Out for Change

THE DATA IS OUT

The Annual Report on Leaving Haredi Society

2023

Editors: Zvika Deutsch, Moshe Shenfeld

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Editors
Zvika Deutsch and Moshe Shenfeld
Text editing: Keren Gliklich | Graphic design: Shira Elk

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Preface

I am proud and honored to present the 2023 edition of our third annual report, "The Data Is Out".

As 2023 draws to a close, we would be remiss if we did not address the terrible events of October 7 and the subsequent war in which we now find ourselves. Beyond the harsh blow dealt to all of Israeli society, this war is also a seminal moment in the EXIT movement to leave Haredi society, as part of its relationship with Israeli society at large, among others.

Many hundreds of combat soldiers who have left the Haredi community, men and women alike, answered the call of duty to protect all of us. As of today, the *Yotzim* community has lost twenty of its sons and daughters, who were officers and combat troops in the IDF, members of the police force, or among the murdered civilians. These figures, along with the data that emerges from this annual report, are a clear and poignant demonstration of the *Yotzim* population's size and significance, as important now as at any time in the many years we have been supporting them. They remind us that policymakers must wake up and do justice to some of Israeli society's finest sons and daughters, who are willing to pay the price for taking part in building and strengthening this society.

Tending to the needs of the *Yotzim* (those who have left Haredi society) while they are still alive – and not only when they fall in the line of duty – is not just the State of Israel's unequivocal interest - it is its duty.

This report, which the Out for Change team of researchers has been working hard on for several months, presents new, updated and robust information on the EXIT movement. It provides a comprehensive and all-encompassing review of methods for identifying *Yotzim*, the number of *Yotzim*, trends, changes, and common denominators. The data presented in the annual report tell the complex story of *Yotzim* – the men and women who have left Haredi society – and help us gain a profound understanding of the obstacles, challenges, and difficulties they face, alongside their achievements and the unique potential of this group, with the strengths, aspirations and power they bring to Israeli society.

The data teach us that the EXIT movement is constantly growing, and that the proportion of male and female *Yotzim* who integrate into Israeli society at large is significantly greater than their percentage of the population, even though some policymakers routinely diminish and disregard them. Although it seems as though some state institutions have begun to internalize the potential within the *Yotzim*, to my great regret, this year, I must repeat my words from the preface to the 2022 annual report: Aside from the efforts, services and budgets that the state invests in the integration of the Haredi population, emphasis must be placed on the *Yotzim*, a population with an extraordinary socio-cultural background and singular strengths and abilities, who want and deserve the best opportunity to be fully acclimated into Israeli society.

Finally, I would like to thank the team that produced this annual report, despite the many personal and professional challenges along the way. Tzvika Deutsch, the chief researcher, who worked tirelessly on texts and formulas; Moshe Shenfeld, who dedicated a great deal of time to research, editing, consulting and guidance; Oren Tirosh, for his major contribution to the research; Keren Gliklich, our fantastic editor, without whom this annual report could not have been published; Shani Kaplan for the help she provided throughout, and Shira Elk, for the graphic design work.

Dr. Shmulik Hess
Chairman, Out for Change

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Introduction

The **Data is Out annual report** aims to present a representative, comparative and comprehensive snapshot of former Haredim (also: "formerly Haredi"), concerning their demographic, educational and vocational characteristics. Existing research data is limited, since other than the data published in this annual report, which is based on the Central Bureau of Statistics' representative databases, almost no representative data on former Haredim has been published, and the little data that has been published does not present a comprehensive and comparative snapshot of their characteristics.[1] This annual report serves to fill the gap by analyzing the Central Bureau of Statistics' data and comparing the data on former Haredim to other groups classified based on their Haredi past and present.

The term "former Haredim" is used as the key concept, rather than the common vernacular term "those who went off the *derech*", both due to the desire to represent all those who left Haredi society, i.e. those who currently define themselves as secular, traditional, or otherwise religious, and because the term "those who went off the *derech*" is not used exclusively for those who left Haredi society (i.e. it is used for those who left other religious societies as well). In this annual report, the term *Yotzim*, a shortened form of the term "former Haredim" (*yotzei hachevra hacHaredit*, in Hebrew), will be used to refer to them.

The groups analyzed in this report are defined based on "Haredi religiosity, or the degree to which they are Haredi, past and present (Jews only) (Table 1): *Yotzim* are those who were Haredi in the past but are no longer Haredim. Those who were Haredi in the past and are presently Haredim are referred to as **Haredi from birth** – **HFB**. Those who were not Haredi in the past, but are currently Haredi, i.e. those who joined Haredi society, are referred to as *mitztarfim*. Those who were not Haredi in the past, and are not Haredi in the present, are referred to as **non-Haredim**. Aside from these subgroups, the study also includes broader groups: Anyone who had been Haredi (both HFBs and *Yotzim*) are termed "**those with Haredi backgrounds**". Those who are currently Haredi (HFBs and *mitztarfim*) are termed **current Haredim**, and those who are not presently Haredi (non-Haredim and *Yotzim*) – who are generally called "non-Haredi Jews" – are termed **not Present Haredi**.

Table 1 | Analyzed groups, based on combining variables of past Haredi religiosity and present Haredi religiosity

		Present Haredi?		
		Yes	No	Total
Past Haredi?	Yes	**HFB**	***Yotzim***	Those with Haredi backgrounds
	No	**Mitztarfim**	**Non-Haredim**	Those with non-Haredi backgrounds
	Total	Current Haredim	Not Present Haredi	All Jews

All the analyses (except outliers) are based on data from the Central Bureau of Statistics – the Social Survey and the Labor Force Survey for the years 2017-2021 and 2019-2022, respectively.

1. Regev and Gordon (2021) presented an estimate of the rate of former Haredim, their numbers, and several other basic background characteristics, but not current characteristics, such as employment and welfare.

Two methods were used to identify past and present Haredi religiosity in the databases, based on the nature of the data contained within them. The first method is based on the data from the Social Survey. It identifies "Past Haredi" as those who self-identified as having been brought up (at age 15) in a Haredi home, while "Present Haredi" are identified as those who currently identify as Haredi. We used this source for analyzing the demographics and welfare characteristics of *Yotzim*, in comparison with Haredim and non-Haredim. Using Social Survey data to identify *Yotzim* is not a novel approach, but until now, the data has been used to arrive at an estimate of LHS ("leaving Haredi society") rates, and not as a tool for analyzing their attributes.

The second method, for which findings were presented in the previous annual report, is the Deutsch, Shenfeld and Tirosh Method (the "Dashat" method), which uses the Labor Force Survey data to identify men who self-report as graduates of Haredi yeshivas (GHY) as "Past Haredi", while identifying those who self-identify as Haredim as "Present Haredi" (identification of the household). We used this method mainly to analyze integration into the labor market and to analyze educational attributes and regional attributes for the men.

Chapter A covers the two methods we used to identify *Yotzim* and those with Haredi backgrounds in the Central Bureau of Statistics' Social Survey data and Labor Force Survey data and compares that data with data obtained through the method used by Regev and Gordon (2021). It displays the LHS rates using the three methods, broken down by gender and age group, and it displays an analysis of LHS rate trends based on the data from the Social Survey.

Chapter B covers the attributes of male and female *Yotzim*: age distribution, level of religiosity, place of residence and family status. This chapter also includes data on service in the IDF or in civilian service, as well as education levels, broken down by gender. Most of the analyses are based on the Social Survey, with a minority of them based on data from the Labor Force Survey, for men only (the "Dashat" method). Where possible, the data was compared to Regev & Gordon's findings (2021), which also include women.

Chapter C covers men's employment. It discusses trends in labor market integration indices, including employment and unemployment rates, as well as data on the vocations of those employed, with an emphasis on high-tech. Furthermore, this chapter contains an in-depth analysis of employment indices among those from Haredi backgrounds, and the number of *Yotzim* within this work force. The analyses in this chapter are based on the data from the Labor Force Survey.

Chapter D covers the attributes of *Yotzim* regarding their general standard of living, their satisfaction with their financial status, and welfare indices, such as feelings of loneliness and depression. This chapter also presents our position on a selection of government services. The analyses are based on data from the Social Survey.

Chapter E presents, for the first time, a unique analysis of trends in military service rates of men from Haredi backgrounds, broken down into *Yotzim* and HFBs, based on the Social Survey. In addition to being able to identify Past Haredi and present, this analysis allows us to identify military service based on self-reporting.

An **online appendix** is attached to this report. It contains an extensive glossary, a methodological discussion of the identification method in the Social Survey and in the Labor Force Survey using the "Dashat" method, as well as an explanation of the relative sampling error, used to decide whether data should be publicized or qualified.

A. Methods of identifying *Yotzim* and LHS rates

Zvika Deutsch

Abstract

This chapter covers methods that make it possible to identify those with Haredi backgrounds (anyone who was Haredi in the past) and *Yotzim* (past Haredim who are not presently Haredi) based on existing data, and compare the estimates derived from this data with the rate of *Yotzim* among those with Haredi backgrounds. The findings reveal higher LHS rates among the younger population, and that generally speaking, LHS rates in this age group are on the rise. However, the data also demonstrate a discrepancy between men and women. According to the 2020-2022 data, the LHS rates among young men are 14%-15% (based on data from the Social Survey and the Labor Force Survey, using the "Dashat" method), and 10%-12% among women (according to the Social Survey).

Definitions and data sources

Groups

Subgroups

Yotzim – Haredim in the past and not in the present (i.e., "former Haredim")
HFB – Haredim in the past and in the present
Mitztarfim – those who were not Haredi in the past, but are presently Haredim

Broader groups

Those with Haredi backgrounds – anyone who was once Haredi (HFB & *Yotzim*)
Those who are currently Haredi – anyone who is presently Haredi (HFB & mitztarfim).

Data sources and identification methods (*)

The Central Bureau of Statistics' Social Survey 2017-2021 and 2007-2012, Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.

Identification of Past Haredi: Grew up in a Haredi family, by self-identification (at age 15). Identification of Present Haredi: Haredi by self-identification.

The Central Bureau of Statistics' 2020-2022 Human Resource Survey, Jewish men born in Israel, aged 25-54.

Identification of Present Haredi: GHYs by self-identification (the "Dashat" method). Identification of Present Haredi: Haredi by self-identification (household level).

Regev & Gordon (2021) – the authors' extrapolation of data from the Labor Force Survey, which were merged with administrative data, for the years 2017-2018, Jews (men and women) aged 20-64.

Identification of Past Haredi: Grew up in a Haredi family, by administrative identification (a family is identified as Haredi based on the secondary educational institutions the family members are enrolled in, based on administrative data).

Identification of Present Haredi: Haredi by self-identification (of the household).

(*) See below for more on these methods, as well as a discussion of this in the online appendix.

A-1 Introduction

Although researchers address the question of how to identify "Haredi Jews" in the databases[2], almost none address former Haredim – those who belonged to Haredi society when they were young but left this society at a certain point in their lives – and this has also led to the underestimation of their rates. This chapter aims to cover methods that make it possible to identify those with Haredi backgrounds (anyone who was Haredi in the past) and *Yotzim* (past Haredim who are not presently Haredi) based on existing data, and compare the various LHS rate estimates: the LHS rates among those with Haredi backgrounds.

Yotzim are Haredim in the past and not in the present, so when they are to be identified based on existing data, and not through the direct question of "Are you a former Haredi?"[3], the challenge is the need to identify both past and present Haredi religiosity in the data. Nonetheless, another question emerges alongside the constraints that the data presents in terms of the information it contains: how to define "past Haredi religiosity" and "present Haredi religiosity", and for what purposes.

Since "Haredi past" and "Haredi background" refer to childhood and adolescence, we can attribute affiliation to Haredi society through two characteristics: family background and educational institutions, in particular high school, whereby the preferred affiliation aspect is chosen based on the specific field under discussion. As such, in general, when the impact of social and community norms is evaluated, preference will be given to addressing the nature of the family background, whereas when the impact of educational background is evaluated, preference will be given to addressing the educational institutions. Here, we emphasize that although the two types of belonging generally overlap in Haredi society, since Haredi families tend to send their children to Haredi educational institutions, occasionally, the two don't perfectly correspond. Thus, at times, preference is given to identification based on one aspect – such as family background – though due to data constraints, identification is based on another aspect – the educational institution. Aside from the types of information they contain, databases differ in their data sources, and currently, the available data in those databases pertaining to the family's level of religiosity is based on self-identification or administrative identification, and the data on the educational institution is based on self-reporting or on administrative data.[4]

When identifying "Present Haredi", in many settings, the best way is to rely on self-identification as Haredi. However, not all databases provide such an identification, and occasionally, self-identification of "present Haredi religiosity" is only on the household level. Though the gap is usually small, at times, it is significant – for instance, when assessing young adults living in their parents' home, which leads to them being classified as Haredi.

In Section A-2, we will cover the two methods we used to identify *Yotzim* and those from Haredi backgrounds in the Central Bureau of Statistics' two databases – the Labor Force Survey and the Social Survey – and compare them with those obtained through the method used by Regev and Gordon (2021). Section A-3 presents estimates of LHS rates using the three methods, and Section A-4 displays an analysis of LHS rate trends based on the data from the Social Survey.

2. For sample surveys, see e.g. Friedman et al., 2011; the Prime Minister's Office, 2021.

3. For an example of the question of past Haredi religiosity by self-identification, see the questionnaire distributed by Askaria (2022).

4. Self-identification: subjective identification (of oneself or of the family/household).
Administrative identification: identification based on administrative data (e.g., the Ministry of Education).
Self-reporting: Reporting an objective data item (such as military service data or studying at a yeshiva).

A-2 Comparing the methods for identifying *Yotzim*

The methods covered in this chapter are all based on identifying Past Haredi and Present Haredi in the data, but they differ in their specific identifications, mainly due to the information that exists in the databases.

A-2.1 Identification in the Social Survey

Past Haredi: Grew up in a Haredi family, by self-identification (at age 15)

Present Haredi: Haredi (male/female), based on self-identification (individual identification)

There are structured questions on the past and present level of religiosity of the respondent. The question on the past is worded as the self-identification of the family (i.e., the home in which the respondent was raised) at age 15, while the question on the present is worded as individual self-identification.[5]For more on this method, please see the online appendix.

A-2.2 Identification in the Labor Force Survey ("Dashat" method)

Past Haredi: GHYs by self-identification

Present Haredi: Haredi, based on self-identification (household identification)

In the Labor Force Survey, past Haredi religiosity is identical to the Deutsch, Shenfeld and Tirosh method (the "Dashat" method), based on self-reported studies in Haredi yeshivas and available information from 2016. Since 2016, Jewish men taking the Labor Survey have been asked whether they studied in any of the following yeshivas: *yeshiva ketana, yeshiva tichonit, yeshiva gedolah, yeshiva gevoha, kollel, yeshivat hesder*. This method defines a "GHY", i.e. a past Haredi, as someone who reported having studied in a *yeshiva ketana* or in a *yeshiva gedola*h, but who had not studied at a *yeshivat hesder.*

This definition is based on sectoral characteristics of yeshivas: Unlike the *yeshiva tichonit*, which teaches secular studies and is generally associated with the national-religious sector (except for a select few yeshivas meant for the Haredi population), "*yeshiva ketana*" is the Haredi term for a yeshiva for high-school aged students, without secular studies, and "*yeshiva gedolah*" is the Haredi term for what the national-religious sector calls a "*yeshiva gevohah*", which teaches 12th-grade students and older. This method's limitation is that it does not identify graduates of a Haredi *yeshiva tichonit* who did not study in a *yeshiva gedolah* as those with Haredi backgrounds, and as such, it may not identify them as *Yotzim*.

Present Haredi religiosity is through self-identification, based on the household's level of religiosity, which is information that has been available since 2014. Starting that year, the survey classified the religiosity levels of the individuals based on how religious a way of life the members of the household lead. Assuming that only a few Haredi Jews live in a non-Haredi household, and that only a minority of *Yotzim* live in a Haredi household, we may presume that the level of religiosity of the household represents all of its members.[6] It should be stated that the identification of present affiliation in the Labor Force Survey data through this question works mainly for older age groups, and less so with young adults who are

5. The text of the "present" question: "Do you consider yourself: Haredi, religious, traditional-religious, traditional and not so religious, or not religious/secular". The text of the "past" question: "When you were 15, was the household in which you grew up: Haredi, religious, traditional-religious, traditional and not so religious, or not religious/secular".

6. "A representative of the household delivers information on the religious way of living of all those living in the home. Question modalities: secular, traditional, religious, very religious, Haredi (for Jewish households only), mixed lifestyle (for households which have more than one individual and with more than one form of religious adherence). (The Central Bureau of Statistics, 2023, p. 23)

under 25 years of age. This will be explained in the next section.

See the online appendix for an expansion on the methodology.

A-2.3 The Regev and Gordon method

Past Haredi: Grew up in a Haredi family, by administrative identification

Present Haredi: Haredi, based on self-identification (based on household)

Aside from these two methods, there is the Regev & Gordon method (2021) which combines the Labor Force Survey's data with administrative data, through which it identifies a "Past Haredi" as a member of a family most of whose children studied in institutions classified as Haredi when they were high school age (a Haredi family, according to the administrative identification). Identification of Present Haredi is based on self-identification, through a question on household religiosity level in the Labor Force Survey, similar to the "Dashat" method.

A-2.4 Summary of the methods and their limitations

Table A-1 summarizes the three methods and their sources:

The Social Survey, which includes the Central Bureau of Statistics' structured questions which allow identification of Past and Present Haredi through self-identification.

The Labor Force Survey using the "Dashat" method, which identifies Past Haredi based on self-reporting of studies at Haredi yeshivas, and identifies Present Haredi based on self-identification.

The Regev and Gordon Method, which combines the Labor Force Survey data with administrative data, and identifies Past Haredi based on the educational institutions of the children in the family and based on administrative data, and Present Haredi based on self-identification, using the data from the Labor Force Survey.

Table A-1 Summary of the methods: Data sources and identification methods

	The Social Survey[1]	The Labor Force Survey, using the "Dashat" method[2]	The Regev and Gordon method (2021)
Data source	Social Survey	Labor Force Survey for men	Labor Force Survey, combined with administrative data
Identification of Past Haredi	Raised in a Haredi family, by self-identification (at age 15)	GHY by self-identification	Raised in a Haredi family, by self-identification, through administrative identification[3]
Identification of Present Haredi	Haredi, based on self-identification (individual-level identification)	Haredi, based on self-identification (household-level identification)	Haredi, based on self-identification (household-level identification)

1. This method was also used by Shenfeld (2020), Sarel & Gilboa (2017), as well as Weinreb & Blass (2018).
2. Deutsch, Shenfeld and Tirosh (in preparation).
3. A family is identified as Haredi based on the secondary educational institutions the family members are enrolled in, based on administrative data).

The three methods differ in their identification of Past Haredi. The "Dashat" method identifies Past Haredi based on studies at a Haredi yeshiva, such that it is only suitable for identifying men, while the Social Survey and the Regev and Gordon method identify Past Haredi based on the religiosity of the family. However, the source of the data on the family is different: In the Social Survey, the religiosity of the family is determined through the respondent's self-identification, while for Regev and Gordon, the character of the family is determined based on administrative data. With regard to identifying Present Haredi, all methods are based on self-identification, but unlike the Social Survey, where identification is on the individual level, in the "Dashat" method and in the Regev and Gordon method, identification is at the household level.

There are disadvantages to identification at the household level, since the assumption that all individuals have similar levels of Haredi religiosity (yes/no) is mainly valid for older populations, and less valid for populations of young adults under 25 years of age who live in their parents' homes, despite their differences. Another limitation pertains mainly to those who are still Haredi: The Labor Force Survey data leaves out boarding school students, who form a sizeable proportion of Haredi men under the age of 25. This situation leads to an underrepresentation of Haredi men.[7]

Moreover, with respect to estimates of the current numbers of Haredi Jews and of those with Haredi backgrounds, the Labor Force Survey data portrays unexplained trends, which were only found in that data, and not in the Social Survey. This limitation may be rooted in the survey's methodological structure, which was adapted for identifying employment trends, and is less indicative of the development of population sizes (for more on this, see Appendix A-1). These limitations are common to the two methods based on this database: Regev and Gordon, and the "Dashat" method.

