that their financial situation will improve in the coming years (respondents who said "don't know" were defined as those who do not estimate an improvement)

Among Yotzim, economic dissatisfaction does not appear to impact their overall life satisfaction, which remains high at 92% (Figure D-9), similar to the rate among non-Haredim (94%). In terms of general optimism, Yotzim also report a high rate (81%), comparable to HFH (79%) and significantly higher than non-Haredim (65%).

Figure D-9: Percentage of those satisfied with their financial situation and optimistic about the future



Source: CBS Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews aged 20-64.
Believe that their lives will improve in the coming years - estimate that in the coming years, compared to today, their lives will be better (respondents who said "don't know" were defined as those who do not estimate an improvement).
Satisfied with their life situation: Responded "Very satisfied" or "Satisfied".

D-3.2 General Standard of Living

The economic disparities among Yotzim over the years are also reflected in objective indicators. These include, for example, the share of Yotzim reporting home ownership, which is lower than in the other subgroups (Figure D-10). Among Yotzim, only 59% reported owning an apartment, compared to 71-76% of non-Haredim and HFH (Figure D-10a). Analysis by gender shows a relative similarity between genders across all groups; among Yotzim, the rate among men is higher by about 5 percentage points, a difference that could be explained by a larger sampling error among Yotzim due to a limited number of observations.

The rate of homeownership among Yotzim is lower than the corresponding rates among non-Haredim and HFH

Figure D-10: Rate of homeownership, broken down by gender and age group



Source: CBS Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews aged 20-64.
Apartment owndership:: an apartment owned by one member of the household or they own another apartment (the question is formulated at the household level).

Age-based analysis demonstrates that the main differences between the subgroups are in the younger and mid-level age groups. Slightly more than half (56%) of young Yotzim (aged 20-29) reported owning an apartment - somewhat lower than non-Haredim and HFH (64-65%). Among the mid-level age group (30-44), home ownership among Yotzim (53%) and non-Haredim (63%) remains similar to the percentages among younger individuals, but among HFH the proportion is extremely higher compared to the younger age group (83%). Among the older adults (aged 45-64), the rate also increases significantly among Yotzim and non-Haredim, and stands at 82%-84%.[29]

These disparities may stem from the loss of family and community support among Yotzim. Unlike their Haredi peers, who can rely on parental assistance and communal resources (such as 'Gemachim' (community-based interest-free loan funds) for purchasing homes and supporting their families, Yotzim must provide for themselves without the safety net of family and community support.

These data may suggest that Yotzim narrow the gap only at older ages, likely due to delayed entry into the workforce. Therefore, they purchase an apartment at an older age compared to non-Haredim. This finding should be interpreted with caution, however, since the number of observations at older ages is small and the margin of error may therefore be larger.

69% of former Haredi women have a driver's license, compared to 24% of female HFH and 85% of non-Haredi women

Another notable gap appears in the rate of driver's license holders. In Haredi society, many refrain from learning to drive for ideological reasons, particularly women. In contrast, among non-Haredim, driving is a basic skill essential for integrating into education and employment. Yotzim fall between these two groups: their rate of driver's license ownership is slightly lower than that of non-Haredim but significantly higher than that of HFH. (For full data on all groups, not by age or gender, see Table D-1 at the end of the chapter).

The data shows that on average, 79% of male Yotzim have a driver's license, a rate slightly lower than that of non-Haredi men (89%), similar to the rate among Joiners, and significantly higher than among HFH (38%).

A gender-based analysis (Figure D-11a) reveals that the percentage of men who hold a driver's license is significantly higher compared to women. There are also notable differences between groups: while the rate of Yotzim men who have a driver's license (88%) is relatively similar to the rate of license holders among non-Haredim (93%), among former Haredi women, driver's license ownership is significantly lower compared to non-Haredi women (69% and 85%, respectively). The rate of Yotzim (men and women) who have a driver's license is similar to the rate among Joiners and very high compared to the rate among HFH.

29. This figure requires some qualification. First, "owned apartment" includes ownership by any household member. This means that a young person living with their parents in a home they own would be classified as a homeowner, potentially inflating the rate among younger individuals. This factor may explain the slight decline observed in mid-life among non-Haredim, as living with one's parents is more common at younger ages, which may increase the percentage of individuals residing in a dwelling owned by a member of the household. Furthermore, in each of the three age groups, the rate of young people among Yotzim tends to be higher compared to the other subgroups (For further discussion, see the online appendix, "The Social Survey").

Figure D-11: Rate of driver's license holders, broken down by gender



Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews aged 20-64.

The low rate of driver's license holders among Yotzim in general and particularly among women is likely influenced by the historically low prevalence of driver's licenses in the Haredi community, as well as the time and financial costs associated with obtaining one. This trend is illustrated in Figure D-11b, which compares the percentage of driver's license holders across three age groups. Among the youngest group, about one-third of HFH (31%) hold a driver's license, compared to approximately two-thirds of Yotzim (72%) and 86% of non-Haredim. In the two older age groups (35-44 and 45-64), the gaps narrow, with 84%-86% of Yotzim holding a driver's license, slightly below non-Haredim (87%-92%) but significantly higher than HFH (41%-45%).

D-3.3 Satisfaction with one's area of residence

The financial situation of Yotzim is also reflected in their satisfaction with their housing situation (Figure D-12). Overall, Yotzim report slightly lower satisfaction with their apartments and residential areas compared to non-Haredim. For instance, approximately 80% of Yotzim expressed satisfaction with their apartment, neighborhood, and relationships with neighbors, compared to approximately 90% among both non-Haredim and HFH. It should be noted that lower satisfaction in these areas is generally associated with lower-income populations (CBS, 2022). It is likely that the financial constraints faced by Yotzim compel them to live in apartments and neighborhoods with poorer conditions, which in turn affects their overall satisfaction.

Figure D-12: Percentage of those satisfied with their apartment and with characteristics in their residential area



Source: CBS Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews aged 20-64.
Satisfied: Responded "Very satisfied" or "Satisfied".

D-4 Emotional Well-Being Indicators

One of the recurring questions regarding the well-being of Yotzim is the prevalence of emotional challenges such as depression. As highlighted in previous editions of this annual report (Deutsch & Shenfeld [eds.], 2023, 2024), studies based on non-representative samples - which are often found by respondents through aid organizations or social media groups dedicated to Yotzim - consistently indicate high rates of depression and loneliness among this population.

An analysis of the CBS Social Survey data, however, presents a more nuanced picture (Figure D-13). For instance, when comparing the frequency of reported depression between Yotzim and non-Haredim, 32% of Yotzim reported experiencing feelings of depression in the past year, only slightly higher than the 26% reported among non-Haredim. Similarly, the gap in reported stress levels is modest (72% vs. 66%), as is the difference in those experiencing sleep-disrupting worries (47% vs. 43%).

Figure D-13: Percentage of individuals experiencing stress, worry, and depression



Source: CBS Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews aged 20-64.
Feeling stressed, worried and depressed - Responded "Always or often" or "Sometimes," to the questions: "In the past 12 months: have you felt pressured?/have you felt depressed?/have worries prevented you from sleeping?"

It can be assumed that emotional distress among Yotzim intensifies in the years leading up to their exit. To explore this, the prevalence of these feelings was analyzed among younger individuals (ages 20-34) in comparison to older individuals (ages 35-64) (Figure D-14b). The findings indicate that even at younger ages, the gap between Yotzim and non-Haredim remains relatively small. Differences were also examined by gender (Figure D-14a).

Figure D-14: Percentage of individuals experiencing stress, worry, and depression among Yotzim and non-Haredim, broken down by age and gender



Source: CBS Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews aged 20-64.
Feeling stressed, worried, and depressed: Responded "Always or often" or "Sometimes, " to the questions: "In the last 12 months: have you felt pressured?/have you felt depressed?/have worries prevented you from sleeping?"

In general, women report higher levels of emotional distress than men. Among non-Haredim, women are more likely than men to experience feelings of depression (30% vs. 21%), worries that disrupt sleep (50% vs. 36%), and stress (73% vs. 59%). A similar pattern is observed among Yotzim, with women reporting these challenges more frequently than men. Thus, although both male and female Yotzim report difficulties at higher rates than non-Haredim, the gap between men in the two groups is relatively

small (less than five percentage points), whereas among women the rate of reported difficulties among former Haredi women is substantially higher than among non-Haredi women, with a gap of nearly 10 percentage points.

The only significant difference between Yotzim and non-Haredim appears in feelings of loneliness. Leaving the Haredi community involves social disengagement, so high levels of loneliness might be expected. However, while there is a difference in loneliness between Yotzim and non-Haredim, it is relatively small (Figure D-15a): about one quarter (26%) of Yotzim reported experiencing loneliness at least sometimes, only slightly higher than the 19% reported among non-Haredim.

In the gender-based analysis, women generally report higher rates of loneliness than men (29% vs. 24%), both female and male Yotzim experience loneliness at rates 6 percentage points higher than their non-Haredi counterparts of the same gender.

The discrepancies are consistent in both younger (20-29) and mid-level (30-44) ages. In both age groups, the share of Yotzim reporting feelings of loneliness is higher by 7-8 percentage points than the rate among non-Haredim in the same age group (Figure D-15b). In summary, it seems that even among young people there is no prominent increase in the share of those reporting feelings of loneliness in the years adjacent to leaving Haredi society. Based on the data, however, it is impossible to rule out a strong effect in the first years after leaving the Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) community, which is not reflected in the younger age groups. Since the Social Survey only includes individuals aged 20 and over, testing this hypothesis is limited.

Figure D-15: Share of people experiencing loneliness, broken down by gender and age group



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: Data from the CBS Social Survey for 2017-2024, Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.
Feeling lonely: Responded "Frequently" or "Sometimes" to the question: "Do you ever feel lonely?"

