



THE DATA IS OUT

The Annual Report on
Leaving Haredi Society

Key Findings

2025

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Introduction

The Data is Out yearbook aims to present a representative, comparative, and comprehensive picture of people who have left ultra-Orthodox society (also referred to as "Yotzim" and "formerly ultra-Orthodox") with regard to their demographic, educational, and employment profiles.

Until now, research information about this population has been limited. Aside from the data published in this yearbook in recent years - based on representative datasets from the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics - very little representative data on people leaving ultra-Orthodox society has been published. What has been published does not provide a comprehensive and comparative picture of their profiles.

This summary booklet accompanies the Yearbook and presents the key findings emerging from the analysis of data from the Central Bureau of Statistics and comparing information about those who have left ultra-Orthodox society with other groups classified based on their current or past affiliation with ultra-Orthodox society.

Exit Rates Show a Steady Upward Trend Over the Past Two Decades

A peak in the early years of the State and a decline from the 1970s onward: After the establishment of the State of Israel, many young people who grew up in ultra-Orthodox families left ultra-Orthodox society and integrated into mainstream Israeli society. Beginning in the 1970s, ultra-Orthodox society accelerated processes of insularity and social separation, and the rates of exit declined.

The low point was in the 1990s: Exit rates reached their lowest point among those born in the late 1960s and the 1970s and stood at about 7% of each ultra-Orthodox birth cohort. Members of this group left ultra-Orthodox society during the 1990s.


Reversal of the trend and rising rates of exit in the past 20 years: Among those born in the 1980s and later, there was an increasing rate of exit, reaching about 12% of each ultra-Orthodox birth cohort among those born in the late 1990s and early 2000s (which is the group leaving ultra-Orthodox society in recent years).

The share of people leaving ultra-Orthodox society within Jewish society is growing rapidly, in line with the rapid growth of ultra-Orthodox society

The growth rate of ultra-Orthodox society is the highest in Israeli society. Therefore, even if the rate of exit declines, the absolute number of people leaving ultra-Orthodox society will continue to grow. The proportion of those who have left ultra-Orthodox society within the non-ultra-Orthodox Jewish population is growing rapidly, rising from about 1% among those born in the 1980s to nearly 3% among those born in the early 2000s.

Figure 1: Rates of exit - according to year of birth

Share of Yotzim among all those from a Haredi background



Source: Social Survey data (2007-2012 and 2017-2023), Jews aged 20-64 (at the time of response). In the Social Survey, age data is categorized into quintiles. To estimate the year of birth, the median age within each age group was used as the reference point.

Leaving ultra-Orthodox society is a sociological, not a religious, phenomenon

Two-thirds of those who leave ultra-Orthodox society remain religious or traditional: Most Yotzim are still on the religious spectrum - about half are religious, and another fifth are traditional-religious.


Similarity between men and women: Levels of religiosity are similar among men and women.

Younger people are somewhat more religious: The share of younger people who remain on the religious spectrum is higher than among older people. This finding is consistent across different surveys. At this stage, it is impossible to determine whether people who leave ultra-Orthodox society become less religious with age, or whether the younger cohort of Yotzim includes a higher proportion of religious individuals than the older cohort.

Similar findings emerge from different sources and based on different definitions of religiosity.

Among respondents to the Labor Force Survey, slightly less than half are religious, and about another fifth are "very religious."

Figure 2: Current distribution of religiosity among Yotzim, by age



Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024).

Yotzim are the youngest group

Those who leave ultra-Orthodox society are the youngest people: About half are aged 30 and under, a proportion slightly higher than among those raised ultra-Orthodox and much higher than among the non-ultra-Orthodox population.


Why are there so many young people among the Yotzim?

1. **Demographic growth in ultra-Orthodox society:** Due to the rapid demographic growth of ultra-Orthodox society, the proportion of young people in this community is much higher than among the non-ultra-Orthodox population. This trend affects both those who leave and those raised ultra-Orthodox in similar ways.
2. **The increase in exit rates:** The rise in exit rates means that the proportion of young people among those who leave is even higher than their proportion among those raised ultra-Orthodox.