7. Even though the population of Haredi men aged 18-24 is supposed to make up 51% of their age-group population (Fran & Klinger, 2018), in the 2020-2022 Labor Force Survey data, the average percentage of men is only 40%.

A-3 Comparing LHS rates, broken down by method

This section compares the LHS ("leaving Haredi society) rates, as calculated from the Social Survey data and Labor Force Survey data using the "Dashat" method, with the findings of Regev & Gordon (2021). In each comparison, adjustments were made for both the sampled years and the age groups, since the LHS rate may vary depending on these variables.

In the first part, up to date LHS rate data is presented, comparing the Social Survey data to the Labor Force Survey data using the "Dashat" method, and in the second part, the LHS rates calculated according to the Regev and Gordon method are compared to LHS rates based on the Social Survey data.

A-3.1 LHS rates based on Social Survey and Labor Force Survey data

LHS rates, comparing the Social Survey data and the Labor Force Survey data, were calculated using the "Dashat" method, for those aged 25-54, broken down by age: young adults (25-34) and adults (35-54).[8] Since the Labor Force Survey, using the "Dashat" method, only provides data on men, the analysis of the data on men was based on two sources, while the analysis of data on women, including the comparison with the men, is based on one source.

Among young men, the current LHS rates (2020-2022) are 14% - 15%

The LHS rate of young men (25-34) is relatively high: 13.9%, according to the Social Survey, and 15.3%, according to the Labor Force Survey data. According to the Social Survey, the LHS rate is lower (12.5% among those aged 35-54), while there is no significant difference between young adults and adults in the Labor Force Survey data (Figure A-1). The differences between the findings in the two sources can arguably be attributed to differences in the sampling methods used in the two surveys, and not very highly attributable to sampling errors, since although the margins of error in the Social Survey are higher, these differences appear consistently, when the Social Survey data is calculated as an average over a longer number of years, and the margins of error are substantially reduced. To understand these differences, a more in-depth study would be in order.

Figure A-1 | **Men's LHS rates, broken down by age group and data source (2020-2022)**



Source: Social Survey data and Labor Force Survey data, men from Haredi backgrounds.

8. In this analysis, data on young adults under 25 years of age was not used, since young Haredi men (who often live in boarding schools) are underrepresented in the Labor Force Survey data, and also due to the limitation on the identification of the religiosity of young adults living in their parents' homes (see Section 2.4-A).

Comparing men and women in the Social Survey data (Figure 2-A) reveals that women's LHS rates are lower than those of the men, among both young adults and adults; and among the young adults, the gender gap is higher than 4 percentage points (among young adults – 13.9% vs. 9.8%, and among adults – 12.5% vs. 7.9%). The general LHS rate for men and women is 11.2%, and 12% for young adults. The large gap between men and women in the Social Survey differs from the one in Regev & Gordon's findings (2021) which indicate relative similarity, will be explained in the next section.

Figure A-2 | **LHS rates, broken down by age group and gender (The 2020-2022 Social Survey)**



Source: Social Survey data, women and men from Haredi backgrounds.

A-3.2 LHS rates through the Regev and Gordon method compared to the 2017-2018 Social Survey

Regev & Gordon (2021) provided LHS data for 2017, and partial data for 2018. Data is presented in aggregate for those aged 20-64, broken down by gender, and data for the groups that include both men and women is broken down into five cohorts. In this section, this data is compared with the 2017-2018 Social Survey data, using two comparisons: LHS rates among those aged 20-64, broken down by gender, and LHS rates by age group, among those aged 20-34. [9]The Social Survey data for those years should be qualified, since the margins of error are high, and in some of the groups, the estimates for just two years tend to fluctuate more. We presented this data solely to compare it with similar data obtained by Regev and Gordon (for data on trends in young adults over time, see the next section).[10]

9. We do not present comparative data on those aged 35-64 since Regev and Gordon's 2017 estimates (2021) for this group are substantially different from the ones they present for 2018.

10, We do not compare Regev and Gordon's Data (2021) to the Labor Force Survey data using the "Dashat" method since they present an analysis for men aged 20-64, which includes young adults under the age of 25, for which the identification of Present Haredi in the Labor Force Survey data is not reliable (due to the household-level identification).

For those aged 20-64 in 2017-2018, Regev & Gordon's findings display similarity between the LHS rates of women (12.8%) and men (13.8%), while there is a sizable gap between women (8.1%) and men (11.6%) in the Social Survey.

According to Regev & Gordon, the general LHS rate (men and women aged 20-64) is 13.3%, vs. 9.9% in the Social Survey data (Figure A-3A). The two sources are more similar in their LHS rates for men (13.8% for Regev & Gordon, vs. 11.6% in the Social Survey data), but they are dissimilar in their estimates of women's LHS rates (12.8% for Regev & Gordon vs. 8.1% in the Social Survey data). These estimates indicate a marked difference between the LHS rates of men and women: According to Regev & Gordon, the gap between the men's LHS rate and the women's LHS rate is just one percentage point, while this gap is sizable in the Social Survey, at 3.5 percentage points.

However, the data on women from the Social Survey should be qualified, as an underreporting of women is suspected. In the Social Survey, we find the familiar phenomenon of an unbalanced ratio between men and women among Present Haredim and those with Haredi backgrounds, [11] which forced the Central Bureau of Statistics to adjust the statistics in order to calculate population forecasts (Paltiel et al., 2012, Fran & Klinger, 2018).[12] Women may tend to be less inclined to identifying as Haredi or as HFB. If the rate of unreported HFB women is higher than the rate of the female *Yotzim*, this would introduce a bias into the data. To evaluate whether the reporting of women is truly biased, an in-depth study would be in order.

11. Among all those from Haredi backgrounds, the ratio between men and women (the number of men per 100 women) is 113 among young adults (aged 25-34), and 116 among adults (aged 35-54), which is rather similar to the ratio among all Haredi Jews today, 100 and 117, respectively. Among all Jews, the ratios are 101 and 97.

12. Researchers assume that this phenomenon was caused by the structure of the estimate and the sampling in the Social Survey and the inconsistency of the self-identification (Paltiel et al., 2012, Fran & Klinger, 2018).

Figure A-3 | **LHS rates, broken down by gender and age groups, by data source (2017-2018)**



Sources: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey, those with Haredi backgrounds (men and women)
Regev & Gordon: Regev & Gordon's extrapolations (2021) of Labor Force Survey data, men and women.
Figure A (gender) – for 2017
Figure B (age groups) – their average for data extrapolations for 2017-2018.

According to Regev & Gordon, the LHS rate among young adults aged 20-34 (8.9% - 12.8%) is lower than the overall estimate for those aged 20-46 (13.3%)

Assessing the data among young adults reveals a complex picture (Figure A-3B). On the one hand, according to Regev & Gordon, the LHS rates in each of the younger age groups (20-34) are lower than the average rate for those aged 20-64 (13.3%). On the other hand, the two LHS rates decrease as age increases (9.7% among those aged 30-34, compared with 12.8% among those aged 20-24). LHS rates among those aged 20-64 seem to have been affected by an unusually high rate among those of more advanced ages.[13]

13. In Regev & Gordon's research (2021), they present the 2018 LHS rates for five cohorts, and the 2017 LHS rates are presented for those aged 20-60 and for the five cohorts, for those aged 20-34. The data for the age groups is the average for the years 2017-2018 that were obtained in their research.

A-4 LHS rates, according to the Social Survey

This section discusses LHS rates based on Social Survey data and Labor Force Survey data, broken down by gender. To analyze the trends, first the 2017-2022 LHS rates will be presented, broken down by age group, followed by trends over time in LHS rates among young adults aged 20-34.

LHS rates are higher among young adults, for both men and women.

Although we prefer using the two data sources to compare the attributes of the *Yotzim*, in this analysis, we'll use only the data from the Social Survey (and not the Labor Force Survey), out of a concern that Human Resource Survey data is not suitable for an analysis of population growth trends. With respect to estimates of the current numbers of Haredi Jews and of those with Haredi backgrounds, the Labor Force Survey data demonstrates unexplained trends, which were only found in that data, and not in the Social Survey. This limitation may be rooted in the survey's methodological structure, which was adapted for identifying employment trends, and less for the development of population sizes (for more on this, see Appendix A-1).

The data analysis reveals lower LHS rates among the higher age groups (Figure A-4). Among young adults aged 20-29, the LHS rate during the assessed period was 12%. It was 10% for the medium-aged group (30-39), and 9.5% for the older group (40-59). This phenomenon exists for both men and women. Among women, the gap between the younger and older women is approximately 2 percentage points (10.7% vs. 8.6%), and for men, approximately 3 percentage points (13.2% vs. 10.3%). This data implies that the LHS rates have largely increased, assuming that most leave Haredi society at a young age. The increase will be assessed by comparing trends over time among young adults.

Figure A-4 | **LHS rates, broken down by gender and age group, 2017-2022**



Source: Social Survey data, women and men from Haredi backgrounds.

To assess the fluctuations in LHS rates over time for the age group, LHS trends among young adults aged 20-34 were analyzed. The analysis examined the trends for two of the groups in two different time periods: 2007-2012 (the first wave) and 2017-2021 (the second wave) (Figure A-5).[14]

14. The "household religiosity level at age 15" variable, which allows us to identify those with Haredi backgrounds, was not available before 2007 and between 2013 and 2016.

Figure A-5 | **Trends in LHS rates, broken down by gender, for those aged 20-34**



Source: Social Survey data, women and men from Haredi backgrounds.
The "household religiosity level at age 15" variable was not available before 2007 and between 2013 and 2016.
In 2011, a methodical change was made to the Social Survey: the variable "Haredi by administrative identification" was added to the sampling and inflation layers (Portnoy, 2007).

Analysis of this data reveals a trend of rising LHS rates among young adults, among both men and women. In total, the rate increased consistently, from 7.5% between 2007 and 2010 to 12.8% between 2021 and 2022. This increase is also noticeable in the separate analysis for men and women, though the data fluctuates more in this analysis. Among men, the LHS rate in the first wave was 8.5%, and in the second wave, 10.5%-14.2%. Among women, these rates ranged from 6.4% to 7.8% in the first wave, and from 9.6% to 12% in the second wave. Overall, the findings indicate an increase in LHS rates, with women displaying a more prominent increase. Since the margins of error are high, this data should be viewed with caution. We will elaborate on this in a study that will be published soon.

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A-Appendices

Appendix A-1 Comparing population growth

As stated, to analyze the attributes of *Yotzim*, we use two main sources: the Central Bureau of Statistics' Social Survey and the Labor Force Survey. These two data sources do not overlap, and with respect to estimates of population sizes in the Labor Force Survey data, pertaining to current Haredi Jews and those with Haredi backgrounds, there are unexplained trends that raise concerns of inconsistency with the population growth estimates.

The following data present population growth trends among men, based on the data appearing in these two data sources. Data from the Social Survey is presented for the years 2007-2022, and data from the Labor Force Survey is presented for the years 2016-2022. The presented data is broken down into young adults (aged 25-34) and adults (aged 35-54).

Figure A-A-1: Trends in population size estimates (logarithmic)[15] – by group and data source

The Social Survey

A.2 All those with Haredi backgrounds



A.1 All those currently Haredi



Labor Force Survey

B.2 All those with Haredi backgrounds



B.1 All those currently Haredi



Sources: The Social Survey: Social Survey data on men, which identifies Past and Present Haredi based on self-identification.
Labor Force Survey: Labor Force Survey data on Israeli-born men, which identifies Past Haredi based on self-reporting of studies at Haredi yeshivas, and Present Haredi based on self-identification.
The "household religiosity level at age 15" variable was not available in the Social Survey data before 2007 and between 2013 and 2016.
In 2011, a methodical change was made to the Social Survey: the variable "Haredi by administrative identification" was added to the sampling and inflation layers (Portnoy, 2007).

15. When the population growth rate is relatively low, the log difference between the population sizes between proximal years represents an approximation of the population growth rate. Thus, presenting the population size on a logarithmic scale allows us to compare relative changes between groups of different sizes which nonetheless grow at a relatively low rate.

The Social Survey data indicate a relatively stable trend in the population growth estimates, and a stable and small difference between the two age groups was found, except for temporary volatility caused by random sampling errors. As a case in point, in 2018, there was a one-off increase among young adults who are currently Haredi, but this number went back down in 2019. Contrastingly, in the Labor Force Survey data, the population growth estimates are less stable and do not correspond with the current growth rate of Haredi Jews and of those with Haredi backgrounds. In this data, for both groups (current Haredim and those with Haredi backgrounds), for each period, a significant increase was noted among adults, whereas only a small increase was noted among young adults.

Furthermore, this growth was not uniform over these years. Between 2017 and 2020, a small change was noted among young adults, compared to a sharp increase among adults, particularly between 2018 and 2019. The increase in the number of adults versus the stable numbers of young adults led to a situation in which the estimated number of young adults in the current Haredi group is higher than the number of adults at the beginning of the period, and this ratio flipped at the end of this period.

One possible explanation for this is tied to the method used for sampling and data collection in the Labor Force Survey – recounts based on the model known as the 4-8-4 model: After sampling the homes, the data is collected in eight repeated interviews – four during the first four months, and after an eight-month pause, four more interviews. The recount phenomenon leads to a high inter-period correlation, particularly for the smaller groups, like the group of *Yotzim*. Consequently, trend estimates in the Labor Force Survey that do not cover long periods of time are less reliable, particularly for those variables that are expected to remain stable over time.

B. Characteristics of *Yotzim*

Zvika Deutsch

Abstract

(Unless stated otherwise, the groups include both men and women)

- Among former Haredim, similarly to HFBs (Past and Present Haredim), there is a high frequency of younger populations: In the 20-54 age range, approximately 46%-55% of the *Yotzim* (depending on the data source) are young adults, aged 20-29, compared to 45% among HFBs in this age range.
- Between one-half and two-thirds of the *Yotzim* define themselves as religious. According to the Social Survey data, 46% of those surveyed self-identified as religious, 34% as religious-traditional, traditional or not very religious, and 21% identified as secular. This breakdown is similar for both men and women.
- Former Haredim aged 20-54 are spread throughout Israel. Approximately 60% live in the Tel Aviv District, the Central District, and Jerusalem.
- The family structure of *Yotzim* is similar to that of non-Haredi Jews: in the 25-54 age group, the rate of married *Yotzim* stands at 62%, slightly below the rate among non-Haredi Jews (66%). The parenthood rate among *Yotzim* is also similar to their rate among the non-Haredi Jews (~70%).
- A high rate of male *Yotzim* served in the IDF (58% vs. 7% of HFBs). The rate of female *Yotzim* who served in the IDF is low. When factoring in military and civilian service, the rate of female *Yotzim* who did their service becomes 28%, compared to 62% among male *Yotzim*.
- Like the HFBs, few *Yotzim* have academic degrees: 12%-21% of male *Yotzim*, and 7%-8% of HFBs have an academic education compared to about 30% of female *Yotzim* and female HFBs.

Definitions and data sources

Groups

Subgroups

Yotzim – Haredim in the past and not in the present (i.e., "former Haredim")
HFBs – Haredim in the past and in the present
Mitztarfim – those who were not Haredi in the past, but are presently Haredim
Non-Haredi Jews – not Haredi in the past nor in the present

Broader groups

Those with Haredi backgrounds – anyone who was once Haredi (HFBs and *Yotzim*)

Data sources and identification methods (*)

The Central Bureau of Statistics' Social Survey 2017-2021, Jews (women and men) aged 20-**54.**

Identification of Past Haredi: Grew up in a Haredi family, by self-identification (at age 15). Identification of Present Haredi: Haredi by self-identification.

The Central Bureau of Statistics' 2019-2022 Labor Force Survey, Jewish men born in Israel, aged 25-54.
Identification of Past Haredi: GHYs by self-identification (the "Dashat" method). Identification of Present Haredi: Haredi by self-identification (household level).

Regev & Gordon (2021) – the authors' extrapolation of Labor Force Survey data, which were merged with administrative data. The year of 2017, Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.
Identification of Past Haredi: Grew up in a Haredi family, by administrative identification (a family is identified as Haredi based on the secondary educational institutions the family members are enrolled in, based on administrative data).
Identification of Present Haredi: Haredi by self-identification (household level).

(*) See the abstract for Chapter 1 for more on these methods, as well as a discussion of this in the online appendix.

B-1 Introduction

This chapter covers the attributes of male and female *Yotzim*: age distribution, level of religiosity, places of residence and family status. This chapter also specifies the military or civilian service rate, broken down by gender. This analysis, broken down by gender, is provided in addition to a special chapter added this year (Chapter E), which delves into the enlistment trends among men from Haredi backgrounds and analyzes the rate of *Yotzim* within that population. Furthermore, data on educational levels, which are also broken down by gender, are provided, and for the population of men, additional sub-analyses were performed.

Most of the analyses in this chapter are based on data from the Social Survey on men and women. In some of the analyses, data from the Labor Force Survey pertaining solely to the men (the "Dashat" method) was used as well. The sample in this survey is the largest, allowing more in-depth analyses of solely the male population. Whenever possible, the data was compared with other estimates. The only one that was found is the one provided by Regev & Gordon (2021), which also encompasses women. [1]Among the topics covered in this chapter, their research only addressed age and religiosity level.

Section B-2 describes the age distribution of *Yotzim*, based on the Social Survey, in comparison with Regev & Gordon's findings (2021). Section B-3 presents estimates of their religiosity levels, comparing a number of methods. Sections B-4 and B-5 present aspects tied to the places of residence of the *Yotzim* and their family status, compared to the three other subgroups: HFBs, non-Haredim and *mitztarfim*, broken down by age group. Section 6 presents participation rates of those serving in civilian service or military service, comparing the subgroups and broken down by gender; and Section 7 presents higher education indices in a variety of aspects, making various comparisons. The chapter is supplemented with tables containing additional data.

1. The researchers combined the Labor Force Survey data with unique administrative data available in the Central Bureau of Statistics' Research Room, which allowed them to identify the Haredi past of women, as well.

B-2 The age of the *Yotzim*

Like the HFBs, there is a high percentage of young adults among former Haredim, though the similarity between the groups varies depending on the data source (Social Survey vs. Labor Force Survey – see Figure B-1). Since the age distribution, based on the Labor Force Survey data and using the "Dashat" method, resembles the one discovered by Regev & Gordon (2021) (see Figure B-N-1 in the appendix), only the data presented by the Regev & Gordon (2021) that also encompasses women is provided in this report, based on Labor Force Survey data.[2]

Figure B-1 | **Age distribution of HFBs and *Yotzim* – two methods (%)**



Sources: Regev & Gordon – Regev & Gordon's (2021) extrapolations of 2017 Labor Force Survey data, women and men. Their extrapolations do not include the age distribution of HFBs.
The Social Survey: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey, men and women. For expanded data based on the Social Survey, broken down by gender and other groups, see Table B-1.

Data from the Social Survey (for those aged 20-54) indicates that 55% of *Yotzim* are aged 20-29, compared to 45% within HFBs. The high rate of young adults among *Yotzim* is consistent with the data that demonstrates an increase in the rate of *Yotzim* (see Chapter 1). According to Regev & Gordon's data, which, as stated, is based mainly on the Labor Force Survey, the age estimate is a bit different, and the age distribution of *Yotzim* is more similar to that of HFBs (46% of *Yotzim* are aged 20-29, compared to 45% of HFBs). We note that with respect to the age distribution of HFBs, no significant difference was found between the two sources (see Figure B-N-1 in the appendix).

Since the Labor Force Survey (which Regev & Gordon rely on, as well) is meant to represent the number of households in Israel, and not the number of individuals (similar to the Social Survey), in our estimation, the Social Survey presents the breakdown of age groups more reliably (for more on this, see the online appendix).

2. The data contained within the chapter is for those aged 20-54, while the data in the appendix pertain to those aged 25-54, and also include data on HFB men, based on Labor Force Survey data. Regev & Gordon do not present data on HFBs.

B-3 Religiosity levels among *Yotzim*

The data demonstrates that most former Haredim become traditional or religious. However, the data sources – the Social Survey and the Labor Force Survey – differ in how they estimate the rates of these groups, due to discrepancies in the classification of religiosity, inter alia. Because of these discrepancies, the two sources are presented separately, and are not compared. Analyzing the data, broken down by age group and based on both data sources, resulted in inconsistent findings. The analysis is also presented broken down by gender in the data based on the Social Survey, which includes women. Generally speaking, no differences were noticed in terms of the religiosity pattern.