Data analysis by time period indicates that after the events of October 7, rates of depression rose among non-Haredim (31%) and Yotzim (43%) alike. In contrast, no change was reported in the rate of loneliness. Further details appear in Box D-T-1.

Based on the findings presented above, it can be cautiously suggested that studies reporting a high prevalence of depression among Yotzim may not accurately reflect the average for this population as

a whole. The prevalence of emotional difficulties among Yotzim appears to be only slightly higher than that of non-Haredi individuals, which can be expected, given the educational gaps, challenges in securing meaningful employment, and other difficulties faced by former Haredi men and women, many of which area more pronounced in the initial stages of their transition.

It is reasonable to assume, however, that among Yotzim, there is a distinct subgroup that differs from the rest in these aspects, one that may not be fully reflected in the averages reported in the Social Survey. This subgroup may be characterized by unique family backgrounds as well as specific social and psychological conditions in the immediate post-exit phase. This issue is explored in greater depth in Box D-1 of the 2024 annual report (Deutsch and Anisman, 2024).

Additionally, further research is needed to identify specific groups within the CBS data that exhibit a higher prevalence of loneliness and depression. Another important area of study is the potential impact of social desirability bias in surveys conducted within aid organizations for Yotzim. This includes examining whether the overall survey environment and preliminary questions influence the likelihood of respondents reporting such emotional difficulties.

D-1.4 Concerns about Risks

The past five years have been marked by significant upheavals at both the national and global levels. The COVID-19 pandemic, rising interest rates and inflation, and the "Iron Swords" war have all affected Israeli society and citizens' sense of personal security in a range of ways. These developments are also reflected in the topics and wording of questions in the Social Survey: beginning in 2021, the question "In the coming years, what do you think is the main risk to you and your immediate family?" was added, with nine possible response options, alongside the option "There is no risk." In the analysis of the Social Survey responses, these nine answers were grouped into four categories: risk from illness or disability, economic risk, security risk, and other risk.[30]

Figure D-16 presents a summary of the distribution of reported risks, together with the overall share of respondents reporting any risk. These figures indicate that Yotzim are more optimistic than non-Haredim but less optimistic than HFH.

Overall, about two-thirds of Yotzim (68%) report concerns about risks in the coming years - a lower share than among non-Haredim (78%), higher than among HFH (57%), and similar to Joiners (67%). The analysis reveals marked differences between non-Haredim and HFH, with Yotzim and Joiners positioned between these two groups. Among non-Haredim, illness or disability is the most commonly reported risk, with more than one-quarter (27%) reporting it. In contrast, among Yotzim, risk from illness or disability is reported at a rate similar to economic risk (23%). Among HFH, only 11% report risk from illness or disability, compared with 22% who report economic risk.

30. Detail of grouped categories:
1. Risk from illness or disability (combining two categories: illness or disability; difficulty inprolonged care of older family members)
2. Economic risk (combining three categories: loss of job or income, difficulty covering expenses, and lack of an adequate standard of housing)
3. Safety risk (combining two categories: crime or violence, and security risk)
4. Other risk (one category - another risk)

Figure D-16: The main risk in the coming years for the individual and their family (%)



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: CBS Social Survey data (2021-2024), Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.
Illness or Disability Risks: Two categories grouped together - illness or disability; difficulty in prolonged care of older family members.
Economic Risks: Three categories grouped together - loss of job or income, difficulty covering expenses, lack of an adequate standard of housing.
Safety Risks: Two categories grouped together - crime or violence, security risk.
Other Risk: One category - another risk.

It is reasonable to assume that fear of illness and disability is age-related. Indeed, the share of older Yotzim who reported concern about risk from illness or disability is higher than that of younger ones (30% vs. 19%; Figure D-17). Moreover, this rate is similar to that reported among non-Haredim (30%) and significantly higher than that of the HFH (15%).

Figure D-17: Chart: Main risk in the coming years to the individual and his family, broken down by age (%)



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: CBS Social Survey data (2021-2024), Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.
Illness or Disability Risks: Two categories grouped together - illness or disability; difficulty in prolonged care of older family members.
Economic Risks: Three categories grouped together - loss of job or income, difficulty covering expenses, lack of an adequate standard of housing.
Safety Risks: Two categories grouped together - crime or violence, security risk.
Other Risk: One category - another risk.

Another aspect is concern about security: About one-fifth of non-Haredim report concern about this risk, compared with 13% and 11% among Yotzim and HFH, respectively (in both age groups). In Box D-5, we further examine changes in concern about security risks following the events of October 7.

Changes in Security and Trust in Government Bodies Following the Events of October 7, and Political Turbulence

In recent years, the State of Israel has experienced political, public health, and security upheavals. Since 2019, there has been ongoing political upheaval and instability, with five rounds of Knesset elections held over only four years. These years were marked by political clashes and widespread protests. Concurrently, in early 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic broke out, accompanied by lockdowns and disruptions to the State's healthcare system and economy. In January 2023, the government, headed by Benjamin Netanyahu, announced judicial reforms, which many in the public perceived as a judicial revolution. Finally, the events of October 7, the Iron Swords War, and the public debate surrounding the war, and the issue of the hostages also left their mark on the Israeli public. In this chapter, we will present the impact of the events of recent years on the four subgroups.

The most prominent trend is an increase in the percentage of respondents identifying the security situation as a primary risk factor. The largest increase was observed among non-Haredim and Joiners, and the smallest increase was among HFH. Among Yotzim, the increase was smaller than that observed among non-Haredim and Joiners, but larger than among HFH.

Figure T-D-1: Concerns about security risks, broken down by period (%)



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: CBS Social Survey data (2021-2024), Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.
Before the war: 2021-7.10.2023; After the war - 7.10.2023-2024

An examination of reported changes across all risk categories (Figure T-D-2) shows that after October 7, 2023, 81% of the non-Haredi population reported concern about various risks, representing a moderate increase of approximately 5 percentage points compared with pre-war levels. Across reported risk categories, increased concern about security risks corresponds with a decline in other types of risk concerns. Among Yotzim and HFH, the general increase in security concerns after the war is about 10 percentage points, and among Joiners - about 15 percentage points.

Figure D-2: Concern about Risk, broken down by Period (%)



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3. Missing value - sampling error exceeds 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: CBS Social Survey data (2021-2024), Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.
Illness or Disability Risks: Two categories grouped together - illness or disability; difficulty in prolonged care of older family members.
Economic Risks: Three categories grouped together - loss of job or income, difficulty covering expenses, lack of an adequate standard of housing.
Safety Risks: Two categories grouped together - crime or violence, security risk.
Other Risk: One category - another risk.
Before the war: 2021-7.10.2023; After the war - 7.10.2023-2024

Similar to the reported increase in security-related concerns, there was also an increase in reports of depression following October 7. Among all subgroups, the reported feeling of depression did not change significantly from 2017 to 2022. However, starting in 2023, there is an evident increase: from 24% to 31% among non-Haredim, from 28% to 43% among Yotzim, and from approximately 17% to 27% among Joiners. The only group in which no change occurred is the HFH. Beyond that, there has been no significant increase in reports of loneliness or sleep-disrupting worries following the war.

Figure T-d-3: Percentage of individuals reporting feelings of depression - by survey years (%)



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: Data from the CBS Social Survey for 2017-2024, Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.
Feeling depressed: Responded "Always or often" or "Sometimes" to the questions: "In the last 12 months, have you felt pressured/depressed ?"

The Social Survey presents data on the degree of trust and satisfaction of Israeli citizens in the functioning of government bodies, including the government, the judicial system, the Knesset, and more. The findings indicate several differences between the groups. Relatively high levels of trust in the judicial system and satisfaction with the functioning of local authorities were observed among non-Haredim, whereas trust in the government and satisfaction with police performance were only moderate. The lowest level of satisfaction among non-Haredim is with the functioning of the Knesset. The picture among Yotzim is relatively similar to that of non-Haredim, except for lower trust in the judicial system and slightly higher satisfaction with the functioning of the Knesset.

Figure D-4: Levels of trust and satisfaction with the performance of government bodies in Israel (average for 2018-2024)



Source: Data from the CBS Social Survey for 2018-2024, Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.

However, it is important to note that the data represent an average over an extended period that included political instability and security-related events, which may have affected levels of trust and satisfaction. Thus, for example, according to the Israeli Democracy Index data from the Israel Democracy Institute (Hermann et al., 2025), during the Bennett-Lapid government, trust in state institutions decreased among right-wing supporters, while it increased among left-wing supporters. No significant change was demonstrated among center-right supporters compared to the average for that period.

Given this information, a comparative analysis of the Social Survey data was conducted for the years 2018-2024, grouped into pairs of years, to provide a more comprehensive perspective. The data portrays an erosion of trust in the government among non-Haredim and among Yotzim. Analysis of the changes between the groups shows that in 2021-2022 (yellow columns) - a period that largely overlaps with the Bennett◦Lapid government (13.6.2021-29.12.2022) - there is a temporary decline in trust in the government among HFH and Yotzim, but an increase in trust in the period afterward. This decrease corresponds to groups with a high percentage of support for the Netanyahu government and a low percentage of support for the Bennett◦Lapid government. These data suggest that support among Yotzim for right-wing governments is lower than that among HFH and higher than that of non-Haredim.

The steady decline in trust in the judicial system is broad-based and cuts across groups. For example, among non-Haredim, trust in the legal system decreased from 66% in 2017-2018 to 49% in 2023-2024, and among Yotzim, it decreased from 42% to 29%, respectively.

Figure T-D-5: Levels of trust in the government and the judicial system, broken down by year (%)



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix). Source: Data from the CBS Social Survey for 2017-2024, Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.