Yotzim are at a critical age for successful integration into higher education and the workforce, underscoring the importance of appropriate supports.

Those who leave ultra-Orthodox society at a young age are at the point of acquiring higher education and entering the workforce. Providing appropriate support during this critical period can have a significant impact on their ability to realize their potential in higher education and in meaningful employment.

Figure 3: Age distribution among 20-54-year-olds (men and women), broken down by subgroups (%)



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).

Source: Social Survey data (2017-2024)

The data do not add up to 100% due to rounding.

Yotzim are overrepresented among those serving in the IDF who come from an ultra-Orthodox background

Yotzim make up the majority of soldiers from an ultra-Orthodox background: 60% of IDF soldiers who come from an ultra-Orthodox background are Yotzim. The share is especially high among younger people - approximately 70%.


Yotzim make up the majority of IDF reservists from an ultra-Orthodox background: 60% of reservists from an ultra-Orthodox background are Yotzim.

The proportion of younger people who leave and enlist is rising: At older ages, the proportion of Yotzim among all people from an ultra-Orthodox background serving in the IDF declines. This decline reflects an increase in the proportion of younger Yotzim and serve, together with rising rates of exit.

The events of October 7 intensified the public debate over military service by graduates of ultra-Orthodox education.

The events of October 7 intensified the public debate over the enlistment of Haredim, an issue that has for years been a source of tension between non-ultra-Orthodox Jewish society and ultra-Orthodox society. While enlistment rates among Yotzim have risen in recent years, this has not been the case among those who are still ultra-Orthodox.

Figure 4: The share of Yotzim among all men from an ultra-Orthodox background who have ever served in the IDF, and among those who have served in the reserves.



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3

Sources: **Served in the IDF:** Social Survey data for 2017-2024, men aged 20-39 from an ultra-Orthodox background.

Reservists: Labor Force Survey data for 2017-2024, men aged 25-44 from an ultra-Orthodox background who worked fewer hours, were absent from work, or did not look for work because of reserve duty.

Yotzim are highly motivated to integrate and serve.


Most male Yotzim enlist: About 60% of male Yotzim serve in the IDF, reflecting their strong motivation to integrate into society. Although Yotzim enlist at lower rates than the non-ultra-Orthodox population (about 90%), their service rate is significantly higher than that of those who are Haredim from Home (grew up ultra-Orthodox and remain so today) (about 10%).

Most former Haredi women do not enlist: The share of former Haredi women who serve in the IDF or in national service is relatively low, at just over 25% of women. This low enlistment rate primarily reflects the religious exemption that they receive while still students in ultra-Orthodox schools, as well as the fact that military service for women is generally not accepted in ultra-Orthodox society.

Yotzim enlist despite opposition within ultra-Orthodox society

Among young Israelis, military service is seen not only as an obligation and an important stage of life, but often also as a gateway into Israeli society for groups on the social periphery. Yotzim enlist at high rates and adopt norms of non-ultra-Orthodox society.

Figure 5: Share of Israelis serving in the IDF or in National Service by group



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3

No value shown: the sampling error is greater than 0.3.

Source: Social Survey data for 2017-2024, ages 20-64.


After October 7, Yotzim enlisted and served in the reserves at high rates

The share of Yotzim serving in the reserves has increased since the outbreak of the war: The proportion of male Yotzim who served in the reserves has risen since October 7, similar to the trend among the non-ultra-Orthodox population.

Yotzim make up the majority of reservists from an ultra-Orthodox background: Before October 7, Yotzim accounted for nearly 60% of all people from an ultra-Orthodox background who served in the reserves. This share declined slightly after the war due to an increase in reserve service among Haredim from home, but Yotzim still make up more than half of reservists from an ultra-Orthodox background.

The share of Yotzim among all reservists is similar to their share in the population: Yotzim who serve in the reserves make up about 2% of the non-ultra-Orthodox population today, similar to the share of Yotzim in the population overall.

Figure 6: Percentage of men in military reserve service, broken down by time period



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3. Maximum value was marked when the relative sampling error was greater than 0.