Most of the men and women who left Haredi society are religious or traditional

Comparing the analysis of Labor Force Survey using the "Dashat" method (2012) and using the Regev & Gordon method – which also relies on Labor Force Survey data – (Figure B-2), reveals a relative similarity between the distributions, though, according to the "Dashat" method, *Yotzim* are less religious. According to Regev & Gordon, 64% of *Yotzim* lived in a religious or very religious household, compared to 58%, according to the "Dashat" method, while the percentage of those living in a traditional or secular household was 24% for Regev & Gordon, and 35% according to the "Dashat" method.

Figure B-2 | **Distribution of the religiosity levels of *Yotzim*, according to the Labor Force Survey classification, using both methods (%)**



Sources: Regev & Gordon – Regev & Gordon's (2021) extrapolations of 2017 Human Resource Survey data, women and men aged 20-64. The "Dashat" method – Labor Force Survey data for the years 2019-2022, men aged 25-59.
Religiosity level: The religious lifestyles of those living in the household.
Mixed lifestyle: A household with more than one individual, which has more than one type of religious lifestyle.

The analysis of Labor Force Survey data by age group (Figure B-3) reveals that the percentage of those living in a religious household is higher among young *Yotzim*: 65% of the younger *Yotzim* (aged 25-29) live in a religious or very religious household, while just 25% of them live in a traditional or secular household, whereas 49-57% of older *Yotzim* (aged 35 and up) live in a religious or very religious household, and 36-48% of them live in a traditional or secular household.

Figure B-3 | **Distribution of the religiosity levels of male *Yotzim*, broken down by age group (%)**



Source: 2019-2022 Labor Force Survey data, the "Dashat" method.
Religiosity level: The religious lifestyles of those living in the household.
Mixed lifestyle: A household with more than one individual, which has more than one type of religious lifestyle.
The data do not add up to 100% due to rounding.

There are several possible explanations for the lower frequency of religious households among older *Yotzim*. It may be that *Yotzim* are less religious when they are older. Another possibility is that as the years go by, the characteristics of the *Yotzim* changed, such that the variance does not indicate a change in religiosity at a higher age. It may also be that at younger ages, *Yotzim* live in households whose main lifestyle is more religious, but at more advanced ages, people tend to live with people who are like them. If they are less religious, we would end up with a decrease in the religiosity level at higher ages.[3] A more in-depth study would be required in order to assess all of the differences and their causes.

The analysis of the Social Survey data, broken down by age (Figure B-4A), reveals that the difference between the younger and older populations is less prominent than the one found in the Labor Force Survey data, based on household (Figure B-3), and that there is a similarity between the distribution of religiosity levels among those aged 20-29 and those aged 30-59. As stated above, an in-depth study would be needed in order to assess the distribution of religiosity levels and how it correlates with age groups, or the reason for the difference in the findings between the two databases.

Analyzing the distribution of religiosity levels in the Social Survey data also allows us to assess gender-based differences (Figure B-4B). The finding was that as a rule, the data for men is similar to the data for women. On average, 46% of *Yotzim* (men and women) identified as religious, 34% identified as religious-traditional, traditional or not so religious, and 20% identified as secular.

3. This analysis is somewhat different from the situation described in the 2022 edition of The Data is Out (Deutsch et al., 2022), which was also based on Labor Force Survey data, though this data was for the years 2016 to 2019 (Chapter 3.8, Figure 14). That analysis revealed a smaller difference between the age groups, and on average, 52% of those aged 25-54 lived in a religious or very religious household, and 39% lived in a secular or traditional household.

Figure B-4 | **Distribution of the religiosity levels of *Yotzim* (men and women), broken down by age group and gender (%)**

Sources: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data, *Yotzim*, men and women aged 20-59.
The data do not add up to 100% due to rounding.

B-4 Areas of residence

Former Haredim are distributed throughout Israel.

Over half of the former Haredim reside in central Israel (including Jerusalem and the Dan region). Comparing the Labor Force Survey data with the Social Survey data reveals a similar situation (see Figure B-A-2 in the appendix). [4]The data indicate that there is not a large difference between all *Yotzim* and the younger group of *Yotzim* (aged 20-29) (Figure B-5): Approximately one-third of *Yotzim* live in the Tel Aviv and central districts (32%-35%), and a quarter of them live in the Jerusalem district (23%-27%). One-sixth of *Yotzim* (17%-18%) live in the Haifa and northern districts, and another 25% are distributed between the southern district (13%-14%) and the Judea and Samaria district (11%).

4. The disparities between the different sources may stem from a number of factors, including differences in the way *Yotzim* are identified, differences in age ranges, differences in sampling methodologies (used by the Central Bureau of Statistics) or sampling errors.

Figure B-5 | **Distribution of residential districts of *Yotzim*, broken down by age group (%)**



Sources: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data, men and women aged 20-54.
For data broken down by gender and other groups, see Table B-2.

Yotzim don't tend to move from one locality to another, similarly to non-Haredim

A similarity between the residential areas of the younger *Yotzim* and those of all of the *Yotzim* was also discovered in the findings pertaining to mobility between localities: Similar to other subgroups, *Yotzim* don't tend to move from one locality to another, and about 60% of them have lived in their locality for over a decade (Figure B-6). This data should be qualified to a certain degree, since it is safe to assume that if those who had grown up in Jerusalem and reside in Jerusalem are disregarded (about one-fifth of the sample), this rate would be slightly lower.

Figure B-6 | **The percentage of those residing in the same locality for over a decade – the four subgroups, broken down by age group**



Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data, Jews (men and women).

The analysis also reveals that over a quarter of *Yotzim* aged 20-29 (27%) have been living in the same home for over a decade (Figure B-7), which is higher than the percentage among those aged 30-54 (21%). This data implies that a substantial percentage of the younger group resides in their parents' homes during the first stage after having left Haredi society.

Figure B-7 | **The percentage of those residing in the same locality for over a decade – broken down by age group**



In parenthesis – a category value for which the relative sampling error is between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more on this, see the online appendix).
Source: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data, Jews (men and women).

B-5 Family status

The family characteristics of former Haredim are usually similar to those of non-Haredim (Figure B-8). The data indicate that 62% of the *Yotzim* are married, which is not far from the percentage among non-Haredim, and contrasts with the high percentages found among Haredi Jews (93% of HFBs and 90% *mitztarfim*). About one quarter of the *Yotzim* are single, similarly to non-Haredim. This percentage is significantly higher than the percentage of single individuals among Haredim, most of whom are married.

Figure B-8 | **Family status distribution (%)**



In parenthesis – a category value for which the sampling error is between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more on this, see the online appendix).
Source: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data, Jews (men and women) aged 25-54.
For data broken down by gender and other groups, see Table B-3.
The data does not add up to 100% due to rounding.

The population of *Yotzim* also resembles the population of non-Haredim in terms of the percentage of those who are parents (Figure B-9).[5]

Figure B-9 | **Parents of children rate**



Source: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data, Jews (men and women) aged 25-54.
For data broken down by gender and other groups, see Table B-3.

5. This data should be qualified to a certain extent, since in all age groups, the percentage of *Yotzim* who are young adults is higher than the percentage of *Yotzim* in the other groups. It stands to reason that full standardization for age would slightly increase the rate of married individuals among *Yotzim* (for a further discussion of this, see the online appendix).

B-6 IDF Service

In the past, it had been implied that a high percentage of those with Haredi backgrounds who enlist are *Yotzim*, since out of the nearly 2,000 graduates of Haredi educational institutions who enlisted in the IDF between 2018 and 2019, about 50% served in non-designated IDF units, and not in tracks designed for Haredim (Eliyahu, 2020), such that it stands to reason that the vast majority of them did not maintain a Haredi lifestyle. A unique analysis of the enlistment rate trends of men from Haredi backgrounds and the percentage of *Yotzim* within that group is provided in Chapter E, which is dedicated to this topic.

58% of male Yotzim served in the IDF, versus 7% of Haredi men

The data provided in this chapter, which were extrapolated from the Social Survey and included men aged 20-54 (Figure B-10), indicate that on average, between 2017 and 2021, 58% of *Yotzim* served in the IDF, a percentage that, whilst lower than the percentage among the non-Haredim (88%), is significantly higher than the percentage of HFBs who reported having enlisted – only 7%. As expected, the percentage of those serving among *mitztarfim* is also high – 63%.

Figure B-10 | **The percentage of men serving in the IDF or performing civilian service**



In parenthesis – a value in the category for which the relative sampling error is between 0.15 and 0.3.
Missing value: a sampling error greater than 0.3.
(For more, see the online appendix).
Source: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data, Jewish men aged 20-54.
For data on other groups, see Table B-4.

62% of male Yotzim and 28% of female Yotzim served in the IDF or the civilian service.

Among women (Figure B-11), the rate of female *Yotzim* who served in the IDF is comparatively low, and when combined with the percentage of women who performed civilian service, the percentage of women who served stands at 28% of the female *Yotzim* (this data is presented with a reservation, due to the relatively high sampling error).

Figure B-11 | **The percentage of women serving in the IDF or performing civilian service**



In parenthesis – a value in the category for which the relative sampling error is between 0.15 and 0.3.
Missing value: a sampling error greater than 0.3.
Source: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data, Jewish women, aged 20-54.
For data on other groups, see Table B-4.

B-7 Higher education

The percentages of both men and women with academic degrees is low, both among Yotzim and Haredim

Educational data is provided here separately for men and women, since the two groups differ in their educational backgrounds within the Haredi education system. The men have nearly no core curriculum studies, particularly at high-school age, since most of them engage solely in religious studies at the *yeshiva ketana*, and do not study mathematics or English, while Haredi girls do have core curriculum studies, but most are enrolled in programs that do not confer full matriculation certificates, but rather partial matriculation certifications and alternative certificates (Szold certificates).[6] Unlike the data on women, which is only found in the Social Survey, educational data on men is based on both the Social Survey and the Labor Force Survey. In general, the data show that the percentage of *Yotzim* with academic degrees – both women and men – is very low compared to non-Haredim, and closer to the percentage among Haredim.

When comparing women's education in the four sub-groups (Figure B-12), we find that there is a discrepancy between those with an academic degree, whose percentage among female *Yotzim* and HFBs is comparable (30%), and graduates of other study programs. With respect to post-secondary educational certificates (at an academic institution or at another post-secondary educational institution), 71% of female HFBs reported having such a certificate, compared to about 51% of the female *Yotzim*. Further-

6. Certificates conferred based on external testing performed by the Henrietta Szold Institute at "Bais Yaakov" seminaries. In 2020, of the 12th-grade boys who had studied in an educational system under Haredi oversight, only 14% had taken at least one matriculation exam, and only 4% were entitled to a matriculation certificate, compared to 94% and 79% of those in the state-secular system, respectively. The actual percentage is lower, since a certain percentage of 12th-grade boys in the Haredi education system are not registered in the Ministry of Education. Among Haredi girls, the percentage that has taken a matriculation exam has risen significantly in recent years (59% in 2020, compared with 31% in 2009), but the percentage of those entitled to matriculation certificates remains low (23% in 2020, compared with 31% in 2009) (Malach & Kahaner, 2022).

more, among female HFBs, the percentage of those whose matriculation certificates were their highest diploma received (6%) is lower than that of female *Yotzim* (33%). Some factors contributing to this gap may be higher LHS rates among women graduates of Haredi schools which prepare their students for matriculation exams, and a high percentage of female *Yotzim* who leave Haredi educational institutions before completing studies that confer professional certificates.[7] These findings should be qualified, since the number of observations of female *Yotzim* aged 25-54 is relatively low (60), and the chance of a sampling error occurring in this group is relatively high.[8]

Figure B-12 | **Distribution of the highest diploma received by women aged 25-54 (%)**



In parenthesis – a value in the category for which the relative sampling error is between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more on this, see the online appendix).
Source: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data. For data on other groups, see Table B-5.

The description of the educational distribution among men in both data sources (the Social Survey and the Labor Force Survey – Figure B-13) indicates that the percentage of *Yotzim* with academic degrees or matriculation certificates is about 30%, compared to about 12% of HFBs and about 61% of non-Haredim. In contrast with this aggregate data, which are similar in both sources, a closer look also reveals discrepancies with regard to *Yotzim*.

7. Certificates defined as "other certificates" are generally professional certificates conferred by post-secondary schools. Courses of study for professional certificates are common at schools for Haredi girls, through 13th and 14th grade programs.

8. Data were supplied in the 2022 The Data is Out annual report (Deutsch et al., 2022) that indicated that 22% of the female *Yotzim* have academic degrees, whereas 30% of the female HFBs have academic degrees, but due to the relatively high margin of error, we presented them as similar.

Figure B-13 | **Distribution of the highest diploma received by men aged 25-54 – using both methods (%)**



In parenthesis – a value in the category for which the relative sampling error is between 0.15 and 0.3.
Missing value: a sampling error greater than 0.3.
(For more, see the online appendix).
Sources: The Social Survey: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey, which identifies Past and Present Haredi based on self-identification.

Labor Force Survey: 2019-2022 Labor Force Survey data on Israeli-born Jewish men, which identifies Past Haredi based on self-reporting of studies at Haredi yeshivas, and Present Haredi based on self-identification.
See the glossary at the beginning of the chapter. For data on other groups, see Table B-6.

According to the Social Survey data, 21% of *Yotzim* have an academic degree, compared to the mere 12% indicated by the Labor Force Survey data. Contrastingly, with regard to HFBs, both sources provide similar data: the percentage of academics is about 7-8%.

The sources also differ in the percentage of those with matriculation certificates. According to the Labor Force Survey, 19% of *Yotzim* have matriculation certificates, whereas according to the Social Survey, under 10% of them have matriculation certificates. This data is somewhat different from the data presented in the 2022 annual report for male *Yotzim*[9]. Notably, despite the variance in sources and years, the combined percentages in both groups, i.e. the percentages of those with matriculation certificates or academic degrees, were similar (at around 30%). Comparing those with academic degrees in different age groups (Figure 14-A), we find that after the age of 30, about 15% of *Yotzim* have an academic degree, compared to 4-11% of HFBs.

When we combine the group of those with academic degrees with those who are currently studying for those degrees (Figure 14-B)[10], we find that 24% of *Yotzim* aged 30-34 have an academic degree or are completing an academic degree. This percentage is higher than the percentage of *Yotzim* with academic

9. This analysis is somewhat different from the situation described in the 2022 edition of The Data is Out (Deutsch et al., 2022), which was also based on Labor Force Survey data, though this data was for the years 2016 to 2019 (Chapter 3.5, Figure 8). That analysis found that about 14% of male *Yotzim* have matriculation certificates, compared to about 20% in the present data.

10. The "academic studies" stage is designated for those who reported in the Labor Force Survey that they are currently studying and reported that their last educational institution is one that confers an academic degree.

degrees at older ages, which could signal one of two situations: An increase in the number of *Yotzim* who decide to engage in academic studies, or a high percentage of *Yotzim* who had dropped out of academic studies. In any case, it is important to qualify this, since the high percentage is in only one age group, and more data is needed to validate these findings.

Figure B-14 | **Academic degree – men, broken down by age group**



Source: 2019-2022 Human Resource Survey data, Israeli-born Jews aged 25-54.
Students: Those who reported that they are currently studying and reported that the last educational institution in which they studied is an institution that confers an academic degree.
For data on other groups, see Table B-7.

B-Tables on the *Yotzim*'s characteristics

Extensive data on the four subgroups – ***Yotzim*** (Haredim in the past and not in the present), **HFBs** (Haredim in the past and in the present), **miztarfim** (those who were not Haredi in the past but are presently Haredim) and **non-Haredim** (not Haredi in the past nor in the present) – for which data has been presented within the chapter appear in the following tables. Furthermore, data on two broader groups on which no data was presented are displayed in these tables.

- **All those with Haredi backgrounds –** anyone who was once Haredi (HFBs and *Yotzim*)
- **All those who are currently Haredi –** anyone who is presently Haredi (HFBs & *mitztarfim*)

The values for all those who are currently non-Haredim (non-Haredim and *Yotzim*) are not displayed in the tables, though their values are similar to those of the non-Haredim, mainly because of the small percentage of *Yotzim* among those who are currently non-Haredim.

Table B-1 | **Age groups, broken down by gender (%)**

	Non-Haredim	*Yotzim*	HFBs	*Mitztarfim*	All those with Haredi backgrounds	All those who are currently Haredi
Men and women						
24-20	15	30	24	(7)	25	20
29-25	15	24	21	11	21	19
34-30	15	20	20	18	20	20
44-35	30	17	25	36	24	27
54-45	25	(9)	10	28	10	14
Men						
24-20	15	26	24	(6)	24	19
29-25	15	27	22	(12)	23	20
34-30	14	(15)	20	19	19	20
44-35	30	(20)	25	36	24	28
54-45	25	(12)	9	(26)	10	14
Women						
24-20	15	34	24	(7)	25	21
29-25	14	(20)	20	11	20	18
34-30	15	(28)	20	17	21	20
44-35	31	(12)	25	36	24	27
54-45	26		10	30	10	15

In parenthesis – a value in a category for which relative sampling error is between 0.15 and 0.3. Missing value: a sampling error greater than 0.3.
(For more, see the online appendix).
Sources: 2017-2021 Social Survey data, Jews (men and women) aged 20-54.

Table B-2 | **District of residence, broken down by gender and age group (%)**

	Non-Haredim	*Yotzim*	HFBs	*Mitztarfim*	All those with Haredi back-grounds	All those who are currently Haredi
Men and women						
Tel Aviv and Central	53	35	33	42	33	35
Jerusalem	7	23	34	20	33	31
Haifa and Northern	21	18	7	16	8	9
The South	15	(13)	11	15	11	12
Judea & Samaria	4	(11)	15	7	15	13
Men						
Tel Aviv and Central	53	32	32	43	32	35
Jerusalem	7	(24)	35	20	34	31
Haifa and Northern	21	(17)	7	16	9	10
The South	15	(14)	10	14	11	11
Judea & Samaria	4	(13)	15	(7)	15	13
Women						
Tel Aviv and Central	53	39	33	41	34	35
Jerusalem	7	(21)	34	20	33	31
Haifa and Northern	21	(18)	6	15	7	8
The South	14	(12)	12	17	12	13
Judea & Samaria	4		15	(7)	15	13
Young adults aged 20-29						
Tel Aviv and Central	50	32	31	39	31	32
Jerusalem	8	26	35	(19)	34	33
Haifa and Northern	20	(17)	9	(18)	9	10
The South	16	(14)	12	(18)	12	12
Judea & Samaria	5	(11)	14		13	13

In parenthesis – a value in a category for which the relative sampling error is between 0.15 and 0.3.
Missing value: a sampling error greater than 0.3.
(For more, see the online appendix).
Source: 2017-2021 Social Survey data, Jews, men and women aged 20-54.

Table B-3 | **Family status, broken down by gender, among those aged 25-54 (%)**

	Non-Haredim	*Yotzim*	HFBs	*Mitztarfim*	All those with Haredi backgrounds	All those who are currently Haredi
Men and women						
Married	66	62	93	90	90	92
Single	24	27	4	(6)	7	5
Parents	72	68	92	91	90	91
Men						
Married	64	61	93	87	89	91
Single	29	(30)	(5)	(9)	8	6
Fathers	66	63	90	88	87	89
Women						
Married	67	64	94	92	92	94
Single	20	(22)	(4)		(5)	(4)
Mothers	77	76	93	94	92	94

In parenthesis – a value in a category for which the relative sampling error is between 0.15 and 0.3.
Missing value: a sampling error greater than 0.3.
(For more, see the online appendix).
Source: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data, Jews (men and women).

Table B-4 | **Military service, broken down by gender and age group (%)**

	Non-Haredim	*Yotzim*	HFBs	*Mitztarfim*	All those with Haredi back-grounds	All those who are currently Haredi
Men and women						
Military service	78	37	4	48	7	14
Civilian Service	8	(11)	3	10	4	5
Total Military or Civilian service	85	48	6	58	11	19
Men						
Military service	88	58	7	63	13	21
Civilian service	1		5		5	4
Total military or Civilian service	89	62	12	64	18	25
Women						
Military service	67			31		7
Civilian service	14	(21)		20	(3)	5
Military or civilian service	82	(28)		51	(3)	12
29-20						
Military service	81	40	(2)	42	7	6
Civilian service	11	(12)	(2)	(12)	(3)	(3)
Military or civilian service	91	52	(4)	54	10	9

In parenthesis – a value in a category for which the relative sampling error is between 0.15 and 0.3.
Missing value: a sampling error greater than 0.3.
(For more, see the online appendix).
Sources: 2017-2021 Social Survey data, Jews (men and women) aged 20-54.