As noted above, the Social Survey also provides data on satisfaction with the performance of the Knesset, the police, the education system, the local authority, and the healthcare system.[31]

The lowest level of satisfaction is with the Knesset, particularly when compared with other government and law enforcement bodies. In the last four years, only 16% of non-Haredim have expressed a positive opinion of the Knesset's functioning. Over time, satisfaction with the legislative branch has eroded. There is a similar pattern among Yotzim. In contrast to these two groups, HFH express high appreciation for the functioning of the Knesset, except for a temporary decline during the Bennett-Lapid government. The higher satisfaction found among HFH could reflect satisfaction with the performance of Haredi Knesset members across all matters related to the needs of the Haredi population.

31. In some of the years, the survey also included questions on trust in the Knesset, the police, the education system, the local authority, and the healthcare system, but these questions were not asked in all years. For this reason, only performance-related data that were available for all years are presented.

Figure T-D-6: Satisfaction with the performance of the Israel Police and the Knesset, broken down by year (%)



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix). Source: Data from the CBS Social Survey for 2017-2024, Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.

There is moderate satisfaction with the performance of the police (around 50%) and shows no signs of erosion over time, including among the non-Haredi population. This figure is somewhat surprising given the fact that in recent years the Ministry of National Security and the police have been widely criticized and have been at the center of political controversy. A similar finding was reported in a study by the Israel Democracy Institute (Hermann et al., 2025). An analysis of satisfaction with the performance of the healthcare and education systems indicates relatively stable levels of satisfaction over time.

Figure D-7: Satisfaction with the performance of the healthcare and education systems, broken down by year (%)



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix). Source: Data from the CBS Social Survey for 2017-2024, Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.

D - Sources

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D-Tables

The following tables provide expanded data on the four subgroups discussed in the chapter: **Yotzim (former Haredim)** - those with a Haredi background who are no longer Haredi today; **Haredim from home (HFH)** - those from a Haredi background who remained Haredi; **Joiners ("became Haredi")** - individuals with a non-Haredi background who have become Haredi; **Non-Haredim** - those from a non-Haredi background who are not Haredi today.

In addition, supplementary data are presented for the two broad analytical groups, classified by past and present affiliation.

- **All those with a Haredi background** (HFH and Yotzim)
- **All Haredim today** (HFH and Joiners

The tables omitted the data for the entire **Non-Haredim today** group (which includes both non-Haredim and Yotzim), because they are very similar to the data of Non-Haredim.

Table D-1: Satisfaction with family relationships, broken down by marital status (%)

	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with a Haredi background	All Haredim today
Total						
Overall satisfied	96	90	99	96	98	98
Very satisfied	69	56	85	70	82	81
Satisfied	26	33	14	26	16	17
Weighted index	88	81	94	88	93	93
Singles						
Overall satisfied	95	86	97	92	94	96
Very satisfied	70	47	82	70	73	80
Satisfied	25	39	15	(22)	21	16
Weighted index	88	77	93	87	89	92
Married or parents of children						
Overall satisfied	96	92	99	96	98	98
Very satisfied	69	62	85	70	83	81
Satisfied	27	29	14	26	15	17
Weighted index	88	84	95	88	94	93

Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3. Values for single joiners were omitted due to the small sample size (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: CBS Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews aged 20-64.

Table D-2: Feeling valued by their family, broken down by family status (%)

	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with a Haredi background	All Haredim today
Total						
Overall valued	98	94	99	98	99	99
High: To a great extent	87	75	92	84	90	90
Medium: To some extent	11	19	7	14	8	9
Weighted index	95	89	97	94	96	96
Singles						
Overall valued	97	91	99	99	97	99
High: To a great extent	85	68	89	72	83	87
Medium: To some extent	12	23	(10)	(26)	14	12
Weighted index	94	85	96	90	93	95
Married or parents of children						
Overall valued	98	96	99	98	99	99
High: To a great extent	88	80	93	85	92	91
Medium: To some extent	10	(16)	7	13	7	8
Weighted index	95	92	97	94	97	96

Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3. Values for single joiners were omitted due to the small sample size (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: CBS Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews aged 20-64.

Table D-3: Standard of living, broken down by gender and age groups (%)

	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with a Haredi background	All Haredim today
Men and Women						
Homeowners [1]	71	59	76	67	74	74
Car owners[2]	87	75	39	72	43	47
Vacationed abroad in the last year	46	34	15	14	17	15
Have a driver's license	89	79	38	77	43	48
Men						
Homeowners[1]	71	61	78	66	76	75
Car owners[2]	87	77	38	72	43	47
Vacationed abroad in the last year	46	34	16	16	18	16
Have a driver's license	93	88	53	87	57	61
Women						
Homeowners[1]	71	56	74	69	73	73
Car owners[2]	86	72	40	71	43	47
Vacationed abroad in the last year	47	34	15	12	17	14
Have a driver's license	85	69	24	65	28	33
Young adults aged 20-34 (men and women)						
Homeowners[1]	61	54	69	49	67	66
Car owners[2]	85	70	37	70	40	41
Vacationed abroad in the last year	47	34	15	(13)	17	15
Have a driver's license	88	76	35	77	40	40

Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).

Source: CBS Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews aged 20-64.

1. Lives in an apartment owned by one of the household members or owns another apartment (household-level question)
2. Has a private or commercial car at their disposal, not including trucks over 4 tons or two-wheeled vehicles (household level question)

Table D-4: General and economic satisfaction, broken down by gender and age groups (%)

	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with a Haredi background	All Haredim today
Men and Women						
Satisfied with their lives[1]	94	92	99	97	98	98
Believe their lives will improve[2]	65	81	79	71	79	77
Satisfied with their financial situation[1]	66	55	73	70	71	72
Believe their financial situation will improve[3]	59	74	67	63	68	66
Manage to cover their monthly expenses[4]	75	64	71	62	70	69
Men						
Satisfied with their lives[1]	94	91	99	97	98	98
Believe their lives will improve[2]	64	78	79	70	79	76
Satisfied with their financial situation[1]	68	57	77	72	74	75
Believe their financial situation will improve [3]	61	72	67	62	68	66
Manage to cover their monthly expenses[4]	77	66	73	64	72	70
Women						
Satisfied with their lives[1]	94	94	99	98	98	98
Believe their lives will improve[2]	65	86	79	72	79	77
Satisfied with their financial situation[1]	64	52	70	67	68	69
Believe their financial situation will improve [3]	57	76	68	64	69	67
Manage to cover their monthly expenses[4]	74	63	70	59	69	67
Young adults aged 20-34 (men and women)						
Satisfied with their lives[1]	95	92	99	99	98	99
Believe their lives will improve[2]	81	87	82	82	83	82
Satisfied with their financial situation[1]	64	54	73	71	71	73
Believe their financial situation will improve [3]	78	82	72	78	74	73
Manage to cover their monthly expenses[4]	81	68	76	66	75	74

Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).

Source: CBS Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews aged 20-64.

1. Responded "Very satisfied" or "Satisfied."
2. Believe that their lives will improve in the coming years
3. Believe their financial situation will improve in the coming years.
4. Responded "Yes, without any difficulty" or "Yes, [but with some difficulty]" in covering all monthly household expenses (including expenses for food, electricity, telephone, etc.).

Table D-5: Mental well-being, broken down by gender and age groups (%)

	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with a Haredi background	All Haredim today
Total						
Loneliness[1]	19	26	9	13	11	10
Felt depressed[2]	26	32	11	19	13	13
Experienced concerns that kept them from sleeping[2]	43	47	22	33	25	25
Felt stressed[2]	66	72	50	55	53	52
Faced their problems[2]	95	93	97	96	97	97
Felt full of energy[2]	84	83	93	86	92	91
Men						
Loneliness[1]	16	24	8	10	10	9
Felt depressed[2]	21	26	10	16	12	12
Experienced concerns that kept them from sleeping[2]	36	38	19	25	21	21
Felt stressed[2]	59	65	43	47	45	44
Faced their problems[2]	95	90	97	95	96	96
Felt full of energy[2]	85	83	92	86	91	90
Women						
Loneliness[1]	22	29	10	18	11	11
Felt depressed[2]	30	39	11	22	14	14
Experienced concerns that kept them from sleeping[2]	50	58	26	42	29	29
Felt stressed[2]	73	81	58	64	61	60
Faced their problems[2]	96	98	98	97	98	98
Felt full of energy[2]	84	83	94	86	93	92
Young adults aged 20-34 (men and women)						
Loneliness[1]	19	26	9	(13)	11	9
Felt depressed[2]	27	30	11	15	13	11
Experienced concerns that kept them from sleeping[2]	37	42	19	26	21	20
Felt stressed[2]	69	73	49	54	51	49
Faced their problems[2]	96	94	97	96	97	97
Felt full of energy[2]	87	87	94	89	93	93

Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).

Source: CBS Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews aged 20-64.

1. Responded "Frequently" or "Sometimes" to the question: "Do you ever feel lonely?"
2. Feeling stressed, worried and depressed - Responded "Always or often" or "Sometimes" to the questions: "In the past 12 months, have you felt pressured?/ Have you felt depressed?/Have worries prevented you from sleeping?/Have you felt that you are able to deal with your problems?/ Have you felt full of energy?"

Table D-6: Mental well-being, broken down by periods (%)

	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with a Haredi background	Haredim today
Experienced loneliness						
2017-2018	20	(24)	8	(11)	10	9
2019-2020	18	(22)	8	17	9	10
2021-2022	19	27	10	14	12	11
2023-2024	20	31	10	(12)	12	10
Feelings of depression						
2017-2018	24	(24)	7	13	9	9
2019-2020	24	(27)	11	18	13	13
2021-2022	24	28	10	16	12	12
2023-2024	31	43	13	27	17	16
Worries that interrupt sleep						
2017-2018	43	36	19	25	21	21
2019-2020	43	53	21	37	24	25
2021-2022	41	40	23	33	25	25
2023-2024	46	56	25	37	28	27
Feelings of stress						
2017-2018	70	66	51	60	52	53
2019-2020	65	75	57	59	58	57
2021-2022	61	70	45	48	48	46
2023-2024	68	76	50	53	53	51

Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: CBS Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews aged 20-64.