Source: The Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) Labor Force Survey data (2017-2024), men aged 25-44.
After the outbreak of the war: 2024 and 2023 after October 7.

Despite being highly motivated to pursue higher education, the share of degree holders among Yotzim is relatively low

Yotzim face a combination of barriers on their path to higher education: Most male Yotzim did not study core curriculum subjects, and most women do not have a formal matriculation certificate (bagrut). Many Yotzim also lack family and financial support, making it difficult to complete missing educational requirements.


The share of degree holders among Yotzim is low: Among both male and female Yotzim, the proportion holding academic degrees is low - about half that of the non-ultra-Orthodox population, and only slightly higher than among Haredim from home.

Former ultra-Orthodox women have less post-secondary education than currently ultra-Orthodox women: Many former ultra-Orthodox women leave the ultra-Orthodox education system before completing their studies in the seminary system and therefore are not eligible even for a post-secondary certificate.

The proportion of male Yotzim who are students is higher than the share of male Yotzim degree holders

In recent years, there appears to be an increase in the share of male Yotzim who are students, but not in the share of degree holders. This may indicate a changing trend and a rise in the number of male Yotzim pursuing higher education, or it may reflect high dropout rates among Yotzim who begin studies but do not successfully complete their degrees.

Figure 7: Academic degree holders (the highest degree)



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3.

Source: Social Survey data for 2017-2024, ages 25-64.

Place of Residence


Yotzim are spread across the country: Yotzim live primarily in Jerusalem, the Tel Aviv District, and the Central District, but also in southern Israel, the north, and the West Bank.

Yotzim fall between ultra-Orthodox and non-ultra-Orthodox society: Looking at regional distribution, ultra-Orthodox populations are more concentrated in Jerusalem, while the non-ultra-Orthodox population is more concentrated in the Tel Aviv and Central Districts. Yotzim show an intermediate pattern: a higher share lives in Jerusalem than among the non-ultra-Orthodox (but fewer than among the ultra-Orthodox), and a smaller proportion live in the Tel Aviv and Central Districts than among the non-ultra-Orthodox (but more than among the ultra-Orthodox).

The characteristics of Yotzim vary across regions

Yotzim in Jerusalem are younger and more religious than Yotzim in Tel Aviv and the Central District. It is possible that many Yotzim initially remain in the city, in addition to the students studying there. As they grow older, Yotzim - especially those who are secular - move to Tel Aviv and the Central District, similar to the pattern seen among the non-ultra-Orthodox population.

Chart 8: Districts of residency, by sub-group



Source: Social Survey data for 2017-2024, ages 20-64.

Family status


Most Yotzim are not single: 75% of Yotzim are married or divorced, a percentage similar to the non-ultra-Orthodox population and lower than among Haredim from home.

The share of divorced individuals among Yotzim is high: One quarter of former ultra-Orthodox women and one eighth of male Yotzim are divorced - rates higher than among the non-ultra-Orthodox population. One third of former ultra-Orthodox women were divorced at some time, even if they are not currently divorced, compared with about one fifth of non-ultra-Orthodox women.

Many Yotzim adopt the marriage norms of non-ultra-Orthodox society

Yotzim leave a society where early marriage and early parenthood are common and enter one where people tend to marry later and have smaller families. Yotzim adopt the norms of non-ultra-Orthodox society regarding marriage and starting a family, although some are influenced by having married at a young age before leaving.

Figure 9: The share of non-single individuals (currently or previously married), by gender



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3.

Source: Social Survey data for 2017-2024, ages 25-64.

*Divorced or widowed: including individuals who are separated.

High levels of participation in the labor market

Employment rates among Yotzim are high: The rate of Yotzim participating in the labor force is only slightly lower than that of the non-ultra-Orthodox population and much higher than Haredim from home.


Yotzim work full-time: On average, Yotzim work full-time, similar to the non-ultra-Orthodox population. In contrast, Haredim from home tend to work fewer hours.

Unemployment among older Yotzim is higher: At younger ages, the share of job seekers among Yotzim is similar to that of the non-ultra-Orthodox population. However, in contrast to other groups, the share of job seekers remains high among Yotzim even at older ages, indicating unique long-term barriers to integration into the labor market.