Table B-5 | **Breakdown of highest diploma received – women and girls aged 25-54 (%)**

	Non-Haredim	*Yotzim*	HFBs	*Mitztarfim*	All those with Haredi back-grounds	All those currently Haredi
Up to completion of high school	16	(17)	23	21	23	23
Matriculation	20	(33)	(6)	23	8	10
Post-secondary and other	11	(21)	41	19	39	35
Academic degree	53	(30)	30	37	30	32

Source: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data.

Table B-6 | **Breakdown of highest diploma received, by source – men aged 25-54 (%)**

	Non-Haredim	*Yotzim*	HFBs	*Mitztarfim*	All those with Haredi back-grounds	All those who are currently Haredi
The Social Survey						
Up to completion of high school	24	58	77	46	75	68
Matriculation	20		(4)	22	(4)	9
Post-secondary and other	15	(13)	11	15	11	12
Academic degree	41	(21)	8	17	10	11
Labor Force Survey						
Up to completion of high school	20	55	75.7	52.8	72.4	70.6
Matriculation certificate	23	19	5.1	16.9	7.3	7.7
Post-secondary and other	14	14	12.5	16.0	12.7	13.2
Academic degree	44	12	6.8	14.3	7.6	8.4

Sources: The Social Survey: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey, Jews who identify as Past and Present Haredi based on self-identification.
2019-2022 Labor Force Survey data on Israeli-born Jewish men who identify as Past Haredi based on self-reporting of studies at Haredi yeshivas, and Present Haredi based on self-identification.

Table B-7 | **Academic degree – men, broken down by age group**

Age group	Non-Haredim	*Yotzim*	HFBs	*Mitztarfim*	All those with Haredi back-grounds	All those who are currently Haredi
Those with an academic degree						
25-54	44	12	7	14	8	8
29-25	23	4	2	3	2	2
34-30	49	17	4	14	6	6
44-35	51	15	11	21	11	13
54-45	44	16	10	15	11	12
Students or those with academic degrees						
25-54	49	16	8	16	9	10
29-25	48	9	4	7	5	5
34-30	53	24	6	16	9	8
44-35	52	16	12	21	12	14
54-45	45	16	11	15	12	12

Source: 2019-2022 Human Resource Survey, Israeli-born Jews aged 25-54.
Students: Those who reported that they are currently studying and that the last educational institution they had studied at is an institution that confers academic degrees.

B-Sources

Eliyahu, A (2020). Completion of education in the IDF for Haredi soldiers and formerly Haredi soldiers (in Hebrew). Knesset Research and Information Center [in Hebrew].

Deutsch, Z., Kaplan, S. & Shenfeld, M. (2022). The Data is Out, 2022 edition. Out for Change.

Malach, G. & Cahaner, L. (2022). The Annual Report of Ultra-Orthodox Society in Israel. The Israeli Democracy Institute [in Hebrew].

Regev, E. & Gordon, G. (2021). Trends in Joining and Leaving the ultra-Orthodox Sector. The Israeli Democracy Institute [in Hebrew].

B-Appendices

Appendix B-1: Supplementary data

Figure B-A-1 | **Distribution of the age groups of *Yotzim* and HFBs among those aged 25-54, using all methods (%)**



Sources: The Social Survey: 2017-2021 Social Survey data, men and women, which identifies Past and Present Haredi based on self-identification.
Human Resource Survey: 2019-2022 Human Resource Survey data on Israeli-born men, which identifies Past Haredi based on self-reporting of studies at Haredi yeshivas, and Present Haredi based on self-identification.
2019-2022 Labor Force Survey data on Israeli-born men, which identifies Past Haredi based on self-reporting of studies at Haredi yeshivas, and Present Haredi based on self-identification.
Regev & Gordon – Regev & Gordon's extrapolations (2021) of 2017 Labor Force Survey data, women and men. Their extrapolations do not include the age distribution of HFBs.

Figure B-A-2 | **Residential districts of *Yotzim*, broken down by age group (%)**



Sources: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data, men and women aged 20-54.
Human Resource Survey: 2019-2022 Human Resource Survey, Israeli-born men aged 25-54

C. Employment among men

Tzvika Deutsch, Moshe Shenfeld and Oren Tirosh

Abstract

The participation of male former Haredim (*Yotzim*) in the workforce is relatively similar to that of non-Haredi Jews, and significantly higher than that of Haredi Jews, though their unemployment rates are higher. Another finding is that *Yotzim* account for about one-quarter of the workforce of those with Haredi backgrounds, which is significantly higher than their share of the population. With regard to fields they work in, *Yotzim* are more similar to Haredi Jews.

- In 2022, the employment rate of *Yotzim* stood at 79%, compared to 90% for all those who are currently not Haredi, and 50% for HFBs (Haredim in the past and in the present). Another finding was that *Yotzim* experienced a slower recovery from the COVID-19 crisis.
- *Yotzim* are characterized by relatively high unemployment rates. Between 2021 and 2022, the percentage of *Yotzim* jobseekers within the workforce (their unemployment rate) stood at 6.9%, compared to 3.9% among those who are currently not Haredi, and 5% among currently Haredi Jews. The percentage of jobseekers within the population stood at 5.8% among *Yotzim*, compared to 3.8% among non-Haredim and about 3% among Haredim.
- On average, *Yotzim* have high-scope jobs: 86% of them had full-time jobs, which is only slightly lower than the figure for the non-Haredim (92%), and significantly higher than the figure for Haredi Jews (65% – 67%).
- About 60% of *Yotzim* work in vocations requiring basic skills and characterized by relatively low wages (such as drivers and construction or sales jobs), compared to about 35% of HFBs and of all those who are currently not Haredi.
- The percentage of *Yotzim* employed in tech (~7%) is lower than that of those who are currently not Haredi (22%), but slightly higher than that of HFBs (~3%).
- *Yotzim* account for about one-quarter of the workforce of men from Haredi backgrounds, and nearly a third of all jobseekers, even though they only account for about 15% of this group.
- *Yotzim* enter the job market relatively young, and Haredi Jews enter the job market at a relatively advanced age.

Groups and data sources

Groups

Subgroups

Yotzim – Haredim in the past and not in the present (i.e., "former Haredim")
HFBs – Haredim in the past and in the present
Mitztarfim – those who were not Haredi in the past, but are presently Haredim
Non-Haredi Jews – not Haredi in the past nor in the present

Broader groups

All those with Haredi backgrounds
All those who are currently Haredi – anyone who is presently Haredi (HFBs & mitztarfim)

All those who are currently not Haredi – anyone who is not Present Haredi (non-Haredim + *Yotzim*, also known as "Jews who are not Haredi").

Data sources and identification methods (*)

The Central Bureau of Statistics Resource Survey for 2016 through 2022, Jewish men born in Israel, aged 25-54. The aggregate analyses are for the years 2019-2022.
Identification of Past Haredi: GHYs by self-identification (the "Dashat" method). Identification of Present Haredi: Haredi by self-identification (household level).

(*) See the abstract in Chapter 1 for more on these methods, as well as a discussion of this in the online appendix.
For employment terminology see Appendix C-2 of this chapter.

C-1 Introduction

This chapter presents representative and comparative data on employment indices pertaining to former Haredim and other groups, which include trends in the labor force integration indices, areas of employment and an in-depth analysis of employment indices among those with Haredi backgrounds.

Unlike the employment rate of Haredi women, which has already reached the government's target for 2030, and is approaching that of non-Haredi Jewish women, the employment rate of Haredi men is far from reaching the government target,[1] and on average, the scope of their job position is significantly lower than that of non-Haredi Jews. The low employment rate and quality of employment of Haredi men, as measured, for example, by the scope of their job positions and their salary levels, may stem from cultural differences, as well as educational gaps (see Chapter B-7). Former Haredim, having gone through the same education system, are also contending with educational gaps during the first few years after leaving Haredi society, so it is particularly crucial to analyze the characteristics of their employment. Although studies on the employment characteristics of both male and female *Yotzim* are scarce, the need to rely on the data from the Labor Force Survey, due to the limited data, allowed us to delve into just the men (using the "Dashat" method and Labor Force Survey data that allow us to identify Haredi background, only for men, based on yeshiva studies)

This chapter presents the employment data for male *Yotzim*, mainly in comparison to three groups: another subgroup of those with Haredi backgrounds; and the two broad groups commonly used in employment indices, which differ with respect to present Haredi religiosity: all those who are currently Haredi (those who are often called "Haredi Jews") and all those who are currently not Haredi (who are generally called "non-Haredi Jews"). Occasionally, the analysis will also relate to the broad group including all those with Haredi backgrounds.

Chapter C-2 presents labor force integration matrices (the rate of participation in the labor force and employment, unemployment indices, and percentage job positions). Section C-3 will cover the *Yotzim*'s main occupations, including the tech industry, and Section C-4 will focus on the employment of those with Haredi backgrounds, broken down by current Haredi religiosity: *Yotzim* and HFBs. Additional data is provided in the section containing the tables.

1. Pursuant to Government Decision 198, the government target is 65% for Haredi men and 81% for Haredi women, aged 25-66 (the 36th Government, 2021). In the first three quarters of 2023, the up-to-date unemployment rate for women who are currently Haredi was 81%, and it stood at 83.3% among women who are not Present Haredi. The employment rate for men was 55% for men who are currently Haredi, and 87% for those who are not Present Haredi (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2023A).

C-2 Labor force integration indices

C-2.1 Employment and participation in the labor force

Integration into the job market was assessed using two common indices: the employment rate and the rate of participation in the labor force. The first index relates solely to employed persons, and the second index also includes jobseekers (for the definitions, see Appendix C-2).

The number of employed persons assessed in the employment rate includes those who worked for at least one hour during the previous week (employed in practice), and those temporarily absent from their jobs (e.g., due to active reserve duty, a vacation or unpaid leave (see Appendix C-2). Generally, when we use the data in this way, we end up with a good picture of the employment rate, since temporary absence from the workplace does not indicate a lack of employment. However, for the years of the COVID-19 crisis (2020-2021), in light of the high percentage of employed persons on unpaid leave during that time, viewing those temporarily absent as employed persons does not give us an accurate picture of the employment rate,[2] so a third index was also analyzed: the actual employment rate.

The employment rate of Yotzim stands at about 80%, compared to 90% for non-Haredim and approximately 50% among Haredi Jews.

First the employment rate trends of *Yotzim* between 2016 and 2022 are presented in comparison with three groups: HFBs, all those currently Haredi, and all those currently not Haredi. Next, the three indices are presented: employment rate, rate of participation in the labor force, and actual employment rate. The data is presented for each group, separately, in order to assess recovery after the COVID years.

As demonstrated in Figure C-1, throughout the entire period, the employment rate of all those not Present Haredi was about 90%, and this rate decreased only slightly during the COVID years. The employment rate of *Yotzim* between 2018 and 2020 was between 82% and 84%, and before and after this period, this figure was slightly lower, at 77-79%.[3] Among Haredi Jews – HFBs and all those currently Haredi – the employment rate was significantly lower: only about 50% were employed persons, and the two groups were quite similar.

2. A few of the publications that relied on the Central Bureau of Statistics' Labor Force Survey took various approaches to addressing the COVID-19 period, which may create a lack of correspondence for 2020 and 2021.

3. One possible explanation for the 2017-2018 data relates to the exceptional representation of *Yotzim* aged 35-54 during those years (for an elaboration on this, see the online appendix).

Figure C-1 | **Employment rate trends (%)**



Source: Labor Force Survey data, Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-54.
For data on other groups, see Table C-1.

The decrease in the employment rates among *Yotzim* during the period following the COVID-19 pandemic (2020-2021) compared to the preceding period (79% in 2022, vs. 84% in 2019), may indicate that they recovered relatively slowly from the crisis, as further manifested by Figure C-2, which compares the employment rates, rates of participation in the labor force, and actual employment rates of each group.

Figure C-2 | **Comparing employment index trends**



Source: Labor Force Survey data, Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-54.
For data on other groups, see Table C-1.

In all groups, except for the group of *Yotzim*, the rate of participation in the labor force was found to be stable during the COVID pandemic as well. Among Yotzim, however, a one-time decrease (82%) was recorded for 2021, and in 2022, this rate rebounded to pre-pandemic figures (~86%). This decline may be the result of a one-time increase in the percentage of those who had despaired of seeking a job ("discouraged workers") during the pandemic. At any rate, due to the limited number of observations among *Yotzim*, the possibility that this fluctuation during 2021 stemmed from a statistical error could not be discounted. During the COVID period (mainly during 2020), a decrease was noted in actual employment rate due to the increase in employed persons who went on unpaid leave, but unlike the other groups, in which the actual employment rate rebounded in 2022 to the levels that had existed before the COVID period, this rate remained relatively low among *Yotzim* in 2022, as well.

C-2.2 Unemployment (job seekers)

A job seeker ("unemployed" or "unemployed person") is someone who is not employed who actively looked for a job during the previous four weeks (see Appendix C-2). The members of this group are interested in integrating into the labor market and are prepared to expend effort to do so. The unemployment rate is customarily defined as the rate of those seeking jobs among all of those participating in the labor force (employed persons and job seekers). This index represents the percentage of those who are interested in finding a job but are unsuccessful at integrating into the labor market.

Given the low percentage of Haredi men who participate in the labor force, comparing the unemployment rate within their labor force to other groups does not result in a comprehensive comparison, since their low level of participation in the labor market increases the unemployment rate. Therefore, to complete the picture, we also provide an analysis of the rate of job seekers from within the entire population (those that are and are not participating in the labor force), as well as an analysis of the discouraged worker rate within the entire population (see Appendix C-2).

Figure C-3 | **Comparing unemployment trend rates (displayed as a rolling average, %)**



Source: Labor Force Survey data, Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-54.
For data on other groups, see Table C-3.

Over the past two years, the unemployment rate of Yotzim has risen, and it is higher than the rates of both non-Haredi and Haredi Jews.

As demonstrated in Figure C-3, when assessed over time, we found that the highest unemployment rates were among *Yotzim*, particularly with respect to the percentage of job seekers within the general population, and not just within those participating in the labor force. Until 2019-2020, the unemployment rates within all groups remained stable or declined, and in 2020, after the COVID-19 pandemic broke out, an increase was noted. After the COVID-19 period, a decrease was noted in the unemployment rates of the Haredi groups and among all those who are currently not Haredi, while a significant increase was noted among *Yotzim*. Between 2021 and 2022, the unemployment rate for *Yotzim* was 6.9%, compared to 4% among those who are currently not Haredi, and 5% among currently Haredi Jews.

The job seeker rate within the population, among the Yotzim, was the highest, which is indicative of the potential for improving their employment rate.

The job seeker rate for *Yotzim* within the population was about 5% before the COVID-19 pandemic, and 5.8% between 2021-2022, compared to 3% or less among Haredi Jews (in both groups). This finding indicates that although the unemployment rate of *Yotzim* is significantly higher than the unemployment rate of Haredi Jews, they displayed an even higher potential of improving their employment rate, as long as the willingness of the Haredi Jews to participate in the labor force does not increase.

We should qualify this and say that the estimates for *Yotzim* are more strongly affected by sampling errors, due to the relatively low number of observations of this population. In any case, these figures are consistent with past figures, since unemployment rates among *Yotzim* are high, and their processes for returning to the labor market seem to be slower, as further reflected by the slow recovery of the unemployment rate after the COVID-19 years. We should note that an increase in unemployment was also noted for 2022 among Arab men, such that the groups that were more strongly affected by COVID-19 may have recovered more slowly (see Appendix C-1, Figure C-A-1).

C-2.3 Scope of job position

Scope of job positions of employed persons were assessed using an analysis of average working hours per week and the percentage of employed persons who generally hold full-time jobs. The average number of hours worked per week was calculated according to two definitions: the typical average working hours per week, which refers to the number of hours that all employed persons (employed in practice and temporarily absent from the workplace) typically worked every week, and the actual average number of hours worked per week, which refers to the average number of hours that those employed in practice had worked over the past week. "Full-time" was generally calculated using two methods: according to the definition of the Central Bureau of Statistics – at least 35 hours per week; and according to the OECD's definition – at least 30 hours per week (for these definitions, see Appendix C-2). This index refers to the typical working hours per week by all employed persons.

Yotzim had scopes of job positions comparable to those of non-Haredim, and higher than those of Haredi Jews

As a rule, *Yotzim* had scopes of job positions that were only slightly lower than those of non-Haredim, and higher than those of Haredi Jews (Figure C-4). On average, *Yotzim* typically worked 44 hours per week, which is similar to the 46 hours per week worked by those who are currently not Haredi, and higher than the 36-37 hours per week worked by Haredi Jews (both groups). A similar discrepancy exists between the average hours worked per week in the past week among those employed in practice: 41 hours per week among *Yotzim*, 43 hours per week among all those who are currently not Haredi, and 34-35 among the Haredi groups.

Figure C-4 | **Average working hours per week**



'Source: 2016-2022 Labor Force Survey data, Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-54.
For data on other groups, broken down by age group, see Table C-4.

When assessing the percentage of employed persons typically working full-time jobs (Figure C-5), we note that according to the Central Bureau of Statistics' definition (working at least 35 hours per week), 83% of the *Yotzim* and 91% of those who are currently not Haredi have full-time jobs, compared to 63-65% for Haredi Jews. A similar gap emerges when comparing the data using the OECD's definition (working at least 30 hours per week): 88% of *Yotzim* and 93% of those currently not Haredi have full-time jobs, compared to 70-72% for Haredi Jews.

Figure C-5 | **Those with full-time jobs – percentage of those working at least 30 or 35 hours per week**



Source: 2016-2022 Labor Force Survey data, Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-54.
For data on other groups, broken down by age group, see Table C-4.

C-3 Occupations

In this section, we specify the areas of employment of *Yotzim* compared to other groups. Section C-3.1 presents the distributions of occupations and industries (see the definitions in Appendix C-2), which were specified by the respondents in the 2019-2022 Labor Force Survey. Data is also presented on those who were not employed at the time the survey was conducted, provided that they were employed during the two years preceding the survey and that they had reported the vocation and industry in which they were employed.[4] The percentages of employed persons in tech occupations and industries are presented in Section 3.2 (for a list of industries and occupations classified as "tech", see Tables C-A-1 and C-A-2 in Appendix C-2)

C-3.1 The vocations of the employed persons

During the first stage, occupations were divided into seven main vocations, based on the Central Bureau of Statistics' grouping of vocations based on average wages (see Figure C-A-2 in Appendix C-1). However, since a large percentage of Haredi Jews are employed in teaching, which is defined as an academic vocation, even though teaching at yeshivas does not require academic training, the academic occupation category was split into two categories: academic occupation – not including teaching, and academic occupation – teaching (a total of eight categories). Alongside this grouping, the presented occupations are classified by the four skill levels required for the position (see Appendix C-3). In this analysis as well, teaching, which belongs in the "high-skilled " category, was split and presented separately.

Nearly two-thirds of Yotzim are employed in "low-skilled" vocations, characterized by low wages, versus about one-third of Haredi Jews and non-Haredim.

When comparing based on the skill level required for the vocation (Figure C-6), we find that 60% of *Yotzim* have occupations that belong to the two lowest levels, compared to 35-38% of Haredi Jews in these vocations and 34% of all those who are currently not Haredi. The percentage of *Yotzim* in high-skilled occupations excluding teaching stands at 19%, which is comparable to the percentage among Haredi Jews (21%), and far less than the percentage of those who are currently not Haredi (43%).

4. Assuming that there was no uniform decrease in employment among all vocations, presenting the data in this way allows us to provide the most reliable distribution of vocations during the period including the years of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Figure C-6 | **Distribution of employed persons, by skill level required for the vocation (%)**



Source: 2019-2022 Labor Force Survey data, Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-54 who were employed during the two years that preceded the survey and reported their occupation.