1. Responded "Frequently" or "Sometimes" to the question: "Do you ever feel lonely?"
2. Feeling stressed, worried and depressed - Responded "Always or often" or "Sometimes" to the questions: "In the past 12 months, have you felt pressured? / Have you felt depressed? /Have worries prevented you from sleeping? /Have you felt that you are able to deal with your problems? / Have you felt full of energy?"

Table D-7: Civic Engagement and Attitudes toward Government Institutions (%)

	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with a Haredi background	All Haredim today
Civic involvement						
Involved in public or political life [1]	18	15	12	11	12	11
Believe you have an ability to influence government policy [2]	16	19	10	16	11	12
Positive opinion on the functioning of [3]						
The Knesset	19	23	31	29	30	31
The police	45	43	46	46	46	46
The education system	40	44	64	46	62	59
The healthcare system	59	62	73	68	72	72
The local authority	66	58	67	66	66	67
Trust in government[4]						
Institutions	37	37	31	38	32	33
The judicial system	58	38	16	21	18	17
The healthcare system	76	72	79	71	78	77
The Israel Police [5]	58	49	48	54	48	49
In the local authority[5]	73	65	72	68	71	71

Source: CBS Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews aged 20-64.

1. Responded "Yes" to the question: "In the last 12 months, have you been involved in public or political life, at the local or national level?"
2. Responded "Yes, to a great extent" or "Yes, to some extent" to the question: "In your estimation, can you have influence on government policy?"
3. Responded "Very good" or "Good" to the question: "What do you think about the functioning of these entities?
4. Responded "Yes, to a great extent" or "Yes, to some extent" to the question "For each of them, say how much you place your trust in them"
5. The question was asked only in some of the years

Table D-8: Trust and Satisfaction Levels with the Performance of Government Institutions, broken down by Period (%)

	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with a Haredi background	Haredim today
Trust in the government [1]						
2017-2018	47	54	36	46	38	39
2019-2020	42	41	40	41	40	40
2021-2022 (*)	33	27	15	21	17	16
2023-2024	27	32	35	43	35	37
Trust in the judicial system[1]						
2017-2018	66	42	18	27	20	21
2019-2020	63	46	19	21	22	19
2021-2022 (*)	55	36	14	24	16	16
2023-2024	49	29	13	(12)	15	13
Functioning of the Knesset[2]						
2017-2018	25	(35)	40	40	39	40
2019-2020	21	(25)	39	24	37	35
2021-2022 (*)	16	20%	17	20	18	18
2023-2024	16	18%	36	35	34	36
Functioning of the Israel Police[2]						
2017-2018	48	49	49	47	49	49
2019-2020	47	42	44	42	44	43
2021-2022 (*)	39	34	37	42	37	38
2023-2024	49	49	55	52	54	54
Functioning of the local authority[2]						
2017-2018	61	50	63	74	62	66
2019-2020	70	60	68	64	67	67
2021-2022 (*)	65	56	68	67	67	68
2023-2024	68	63	67	63	67	66

Source: CBS Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews aged 20-64.

1. Responded "Yes" to the question: "In the last 12 months, have you been involved in public or political life, at the local or national level?"
2. Responded "Yes, to a great extent" or "Yes, to some extent" to the question: "In your assessment, can you have influence on government policy?"
3. Responded "Very good" or "Good" to the question: " What do you think about the functioning of these entities?"Responded "Yes, to a great extent" or "Yes, to some extent" to the question " say how much you place your trust in them"
4. The question was asked only in some of the years

E. Transitions to Haredi society – historical trends and current influence

Written by: Adar Anisman and Tzvika Deutsch

Groups and Data Sources

Groups

The analysis groups are classified based on current affiliation (currently Haredim or not) versus past affiliation (whether they are from a Haredi background or not).

Subgroups

Yotzim (former Haredim): Individuals with a Haredi background who are not Haredi today (short for those who left the Haredi community).

Haredim from home (HFH): Those with a Haredi background who are Haredim today - short for those from a Haredi home.

Joiners ("Became Haredim"): Those with a non-Haredi background who are currently Haredi - short for those who have joined the Haredi community.

Non-Haredim: Those with a non-Haredi background who are not currently Haredi - short for non-Haredi Jews.

Data Sources and Identification Methods (*)

The Central Bureau of Statistics Social Survey for the years 2007-2012 and 2017-2024, Jews (women and men) aged 20 - 64.

Identification of a Haredi background: raised (at age 15) in a Haredi family by self-identification (this variable is not available in data before 2007 and in the years 2013-2016); Identification of Haredi today: by self-identification

The Integration Survey - an online survey conducted by Out for Change in May-June 2025.

Identification of a Haredi background: raised (at age 15) in a Haredi family by self-identification; Identification of non-Haredi today: non-Haredi today by self-identification.

(*) For more on the data sources, see the online appendix.

E-1 Introduction

The Haredi population has the fastest growth rate in Israel - about 4% per year. According to estimates by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), within approximately four decades, Haredi society will constitute a third of the total population in Israel and about a quarter of the total adult population (Paltiel et al., 2012). Also, although Haredi society constitutes about one-eighth of the Jewish population in Israel, the proportion of Haredi students in Hebrew education is one quarter of all students, and at the elementary school level, it is even higher.[32]

32. The proportion of Haredi students out of all students in the Hebrew education system at the elementary schoool level is 29%, compared with 24% at the high school level and 25% of all students in middle schools (Cahaner & Malach, 2023).

Haredi society has distinct characteristics, such as a tendency toward segregation, education in a school system that does not provide basic skills for integration into meaningful employment, and low rates of participation in higher education and the labor market. These characteristics have a significant impact on the Israeli economy (Deutsch et al., 2025) and on the character of Israeli society itself.

In recent years, public debate has expanded around issues such as military conscription to the IDF, gender segregation, autonomy in the education system, and the payment of allowances, topics linked to the distinctiveness of Haredi society, ongoing demographic changes in Israeli society, and the shift from a society with a solid secular majority to one in which most members fall somewhere along the religious spectrum (see, for example, Rubinstein and Gaon, 2019). According to Hermann et al. (2024), in recent years, a large majority of secular individuals have consistently expressed concern that they may not be able to maintain a way of life aligned with their values and beliefs. The share of secular individuals expressing this concern has increased by nearly 25 percentage points over the past seven years, from 55% in 2017 to 78% in 2024, in line with the growing share of Haredim in Israeli society.

Two main factors influence the growth rate of Haredi society. One factor is high fertility rates - Haredi women give birth to 6.4 children on average, compared to 3 children among non-Haredi Jewish women (Hleihel, 2023). The second factor is the transition dynamic - joining Haredi society on the one hand and leaving it on the other.

The current study examines the historical and sociological context of joining Haredi society, recognizing that a high proportion of those who leave Haredi society are second-generation Joiners. Accordingly, there is a connection between the characteristics of Joiners and Yotzim. This study examines the background of Joiners and the relationship between joining Haredi society and its demographic composition. It also addresses intergenerational transitions - namely, the potential impact of second-generation Joiners on the demographic composition of Yotzim as a group, and how changes in the composition of Haredi society may influence both those who leave and the exit process per se.

Structure of the Chapter: Section E-2 presents a historical overview of joining Haredi society as a sociological movement from the establishment of the State of Israel to the present time; Sections E-3 and E-4 review transition patterns between different groups in Israeli society; Section E-5 presents the background characteristics of the various groups in Israeli society; Section E-6 provides an in-depth analysis of the characteristics of Joiners; Section E-7 presents preliminary data on the differences between Yotzim who are second-generation Joiners and Yotzim whose parents are HFH; and Section E-8 discusses the findings and the implications of these transitions for future exits from Haredi society.

E-2 Review – Transitions into Haredi Society

Haredi society is often perceived as a single, cohesive and separatist community- "black and white" - that operates according to rigid norms. Even when researchers identify differences, factions, or internal diversity among various communities within Haredi society, they still tend to treat it as homogeneous (e.g., Brown, 2021; Friedman, 1991; Berman, 2000). Friedman also noted that despite the different factions and disagreements between them, including differing social norms, Haredim remain "one society in the consciousness of its members" (1991, p. 161).

To the best of our knowledge, one of the less-discussed issues within Haredi society is the distinction between those who grew up in Haredi households - especially following shifts within Haredi society since the 1950s and the heightening of its social boundaries - and those who grew up in non-Haredi

households and are familiar with non-Haredi culture and worldviews, namely "Ba'alei Teshuva" or other entrants to Haredi society

To the extent that the discussion also turns to Haredi society itself, it focuses on how Haredi society relates to those who choose to join it (see, for example, Doron, 2021; Kaplan, 2007).

Belonging to Haredi society is a sociological affiliation rather than a religious or faith-based affiliation (see, for example, Brown, 2021; Doron, 2006). Research about leaving Haredi society also emphasizes that this is a sociological phenomenon rather than merely a religious one (e.g., Horowitz, 2018; see also Deutsch and Anisman, 2024, who show that most men and women who leave the Haredi community remain religious). Similarly, joining Haredi society involves an essential dismantling of identity and a transition between communities. Thus, although the decision to join Haredi society is a personal one, it is likely that common patterns can be identified in these transitions, which are influenced by social factors.

Research on trends in joining Haredi society typically identifies three main points-in-time: the years following the establishment of the State of Israel; the Yom Kippur War; and the rise of "Shas" as a religious, ethnic, and social movement (Diagram 1).

Diagram E-1: Milestones in joining Haredi society



The present chapter briefly reviews these milestones and the background to joining Haredi society during each of these periods.