Yotzim internalize the work norms common among non-Haredi Jews

Yotzim come from ultra-Orthodox society, where many men do not work at all or work only part-time. The data show that in all aspects within their control - labor force participation and scope of employment - Yotzim are similar to the non-ultra-Orthodox population.

Figure 10: Employment rate and participation in the labor force



Source: Labor Force Survey data for 2016-2024, Jewish men born in Israel, ages 25-64

Difficulty integrating into quality employment


A large share of Yotzim work in low-wage jobs: 58% of Yotzim work in positions that do not require an academic education or professional training and that generally offer low wages, such as drivers, skilled trade workers, or jobs in sales and services.

Graduates of ultra-Orthodox education face difficulties entering high-quality jobs: Only about one fifth of Yotzim work in positions that require high-level skills and offer correspondingly higher wages, similar to the rate among Haredim from home.

Gap in education and skills affect all graduates of ultra-Orthodox education

Both Yotzim and Haredim from home are graduates of ultra-Orthodox yeshivot, where core curriculum subjects are not taught. As a result, many face educational gaps and a lack of core academic skills such as English and mathematics. These gaps may help explain their lower rates of integration into higher education and into jobs that require high levels of skill.

Figure 11: Distribution of employed individuals by the skill level required for their occupation (%)



Source: Labor Force Survey data for 2021-2024, men born in Israel, ages 25-64.

A rising trend in employment in the high-tech sector


The share of Yotzim employed in high-tech professions is low: 8% of Yotzim are employed in high-tech and exact sciences professions, about one third of the rate among the non-ultra-Orthodox population.

A growing trend in integration into high-tech: Until recently, the proportion of Yotzim and Haredim from home working in high-tech professions was similar. In the past five years, this trend has changed, and the share of Yotzim entering high-tech employment has been rising. Among Haredim from home, there has been no significant change.

The upward trend parallels policy changes in the Council for Higher Education

In 2017, the Council for Higher Education (CHE) changed its policy regarding efforts to encourage graduates of ultra-Orthodox education to integrate into higher education. Today, there is greater emphasis on integration within mainstream campuses and adapting support frameworks for Yotzim who study on these campuses.

Figure 12: Trends in high-tech employment, ages 25-44



Source: Labor Force Survey data for 2016-2024, men born in Israel aged 25-64 who were employed in the two years preceding the survey and reported having an occupation.

The proportion of Yotzim who are employed and enrolled in higher education is higher than their representation among graduates of ultra-Orthodox education.


Yotzim are highly represented in integration: Yotzim make up only 15% of people with an ultra-Orthodox background, but they account for about one fifth of those who are employed and those who hold academic degrees.

The share of Yotzim among job seekers is high: More than a quarter of job seekers from an ultra-Orthodox background are Yotzim, reflecting the combination of high labor force participation and difficulties integrating into quality employment.

Yotzim want to integrate into the workforce

Despite educational gaps, male Yotzim participate in the general labor market at high rates. The share of job seekers among Haredim from home is lower because of disincentives: restrictions on employment or on pursuing higher education for Haredim who did not enlist, as well as government and community benefits that reduce the incentive to work.

Figure 13: The share of Yotzim, among all men from an ultra-Orthodox background in the labor market, ages 25-54



Source: Labor Force Survey data, average for 2021-2024, men from an ultra-Orthodox background born in Israel.

Yotzim maintain family ties, but the quality of the relationship is not optimal


Yotzim remain in contact with their ultra-Orthodox families: Nearly 90% of Yotzim report being satisfied with their relationship with their ultra-Orthodox family, a rate only slightly lower than in other groups.

The quality of the relationship is weaker: Fewer than half of Yotzim report a high level of satisfaction with the relationship, which is a lower share compared with other groups.

Satisfaction with family relationships is higher among those who are not single

Yotzim who are not single report higher satisfaction with their relationship with their family. They may be referring to the family they themselves have established, but it is also possible that relationships with their family improve over time and after they start their own families.