Figure C-7 shows the distribution of seven main occupations, with the academic occupation split into two categories: academic – not teaching, and academic – teaching (all 8 columns add up to 100%).

Figure C-7 | **Occupations, by population groups (%)**



Source: 2019-2022 Labor Force Survey data, Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-54 who were employed during the two years that preceded the survey and reported their occupation.
For data on other groups in greater detail, see Table C-3. For data on employed persons, by economic activity, see Table C-6.

Occupations categorized by their average wages (for men) – these are arranged from highest to lowest. For example, the average wages of managers are the highest, so these occupations appear high up on the Y-axis, while elementary occupations, whose average wages are the lowest, appear lower (for average wages for men, see Figure C-A-2 in Appendix C-1). This representation illustrates that many *Yotzim* are employed in positions with a low average wage. Thus, for example, about 53% of *Yotzim* are in occupations for which the average wages in 2020 were less than 10,000 ILS (elementary occupations, service and sales workers, skilled workers), which is greater than the percentage of HFBs and all those who are currently not Haredi (28-30%, in both groups).

In contrast, with regard to non-teaching academic occupations, the percentage of *Yotzim* working in this field (13%) is comparable to that of FSBs (16%), and lower than all those who are currently not Haredi (31%). This is tied to the low percentages of *Yotzim* who have obtained post-secondary education (see Chapter B-7). The situation is different for teaching professions: Among HFBs, the percentage of those employed in teaching is the highest (21% – the most prevalent category), compared to about 4% of *Yotzim* and all those who are not Present Haredi. This analysis also reveals that about 29% of *Yotzim* work in general skilled occupations (e.g.: drivers and construction occupations), and in sales (18%). For extensive data on employment by occupation, see Table C-5 in the tables section).

In conclusion, a relatively high percentage of *Yotzim* are employed in manual labor and in occupations that do not require academic training. Teaching is the dominant occupation among Haredi Jews, and the characteristics of these two groups differ from those of non-Haredim.

C-3.2 Employment in the tech industry

Among Yotzim, the rate of those employed in tech is lower than the rate among non-Haredim, and slightly higher than the rate among Haredim.

The extent of integration of *Yotzim* in tech businesses and professions (for definitions, see Appendix C-3) is lower than that of non-Haredim, and only slightly higher than that of Haredi Jews.

As evidenced by Figure C-8, during the years 2019-2022, only 7.4% of *Yotzim* worked in occupations tied to tech, a rate considerably lower than that of all those who are currently not Haredi (21.7%), slightly higher than the rate for all those currently Haredi (4.3%), and higher than that of HFBs (2.9%).[5] The rate of *Yotzim* who have integrated into the tech industries is rather comparable to the percentage of *Yotzim* who work in tech occupations, in comparison to Haredi Jews and non-Haredim, where the rate is slightly lower.

5. This data differs from the data published in the 2022 edition of The Data is Out, by Deutsch et al. (2022), according to which the integration rate of *Yotzim* is similar to that of HFBs. There may have been an increase in the rate of those employed in tech, but it stands to reason that part of the reason for the difference between the periods is statistical errors or an error in the classification of *Yotzim* at higher ages (for more, see the online appendix).

Figure C-8 | **The percentage of those employed in tech (%)**



Source: 2019-2022 Labor Force Survey data, Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-54 who were employed during the two years that preceded the survey and reported their occupation, adjusted to the industry index and occupation index.
For data on other groups, broken down by age group, see Table C-7.

Both *Yotzim* and HFBs are GHYs, and lacking a core curriculum education – mainly English and mathematics – these groups grapple with educational gaps and lack the skills needed to integrate into tech. Though it stands to reason that these educational gaps are precisely the reason that these two groups have a low rate of integration into tech, *Yotzim* seem to be integrating into these fields at higher rates. Integration into the job market at a young age, along with the willingness to work in jobs with more working hours (see the discussion of this issue in Section C-2.3 above) contribute to the *Yotzim*'s integration into these occupations.

C-4 Employment of those with Haredi backgrounds, broken down by present Haredi religiosity

The data presented in Section C-2 emerged from a comparison, over time, of the extent of *Yotzim*'s integration into the labor force, compared to non-Haredim and those who are presently Haredi. The data reveals that with regard to all aspects of participation in the labor market, *Yotzim* resemble non-Haredim more than Haredi Jews, particularly HFBs. These findings have two indirect implications. One is that *Yotzim* drive up the employment indices of all men from Haredi backgrounds, i.e. GHYs; and the other is that the representation of *Yotzim* within the labor force of those with Haredi backgrounds, and the work hours that they produce, are greater than their relative share of the population. Section C-4.1 will present this data directly by analyzing a number of employment indices for the years 2019-2022, among all men from Haredi backgrounds, broken down by *Yotzim* and HFBs, and by calculating the percentage of *Yotzim* among all men from Haredi backgrounds in these indices. Section C-4.2 will delve into employment trends by age group.

C-4.1 The percentage of *Yotzim* within the labor force of men from Haredi backgrounds

In the years 2019-2022, the employment rate of *Yotzim* stood at 81%, while the employment rate for HFBs was only 50% (Figure C-9). On average, the employment rate among all men from Haredi backgrounds stood at 55%. The percentage of job seekers within the population stood at 5.4% among *Yotzim*, compared to 2.4% among HFBs, and on average, the rate of job seekers among all men from Haredi backgrounds stood at 2.9%. Similar findings emerged with respect to their rate of participation in the labor force and the general average working hours of the employed persons.

Figure C-9 | **Integration into labor force indices – men from Haredi backgrounds, 2019-2022**



Source: 2019-2022 Labor Force Survey data, those with Haredi backgrounds, aged 25-54.

Yotzim account for about one-quarter of the labor force of men from Haredi backgrounds, even though they only account for about 15% of this group.

The analysis of the relative share of *Yotzim* among these groups (Figure C-10) demonstrates that *Yotzim* accounted for 23% of all employed persons with Haredi backgrounds, and 30% among all men from Haredi backgrounds seeking employment. When factoring in the employed persons' working hours, we discover that the total working hours of *Yotzim* represents 27% of the total working hours of men from Haredi backgrounds.

Figure C-10 | **The percentage of *Yotzim* within the labor force – men from Haredi backgrounds, 2019-2022**

Source: Labor Force Survey data, those aged 25-54.

C-4.2 Employment trends, broken down by age group

This section compares the employment rate trends and trends in the labor force participation rates of men from Haredi backgrounds, broken down by two age groups: young adults (aged 25-34) and adults (aged 35-54), and presents an analysis of the rate of employed persons working full-time positions, broken down by these two age groups.

As a rule, young Haredim integrate into the job market at even lower rates than the low integration rates of adult Haredim, and this figure may be indicative of joining the job market at a later stage of life. Thus, for example, during the years 2021-2022, the employment rate of HFB young adults stood at 40%, while the employment rate of adult HFBs was 59% (Figure C-11). A similar discrepancy emerged among all those currently Haredi (41% vs. 61%). This gap remained relatively stable over time, and even decreased slightly during the years 2021-2022 (the decrease during these years can be found when reviewing annual data, and not as a two-year rolling average).[6]

6. This reduction is different from the increase reported in the publications released by the Ministry of Labor (2023A). It stands to reason that the difference here lies in the different definitions of employed persons during the COVID-19 period, which is apparent in the Ministry of Labor's Employment Report for 2022 (Harpaz, 2023), in which the definition of an employed person was different during the time between March 2020 and June 2022.

Figure C-11 | **Employment rate, broken down by age**



Source: Labor Force Survey data, Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-54.
For data on other groups, see Table C-2.

Yotzim enter the job market relatively young, and Haredi Jews enter the job market at a relatively advanced age.

Among young adult *Yotzim*, the employment rate over time was approximately 80%, and this rate was between 76% and 86% for adult *Yotzim*.[7] Due to volatility, it is impossible to provide a precise estimate for a particular year. At any rate, *Yotzim*'s contribution to the employment rates of men from Haredi backgrounds is evidenced by the fact that the employment rate of men from Haredi backgrounds is higher than that of HFBs – 6 percentage points higher for young adults, and 3-4 percentage points higher for adults. This gap exists due to the *Yotzim*'s higher employment rates.

These findings also demonstrate that the proportion of *Yotzim* among men from Haredi backgrounds who integrated into the job market at a young age is higher than the proportion provided in the previous section, with no age distribution. Furthermore, comparing the rate of those employed in full-time jobs (at least 35 hours) by age group (Figure C-12) also demonstrates that this rate is higher among *Yotzim* and non-Haredim, and lower among Haredi Jews.

7. The volatility in the older group is also the result of sampling errors, which are higher among *Yotzim*, because of the relatively small number of individual observations (158-211) during this period. Regarding the period that lasted until 2018, there may be an over-identification of adult *Yotzim*, which could affect employment estimates (for a discussion of this issue, see the online appendix).

Figure C-12 | **The rate of those employed in full-time jobs (at least 35 hours), broken down by age group**



Source: 2016-2022 Labor Force Survey data, Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-54.
For data on other groups, see Table C-4.

C-Employment tables

The following tables display further details about the four main groups discussed in this chapter: The two subgroups, *Yotzim* (Haredim in the past and not in the present) and **HFBs** (Haredim in the past and in the present), as well as the two broad groups typically included in employment indices: **all those who are currently Haredi** (anyone who is presently Haredi: HFBs & *mitztarfim*) and **all those who are currently not Haredi**: non-Haredim and *Yotzim*, who are also known as "Jews who are not Haredi). Data is also provided on the groups for whom data hadn't been provided methodically:

- **All those with Haredi backgrounds** (anyone who was once Haredi: HFBs and *Yotzim*)
- *Mitztarfim* (those who were not Haredi in the past, but are presently Haredim)

The data on the group of non-Haredim (non-Haredim and *Yotzim*) is not displayed in the tables, though their values are similar to the values of all those who are currently not Haredi (Jews), mainly because of the small percentage of *Yotzim* in this group.

Table C-1 | **Participation in the labor force and employment**

Year	*Yotzim*	HFBs	*Mitztarfim*	All those with Haredi back-grounds	All those who are currently Haredi	All those who are currently not Haredi
Rate of participation in the labor force						
2016	85	51	66	58	55	93
2017	84	51	64	57	54	93
2018	88	51	63	58	54	93
2019	88	52	63	58	55	93
2020	88	52	64	58	55	92
2021	82	53	61	57	54	92
2022	86	52	62	57	54	93
Employment rate						
2016	79	48	61	54	52	89
2017	78	48	60	53	51	90
2018	83	48	60	54	51	90
2019	84	50	60	55	53	89
2020	82	50	59	55	52	88
2021	77	49	56	53	51	88
2022	79	50	60	55	52	90
Actual employment rate						
2016	75	44	56	51	48	85
2017	73	44	57	50	48	85
2018	80	43	56	50	47	85
2019	79	46	57	51	49	85
2020	73	41	49	46	43	78
2021	69	43	51	47	45	82
2022	72	47	56	51	49	85

Source: 2016-2022 Labor Force Survey data, Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-54.

Table C-2 | **Employment rate, by age group (rolling average)**

	Yotzim	HFBs	*Mitztarfim*	All those with Haredi backgrounds	All those who are currently Haredi	All those who are currently not Haredi
Ages 25-34						
2017-2016	79	41	54	47	43	86
2018-2017	76	42	53	47	44	86
2019-2018	81	43	52	49	45	86
2020-2019	81	43	50	49	44	85
2021-2020	78	42	46	48	43	83
2022-2021	80	40	45	46	41	84
Ages 35-54						
2017-2016	78	57	64	62	60	91
2018-2017	84	56	64	62	59	92
2019-2018	86	57	64	62	59	92
2020-2019	86	58	66	62	60	91
2021-2020	81	57	66	61	59	90
2022-2021	76	59	68	62	61	91

Source: 2016-2022 Labor Force Survey data, Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-54.

Table C-3 | **The unemployment rate (job seekers)**

	Yotzim	HFBs	*Mitztarfim*	All those with Haredi back-grounds	All those who are currently Haredi	All those who are currently not Haredi
Job seekers within the labor force (unemployment)						
2017-2016	7.1	6.2	6.7	6.5	6.4	3.9
2018-2017	6.5	6.1	5.3	6.2	5.8	3.8
2019-2018	5.6	5.0	4.4	5.2	4.8	3.8
2020-2019	5.8	4.1	5.8	4.5	4.5	4.1
2021-2020	5.7	5.5	7.3	5.6	6.0	4.7
2022-2021	6.9	5.0	5.1	5.4	5.0	4.0
Job seekers within the population						
2017-2016	6.0	3.1	4.3	3.7	3.5	3.6
2018-2017	5.5	3.1	3.4	3.5	3.2	3.5
2019-2018	4.9	2.6	2.8	3.0	2.6	3.5
2020-2019	5.1	2.1	3.7	2.6	2.5	3.8
2021-2020	4.8	2.9	4.5	3.2	3.2	4.3
2022-2021	5.8	2.6	3.1	3.1	2.7	3.7
Job seekers and discouraged workers within the population						
2017-2016	6.4	3.4	4.8	4.0	3.8	3.8
2018-2017	5.8	3.3	3.6	3.8	3.4	3.6
2019-2018	5.1	2.9	2.8	3.2	2.8	3.6
2020-2019	5.1	2.5	3.7	2.9	2.7	4.0
2021-2020	5.4	3.3	4.9	3.6	3.7	4.5
2022-2021	6.3	3.0	3.7	3.5	3.1	3.8

Source: 2016-2022 Labor Force Survey data, Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-54.

Table C-4 | **Work hours, broken down by age group**

Age groups	*Yotzim*	HFBs	*Mitztarfim*	All those with Haredi backgrounds	All those who are currently Haredi	All those who are currently not Haredi
Worked a full-time job						
At least 35 hours						
Ages 25-54	83	63	72	68	65	91
Ages 25-34	83	61	68	67	63	85
Ages 35-54	84	65	73	69	67	94
At least 30 hours						
Ages 25-54	88	70	78	74	72	93
Ages 25-34	87	68	76	73	70	88
Ages 35-54	90	71	78	75	73	95
Average work hours						
Usual work hours						
Ages 25-54	44	36	39	38	37	46
Ages 25-34	42	35	38	37	36	43
Ages 35-54	45	37	40	38	37	47
Actual work hours						
Ages 25-54	41	34	37	36	35	43
Ages 25-34	40	33	37	35	34	41
Ages 35-54	42	35	37	36	35	44

Source: 2016-2022 Labor Force Survey data, Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-54.

Table C-5 | **Data on employment, by occupation – 2019-2022**

	Yotzim	HFBs	*Mitztarfim*	All those with Haredi backgrounds	All those who are currently Haredi	All those who are currently not Haredi
Managers	9.4	7.8	7.3	8.2	7.7	14.4
Of which:						
Legislators, officials and senior managers	0.7	1.1	1.6	1.0	1.2	2.5
Managers – general	5.5	4.4	4.1	4.7	4.3	9.6
Managers in hospitality, commerce and services	3.2	2.3	1.6	2.5	2.1	2.3
Professionals	16.9	37.1	26.0	32.7	34.3	34.5
Of which:						
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT)	5.3	2.9	7.4	3.4	4.0	19.6
Instruction	4.4	21.4	8.3	17.7	18.1	3.7
Business, Administration and Other	1.1	1.5	2.7	1.4	1.8	5.5
Legal, social and cultural	6.1	11.4	7.6	10.2	10.4	5.7
Practical engineers, technicians, etc.	13.4	20.0	18.5	18.5	19.6	16.4
Of which:						
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT)	2.8	1.6	4.0	1.9	2.2	5.5
Business, Administration and Other	6.9	7.6	7.3	7.5	7.5	8.2
Legal, social and cultural	3.7	10.8	7.2	9.2	9.9	2.7
Clerical support workers	7.5	6.5	8.0	6.9	4.6	6.7
Service and sales workers	17.9	14.2	15.4	14.5	11.9	15.0
Of which:						
Personal service workers	8.0	8.3	8.9	8.3	8.5	4.4
Sales workers	5.9	5.2	5.1	5.4	5.2	3.8
Protective services workers	4.0	0.6	1.4	1.4	0.8	3.7
Professionals	18.1	7.4	13.0	9.8	8.8	9.8
Of which:						
Agriculture and related trades workers	4.2	3.1	4.3	3.3	3.4	2.4
Building and related trades workers (excluding electricians)	5.9	3.2	3.9	3.8	3.4	2.7

Metals, machinery, and related trades workers	3.5	0.4	2.3	1.1	0.8	2.1
Electrical and electronic trades workers	4.5	0.8	2.5	1.6	1.2	2.5
Plant and machine operators and drivers	11.0	3.5	6.3	5.2	4.2	6.2
Elementary occupations	5.8	3.5	5.5	4.0	4.0	2.3

Source: 2016-2022 Labor Force Survey data, Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-54.
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) also includes science, engineering and health.
Managers – general: Administrative and commercial managers, sales, marketing and development managers, production and specialized services managers

Table C-6 | **Industries of employed persons – 2019-2022**

	Yotzim	HFBs	*Mitztarfim*	All those with Haredi backgrounds	All those who are currently Haredi	All those who are currently not Haredi
Manufacturing	12.1	8.4	8.7	9.2	8.5	15.4
Construction	11.2	4.4	8.0	5.9	5.3	6.1
Retail trade and vehicle repair	19.3	11.6	11.7	13.3	11.6	11.9
Transportation, storage, and courier activities	6.2	3.8	6.8	4.3	4.6	5.7
Accommodation and food service activities	4.1	4.0	3.5	4.0	3.9	4.0
Information and communication	6.5	3.4	5.0	4.0	3.8	13.3
Finances and real estate	3.6	3.0	4.1	3.1	3.3	5.6
Professional, scientific and technical activities	2.9	3.5	7.4	3.4	4.5	10.9
Administrative and support service activities	7.4	2.1	6.0	3.3	3.1	4.0
Local and public administration	8.6	3.0	4.5	4.3	3.4	9.0
Education	8.3	34.1	16.1	28.4	29.6	5.7
Human health, welfare and social work activities	3.8	7.8	5.9	6.9	7.3	3.8
Other	6.1	10.8	12.4	9.8	11.2	4.6

Source: 2016-2022 Labor Force Survey data, Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-54.
Manufacturing: This includes the agriculture, mining and quarrying industries, manufacturing, and electricity and water supply.

Table C-7 | **Rate of tech employment, by age group – 2019-2022**

Age	*Yotzim*	*Mitztarfim*	HFBs	All those who are currently Haredi	All those with Haredi backgrounds	All those who are currently not Haredi
Tech industries						
54-25	7.5	5.1	2.2	2.9	3.4	18.9
34-25	8.6	4.5	2.7	3.1	4.2	19.7
44-30	7.6	6.7	2.4	3.4	3.3	21.0
Tech occupations						
54-25	7.4	8.4	2.9	4.3	3.9	21.7
34-25	8.0	7.7	3.5	4.4	4.6	23.6
44-30	6.9	11.0	3.5	5.3	4.2	24.3

Source: 2016-2022 Labor Force Survey data, Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-54.

C-Sources

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C-Appendices

Appendix C-1 Supplementary data

Figure C-A-1 | **Employment rate among Arab men aged 25-66**



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2023A.

Figure C-A-2 | **Average monthly wages of employees aged 25-54, by occupation (men)**



Source: Data from the 2020 CBS Expenditure and Income Survey (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2023B).

Appendix C-2 Employment glossary

1. Participates in the labor force: An employed person or job seeker.

1.1 Employed person: A person who is actually employed or temporarily absent from the workplace.

1.1.1. Actually employed: One who worked for at least one hour during the week preceding the survey.

1.1.2. Temporarily absent from the workplace: Temporarily absent from the workplace due to illness, vacation, reserve service, a reduction of work hours, a labor dispute, or a temporary suspension of employment (up to 30 days). One who was temporarily absent for up to one month or up to one year is considered employed if the person's return to work at that employer is guaranteed at the end of the period of absence.

3.1.2. Job seeker ("Unemployed"): A person who had not worked but had actively been seeking a job during the four weeks that preceded the survey, and is interested in beginning to work and available to do so if offered a suitable position.

2. Does not participate in the labor force

2.1. Discouraged worker: Someone who is not in the labor force, who had looked for a job during the previous year, but not during the previous four weeks, because they thought that they wouldn't find a suitable job in the profession they wish to work in, or in their area of residence, and is available and interested in working, if offered a suitable position.