E-1.2 Leaving and Joining Haredi society after the establishment of the State of Israel

The period after the establishment of the State of Israel was characterized by high exit rates from Haredi society, which suddenly faced competition from Zionist youth movements and the IDF's ethos of victory. Against this backdrop, and as part of the struggles between Zionist state institutions and Haredi society, Haredi youth worked to persuade immigrants from Middle Eastern countries to enroll their children in religious and Haredi schools and later, into the Yeshiva Gedola (Lupo, 2004; Friedman, 1991). Indeed, a certain proportion of these students joined Sephardi yeshivot, primarily the "Porat Yosef" Yeshiva in Jerusalem, while others entered Lithuanian-Ashkenazi yeshivot. At the same time, some Sephardi yeshivot adopted the customs of the Lithuanian yeshivot. Alongside the Sephardi tradition, a Sephardi-Lithuanian Haredi community emerged, similar in its lifestyle and dress code to the Ashkenazi-Lithuanian Haredi society.

However, it should be noted that this included a relatively small number of young people, and that, beyond this educational push, during these years Haredi society largely focused on separating itself from the broader Israeli society and on building institutional mechanisms that reinforced this separation.

E-2.2 Joining Haredi society after the Yom Kippur War

Brown (2021) and Kaplan (2007) both refer to the years following the Six-Day War as a period in which a movement to join Haredi society emerged, against the backdrop of the war's outcome and in response to the social changes of the 1960s. These and other researchers (for example, Beit-Hallahmi, 1992) also note the collective trauma after the Yom Kippur War, and the loss of confidence in the leadership as key factors driving this wave.

Simultaneously, Haredi movements and institutional frameworks developed at this time, and sought to influence non-Haredi populations and draw them closer to Haredi Judaism. These included Chabad's outreach and return-to-religion initiatives, Lithuanian rabbis who appealed to the secular public, and organizations and rabbis who targeted traditional Mizrahi communities. Accordingly, Joiners into Haredi society in this period largely came from three main population groups: new immigrants, especially from the United States and the Soviet Union; middle-class, secular Ashkenazim; and Mizrahim from disadvantaged neighborhoods (Brown, 2021; Doron, 2021).

However, cultural, academic, and media portrayals of the return-to-religion movement during these years focused mainly on public figures who were mostly secular and Ashkenazi, most notably, Uri Zohar. These figures became symbols of the return-to-religion movement, namely, secular, Ashkenazi, middle-class individuals who joined Haredi society and replaced one identity with an entirely different one.

Joiners into Haredi society in this wave were characterized by their efforts to fully assimilate : They adopted the ideal of the "society of learners" and embraced Haredi social seclusion, often to the point of distancing themselves from their non-Haredi families. Despite their efforts, they were never fully accepted into the "inner circle"; Joiners were not regarded as equal to those born into Haredi society and encountered discrimination in matchmaking and in admission to educational and other institutions within Haredi society. Haredi society believed there was a need to protect itself against the potential influence of Joiners, individuals who had not grown up in Haredi society and were educated with values foreign to it, and who were therefore seen as likely to "import" those norms and values into Haredi society itself (Doron, 2012, 2021).

E-2.3 Joining Haredi society - the Establishment of the Shas Movement

As noted, throughout the years following the establishment of the State of Israel, a high proportion of those joining Haredi society were immigrants from Islamic countries. Over time, the Sephardi Haredi population grew, and as it expanded, Sephardi Haredim experienced discrimination by Ashkenazi Haredim, because of their origin. Against the backdrop of this discrimination, the Shas movement emerged in the early 1980s, initially as a local list that ran in the 1983 Jerusalem municipal elections, and subsequently as a national political party, first running in the elections to the 11th Knesset, where it won four seats.

Initially, Shas functioned as a political party and a Sephardi-Mizrahi social movement rather than a distinctly Haredi one. In the early 2000s, only about one-third of Shas voters defined themselves as Haredi (Lupo, 2004), while most identified as traditional or religious. This finding is not surprising given the characteristics of Sephardi religiosity and traditionalism. Whereas Ashkenazi Haredi society turned toward segregation following the establishment of the State of Israel (Friedman, 1991), Sephardi Haredi

society maintained a broad religious spectrum - from secular to Haredi - within the same community and even within the same family. Moreover, in many cases, the process of becoming more religious and joining ultra-Orthodox society did not involve cutting ties with one's non-Haredi or non-religious family. (Doron, 2021; Zicherman, 2014).

In the 1999 Knesset elections, Shas won 17 seats, but in the years that followed, its strength declined, and it typically received 9-11 seats. These mandates were received mainly from Sephardim-Haredim, and from a small number of non-Haredi voters and families from the socio-geographic periphery on the borderline between religious and Haredi.

In the 2023 Knesset elections, for example, voter turnout rates for Shas in Haredi cities were close to the proportion of Sephardi residents in those cities.[33] Development towns in the south of Israel, which have been one of Shas's main activity hubs, demonstrated lower voter turnout rates for the party in the elections: about 12% in Sderot, Yeruham, and Dimona, and 18% in Ofakim. An exception is Netivot, where the party received 42% of the votes.

Diagram E-2: Key milestones in the history of the Shas party



One of Shas's main ways of drawing people closer to Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) life is through its own Haredi education system, "Ma'ayan HaChinuch HaTorani" (now "Bnei Yosef"), which was established in the late 1980s. This education system includes three types of institutions: those for children from Haredi households; those for "strengthening" families ("kiruv"); and outreach institutions intended for children from lower socio-economic backgrounds who do not come from Haredi homes. In these institutions, the school staff is Haredi, and schools encourage parents to adopt Haredi practices (Zibtsner and Lehmann, 2010).[34]

Accordingly, when the network was established, its founders presented it as a system that would combine religious and general studies with an emphasis on Sephardi traditions - namely, an educational framework not necessarily intended only for children from Haredi households, but for Sephardi children, whose parents valued religious and traditional education (Feldman, 2020).

From the early 2000s to the mid-2010s, the network experienced a threefold increase in both the number of institutions and students enrolled: from approximately 13,000 students and 90 schools in the early

33. In Elad, about 50% voted for Shas, compared with roughly 45% Sephardi residents; in Bnei Brak, about 30% voted for Shas, alongside approximately 30% Sephardi residents; in Beitar Illit, about 30% voted for Shas, compared with some 20% Sephardi residents; and in Modi'in Illit, about 20% voted for Shas, with roughly 20% Sephardi residents. Data on the share of Sephardi residents in each city are drawn from Regev and Miletzky (2024); data on the 2023 elections to the 25th Knesset are based on the Central Elections Committee website https://votes25.bechirot.gov.il/.

34.In recent years, Ashkenazi schools, primarily affiliated with smaller Hasidic groups, have joined the network, mainly due to disagreements with the Ashkenazi Independent Education system. Since 2024, some of these institutions have left the Bnei Yosef network and joined the state Haredi education system.

2000s to more than 41,000 students and 190 schools by 2016 (Feldman, 2020).[35] During the same period, the party's voter base did not increase significantly, indicating that the expansion of the education network did not translate into increased political support. Indeed, a deeper examination shows that a high proportion of institutions and students come from Haredi cities. In the early years of the network, growth occurred mainly by incorporating existing Haredi schools into the network rather than through outreach to new communities. However, during periods when Shas was part of the governing coalition, the network saw a surge in the opening of new schools (Feldman, 2020).

By contrast, in most socio-geographic peripheral towns, there was little to no change in the number of schools affiliated with the Shas education system between 1996 and 2003, or only a moderate increase (Zussman and Lipiner, 2021). Most growth in the student population stemmed from the rapid expansion of the Haredi population.

As noted, Netivot is an exception in this respect. The number of Shas-affiliated schools in Netivot grew from one in 1996 to seven in 2003. At the same time, the party's share of the vote in the town also doubled, indicating a deeper process in which the city's Mizrahi population became increasingly ultra-Orthodox. In conclusion, the social background of those joining ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) society has changed over the years. Overall, however, there has been a consistent pattern of people from Mizrahi, traditional, and religious families joining Haredi society, but "returning to religion" (□azara bi-teshuva) - a process in which secular, middle-class Ashkenazim join Haredi communities - has remained a relatively marginal phenomenon.

E-3 Transitions among groups in Jewish-Israeli society

One of the key issues in public discourse in Israel is the demographic changes in the composition of Jewish society, namely, the shift from a society with a clear secular majority to one that is more religious and traditional. Public discourse also raises concerns regarding the growing power of Haredi society. Demographic changes stem from two main factors combined: the more rapid demographic growth of religious groups, particularly the Haredi population, and processes of religious return in general and of entry into Haredi society in particular. This chapter presents a general overview of changes in the composition of Jewish-Israeli society and of movement between its different groups. The next chapter will present data trends regarding leaving and joining Haredi society over time.

This section presents an overview of movement patterns among Jews aged 20-64. This picture is derived from a comparative analysis of the Central Bureau of Statistics Social Survey data on the breakdown of levels of religiosity according to self-identification - level of religiosity today in comparison to religious background (the level of religiosity in the family at age 15).

We begin by presenting the breakdown of current religiosity level and religious background among all Jews aged 20-64 (Figure E-1). Afterward, we present the distribution of religiosity level today, broken down by religious background, enabling an examination of transitions from origin groups to the current ones (Figure E-2). Most data are presented in a grouped manner: Haredi, religious (religious or traditional-religious) and non-religious (traditional-non-religious and secular).[36]

35. Feldman (2020) further notes that the Ministry of Education does not formally recognize some educational institutions operating under the Bnei Yosef network and are therefore not included in official statistics.

36. The full categories include: Haredi, religious, traditional-religious, traditional-not-so-religious, and non-religious-secular.

Figure E-1: Distribution of population: religiosity level today and the family's religious background - among 20-64-year-olds (%)



Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.

As shown in Figure E-1, during 2017-2024, approximately one-eighth of individuals aged 20-64 were Haredi (12.4%); nearly one-quarter were religious or traditional-religious (11.8% and 12.4%, respectively); about one-fifth were traditional-non-religious (20.1%); and nearly half were non-religious (43.3%). In general, the distribution of those with a religious background is similar to that of the level of religiosity today, with small differences: the rate of Haredim today is slightly higher than the rate of those with a Haredi background (12.4% and 10.5%, respectively), the rate of the religious and the traditional-religious today is slightly lower (24.2% and 30.5%. respectively), and the rate of the non-religious and traditional-non-religious is higher (63.4% and 59%, respectively).