Figure 14: Satisfaction with family relationships among singles



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3.

Source: Social Survey data for 2018-2024, among single or divorced individuals (including separated and widowed), ages 20-64.

Satisfaction with family relationships: High - "very satisfied"; Medium - "satisfied".

One third of young Yotzim experienced poverty in recent years


Poverty at a young age: One third of young Yotzim experienced poverty in recent years, which is twice the rate for Haredim from home and the non-Haredim.

Difficulty meeting monthly expenses: One in three young Yotzim report that they are unable to meet their monthly expenses, compared with one in five young people raised ultra-Orthodox who are still ultra-Orthodox and one in six young non-ultra-Orthodox individuals.

The gaps narrow at older ages, but do not disappear completely

Leaving ultra-Orthodox society occurs at a critical stage for integration into education and employment. Over time, some Yotzim succeed in integrating and closing these gaps, while others do not. As a result, the gaps narrow with age but do not disappear completely.

Figure 15: Financial difficulties among Yotzim



Source: Social Survey data for 2017-2024, young adults ages 20-29.

Yotzim are less satisfied with their financial situation, but optimistic it will improve


A relatively low percentage of Yotzim report satisfaction with their financial situation: Nearly half of young Yotzim are not satisfied with their financial situation, which is consistent with reports of experiencing poverty and having difficulty covering expenses.

Optimism about the future: 80% of young Yotzim are optimistic that their financial situation will improve in the coming years.

Yotzim are young and on the beginning of their journey

Yotzim face gaps at a critical stage for integration into education and employment. However, they are still young and at the beginning of their journey, giving them time to reshape their paths and close gaps related to leaving ultra-Orthodox society and their educational background.

Figure 16: The share of Yotzim satisfied with their financial situation and optimistic about the future



Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics Social Survey data for 2017-2024, ages 20-29.

Expects financial conditions to improve in the coming years: Respondents who estimate that in the coming years, compared with today, their financial situation will be better ("don't know" was classified as not expecting improvement).

Not satisfied with their financial situation: Respondents who answered "not so satisfied" or "not satisfied at all" with their financial situation.

The war has led to increased levels of depression in the general population and especially among Yotzim

Under normal circumstances, there were no unusually high reports of depression: Before the outbreak of the war, the rate at which Yotzim reported experiencing depression was similar to that reported among non-ultra-Orthodox Jews. This was the case despite the challenges involved in leaving ultra-Orthodox society and the impact leaving can have on family relationships and on the loss of social and community networks.


Increase after the outbreak of the war: After the outbreak of the war, reported levels of depression increased in both groups, but the increase was sharper among Yotzim. Since October 7, the levels of depression reported by Yotzim have been significantly higher than those reported by non-ultra-Orthodox Jews.

Is the change related to a lack of family support?

When factors arise that affect emotional well-being across the population, Yotzim may be more vulnerable due to the lack of family support and social networks.

Another possible explanation is that Yotzim previously reported depression less frequently, perhaps due to a reluctance to acknowledge it (for example, because of social desirability). The events of October 7 sparked more open discussion in Israeli society about depression, which may also explain the increase in reporting.

Figure 17: Reported experiencing depression, by period



Source: Social Survey data for 2017-2024, ages 20-64.

Experiencing depression: Respondents who answered "always", "often" or "sometimes" to the question: "In the past 12 months, have you felt depressed?"

Most Jews in Israel maintain their level of religiosity


Among Jews, there are relatively few shifts in religiosity: About 90% of both non-religious Jews and ultra-Orthodox Jews do not change their level of religiosity and belong in adulthood to the same group in which they were raised.

Religious Jews move between groups more often: About two thirds of those who grew up in a religious household define themselves as religious in adulthood, while one third change their affiliation. Although this is a minority among those with a religious background, it is a much higher rate than among the non-religious and the ultra-Orthodox.

Most transitions move in one direction - toward lower levels of religiosity

Most religious and traditional-religious individuals who changed their level of religiosity became less religious. The relatively high rate of such transitions indicates that within religious society, individuals can move between levels of religiosity without a change in their broader sociological group affiliation. In ultra-Orthodox society (and to some extent also in secular society), group affiliation tends to be more dichotomous.