3. Scope of job position

3.1 Work hours per week: The number of work hours per week, at all workplaces, including preparation time (for teachers and artists).

3.1.1. Usual work hours per week: "Weekly work hours", usually.

3.1.2. Actual work hours per week: The actual weekly work hours for the week preceding the survey.

3.2. (Usual or actual) scope of job position

3.2.1 Full-time worker: One who works 35 hours or more (according to the definition of the Central Bureau of Statistics) / One who works 30 hours or more (according to the definition of the OECD).

3.2.2 Part-time worker: One who works 1-34 hours (according to the definition of the Central Bureau of Statistics) / One who works 1-30 hours (according to the definition of the OECD).

4. Areas of activity

4.1. Occupation. The set of jobs and activities carried out by the employed person at the workplace, regardless of any trade that the person learned, if the person does not practice it, according to the Standard Classification of Occupations (2011), the Central Bureau of Statistics (2015A) (based on ISCO-08, the classification used by the International Labor Organization).

Economic activity. The economic industry to which the plant or institution belongs ("classification unit"), in which the employee is employed, according to the Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (2011), Central Bureau of Statistics (2015B), based on ISIC – Rev. 4: The United Nations' recommendations on the standard classification of all economic activities.

5. Employed in tech fields

5.1. **Employed in tech** Employed in one of the economic activities specified in the list in Table C-N-1.

5.2. **Employed in a tech occupation** Employed in one of the occupations listed in Table C-N-2.

Table C-A-1 | **List of economic activities classified as tech**

Classification code	Category description
21	Manufacture of pharmaceutical products, including homeopathic preparations
26	Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products
303	Manufacture of air- and spacecraft and related machinery
62	Computer programming, consultancy and related activities
631	Data processing, hosting and related activities
720	Research and development centers
721	Research and development in engineering and natural sciences

Table C-A-2 | **List of occupations classified as tech**

Classification code	Category description
133	Information and communications technology (ICT) service managers
211	Physical and earth science professionals
212	Mathematicians, actuaries and statisticians
213	Life science professionals
214	Engineering professionals (excluding electrotechnology)
215	Electrotechnology engineers
251	Software and applications developers and analysts
252	Database and network professionals
311	Physical and engineering science – practical engineers and technicians
314	Life science practical engineers and technicians and related associate professionals
315	Ship and aircraft controllers, practical engineers and technicians
351	Information and communications technology (ICT) operations and user support practical engineers and technicians

Appendix C-3 Occupations by skill level

The Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS, 2015A) classifies occupations into four skill levels that reflect the requirements for optimal performance of the tasks in the given occupation.

- Level One: Jobs that involve performing simple and routine physical or manual tasks. For example: cleaning, digging, manually carrying or transporting materials, sorting, manual storage or assembly of products, manually picking fruits and vegetables.
- Level Two: Jobs that involve performing simple technical tasks. For example: operating machinery and electronic equipment, driving vehicles, maintenance or repair of electrical and mechanical equipment.
- Level Three: Jobs that involve performing complex technical tasks which require extensive substantial, technical and procedural knowledge in the given field. For example: preparing detailed estimates of quantities and costs of materials and labor for specific projects, coordinating, supervising and controlling the activities of other employees, or performing technical tasks with the support of professionals.
- Level Four: Jobs that involve finding solutions to complex problems while using discretion and creativity. For example: analysis and research, diagnosis and treatment of diseases, imparting knowledge to others in the field of building or machinery design, or construction and production processes. Examples of occupations classified at this level: sales and marketing executives, civil engineers, secondary school teachers, musicians, operating room nurses and information systems analysts.

D. Well-being indices and positions

Zvika Deutsch

Abstract

(Unless stated otherwise, the groups include both men and women)

- The percentage of homeowners among former Haredim aged 30-54 (58%) is lower than the corresponding percentages among non-Haredim (69%) and among HFBs (Past and Present Haredim) (83%).
- The percentage of holders of drivers' licenses among *Yotzim* (86% for men, 68% for women) is a bit lower than that of non-Haredim (92% for men, 86% for women) and significantly higher than the percentage among HFBs (49% for men, 22% for women).
- Higher percentages of *Yotzim* report experiencing financial difficulties, in comparison to both non-Haredim and Haredim. A lower percentage of *Yotzim* report not being able to make ends meet (61-65% among *Yotzim*, compared to 72-80% of non-Haredi Jews, and 65-74% of HFBs), and being less satisfied with their financial situation (51% of *Yotzim*, compared to 65% for non-Haredim and 72% for HFBs). A high percentage reports a sense of poverty. However, *Yotzim* are similar to non-Haredim in terms of their life satisfaction. Looking forward, *Yotzim* are optimistic on improving their circumstances in the future, compared to both non-Haredim and HFBs.
- The percentage of *Yotzim* who report feelings of depression (26%) is similar to that of non-Haredim (24%). These groups differ only slightly with regard to feelings of loneliness: 21-24% of *Yotzim* reported having such feelings, compared to 18-19% of non-Haredim. These findings contradict the studies that indicate a higher rate of feelings of depression and loneliness among *Yotzim*. This could perhaps be attributed to an overrepresentation, in this study, of people who approached support organizations, who are, in all likelihood, dealing with emotional difficulties. However, all of the data imply that a sub-group exists, whose members experience intense emotional difficulties.
- *Yotzim* are comparable to non-Haredim with regard to their attitudes about government systems and the amount of trust they place in these systems, except for the level of trust they place in the judicial system, which is lower than that of non-Haredim, but higher than HFBs and mitztarfim.

Definitions and data sources

Groups

Subgroups

Yotzim - Haredim in the past and not in the present (i.e., "former Haredim", men and women)
HFBs - Haredim in the past and in the present
Mitztarfim - those who were not Haredi in the past, but are currently Haredi
Non-Haredim - not Haredi in the past nor in the present (Jews)

Data sources and identification methods (*)

The Central Bureau of Statistics' Social Survey 2017-2021, Jews (women and men) aged 20-54. Identification of Haredi past: Grew up in a Haredi family, by self-identification (at age 15). Identification of Haredi present: Haredi by self-identification.

(*) See the abstract for Chapter 1 for more on these methods, as well as a discussion in the online appendix.

D-1 Introduction

This chapter covers the characteristics of *Yotzim* regarding their general standard of living, their satisfaction with their financial status, and well-being indices, compared to the other three subgroups: HFBs, *mitztarfim*, and non-Haredim. Furthermore, this chapter presents positions on a selection of government services.

The analyses are based on the data from the Social Survey, and unless stated otherwise, they pertain to both men and women.

Section D-2 presents an analysis of standard of living indices, such as the percentage of homeowners and holders of drivers' licenses, as well as a comparison of satisfaction with areas of residence. Section D-3 presents data on life satisfaction and financial satisfaction, including an analysis of future optimism and perceptions of poverty. Section D-4 presents well-being indices for emotional states such as loneliness, depression, and feelings of stress. The sidebar in this chapter (Sidebar D-1) contains a synopsis of a study on the relationships between male and female *Yotzim* and their families. The last section analyzes positions toward government systems.

D-2 General standard of living

The percentage of homeowners among Yotzim is lower than the corresponding percentages of non-Haredim and HFBs

An assessment of the percentage of those who reported being homeowners, broken down by age group – young adults (20-29) and adults (30-54) (Figure D-1) – reveals that over half of the *Yotzim* who are young adults (54%) are homeowners, which is a bit lower than that of non-Haredim (64%) or HFBs (63%). Among the older *Yotzim* (30-54), the difference between the percentage of *Yotzim* homeowners (58%) and non-Haredi homeowners (69%) is unchanged but is greater when compared to HFBs (83%).[1]

1. This data item should be qualified. First, "home ownership" includes situations in which one member of the household owns a home, so a young adult living with their parents, who are homeowners, will be considered a homeowner. Furthermore, in both age groups among the *Yotzim*, the percentage of young adults is higher, when compared to non-Haredim and HFBs. It may be that full standardization for age would somewhat reduce the discrepancy between *Yotzim* and other groups (for a more extensive discussion of this, see the online appendix, "The Social Survey").

Figure D-1 | **Percentage of homeowners, broken down by age groups**



Source: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data, Jews (men and women) aged 20-54.
Home ownership – see Table D-1. Household-level question.

68% of female Yotzim have a drivers' license, compared to 22% of female HFBs and 86% of non-Haredi women

Roughly speaking, the percentage of *Yotzim* with drivers' licenses is somewhat smaller than that of non-Haredim, and significantly higher than HFBs, since many of them avoiding taking drivers' education classes for ideological reasons (for data not broken down by age or gender, see Table D-1 in the tables section). The analysis by gender (Figure D-2) reveals that 86% of male *Yotzim* have drivers' licenses, which is lower, albeit slightly, than that of non-Haredim (92%), whereas this rate is just 68% among female *Yotzim* – significantly lower than that of non-Haredi women (86%). These rates are significantly lower among HFBs: Only 49% of the men and 22% of the women have drivers' licenses.

Figure D-2 | **Percentage of holders of drivers' licenses, by gender**



Source: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data, Jews (men and women) aged 20-54.

Seemingly, Yotzim obtain drivers' licenses at older ages

The low percentage of *Yotzim* who hold drivers' licenses, and more specifically, the low percentage of female *Yotzim* who hold drivers' licenses, is apparently affected by the scarcity of Haredi holders of drivers' licenses, and by the amount of time required to obtain a drivers' license. This situation is reflected in Figure D-3, which compares the percentages of drivers' license holders by age: young adults (20-29) and adults (54-30), without any gender breakdown. At younger ages, at least one-third of HFBs (29%) and over two-thirds of *Yotzim* (71%) have a drivers' license, compared to 84% of non-Haredim. At older ages, these gaps are reduced: 87% of adult *Yotzim* have drivers' licenses, which is only slightly less than the percentage of license holders among non-Haredim (91%), and significantly higher than the percentage of license-holders among HFBs (42%).

Figure D-3 | **Percentage of holders of drivers' licenses, broken down by age group**



Source: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data, Jews (men and women) aged 20-54.

Satisfaction amongst Yotzim regarding housing is lower than that of non-Haredim.

With respect to satisfaction with residential aspects (Figure D-4 | Satisfaction levels with homes and aspects of residential areas), *Yotzim* are a bit less satisfied with aspects of their residential situation than non-Haredim. For example, 81% of *Yotzim* said that they are satisfied with their homes, and 83% said they were satisfied with their residential area, compared to 89% and 88%, respectively, of non-Haredim. Notably, relatively low levels of satisfaction with these aspects typify those with low incomes (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2022). It stands to reason that a person's financial status would compel them to live in homes or in areas in poorer conditions, which adversely affects their level of satisfaction.

Figure D-4 | **Satisfaction levels with homes and aspects of residential areas**



Source: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data, Jews (men and women) aged 20-54.
* This question was directed to those who use public transportation in their residential areas (90% of HFBs, 17% of *Yotzim*, and 76% of non-Haredim).
"Satisfied" – those who responded saying they were "very satisfied", or "satisfied".

D-3 Overall satisfaction and satisfaction with financial status

In general, higher percentages of *Yotzim* report facing financial difficulties, which manifest in several ways: a lower percentage report having managed to cover regular monthly expenses, their satisfaction with their financial situation is lower, and higher percentages of *Yotzim* report experiencing poverty. However, despite the financial challenges, *Yotzim* seem optimistic about their futures. This may be because their current situation is seen as part of the change they are making in their lives, in order to improve their futures.

Higher percentages of male and female Yotzim report experiencing financial difficulties and finding it hard to make ends meet

With respect to income and expenses (Figure D-5), among the *Yotzim*, only 65% of young adults (aged 20-29) and 61% of adults (aged 30-54) reported that they covered their monthly household expenses, which are low levels compared to non-Haredim, among which 80% of young adults and 72% of those who are older reported similar success. When compared to HFBs, at younger ages, the percentage of *Yotzim* who manage to pay their monthly expenses is lower than that of Haredim (74%), but similar at older ages (65%).

Figure D-5 | **The percentage of those who manage to cover their monthly expenses, broken down by age group**



Source: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data, Jews (men and women) aged 20-54.
Responded "I succeed, with no difficulty", or "I succeed". See Table D-2. Household-level question.

Higher percentages of Yotzim report perceived poverty, in comparison to both non-Haredim and Haredim.

In addition to the low percentage of *Yotzim* who manage to cover their monthly expenses, their levels of perceived poverty are higher (Figure D-6). This finding corroborates the claim that *Yotzim* face financial difficulties. Approximately one-half (51%) perceived themselves as poor during their adult lives (starting at age 15), compared to one-third of non-Haredim (31%), one-third of HFBs (32%), and a bit more than one-third of *mitztarfim* (37%). Family poverty may increase the chances of leaving Haredi society. Alternatively, leaving Haredi society may affect the perception of poverty in the past. However, it stands to reason that this gap stems partly from how *Yotzim* perceive their present financial situation, since this gap is maintained with respect to their perceived poverty in the past year (though it is lower).

Figure D-6 | **Percentage of those who see themselves as poor - at various points in time**



In parenthesis – a value in a category where the relative sampling error is between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more on this, see the online appendix).
Source: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data, Jews (men and women) aged 20-54.[2]

Despite their dissatisfaction with their financial situations, male and female Yotzim are optimistic, and assume their financial situations will improve during the upcoming years.

One more statistic supplements the data on experiences of poverty and difficulties with covering monthly expenses: Only about one-half of *Yotzim* (51%) are satisfied with their financial situations, compared to higher percentages among non-Haredim (65%) and Haredim (72%) (Table D-7).[3]

However, despite the financial difficulties, though the highest prevalence of feelings of poverty and dissatisfaction with their financial situation occurs among *Yotzim*, they display high levels of optimism (77%) about improving their financial situations in the upcoming years (Figure D-7), compared to non-Haredim (66%) and HFBs (69%). This gap formed partly because the prevalence of young adults among *Yotzim* is higher, and at young ages, optimism may be higher, since they have a more realistic chance of improving their circumstances.

2. All respondents, male and female, were asked whether there were any times, since they were 15 years old, that they felt they were poor (from "often" to "never"). All respondents, except for those who had responded "never", were asked when they had last felt they were poor. This figure displays cumulative rates: The group that reported perceived poverty since 15 includes the group that reported perceived poverty during the past five years, and the group that reported perceived poverty during the past five years includes the group that reported perceived poverty in the past year.

3. The phenomenon of reported satisfaction is widespread among Haredim (Rier et al., 2008), apparently because of the cultural characteristics of social desirability. This bias is mentioned early on, in the classic studies in this field (Crowne & Edwards, 1953, Marlowe, 1960). According to this bias, the more socially desirable a behavior, the more respondents will tend to associate themselves with the behavior.

Figure D-7 | **Levels of financial satisfaction and optimism concerning the future**



Source: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data, Jews (men and women) aged 20-54.
Those assuming that their financial situations will improve in the coming years – those who responded "I don't know" were designated as those who do not assume their financial situations will improve.
"Satisfied" – those who responded saying they were "very satisfied" or "satisfied".

Indeed, the analysis of optimism regarding improving their financial situations, solely among the young adults (Figure D-8), reveals a similarity between *Yotzim* (80%) and non-Haredim (80%), and this optimism, within these two groups, is higher than that of HFBs (71%).

Figure D-8 | **The percentage of those who believe that their general and financial situations will improve in the future, among young adults**



Source: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data, Jews (men and women) aged 20-29.
Those who responded "I don't know" were designated as those who do not assume their financial situations will improve.

Among *Yotzim*, financial dissatisfaction does not impair their overall life satisfaction (91%) (Figure D-9), one aspect in which they resemble non-Haredim (93%). *Yotzim* also exhibited high levels of general optimism (81%), comparable to that of HFBs (79%) and higher than that of non-Haredim (71%). In this index (general optimism), at younger ages, as well (Figure D-8), the optimism levels of *Yotzim* (88%) are slightly higher than both non-Haredim (82%) and HFBs (80%).

Figure D-9 | **Levels of life satisfaction, and the percentages of those who believe their lives will improve in the future**



Source: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data, Jews (men and women) aged 20-54.
Those assuming that their lives will improve in the coming years – those who responded "I don't know" were designated as those who do not assume their financial situations will improve.
"Satisfied" – those who responded saying they were "very satisfied" or "satisfied".

D-4 Well-being indices

Previous studies reported the high prevalence of emotional issues, such as depression, among *Yotzim*. (e.g., Lasry, 2020, Keissar-Sugarman, 2022, David & Trachtenberg, 2022). The data presented in these studies was based on non-representative samples, obtained through questionnaires distributed among those who approached associations that support former Haredim, or had used those associations' distribution channels. Reaching the respondents in this way led to an overrepresentation of *Yotzim* associated with "*Yotzim* groups", such as associations that support *Yotzim*, or social media groups. Thus, it stands to reason that those who are in their initial stages of leaving Haredi society or dealing with weakened family bonds would be more likely to seek out these connections. It also stands to reason that the percentage of those respondents that experienced emotional difficulties would be significantly higher than the average levels for *Yotzim*. Furthermore, questions on their emotional experiences might be biased, due to social desirability (a bias that takes into account the fact that some of the respondents respond the way they think they are expected to respond). Thus, those participating in programs for *Yotzim*, for example, might think that they are expected to express experiences of wretchedness, so they report emotional struggles more than others.

Male and female Yotzim report similar levels of loneliness and depression as non-Haredim, in contrast to the common perception that presents Yotzim as suffering from emotional difficulties

However, when assessing the prevalence of reported emotional difficulties among *Yotzim* compared with non-Haredim, the picture that arises from the Central Bureau of Statistics Social Survey data contrasts with the perception commonly held by *Yotzim*. For example, we found that the percentage of *Yotzim* who had experienced feelings of depression in the past year (26%) was similar to that of non-Haredim (24%) (Figure D-10). Similar findings were also noted in the percentage of those reporting feelings of stress in the past year (68%) and concerns that kept them from sleeping (about 40%).

Figure D-10 | **Percentages of those who felt stress, concern, and depression**



Source: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data, Jews (men and women) aged 20-54.
Felt stress, concerns, or depression, occasionally or always, during the past year. For the definition, see Table D-3.

One may assume that experiences of emotional difficulties are most intense among *Yotzim* during the years immediately after leaving Haredi society. Therefore, the prevalence of these feelings among young adults (aged 29-20) was assessed, in comparison with those aged 30-54 (Figure D-11). The data indicate that *Yotzim* resemble non-Haredim at younger ages, as well.

Figure D-11 | **Percentages of those who felt stress, concern, and depression among *Yotzim* and non-Haredim, broken down by age group.**



In parenthesis – a value in a category where the relative sampling error is between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more on this, see the online appendix).
Source: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data, Jews (men and women) aged 20-54.
Felt stress, concerns, or depression – see Figure D-10.

The only facet in which *Yotzim* noticeably differed from non-Haredim, though a larger gap was expected, concerns feelings of loneliness. Leaving Haredi society is an act involving social detachment, and

one might expect to see heightened feelings of loneliness among *Yotzim*. However, the gaps are small in this area, as well (Figure D-12), since the percentage of *Yotzim* who reported having occasionally felt lonely ranged from 21% to 24% – only slightly higher than the percentages among non-Haredim, which stood at 18-19%. At any rate, a strong effect during the first few years after leaving Haredi society, which doesn't manifest at younger ages, can't be ruled out. Since the Social Survey only included those aged 20 and above, the ability to test this hypothesis is limited.

Figure D-12 | **Percentages of those who felt loneliness - broken down by age group**



In parenthesis – a value in a category where the relative sampling error is between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more on this, see the online appendix).
Source: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data, Jews (men and women) aged 20-54.
They found themselves in situations where they often or occasionally felt lonely.

Again, this data contradicts the findings in many studies, which demonstrated that the population of *Yotzim* tends to experience depression. To test this claim, Social Survey data was compared against the findings of a questionnaire distributed among those who registered for Out for Change programs (Keissar-Sugarman et al., 2022, henceforth: "KSA"), and included four questions that appear in the Social Survey: the questions on feelings of loneliness and depression, which were mentioned in this section; the question on satisfaction with their financial situations, which was mentioned in the previous section; and the question on the ability to cover monthly expenses, which was mentioned above.