The data further indicate that Jewish Israeli society is predominantly non-religious: nearly two-thirds (63%) of Jews in Israel are non-religious (secular or traditional-non-religious); approximately one-quarter (24%) are religious; and about one-eighth (13%) are currently Haredi.

Figure E-2: Distribution of transitions: religiosity level today by the family's religious background - among 20-64-year-olds (%)



Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.

An analysis of religiosity level today by religious background reveals a pattern of stability in group affiliation, i.e., most individuals today belong to the same group they belonged to in adolescence (Figure E-2).

This stability is particularly evident among those from a Haredi background and those from a non-religious background: around 90% of those who grew up in Haredi society are still affiliated with Haredi society today, and about 90% of those who grew up in non-religious society remain non-religious.

Only a small percentage of individuals from a Haredi background left Haredi society: 7% left and remained religious, and 4% became non-religious. Among individuals with a non-religious background, 7% are religious today, and 2% have joined Haredi society, indicating that the trend of becoming more religious among those from a non-religious background is limited.

Among those from a religious background, there is greater movement between the categories. Nearly two-thirds (64%) maintain their religious identity, compared to about one-third who become non-religious (30%) and a minority who become Haredim (6%).

However, transition patterns are characterized by gradual shifts along the religious spectrum -passing through a traditional (Masorti) identification - rather than sharp changes from religiosity to non-religiosity.

An analysis of the full distribution of religiosity levels across the five categories (Figure E-N-1) reveals a more nuanced pattern among the traditional groups. Among those with a traditional-religious background, about half maintain the level of religiosity they grew up with, but among the rest, there is a clear tendency toward a transition to decreased religiosity. Within this group, the share of those who define themselves as secular or traditional-non-religious today is much higher than the share of those who choose to define themselves as religious or Haredi. Similarly, among those with a traditional-non-religious background, there is a strong tendency to move towards secularism, with the proportion

of those who define themselves as non-religious or secular being very high compared to those who identify as religious or Haredi self-identification.[37]

The changes in religiosity level, especially among traditional groups, illustrate the religious-sociological continuum of traditionalism and the individual's ability to move between religiosity levels without changing group affiliation. This is in contrast to belonging to Haredi society (and to a lesser extent, secular society), which is more dichotomous.

Furthermore, Figure E-N-1 in the appendix shows that most of the transitions between religiosity levels are toward the less religious direction - in each of the three groups (traditional-non-religious, traditional-religious, and religious), the share of the population that defines itself today as less religious than in its youth is significantly higher than the share of the population that defines itself as more religious than in its youth.

We have presented an overall picture of transitions between groups The data were presented for broad age groups, but without showing changes that occurred over time and without taking into account the effects of demographic changes. These issues will be discussed in detail in the next two chapters.

E-4 Trends in Leaving and Joining Haredi Society

Demographic changes in Israeli society are influenced, among other things, by the demographics of Haredi society: an exceptionally high natural growth rate and the transitions to and from Haredi society.

In this section, we will analyze the transition trends: rates of leaving Haredi society - the share of Yotzim out of all those with a Haredi background - and the rates and percentages of those joining Haredi society - the share of Joiners amongst f all those with a non-Haredi background. These data indicate changes in the scope of leaving and joining over time, but do not show the demographic changes associated with the rapid growth rate of Haredi society.

Therefore, we also examine trends in the integration rate into the target population, i.e. the rate of Yotzim from among all those with a non-Haredi background today and the rate of Joiners from among all those who are Haredi today. These rates reflect the demographic changes within each subgroup and incorporate both overall population growth and shifts in transition rates.[38]

It appears that among those born in the mid-1950s through those born in the mid-1960s, there was a rise in the number of people joining Haredi society, followed by a trend of stabilization and even a slight decline (Figure E-3a). In contrast, among Haredim today, there is a consistent decline in the rate of Joiners (Figure E-3b). Therefore, as long as there is no significant increase in the rates of people joining or the growth rate of non-Haredi Jewish society, the downward trend in the rate of joining among all Haredim today is expected to continue due to the high growth rate of Haredi society.[39]

37. Among those with a traditional-religious background, about 47% define themselves today as traditional-religious, compared to about 38% who define themselves as less religious (traditional-non-religious - secular) and about 15% as more religious (religious-Haredi). Among individuals with a traditional-not religious background, approximately 58% continue to define themselves as traditional-not religious today, compared with about 27% who define themselves as non-religious and about 14% who define themselves as more religious (traditional-religious or Haredi).

38. These data were presented in a study by Deutsch, Shenfeld, and Anisman (2025).

39. Among the 50-64-year-olds (born in the early 1960s to the mid-1970s), there are approximately one million non-Haredi Jews and nearly 80,000 Haredi Jews (8% of the population). About 4% of the non-Haredi population is about 40,000 people, or half of the Haredim in the same age group. In contrast, among the 30-44-year-olds, the number of non-Haredi Jews is approximately 1.2 million people, while the Haredim in this age group amount to approximately 200,000 people (14% of the population). Approximately 4% of the non-Haredi population are about 50,000 people - or one-quarter of the Haredim in the same age group.

Figure E-3: Leaving and joining rates – trends across birth cohorts by gender



Source: The Central Bureau of Statistics' (CBS) Social Survey data for 2007-2012 and 2017-2024, 30-year-olds and over (at the time of response).

As for leaving Haredi society, there is a noticeable downward trend in exit rates among those born in the 1960s and 1970s, and then, starting in the second half of the 1980s, an increase. Due to the rapid growth rate in Haredi society, the percentage of Yotzim among all non-Haredi individuals is increasing faster than the increase in the exit rate and is expected to continue rising even if the upward trend in exit rates is curbed.

In conclusion, the data presented show that the relative trends for each group do not fully reflect the effects of demographic growth. Over the years - even at times when joining Haredi society increased - there has been a significant decline in the proportion of Joiners out of the total population of Haredim today. This is because the rapid natural growth rate of Haredi society offsets the effects of joining, so

that the proportion of Joiners out of all Haredim is decreasing over time. Among the Yotzim, a counter-image is presented. Due to the rapid natural growth rate in Haredi society, even at times of stability in exit rates, there is an increase in the proportion of Yotzim out of the total current non-Haredi population.

E-5 The Composition of the Groups in Israel

So far, we have focused on transitions between groups and presented initial data regarding their scope and how they are reflected in Haredi and non-Haredi society. In this section, we will further examine the potential impact of transitions on each of the groups.

As described in Section 2, joining Haredi society has a great impact on secular-Haredi relations in Israel, as well as on internal Haredi relations. In secular society, the rapid growth rate of Haredi society is often perceived as a threat, and joining Haredi society is often perceived as a double threat. Conversely, Haredi society is deeply concerned about the spread of non-Haredi norms and practices that it views as foreign to its distinct character.

This raises the question: Is there any truth to these concerns? Is the scope of transitions, especially joining Haredi society, large enough to affect the groups themselves?

Analysis of the religious background of Jewish society today shows that the predominantly Haredi population consists of those who grew up and were educated in it (Figure E-4).

Figure E4: Distribution of religious background, broken down by religiosity level today (%)



Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.

In the past, the phenomenon of returning to religion had a great influence on the composition of Haredi society. Approximately 50% of individuals aged 50 and over (born in the 1960s and 1970s) who are Haredi today grew up in non-Haredi homes (Figure E-5). These are the parents of today's young Haredim, meaning that many of those young people grew up in families where the parents are graduates of State or State-Religious education system, and were exposed to the general Jewish-Israeli society and its

culture, as well as to Western culture. Moreover, it is likely that many of these Haredi youths have relatives who are not Haredi.

A noticeable generational shift is evident in the younger generations: the share of HFH has increased, while rates of joining have declined. Among Haredim today aged 30-39, fewer than one-quarter grew up in a non-Haredi home.

Figure E-5: Distribution of religious background (at age 15) among Haredim today, broken down by age groups (%)



Source: The Central Bureau of Statistics' Social survey data for 2017-2024, Haredi today (women and men).
Stable data: assumes that most transitions have already been completed within these age groups. Qualified data: assumes that transitions between the groups have not yet ended.
From a religious background: religious or traditional-religious. From a non-religious background: traditional–not-so-religious, and non-religious, secular.

Moreover, the data indicate that most transitions occur between religious and Haredi society. This pattern is especially salient among the older cohort: 60%-70% of Joiners from the 50+ age group come from a religious background, compared with approximately 50% among individuals under 50. It should be noted that during the 1970s, the media was preoccupied with the widespread phenomenon of "returning to religion" among the secular middle class. The data, however, indicate that this group nevertheless constituted a minority among Joiners.

Most transitions between levels of religiosity, however, reflect a movement toward a decline in religiosity rather than toward greater religiosity. (see Section E-3). This raises the question: What is the composition of other groups in Israeli society - religious and non-religious - and who are the people joining them? Unlike Haredi or secular society, the Religious-Zionist community is known to encompass a continuum of religious practices and lifestyles (see, for example, Katzman, 2022). At one end are liberal religious individuals who are fully integrated into non-religious society; at the other end are the Torah-Religious (also referred to as National-Haredi). The National-Haredim originate in the religious community but adopt more stringent religious practices and conservative outlooks resembling those of Haredi society, but identify with Zionism and nationalism (Sheleg, 2020).

Among those who are religious today, the share of individuals with a religious background has remained relatively stable over time - between 75% and 83%. By contrast, the share of individuals with a Haredi background among those who are religious today, has been increasing, reflecting three factors: the numerical growth of Haredi age groups; rising exit rates; and the fact that most individuals who exit Haredi society join the religious community (Figure E-6).