Figure 18: Remained in the group in which they were raised, by religious background (%)



Source: Social Survey data for 2017-2024, Jews ages 20-64.

The composition of ultra-Orthodox society is changing, and with it the background of Yotzim


Half of older Haredim joined the Haredi community: Among those aged 50 and over (born in the 1960s and 1970s), nearly half of Haredim grew up in non-ultra-Orthodox homes. Ultra-Orthodox society was smaller during those years, and therefore the percentage of those who joined (also referred to here as “joiners”) was higher.

Among those aged 30 - 39, those who joined make up less than a quarter of Haredim today: The rapid natural growth of the ultra-Orthodox population has led to a significant shift in the composition of ultra-Orthodox society. Among Haredim today aged 30 - 39, only about one fifth grew up in a non-ultra-Orthodox home, even though the total number of joiners has remained similar.

Joining Haredi society reflects familiarity with non-ultra-Orthodox culture

About half of the parents of today's young Haredim are graduates of the state or state-religious education systems. In other words, they were previously exposed to broader Jewish-Israeli society and its culture, as well as to Western culture, and their children are likely to have relatives who are not ultra-Orthodox. These characteristics may make non-ultra-Orthodox culture more accessible to the children of those who joined.

Figure 19: Distribution of religious background (at age 15) among today's Haredim



Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics Social Survey data for 2017-2024, individuals who are currently Haredi.

Reflective data: Based on the assumption that most transitions have already been completed among these age groups.

Qualified data: Based on the assumption that transitions between groups have not yet been completed.

Religious background: Religious or traditional-religious.

Non-religious background: Traditional-not so religious and non-religious (secular).

The children of joiners leave at younger ages


The composition of ultra-Orthodox society affects the background of Yotzim: Since about half of today's Haredim aged 50 and over are joiners, we would expect that at least half of Yotzim will be the children of these individuals. As the share of joiners declines, we would also expect the share of second-generation joiners among Yotzim to decline.

Two thirds of those who leave by age 18 are second-generation joiners: Surveys conducted by Out for Change show that the children of joiners tend to leave at younger ages. Among those who left at age 18 or younger, they make up about two thirds of Yotzim, whereas among those who left at age 22 or older, they make up about half.

Age of leaving is related, among other factors, to family background

Children of joiners often have relatives who are not ultra-Orthodox, and these relatives may expose them to non-ultra-Orthodox society, provide resources, and make leaving more accessible. In addition, discrimination against second-generation joiners in educational institutions may lead them to feel rejected by ultra-Orthodox society. These factors contribute to leaving at a younger age.

Figure 20: The percentage of Yotzim who have two parents who were raised ultra-Orthodox, by age of exit (Integration Survey)



Source: Integration Survey (2025) conducted among 618 former ultra-Orthodox men and women, ages 25-60, who were self-identified.

Changes in the composition of ultra-Orthodox society may also affect the process of leaving


Second-generation joiners have distinct characteristics among Yotzim: Non-representative surveys of people who have left ultra-Orthodox society suggest that Yotzim who are second-generation joiners to ultra-Orthodox society differ in several characteristics from Yotzim who have two parents who grew up in ultra-Orthodox society.

Second-generation joiners serve in the IDF at higher rates: One such characteristic is military service. Yotzim for whom at least one parent did not grow up in ultra-Orthodox society serve in the IDF at higher rates compared with other Yotzim. This service may be related to familiarity with the military through family members or to the younger age at which they leave.

As the share of Yotzim whose parents were raised ultra-Orthodox increases, the need for support for Yotzim in integrating will also grow.

Demographic changes in ultra-Orthodox society may require broader support for the integration processes of Yotzim. This includes familiarization with Israeli society, assistance in reducing educational gaps, and the development of soft skills that can influence their future life trajectories.

Figure 21: IDF enlistment by parental background, men aged 25 and over (Integration Survey)



Source: Integration Survey (2025), conducted among 350 male Yotzim, ages 25-60, self-identified.



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