Once these datasets were compared, substantial gaps emerged between the reported prevalence of feelings of depression and loneliness in the two sources (Figure D-13). Over two-thirds of the respondents who had registered for Out for Change (69%) reported situations in which they felt lonely, compared to less than one-quarter of the *Yotzim* in the Social Survey (23%), and a similar percentage of those who approached the organization reported feeling depressed (65%, vs. 26% of respondents in the Social Survey). A significant, yet smaller gap was found with respect to their financial situations: Just under one-third of those who approached Out for Change (38%) reported satisfaction with their financial situation, compared to one-half of *Yotzim* respondents in the Social Survey (51%). This data does not allow us to reach a conclusion regarding what had caused the gap, i.e., whether it was because of a different group of respondents or due to the effects of social desirability.

Figure D-13 | **Comparing Social Survey indices with the survey conducted among those who registered for Out for Change (Keissar-Sugarman et al., 2022)**



Source: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data, Jews (men and women) aged 20-54.
KSA data: Keissar-Sugarman et al. (2022), pp. 38, 43.

One may cautiously presume that studies that identified a high prevalence of depression among male and female Yotzim do not represent the mean values of the population

Based on the above findings, one may cautiously presume that the studies that identified a high prevalence of feelings of depression among *Yotzim* do not represent the mean values of this entire population. However, it stands to reason that there is a subgroup of *Yotzim* that differs from the other *Yotzim* in these areas, and this group vanishes within the mean values of the *Yotzim* in the Social Survey. This subgroup may be characterized as having a distinct family background, as well as experiencing different social and emotional circumstances during the stage immediately after having left Haredi society. To specify and identify this phenomenon, it would be valuable to conduct an in-depth study that would identify groups associated with a high prevalence of feelings of loneliness and depression in the Central Bureau of Statistics' data. Moreover, the likelihood of a social desirability bias in the questions distributed by organizations supporting former Haredim should be investigated, i.e., an assessment of whether the general atmosphere and preliminary questions make it more likely for these types of feelings to be reported.

Sidebar D-1 | Research Synopsis

"Near and Far: Relationships between those who have left ultra-Orthodox Society (*Yotzim*) and their Families

Zvika Deutsch and Shani Kaplan (Deutsch & Kaplan, 2023)

Background

Often, the issue of the ties between *Yotzim* and their families becomes part of public discourse. At times it is presented with an emphasis on cases where the disconnect is absolute, and only seldom does this discourse address the quality of the relationship between *Yotzim* and their families, when they haven't completely severed ties. Is this a normal relationship between parents and children or a distant relationship? What are the characteristics of the relationship? A few studies – most of which used qualitative methods – have addressed these relationships, and their findings paint a non-uniform picture of the prevalence of the phenomenon of family disconnects. The studies mainly relied on respondents who had come into contact with social groups of *Yotzim* or organizations that support *Yotzim*, so it stands to reason that those studies would report higher prevalences of *Yotzim* whose family bonds are weaker. Thus, it is reasonable to expect these studies to report a higher prevalence of this phenomenon than is actually the case.

Unlike the traditional approach, which views the disconnect as a result of social pressure (such as Doron, 2013), this study presented empirical testimonies that support the approach that sees them as the result of a personal conflict between parents and children, and not as social punishment (see, for example, Horowitz, 2018). According to this view, the social group affects the relationship, mainly indirectly, through its influence on the level of dialog and the family lifestyle, as well as the feelings of disappointment in oneself, failure and social shame. This should be qualified, since disconnects due to social pressure may have been more prevalent in the past, and the same applies to complete disconnects between *Yotzim* and their parents. Thus, the discussion on the cause of the disconnect should only be understood as a description of the current situation.

Method

The study relied on the Central Bureau of Statistics 2018-2021 Social Survey data, which assessed how satisfied single *Yotzim* were with their relationships with their families, as well as their feelings on how much their families appreciate them, compared to HFBs and non-Haredim. To supplement this analysis, the data from a unique study conducted by Out for Change, published between 2016 and 2019 (henceforth: the "Family Relationship Survey") was analyzed. This study assessed the relationships *Yotzim* had with their families. The analysis was conducted on *Yotzim* who had left Haredi society at least three years earlier, with the aim of allowing an assessment of whether the degree of the family relationship had changed after the first year.

Notably, and similarly to the surveys conducted with groups of *Yotzim*, the Family Relationship Survey is not representative of all *Yotzim*. For example: in this survey, 82% of *Yotzim* reported that they were

secular and 9% classified themselves as traditional, in contrast with the Social Survey, in which 21% of *Yotzim* included in the analysis classified themselves as traditional/not so religious, and a further 21% classified themselves as secular (henceforth: not religious). The rest reported that they were traditional or religious. At any rate, analyzing the survey helped us understand the characteristics of the relationship in the "groups of *Yotzim*", groups which, as stated above, are more representative of *Yotzim* dealing with weakened family bonds.

Findings

The Social Survey data (Figure T-D-1) reveals that in general, most *Yotzim* (90%) are satisfied with their relationships with their families, and feel that their families appreciate them, though their levels of satisfaction and appreciation are low, compared with HFBs (97%) and non-Haredim (96%).

Figure T-S-1 | **Satisfaction with the relationship with family members (%)**



Source: Data from the 2018-2021 Social Survey data, Jewish singles, men and women, aged 20-44.
The figures do not add up to 100%, due to rounding.

A quarter of respondents (27%) to the Family Relationship Survey data (Figure T-S-1) reported that their relationship with their parents was completely severed during the first year after they left Haredi society, as opposed to half (48%) who were partially in touch with their families, and a quarter (25%) who reported that they had a good connection with them. As time went on, the relationship between the *Yotzim* and their families improved, such that the percentage of respondents who reported a complete disconnect from their families at the time they responded to the survey – at least three years, roughly, after they left Haredi society – had dropped to a tenth of its previous level (11%), while the percentage of those who reported a good relationship surged to nearly half (46%).

Figure T-S-2 | **The strength of the *Yotzim*'s relationships with their families – during the first year after leaving Haredi society, and at the time of the survey**



Source: The Family Relationship Survey, conducted by Out for Change, between the years 2016-2019, among *Yotzim* (men and women) who had left Haredi society at least three years earlier.

Regarding the strength of the relationship, most respondents reported that they were invited to family events and Shabbat and holiday meals, but only if they observed the Sabbath. Most of them also reported that their families did not support them financially, and approximately 40% of this group associated this with the fact that they left Haredi society. Since the family relationship was preserved at junctures that are exposed to society (family events) more so than matters tied to a more intimate family setting (financial support), these findings are more supportive of the approach that describes the disconnect as a personal conflict between parents and children and is less supportive of the approach that describes the disconnect as part of social punishment and social pressure that encourages a disconnect.

D-5 Trust in government services

The level of trust in the judicial system among Yotzim is higher than that of Haredim and lower than that of non-Haredim

With regard to conceptions of social involvement, *Yotzim* resemble non-Haredim in how they perceive their ability to influence government policy and in how involved they are in public life (Table D-5 in the tables section). Moreover, the positions that *Yotzim* have towards government systems and the level of trust they place in those systems are akin to those of non-Haredim, barring their positions on the judicial system, in which they place less trust than the trust exhibited by non-Haredim, but more than the trust exhibited by HFBs (Figure 14-D). It is important to clarify that on average, these questions relate to the years 2017-2021, a period partially characterized by government instability and several rounds of elections.

Figure D-14 | **The percentages of those who place trust in government systems and have positive views of them**



Source: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data, Jews (men and women) aged 20-54.
Place trust: Responded "very good" or "good" to the following question: "How do you feel about how the following entities' function:"
Hold a positive view: Responded "Yes, to a great extent" or "Yes, to a certain extent" to the following question: "Do you place trust in ...."

When comparing two periods – the period between 2017-2019 and the period between 2020-2021 (Figure 15-D) – a small decline was observed in the level of trust placed in the judicial system among non-Haredim (from 65% to 59%), whereas no substantial change occurred in the positions of the *Yotzim* (45%-42%). Trust in the government declined sharply during this period, among both *Yotzim* and those who are not *Yotzim*, ostensibly because of the government instability characteristic of that period.

Figure D-15 | **The percentage of those placing trust in the government and the judicial system, broken down by two periods**



Source: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data, Jews (men and women) aged 20-54.
Place trust: Responded "Yes, to a great extent" or "Yes, to a certain extent" to the following question: "Do you place trust in the government / the judicial system?"

D-Tables on well-being indices and positions

Extended data on the four subgroups discussed in this chapter – *Yotzim* (Haredim in the past and not in the present), **HFBs** (Haredim in the past and in the present), *miztarfim* (those who were not Haredi in the past but are presently Haredim) and **non-Haredim** (not Haredi in the past nor in the present) – is presented in these tables. Furthermore, data on two expansive groups on which no data was presented in this chapter is displayed in these tables.

- **Those with Haredi backgrounds**: Anyone who was Haredi in the past (HFBs and *Yotzim*)
- **All those currently Haredi**: Anyone who is currently Haredi (HFBs and *mitztarfim*)

The values for all those who are currently non-Haredim (non-Haredim and *Yotzim*) are not displayed in the tables, though their values are similar to those of the non-Haredim, mainly because of the small percentage of *Yotzim* among those who are currently non-Haredim.

Table D-1 | **Standard of living, broken down by gender and age group (%)**

	Non-Haredim	*Yotzim*	HFBs	*Mitztarfim*	All those with Haredi backgrounds	All those currently Haredi
Men and women						
Homeowners[1]	68	56	74	61	72	71
Automobile owners[2]	87	74	35	70	39	43
Went on vacation abroad in the past year	45	34	14	12	16	14
Have a drivers' license	89	78	36	76	40	45
Men						
Homeowners[1]	68	57	75	59	73	71
Automobile owners	87	74	35	71	39	44
Went on vacation abroad in the past year	45	33	15	14	17	15
Have a drivers' license	92	86	49	86	53	58
Women						
Homeowners[1]	67	55	73	64	71	71
Automobile owners	86	73	36	68	39	43
Went on vacation abroad in the past year	45	36	13	(10)	15	13
Have a drivers' license	86	68	22	65	26	32
Young adults aged 20-29						
Homeowner[1]	64	54	63	47	62	61
Automobile owner	83	66	29	70	33	33
Went on vacation abroad in the past year	46	33	15	14	17	15
Have a drivers' license	84	71	29	74	34	33

In parenthesis – a value in a category for which the relative sampling error is between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more on this, see the online appendix).

Source: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data, Jews (men and women) aged 20-54.

1. Those who lived in a home owned by one member of the household or responded that they owned a different home (household-level question).
2. Those who have a private or commercial vehicle, not including trucks weighing over 4 tons, or two-wheeled vehicles (household-level question).

Table D-2 | **General and financial satisfaction, broken down by gender and age group (%)**

	Non-Haredim	*Yotzim*	HFBs	*Mitztarfim*	All those with Haredi back-grounds	All those currently Haredi
Men and women						
Satisfied with their lives[1]	93	91	98	97	97	98
Assume that their lives will improve[2]	71	81	79	76	79	78
Very satisfied with their financial situation[1]	65	51	72	72	70	72
Assume that their financial situation will improve[3]	66	77	69	66	70	68
Manage to cover their monthly expenses[4]	74	63	69	61	69	67
Men						
Satisfied with their lives[1]	93	89	97	97	96	97
Assume that their lives will improve[2]	70	78	79	75	79	78
Very satisfied with their financial situation[1]	67	52	76	77	73	76
Assume that their financial situation will improve[3]	68	74	68	65	69	68
Manage to cover their monthly expenses[4]	76	63	70	64	69	69
Women						
Satisfied with their lives[1]	94	93	98	97	98	98
Assume their lives will improve[2]	72	86	78	78	79	78
Satisfied with their financial situation[1]	62	51	68	66	66	67
Assume their financial situation will improve[3]	65	80	69	68	70	69
Manage to cover their monthly expenses[4]	72	64	69	58	68	66
Young adults aged 20-29						
Satisfied with their lives[1]	94	92	98	98	97	98
Assume that their lives will improve[2]	82	88	80	89	81	81
Very satisfied with their financial situation[1]	64	53	72	81	70	73
Assume that their financial situation will improve[3]	80	80	71	79	72	72
Manage to cover their monthly expenses[4]	80	65	74	71	73	74

In parenthesis – a value in a category where the relative sampling error is between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more on this, see the online appendix).
Source: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data, Jews (men and women) aged 20-54.

1. Responded "very satisfied" or "satisfied".
2. Assume that their lives will be better in the coming years.
3. Assume that their financial situation will be better in the coming years.
4. Responded "I succeed with no difficulty", or "I succeed" in covering all of the household's monthly expenses (including expenses such as food, electricity, telephone bills, etc.).

Table D-3 | **Mental well-being, broken down by gender and age group (%)**

	Non-Haredim	*Yotzim*	HFBs	*Mitztarfim*	All those with Haredi backgrounds	All those currently Haredi
Men and women						
Felt lonely[1]	18	23	8	12	9	9
Felt stressed[2]	68	68	52	57	53	53
Felt depressed[2]	24	26	9	14	11	10
Experienced concerns that keep them from sleeping[2]	41	40	20	27	22	21
Facing difficulties[2]	96	95	97	96	96	96
Feeling invigorated[2]	86	85	93	86	92	91
Men						
Felt lonely[1]	16	(25)	8	(10)	10	8
Felt stressed[2]	62	63	44	48	46	45
Felt depressed[2]	20	(24)	9	13	11	10
Experienced concerns that keep them from sleeping[2]	35	33	15	20	18	17
Facing difficulties[2]	95	93	95	94	95	95
Feeling invigorated[2]	86	82	92	86	91	91
Women						
Felt lonely[1]	20	(20)	8	16	9	10
Felt stressed[2]	74	77	60	68	61	62
Felt depressed[2]	28	(29)	10	(14)	12	11
Experienced concerns that keep them from sleeping[2]	46	49	24	35	26	26
Facing difficulties[2]	96	97	98	98	98	98
Feeling invigorated[2]	85	87	94	87	93	92
Young adults aged 20-29						
Felt lonely[1]	19	(24)	8	(16)	10	9
Felt stressed[2]	70	70	48	59	51	49
Felt depressed[2]	26	(24)	9	(11)	11	10
Experienced concerns that keep them from sleeping[2]	36	36	17	(23)	20	18
Facing difficulties[2]	96	97	96	98	96	97
Feeling invigorated[2]	88	93	95	91	95	95

In parenthesis – a value in a category for which the relative sampling error is between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more on this, see the online appendix).
Source: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data, Jews (men and women) aged 20-54.
1. Responded "often" or "occasionally" felt lonely to the question of: "Are there situations in which you feel lonely?"
2. Feel stress, depression, concerns that kept them from sleeping, faced problems, or felt invigorated – Responded "always or often" or "sometimes/at times" to the following questions: "During the past 12 months, have you felt stressed/depressed, had you been beset with concerns that kept you from sleeping / had you confronted problems / had you been invigorated".

Table D-4 | **Satisfaction with family ties, broken down by family status (%)**

	Non-Haredim	*Yotzim*	HFBs	*Mitztarfim*	All those with Haredi backgrounds	All those currently Haredi
Satisfaction with the family relationship						
Total						
Satisfied	28	35	14	26	17	17
Very satisfied	68	56	84	69	81	81
Total satisfied	96	91	99	95	98	98
Single						
Satisfied	26	39	(15)		21	(15)
Very satisfied	70	51	83		75	83
Total satisfied	96	90	98		96	97
Married or divorced						
Satisfied	29	32	14	27	16	17
Very satisfied	67	60	85	69	83	81
Total satisfied	96	92	99	95	98	98
The degree to which family members appreciate them						
Total						
Somewhat	87	73	92	85	90	91
To a high extent	11	23	7	14	9	9
Total who felt appreciated	98	96	99	99	99	99
Single						
Somewhat	85	71	90		85	87
To a high extent	13	(26)	(11)		15	(13)
Total who felt appreciated	98	98	100		99	100
Married or divorced						
Somewhat	11	(20)	7	13	8	8
To a high extent	88	75	93	86	91	91
Total who felt appreciated	99	95	99	99	99	99

In parenthesis – a value in a category in which the relative sampling error is between 0.15 and 0.3. The values of single mitztarfim were left out because of the small sample size (for more on these, see the online appendix).
Source: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data, Jews (men and women) aged 20-54.

Table D-5 | **Involvement in public life and positions on government systems (%)**

	Non-Haredim	*Yotzim*	HFBs	*Mitztarfim*
Involved in public or political life[1]	18	18	14	12
Assume that they can influence governmental policy[2]	17	18	12	19
Hold a positive view of:[3]				
The health care system	57	59	75	68
The education system	42	48	61	42
The Israel Police	46	41	45	45
The local government	67	56	67	68
The Knesset	21	26	35	28
Place trust in[4]				
The government	41	43	34	40
The judicial system	63	44	19	24
The health care system	75	73	83	71

Source: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data, Jews (men and women) aged 20-45.

1. Answered "yes" to the following question: "During the past 21 months, have you been involved in public or political life, on a national or local level?".
2. Responded "Yes, to a great extent" or "Yes, to a certain extent" to the following question: "Do you believe you can influence governmental policy?".
3. Responded "very good" or "good" to the following question: "How do you feel about how the following entities function:"
4. Responded "Yes, to a great extent" or "Yes, to a certain extent" to the following question: "Do you place trust in ...."

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E. Enlistment among men from Haredi backgrounds: HFBs and *Yotzim*

Zvika Deutsch and Moshe Shenfeld

Abstract

This chapter presents a unique analysis of trends in the enlistment rates of men from Haredi backgrounds, broken down into those who are currently Haredi (HFBs) and those who are not Present Haredi (*Yotzim*). The IDF's reports do not provide consistent data and do not distinguish between recruits with Haredi backgrounds, based on their current Haredi religiosity. This analysis, however, is based on the Central Bureau of Statistics' Social Survey, which allows us to identify the past religiosity level of the respondent's family (when the respondent was 15), by self-identification, and current religiosity, and to identify whether the respondent served in the military, based on self-reporting. The findings reveal that in contrast with the trends emerging from the IDF's reports, over the past decade, no major change has occurred in the percentage of IDF servicepeople who had Haredi backgrounds. However, we did find that alongside a significant and ongoing decline in the percentage of HFBs who serve in the IDF, the enlistment rate of *Yotzim* has increased. This increase, along with the higher LHS rates at younger ages, is what tempered the decline of the enlistment rate among men from Haredi backgrounds. Another revelation from these findings is that based on the current data on younger ages, *Yotzim* make up about 60-70% of all those with Haredi backgrounds who enlist.

Definitions and data sources

Groups

Yotzim – Haredim in the past and not in the present (i.e., "former Haredim")
HFBs – Haredim in the past and in the present
Those with Haredi backgrounds – anyone who was once Haredi (HFBs and *Yotzim*)

Military service terminology

Recruit: Someone who enlisted into military service in a given year.
Serviceperson: Someone who performed military service, at any time.

Data sources

The Central Bureau of Statistics' Social Survey 2012-2007 and 2017-2021, men aged 20-54.

Identification of Past Haredi: Grew up in a Haredi family, by self-identification (at age 15). Identification of Present Haredi: Haredi by self-identification.
The information on military service is based on self-reporting.

IDF reports: The number of recruits "among yeshiva students and graduates of Haredi educational institutions" during the years 2010-2021, based on IDF reports.

Administrative data: Data on graduates of Haredi educational institutions (one who was in a high school under Haredi supervision in 11th grade), based on the Ministry of Education's records for the years 2003-2019.
For more on this topic, see Appendix E-2 in this chapter.

E-1 Introduction

Currently, the IDF has no information on the present Haredi religiosity of recruits classified as Haredim

The low IDF enlistment rate among Haredi Jews has spurred extensive public debate on "sharing the burden". Although the IDF has invested extensive resources to encourage the enlistment of Haredi Jews and to create tailored service tracks, responsiveness has been low until now. Following years of claims that the number of recruits has rapidly increased, the trend reversed in 2018, and the number of recruits has been consistently and significantly declining. According to current IDF data, valid as of the end of 2022, only 9% of the graduates of Haredi educational institutions who were born in 2001 (i.e. up to age 21) have enlisted (The IDF, 2022).