Figure E-6: Distribution of religious background (at age 15) among those religious today, broken down by age groups (%)



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3. Missing value - sampling error exceeds 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: The Central Bureau of Statistics' Social survey data for the years 2017-2024, religious today (women and men).
Stable data: assumes that most transitions have already been completed within these age groups. Qualified data: assumes that transitions between groups have not yet been completed.
From a religious background: religious or traditional-religious.
From a non-religious background: traditional–not-so-religious, and non-religious, secular.

Non-religious society is the most homogeneous of the three groups: the proportion of people from a non-religious background among non-religious today is 81%-85%, with only about 15% with a religious background. The proportion of people with a Haredi background among the non-religious today is neglible, since non-religious people are the largest group in the population, and due to the relatively low proportion of people with a Haredi background who leave religion as well as Haredi society (Figure 7).

Figure E-7: Distribution of religious background (at age 15) among those non-religious today (%)



Missing value - sampling error exceeds 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: Data from the Central Bureau of Statistics' (CBS) Social Survey for 2017-2024, non-religious today (men and women).
Stable data: assumes that most transitions have already been completed within these age groups.
Qualified data: assumes that transitions between groups have not yet been completed.
From a religious background: religious or traditional-religious.
From a non-religious background: traditional-not-so-religious, and non-religious, secular.

E-6 Joining Haredi Society

The previous sections presented the composition of Haredi society today - HFH and Joiners. This section examines in greater depth the characteristics of Joiners into Haredi society, focusing on their self-identification and ethnic origin.

E-6.1 Self-identification and the concept of "returning to religion" (hazara b'tshuva) among Joiners

The primary focus of this report/section is transitions between groups rather than individual personal processes. Accordingly, the analysis mainly refers to joining Haredi society in general, rather than specifically on the phenomenon commonly referred to as "becoming religious."

In Jewish Israeli society, the term Returnees to religion (ba'alei teshuva) is typically associated with secular or traditional individuals who begin observing Jewish law and embrace a religious or Haredi lifestyle. It is not generally used to describe religious individuals who choose to join Haredi society. Hence, individuals from religious households who join Haredi society often do not identify themselves as Returnees, as they have been religious throughout their lives (see, for example, Sharabi, 2014).

This issue was examined in the Social Survey conducted in 2009 and 2018. These surveys included questions pertaining to self-identification as Returnees among those who reported that during their lifetime, they have become more religious (Figure 8).[40]

40. Respondents were asked: "During your lifetime, compared with today, have you: become more religious?, has your religiosity level remained unchanged?, or have you become less religious?". Those who mentioned they have become more religious, were also asked: "Do you define yourself as a Returnee to Religion?

Figure E-8: Change in religiosity level and identification as a Returnee, broken down by religiosity level today (%)



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3. Missing value - sampling error exceeds 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: The Central Bureau of Statistics' Social Survey for 2009 and 2018, Jews (men and women).
Respondents who reported that they became more religious were also asked if they identify as returnees to religion.
The category "Became more religious" refers to those who reported that during their lifetime they became more religious, but did not identify as a Returnee.
The category of "Returnee to Religion" refers to those who reported that during their lifetime they became more religious, and also identify as Returnees.
Data by religious background and by subgroups (Haredim today, Yotzim, etc.) are presented in Figure E-N-2 of the appendix.

An analysis of responses to this question indicates that approximately 20% of those who are currently Haredim identify themselves as Returnees and an additional 20% reported having become more religious over the course of their lives but do not identify as Returnees to religion. Among those who are religious today (but not Haredi), approximately 15% self-identified as Returnees and about 25% reported having become more religious without identifying as such. The proportion of those who identify as returnees to religion among individuals who are Haredim today, is similar to earlier estimates, according to which 22% of the adult Haredi population are Returnees by self-identification (Friedman et al., 2011).[41]

As noted in the previous section, the proportion of Joiners among all those who are Haredim today, is approximately 24%, consistent with commonly cited data. However, this estimate includes individuals aged 20-34, who were not included in the 2009 survey. Given that joining rates are lower among this younger cohort, one might have expected the rate reported by Friedman et al. (2011) to be higher. In addition, the overall estimates of Joiner rates are relatively low, as they do not account for joining at later ages, a factor that has a significant effect on Joiner rates (Deutsch et al., 2025).

41. It should be noted that Friedman et al. (2011) referred to 2009 data only.

To examine the reasons for the lower-than-expected estimate, an analysis was conducted of the data pertaining to Joiners, those who are Haredim today but grew up in non-Haredi households. The findings indicate that approximately two-thirds of Joiners identified themselves as Returnees while the remainder reported that they had become more religious or that their level of religiosity had not changed but did not identify themselves as Returnees (Figure E-9).

Figure E-9: Changes in religiosity levels among Joiners into Haredi Society, broken down by Gender (%)



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3. Missing value - sampling error exceeds 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: The Central Bureau of Statistics' Social Survey for 2009 and 2018, Joiners into Haredi society (men and women).
Respondents who reported that they became more religious were also asked if they identify as Returnees to religion.
The category "Became more religious" refers to those who reported that during their lifetime they became more religious, but did not identify as a Returnees.
The category Returnee to Religion refers to those who reported that during their lifetime they became more religious, and also identify as Returnees.

An analysis of the religious backgrounds of Joiners further supports the hypothesis of a link between religious background and self-identification as Returnees: 92% of Joiners who grew up in non-religious households defined themselves as Returnees, compared with only 47% of those who grew up in religious households (Figure E-10).

Figure E-10: Self-identification as Returnees among Joiners into Haredi society, broken down by religious background (%)



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: The Central Bureau of Statistics' Social Survey for 2009 and 2018, Joiners into Haredi society (men and women).
Respondents who reported that they became more religious were also asked if they identify as Returnees
The category "Became more religious" refers to those who reported that during their lifetime they became more religious, but did not identify as a Returnees.
The category of Returnees refers to those who reported that during their lifetime they became more religious, and also identify as Returnees.

E-6.2 Origin and ethnic background among Joiners

As noted in Section 2, ethnic background constitutes an important component in the structure of Haredi society. It is important to note that Sephardi Haredi society differs from Ashkenazi Haredi society in its patterns of integration into Israeli society (in education and employment), as well as in its relationships with non-Haredi family members and with those who join. An examination of parental ethnic origins within the four subgroups (HFH, Yotzim, non-Haredim, and Joiners) reinforces the conclusion that, since the establishment of the state, transition rates have been higher among Mizrahim (individuals born in Africa or Asia, or whose parents were born in those regions). As shown in Figure E-11, their share among Joiners and Yotzim exceeds their share in the source population. Moreover, across all age groups, the share of Joiners and Yotzim with at least one parent originating from Africa or Asia is higher than the corresponding share among HFH.

Figure E-11: Parents' origin, broken down by subgroups and age groups (%)



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3. Missing value - sampling error exceeds 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics' Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews (men and women).
Israeli: Both parents born in Israel; Ashkenazi - both parents born in Europe or America;
Mizrahi - both parents born in Asia or Africa, excluding South Africa and Rhodesia; Mizrahi and Ashkenazi - one parent born in Europe or America and one parent born in Asia or Africa.
For analysis by additional groups, see Figure E-N-2.

Notably, it is impossible to identify country of origin among third-generation Israelis - those whose parents were born in Israel and are therefore classified as natives (Israeli-born). Because their proportion is very high among younger cohorts and lower among older cohorts, differences in origin are more pronounced among older individuals and less so among younger ones.

The share of young individuals who are Israeli-born is slightly higher in groups with a Haredi background

(HFH - 68%, Yotzim - 61%) compared with groups from a non-Haredi background (non-Haredim - 55%, Joiners - 49%). This likely reflects earlier ages at marriage within Haredi society, leading third-generation Israelis in Haredi communities to be born earlier than their third-generation counterparts in non-Haredi populations.

Another issue to consider is that Mizrahi immigrants originating from countries in the Americas and Europe (primarily France) are classified as Ashkenazi. However, their share within the overall population is likely relatively small; consequently, the impact of this classification on the analysis and conclusions is limited.

The data presented in Sections 5 and 6, which examine the religious and ethnic background of Joiners, indicate that, contrary to prevailing perceptions in Israeli culture (see discussion in Section 2), even during the 1970s and 1980s, the majority of Joiners were religious and of Mizrahi background rather than secular Ashkenazim.

The ethnic composition of Yotzim, and its strong resemblance to the ethnic composition of Joiners, suggests that the share of Joiners' children among those who choose to exit Haredi society is higher than their share within the overall Haredi population today. In the next section, we will compare the characteristics of these Yotzim with those of Yotzim whose parents are both HFH.

E-7 Exit from Haredi Society Among Joiners' Children

The prevailing assumption, based largely on the high proportion of second-generation Joiners among Yotzim, is that the scope of exit is greater among the second generation of Joiners than among those whose parents are HFH (Horowitz, 2018; Regev and Gordon, 2021).

However, as explained in the previous section, the composition of Haredi society varies by age cohorts. Among older cohorts, Joiners constitute approximately 50% of the Haredi population, and this share declines steadily among younger cohorts. The parents of Yotzim who were examined in earlier studies, belong to these older cohorts. Therefore, even if the exit rate is not higher among Joiners, it is reasonable to expect that the proportion of Yotzim who are second-generation Joiners would be very high, reflecting the composition of Haredi society in earlier birth cohorts. To the best of our knowledge, previous studies have not taken into account the proportion of Joiners when analyzing the demographic background of Yotzim.

Hence the question arises: Will changes in the composition of Haredi society - particularly the decline in the proportion of Joiners - affect exit trends and the characteristics of those who choose to leave? The share of former Haredim who are second-generation Joiners may be influenced by two factors: first, the overall proportion of Joiners within the current Haredi community; and second, any potential tendency - if such a tendency exists - for higher exit rates among second generation Joiners.

The decline in the proportion of Joiners within the overall Haredi community is expected to reduce the share of second-generation Joiners among younger cohorts. Accordingly, we would expect to observe a shift in the composition of Yotzim, with younger individuals more likely to have two parents raised in Haredi households, and older individuals more likely to have at least one parent who is a Joiner.

The Social Survey conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics does not contain data that enable examination of this question. However, a dedicated survey administered by Out for Change in 2025 (hereafter, the Integration Survey) incorporated questions that make it possible, based on self-

identification, to determine whether respondents' parents are HFH. The findings from the Integration Survey indicate a moderate increase in the share of Yotzim with HFH parents: 42% among individuals aged 35-49 are children of HFH parents, compared with 52% among younger respondents aged 18-24 (Figure E-12).

Figure E-12: Rate of Yotzim whose parents are HFH, broken down by age group (Integration Survey)



Source: The Integration Survey (2025) conducted among 932 Yotzim (former Haredim), aged 25-60, who were identified by self-identification (for further details see online appendix).

However, the rate of increase in the proportion of Yotzim whose parents are HFH is lower than would be expected, given demographic changes within Haredi society, and even when accounting for the possibility that exit rates among the children of Joiners are higher than their relative share in the population.

A deeper examination reveals that the moderate trend is influenced by respondents aged 18. In this group, the share of respondents whose two parents are HFH is lower than among those aged 19-24 and more closely resembles the share observed among those aged 25-29 (Figure 13).

Figure E-13: Rate of children of two HFH parents, broken down by specific age (Integration Survey)



Source: The Integration Survey (2025) conducted among 932 Yotzim (former Haredim), aged 25-60, who were identified by self-identification (for further details see online appendix).

The difference between 18-year-olds and individuals aged 19-24 likely reflects a connection between Haredi background and exit age among survey respondents: the median exit age is 21 among Yotzim whose two parents are HFH, compared with 20 among Yotzim whose two parents are Joiners (Figure E-14).

Figure E-14: Share of children of two HFH parents, broken down by exit age (Integration Survey)



Source: The Integration Survey (2025) conducted among 932 Yotzim (former Haredim), aged 25-60, who were identified by self-identification (for further details see online appendix).

Another characteristic that corresponds with the Haredi background of Yotzim is ethnic origin. As noted in Section 6, the majority of Joiners are of Mizrahi origin, whereas the majority of HFH are of Ashkenazi origin. A similar pattern emerges among survey respondents: approximately 80% of respondents whose parents are HFH reported that both parents are Ashkenazi, compared with only about one-third of respondents with at least one parent who was raised in a non-Haredi household (Figure E-15).

Figure E-15: Ethnic origin, broken down by parents' Haredi status (Integration Survey)



Source: The Integration Survey (2025) conducted among 932 Yotzim (former Haredim), aged 25-60, who were self-identified (for further details see online appendix).

This finding is also observed among Yotzim who do not reach out to support organizations. An examination of responses from survey participants recruited via iPanel reveals a similar pattern, despite differences in the ethnic composition of respondents in this sample (compared with respondents recruited directly by Out for Change). In both populations, the share of children with two Ashkenazi parents was more than twice as high among those whose two parents are HFH than among those with at least one non-Haredi parent (see Figure E-N-4).

The characteristics of Yotzim who are children of Joiners may affect their integration into Israeli society. This is particularly evident with respect to conscription in the IDF. The combination of a younger exit age, greater access to information, and familiarity with military service among those with non-Haredi family members, increases the likelihood of enlisting. This pattern is clearly reflected in the Integration Survey data: 58% of male Yotzim with at least one Joiner parent enlisted in the IDF, compared with 41% of male Yotzim with two HFH parents (Figure E-16).

Figure E-16: Conscription into the IDF by parents' background - men aged 25 and over (Integration Survey)



Source: The Integration Survey (2025) conducted among 350 Yotzim men aged 25-60, who were identified by self-identification (for further details see online appendix).

E-8 Summary and Discussion

The current study provides a historical overview and current data on the composition of Haredi society, with particular focus on those who join it.

The composition of Haredi society is significantly shaped by the characteristics of Joiners. During the 1950s and 1960s, joining rates into Haredi society were relatively extensive; accordingly, among the older age cohorts, Joiners constitute approximately half of those who are Haredi today. After the 1950s and 1960s, no substantial change is evident in the rate of joining Haredi society. In recent years, however, the share of Joiners within Haredi society has steadily declined, due to the rapid overall growth of the Haredi population.

Over the years, those who joined Haredi society tended to come from a religious background and from Mizrahi origins. The process of joining did not conform to the "classic" model of secular Ashkenazi Returnees, but instead took the form of increased religiosity, producing a religious-Haredi continuum distinct from the separatist orientation characteristic of Ashkenazi Haredi society.

In contrast to Joiners, the majority of HFH in these age cohorts are Ashkenazi. Based on the currently available data, it is impossible to determine the composition of Haredi society among younger cohorts or to assess how waves of those joining Haredi society have influenced the ethnic background of younger generations.

The demographic characteristics of Yotzim, as individuals born into Haredi society are shaped by the composition of Haredi society itself. Thus, a relatively high proportion of Yotzim are of Mizrahi origin, reflecting the fact that many were born to parents who joined Haredi society and whose relative proportion is higher among older cohorts. Accordingly, changes in the proportion of Joiners within the current Haredi population are expected to influence the characteristics of Yotzim and may also affect the exit movement through several mechanisms.

The first mechanism concerns the relative ease of exit and the motivation to do so. In this context, some scholars argue that among the second generation of Joiners there are both "pull" factors toward non-Haredi society and "push" factors away from Haredi society (push-pull).

Regarding pull factors, exiting Haredi society is more accessible to those who are more exposed to Israeli society and to non-Haredi relatives, as is the case among many individuals from Sephardi backgrounds, where it is less customary to sever ties with non-Haredi family members (Horowitz, 2018; Zicherman, 2014). In contrast, in more closed and conservative communities, exit rates are lower, as indicated by field-based evidence.

With respect to push factors, the treatment of Joiners' children is particularly salient, especially regarding admission to prestigious educational institutions and matchmaking (Kaplan, 2007). These children, who during adolescence - or even earlier - experience rejection by Haredi society, may feel less committed to it and may more readily seek an independent path.

Thus, a decline in the share of Joiners into Haredi society may lead to reduced exit rates, stemming from a decrease in the proportion of individuals for whom these specific push-pull factors are especially relevant.

However, despite the association between joining and exiting rates, a decline in the proportion of Joiners would not necessarily result in a decline in exit rates. As Horowitz (2018) notes, additional subgroups exhibit relatively high exit levels, including modern Haredim and Anglo-Saxon Haredim (also called "Anglo Haredim"). Despite missing data on exit rates among modern Haredim, qualitative assessments suggest that exit rates in these groups are relatively high.

Furthermore, the currently high exit rate is already beginning to show its effects. Many young Haredim today, regardless of their parents' background, maintain contact with relatives, friends, or acquaintances who have chosen to exit Haredi society. These individuals serve as sources of guidance and assistance, thus constituting an additional pull factor encouraging exit.

Demographic changes within Haredi society may affect not only exit rates but also the integration of Yotzim into the society to which they transition. As noted, Joiners' children seem to exit at younger ages, and correspondingly demonstrate higher rates of conscription into the IDF. Furthermore, ties to non-Haredi family members provide them with tools that facilitate integration into non-Haredi society, particularly in overcoming knowledge and cultural barriers related to military service, higher education, and access to meaningful/quality employment (see Anisman and Deutsch, 2025).

A decline in the proportion of Joiners' children among Yotzim may be accompanied by an increase in the share of Yotzim who need support during their integration process, including becoming familiar with Israeli society, assistance in overcoming educational gaps, and acquisition of soft skills essential for adult life.

Today's relatively high exit rate, compared to previous decades, may serve as a moderating factor. Currently one in seven young people leave Haredi society. The magnitude of this rate may mean that, unlike in the past, many Yotzim today - including those from the core of the Haredi community - have relatives and friends who preceded them in this transition and can serve as anchors and sources of support during the process of integration into mainstream Israeli society (Horowitz, 2025).

Further research is required to examine the scope of exit from additional subgroups within Haredi society and to assess possible differences in the integration trajectories of Yotzim based on their Haredi background.

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E - Appendix

Figure E-N-1: Changes in religiosity levels among Jews aged 20-64 (%)



Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.

Figure E-N-2: Changes in religiosity levels - by main groups and subgroups (%)





Source: The Central Bureau of Statistics' Social Survey for 2009 and 2018.
Respondents who reported that they became more religious were also asked if they identify Returnees
The category "Became more Religious" refers to those who reported that during their life they became more religious, but did not identify as Returnees.
The category of Returnees refers to those who reported that during their lifetime they became more religious, and also identify as Returnees
The data for Yotzim are not presented because of the small number of observations.

Figure E-N-3: Country of origin, broken down by gender (%)



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3. Missing value - sampling error exceeds 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics' Social Survey data (2017-2024), Jews (men and women).
Israeli: Both parents born in Israel; Ashkenazi - both parents born in Europe or America; Mizrahi - both parents born in Asia or Africa, excluding South Africa and Rhodesia; Mizrahi and Ashkenazi - one parent born in Europe or America and one parent born in Asia or Africa.

Figure E-N4: Ashkenazi respondents - according to their parents' Haredi / ultra-Orthodox status (Integration Survey - comparison between the survey conducted by Out for Change, and the one conducted by iPanel)



Source: Integration Survey (2025).
The survey conducted by Out for Change: 936 male and female Yotzim (former Haredim), aged 18-60 who self-identified (for further details, please refer to the online appendix).
The survey conducted by iPanel: 194 male and female Yotzim (former Haredim), aged 18-44 who self-identified. The survey was conducted only among individuals who, at the time of their registration with iPanel, self-identified as religious or traditional.

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