The increase and decrease can be ascribed to a number of a factors, including the exhaustion of the enlistment potential, or changes in the tallying methods following the conclusions reached by the Numa Committee on tallying flaws (IDF, 2020).[1] However, the extent to which the improvements recommended by the committee were implemented is unclear. In any case, the extent to which the data truly indicates a genuine decline in the enlistment of those with Haredi backgrounds is currently unclear, since it may be that the data solely reflects a change in the tallying method that was not expressed in the data from previous years.

Moreover, although we know that some of the graduates of Haredi educational institutions who enlist are former Haredim (*Yotzim*) – and according to several assessments, most of them are *Yotzim* – the exact percentage is unknown.[2] Currently, the IDF only has information on the past Haredi religiosity of recruits, and not on their present Haredi religiosity, and even the past data is inaccurate. As the IDF stressed in its latest reports to the government during the years 2021-2022, it is unable to vouch for the accuracy of the data, since the only information it had available was the information sent by the educational institutions the soldiers had studied at before enlisting, and this information is incomplete (Almasi, 2023). In other words, the information provided by the IDF, which the public occasionally refers to as "the enlistment of Haredim", essentially refers to those with Haredi backgrounds, even if they are not Present Haredi, and may also be based on incomplete data.

The research presents a current picture of the enlistment of those with a Haredi background, broken down by present Haredi religiosity, using data from the Social Survey

This chapter, which is, by nature, more research-heavy, is meant to fill in this gap using data from the Central Bureau of Statistics' Social Survey, which allows us to identify military service, based on self-reporting, and to identify past and present Haredi religiosity based on self-identification[3]. As is the case for the terms used throughout the yearbook, "those with Haredi backgrounds" is the term used to refer to anyone who was once Haredi. Within that group, all those who are not Present Haredi (including those who are religious or traditional) are *Yotzim*, and those who are also currently Haredim are termed

1. For more on the Numa Committee, see below.

2. During the Knesset committee hearing held in May of 2023, the IDF representative estimated that hundreds of the approximately 1,200 graduates of Haredi educational institutions who enlisted are "those who went off the derech", clarifying that precise estimates can't be provided (The 25th Knesset, 2023). This issue resurfaces every so often in public discourse (see, for example, Zitun & Shohat, 2018, Arlosoroff, 2019, Gabai, 2023, Shlesinger 2023).

3. For an explanation of the difference between self-identification and self-reporting, see Section 1.2 of the online appendix.

"Haredi from birth" (HFB).[4] This data will allow us to piece together an updated snapshot of the enlistment trends of those with Haredi backgrounds, and to provide an estimate of how many of those are *Yotzim*.

To tie this data to the existing data on the enlistment of Haredim, the analysis will be preceded by a presentation of the data emerging from the IDF's official reports (henceforth: "IDF reports"). When reporting recruits who are "yeshiva students and graduates of Haredi educational institutions", the IDF presents the data on two levels: a restrictive definition, which includes graduates of Haredi educational institutions, as defined by law,[5] and an expansive definition, which also includes those with Haredi affiliation who had not studied at those institutions.

Section E-2 covers the Equal Burden Law. It discusses the complexity of the definitions and the background to the establishment of the Numa Committee. Moreover, it discusses trends in the numbers of recruits of Haredi background, according to IDF reports, and their percentage among those with Haredi backgrounds (based on administrative educational data). Another claim that is put forward is that although this data ostensibly indicates an increase in the number of recruits with Haredi backgrounds, followed by a decrease, these changes seem to have been mainly caused by a change in the tallying method. Section E-3, which is based on the Social Survey data, presents an analysis of the percentages of servicepeople with Haredi backgrounds. Based on this analysis, it seems that throughout the entire period, the percentage of servicepeople with Haredi backgrounds remained rather constant, reflecting the claim made in Section E-2. Moreover, this section will also present an analysis that distinguishes between *Yotzim* and HFBs, as well as an estimate of the percentage of *Yotzim* among all servicepeople with Haredi backgrounds. Section E-4 uses a simulation to illustrate that an increase in the percentage of former Haredim raises the enlistment rate of men from Haredi backgrounds.

E-2 Haredi Jews in the IDF: The Equal Burden Law and enlistment trends

This section covers the IDF reports on recruits with Haredi backgrounds, pursuant to the provisions of the "Equal Burden Law" – The Security Service Law (Amendment 19), 2014. The law establishes that the government must determine enlistment targets for "yeshiva students and graduates of Haredi educational institutions",[6] and that in order to monitor the attainment of these targets, every year, the minister of defense must report the number of recruits within that population to the government.[7] However, notwithstanding the law, the last time the government set enlistment targets was in 2013, before the law was enacted, and those targets were set solely until 2016.[8]

4. The data refers to religiosity levels at the time the survey was conducted, not at the time they were serving in the military. In any case, with regard to those with Haredi backgrounds, it is plausible that their religiosity levels at the time of the survey are similar to their religiosity levels when they were serving, as there are testimonies to the effect that most of the "disaffiliation" occurs at a younger age (Regev & Gordon, 2021). Moreover, the main findings are based on an analysis of young adults, aged 20-29, such that only a short time had transpired since their military service, and some of them are still serving.

5. See below for more on the legal definitions.

6. Section 26-O of the Security Service Law (Amendment 19), 2014. The Law Book, 2441, p. 358.

7. Ibid.

8. In 2013, Decision 638, the government set the recruitment target at 2,000 recruits in 2013, 2,700 in 2014, 2,700 on 2015 and 3,200 in 2016. No targets were determined for further years (Malach & Cahaner (2022; 76).

The criterion used to classify people as Haredim has varied over the years

With respect to IDF reports, although the law addressed this issue, the criteria used to classify people as "Haredim" in its reports has varied over the years, requiring the involvement of the Israeli Supreme Court (2017), among other things. After the court's ruling, it was determined that with respect to the law's requirements, "graduates of Haredi educational institutions" would be anyone who had studied for at least two years, between the ages of 14 and 18, in an educational institution administratively classified as Haredi,[9] as well as GHYs whose service had been deferred, even if they are not graduates of Haredi yeshivas (GHY) pursuant to the law's provisions (IDF, 2020).[10]

Alongside the IDF reports on the number of recruits, as stipulated by law (with various interpretations), over the years, these reports have also come to include a more expansive definition, which includes, besides these recruits, recruits with a Haredi affiliation that are not graduates of Haredi institutions, as per the legal definition, such as Haredi new immigrants and Haredi youth from programs for Haredi school dropouts, such as the HILA program. In December of 2019, after an internal investigation in the IDF that followed claims in newspaper articles that data on Haredi enlistment had been falsified,[11] the commander in chief of the IDF appointed a committee headed by Major General (res.) Roni Numa, to clarify who is Haredi, for the purposes of the Enlistment Law, as well how the IDF would comply with the law, and how the IDF had calculated their numbers between 2011 and 2018 (the "Numa Committee"). The committee published its conclusions in February 2020, and, inter alia, pointed out failures in its tallying procedures (IDF, 2020).

Thus, the data reported by the IDF at various junctures can be divided into three periods (Figure E-1):

Based on the Numa report, annual IDF reporting can be divided into three reporting periods

The period before the law (2010-2013): Reports pursuant to the targets determined in the 2011 government decision, according to which the term "Haredi" included Haredi *yeshiva gedolah* students eligible for deferred enlistment under the Tal Law.[12] During these years, the tallying method was substantially different from the tallying method used after the law went into effect, and despite the restrictive definition of the term "Haredi", the tally of recruits also included those without any Haredi affiliation who had served in tracks designated for Haredim. This is why the Numa Committee did not check this data, and it is viewed as less reliable (IDF, 2020).

The first period after the law went into effect (2014-2018): IDF reports after the "Equal Burden Law", but before the publication of the Numa Report. During this period, the numbers of recruits remained relatively stable, according to both the broader definition and the legal definition, except for 2017, when a one-time reduction occurred, according to the legal definition, and an increase, according to the broader definition. It is likely that these changes stem from the quality of the data, pursuant to the findings of the Numa Committee regarding severe failures in 2016 and 2017. We note that the figures appearing in the chart are after adjustment, following the work of the committee (for the IDF reports before the publication of the report, and the adjustments made in its aftermath, see Figure E-A-1 in the appendix).

9. For the purposes of this law, a Haredi educational institution is a "unique cultural" educational institution (yeshivot lelimudei kodesh), or a Haredi institution designated as such by the minister in a ministerial order (IDF, 2020).

10. For more on the changes that occurred in the definition of recruits of Haredi background consequent to the High Court ruling, see the first chapter of the Numa Report (IDF, 2020)

11. See, for example, Blumental, 2019, and Bender & Lev-Ram, 2019

12. Decision 2698 (The 32nd Government, 2011). For more on the Tal Law, see Deutsch, 2017.

The second period after the law went into effect (2019-2021). IDF reports after the publication of the Numa Report, including reports on 2019. The figures referring to these years are lower, and indicate stable numbers of recruits, ranging from 1,190 to 1,220, according to the legal definition, and from 1,710 to 1,770, according to the expansive definition. This figure is significantly lower than the figure reported until 2018, and it stands to reason that this decline reflects the corrections implemented following the committee's recommendations.

Figure E-1 | **Trends in the annual number of men from Haredi backgrounds who enlisted, according to IDF reports**



Sources: IDF Reports. For details, see the comments to Table E-A-2 in the appendix.
The years refer to the enlistment years, which begin on the 1st of July.

Although Figure E-1 depicts only a slight increase in the number of recruits between 2019 and 2021, given the annual growth rate of Haredi society (which stands at 3-4.5%), with regard to the enlistment rate, this actually reflects a steeper decline. In order to assess such a change, where the data on all those with Haredi backgrounds according to the legal definitions isn't available to us, we relied on the administrative data on the number of men who, in 11th grade, had studied at an institution under Haredi supervision, under the auspices of the Ministry of Education. Since the Haredi recruits could enlist at age 19-20 but are permitted to defer their enlistment until they were 24 or 25, this range was taken into account. [13] Thus, the percentage of recruits with Haredi backgrounds was calculated as two ranges: an upper threshold, to adjust for those aged 19-20, and a lower threshold, to adjust for those aged 24-25 (for more on the normalization method, see Appendix E-2). The average figures and ranges for both age ranges are displayed in Figure E-2. We note that the graph presents data solely from 2014 and thereafter, as data before that year is less reliable.

13. This analysis provides an approximation of the trends pertaining to the rate of recruits with Haredi backgrounds, not an accurate estimate, since a Haredi cohort, for the purposes of the Enlistment Law, does not overlap with size of the cohort upon which the calculation was performed.

Figure E-2 | **Trends pertaining to the (approximate) rate of recruits with Haredi backgrounds (administrative data)**



Sources: The number of recruits – based on IDF reports. Cohort size – men who, in 11th grade, had studied at an institution under the auspices of the Ministry of Education that was under Haredi supervision. For details, see the comments to Table E-A-2 in the appendix.
The lower threshold is normalized to graduates of Haredi education, aged 19-20, in the relevant enlistment year, and the upper threshold is normalized to those aged 24-25 that same year.
The line represents the mean value of the two thresholds, and the shaded area represents the range between them. For an explanation, see Appendix E-2.

In the two periods after the enforcement of the law, the enlistment rate remained relatively stable

The analysis indicates that the enlistment rate was relatively stable in each of the two periods after the law went into effect, except for 2017. During the first period (2014-2018), it stood at 23-26%, according to the expansive definition and at 19-23%, according to the legal definition. During the second period (2019-2021), following the recommendations of the Numa Committee, this rate declined to 15-17%, according to the expansive definition and 10-11%, according to the legal definition.

The enlistment rate of men from a Haredi background based on IDF reports after the Numa Report resembles data from other sources

The data emerging from the graph on the enlistment rate during the years following the publication of the Numa Report resemble the data on the enlistment rate of men from Haredi backgrounds that was publicized by the IDF: 9% of the 2021 cohort had enlisted by the end of 2022 (IDF, 2022).[14] This data is similar to the data presented in the next section. Taken together, these findings support the assumption that the IDF's latest reports on the number of recruits, according to the legal definition, are an approximate representation of the number of recruits who are men from Haredi backgrounds. Since the main reduction in these numbers is in the figures publicized after the Numa Report, it is reasonable to assume that the gap was largely the result of corrections to the tally, and not so much the result of actual changes to the number of recruits.

14. The data reported by the IDF calculates the enlistment rate among those who had completed 12th grade in a high school under the auspices of the Ministry of Education, under Haredi supervision.

E-3 Enlistment rate trends

To provide a reliable estimate of trends pertaining to the enlistment rates of those with Haredi backgrounds, as well as an estimate of the rate of *Yotzim* within that group, we relied on Social Survey data, which allows us to identify, based on self-identification, past and present Haredi religiosity, and determine whether the respondent had served, at any point in time, in the IDF, based on self-reporting.[15] We stress that due to the limitation on available data, the analysis in this section refers to "servicepeople", i.e. those who had served in the IDF at any point in time, and not those who enlisted that year. In any case, as we'll see, the number of servicepeople among young adults is rather close to the number of recruits.

This analysis was done in three stages. During the first stage (Section 3.1), an estimate of military service rates during 2017-2021 was calculated, based on Social Survey data and broken down by age groups as well as present Haredi religiosity – *Yotzim* and HFBs. The next section (Section 3.2) describes trends in military service rates broken down by all servicepeople with Haredi backgrounds and HFBs. Section 3.3 is an estimate of the percentage of former Haredim among all servicepeople with Haredi background. The assumption is that the percentage of servicepeople from Haredi backgrounds is affected by several factors, including the percentage of servicepeople among HFBs, the percentage of servicepeople among *Yotzim*, and the percentage of *Yotzim* within all those with Haredi backgrounds serving in the IDF.

E-3.1 Military service rates among men from Haredi backgrounds

To identify trends in the military service rate among all men from Haredi backgrounds as well as *Yotzim* and HFBs, the population was divided into four age groups, which are not mutually exclusive: ages 20-24, ages 20-29, ages 25-39 and ages 30-54. The overlap between the age groups was maintained since the sample size becomes smaller with age, particularly for *Yotzim*. The data is displayed with the mean values for the years 2017-2021.

Figure E-3 | Military service rates among those with Haredi backgrounds broken down by present Haredi religiosity and age group (Mean values for the years 2017-2021)



Source: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data, men from Haredi backgrounds aged 20-54.
The data for those aged 20-24 should be qualified due to the relatively small number of observations.
The vertical lines represent the confidence interval, with a confidence level of 95%.
For the comprehensive data, including the number of observations, see Table E-A-1 in the appendix.

15. For an explanation of the difference between self-identification and self-reporting, see Comment 3 in Chapter 1, as well as Section 1.2 of the online appendix.

Approximately 9% of young adult men from a Haredi background served in the IDF, similar to the rates recently published by the IDF.

The data indicate that among all those with Haredi backgrounds, the military service rate decreases as the age level decreases: among those aged 30-54, it stands at 14%, while among young adults aged 20-24, it stands at only 9%. This figure is similar to the IDF data, according to which by the end of 2022, 9% of the graduates of Haredi education had enlisted by age 21 (IDF 2022, and Figure E-2 above).[16]

The decrease, directly correlated with age, of the military service rate, might explain the propensity of Haredim to enlist at older ages, though this explanation is less plausible, since, according to IDF data, over 80% of graduates of Haredi institutions who enlisted between 2019 and 2021 were 18 to 21 years of age, and 97% of them were younger than 25 (IDF, 2023).[17]

In the younger age groups, 60-63% of Yotzim served in the military compared to 7% of HFBs.

These figures also illustrate the significant discrepancy between the percentage of recruits among HFBs versus those of *Yotzim*. In the 20-24 age group, the military service rate is 52%, among *Yotzim*, and only 3% among HFBs, while within the more expansive age group (20-29), this rate rises to 63% of *Yotzim*, and 4% of HFBs. At higher ages, opposite trends were noted: Among *Yotzim*, the military service rate of those aged 25-39 stood at 60%, compared to 25% of those aged 30-54, whereas among HFBs, this rate stood at 7% and 10%, respectively.

The low military service rate of men from Haredi backgrounds aged 20-24 (9%), compared to the expanded group of those aged 20-29 (12%), could be attributed to the prevalence of recruits over the age of 20. However, it is important to qualify this and state that the data on those aged 20-24 concerning HFBs and *Yotzim* should be treated with caution, due to the rather high error rate in these groups.

This data imply that the increase in the military service rate of *Yotzim*, along with the increase in the LHS rates, help temper the sharp drop in the rate of military service among all those with Haredi backgrounds, despite the sharp decline in the rate of military service of HFBs. The next section provides a more in-depth analysis of these trends.

E-3.2 Trends in the military service rates of those coming from Haredi backgrounds

Figure E-4 presents trends in the military service rates among all men from Haredi backgrounds and among HFBs. The analysis was conducted over two time periods: 2007-2012 and 2017-2021[18] – and the data is presented as a rolling average of two-year time windows. It should be noted that in 2011, a methodological change was made to the Social Survey, which could have a major impact on the data on groups with a Haredi affiliation. Moreover, the comparison between data collected before 2010 and data collected after that year should be treated with caution[19].

16. IDF data is for those born in 2001 who enlisted by the end of 2022 (IDF, 2022).

17. This data refers to the age distribution of the recruits based on the service cohort for the years 2019-2021. It is important to point out that this data is expected to differ from the age distribution of recruits in any birth year cohort.

18. The variable called "religiosity level of the household at age 15", which allows us to identify those with Haredi backgrounds, was not available before 2007 or between the years 2013-2016.

19. In 2011 the variable "Haredi by administrative identification" was added to the sampling and inflation layers (Portnoy, 2007).

Figure E-4 | **Trends in military service rates among those with Haredi backgrounds and HFBs broken down by age group**

Source: Social Survey data, men from Haredi backgrounds aged 25-54.
The "household religiosity level at age 15" variable is not available before 2007 and between 2013 and 2016.
In 2011, a methodical change was made to the Social Survey: the variable "Haredi by administrative identification" was added to the sampling and inflation layers (Portnoy, 2007).
The colors of the shaded areas represent a confidence interval with a confidence level of 95%.

There is a consistent negative trend in the rate of military service among HFBs in both age groups

This data indicate that in the years 2010-2011 and thereafter, a constant negative trend in the rate of military service among HFBs, in both age groups, was noted (Figure E-4A), while the consistent negative trend among those with Haredi backgrounds (Figure E-4B) only applied to the older populations – the rate of military service in the younger group (25-39) even increased in the years 2020-2021. In any case, in order to infer that this was truly a trend change, and not a short-term change, we should await the data for the coming years.

When it comes to all servicepeople with Haredi backgrounds, during 2020-2021, the rate was 12.8% among those aged 30-54 and 14% among those aged 25-39, compared to the peak rate, which stood at 24.5% and 16%, respectively. With respect to HFBs, the military service rate during 2020-2021 was 7.5% among those aged 30-54 and 6.7% among those aged 25-39, compared to the peak rate, which were 18.7% and 10.7%, respectively. This decline can be partially attributed to the methodological change, though when the negative trends are examined after the methodological change, the picture that emerges is still one of a continuous negative trend.

E-3.3 The percentage of *Yotzim* among all servicepeople from Haredi backgrounds

Roughly 70% of young HFB servicepeople are Yotzim

The analysis of the rate of *Yotzim* within the total population of servicepeople with Haredi backgrounds (Figure E-5) indicates that until the age of 29, roughly 70% of the servicepeople are *Yotzim* and that this rate declines slightly with age: Among those aged 25-39, the *Yotzim* account for about 50% of the servicepeople, and among those aged 30-54, they account for about 38% of them. This decline could be affected by the propensity of the Haredim to enlist at an older age, by the negative trends in Haredi enlistment described in the previous section, and by the change in the rate of *Yotzim* (as will be illustrated in Section E-4.2).

E-5 | **The percentage of *Yotzim* among all servicepeople from Haredi backgrounds, by age group**



Source: Data from the 2017-2021 Social Survey data, servicepeople with Haredi background, aged 20-54.
The vertical lines represent the confidence interval, with a confidence rate of 95%.
For the comprehensive data, including the number of observations, see Table E-A-1 in Appendix E-1.

In this chart, the 72% rate is the rate that represents the percentage of *Yotzim* aged 20-29 out of all servicepeople with Haredi backgrounds (service year cohort), i.e. out of those who enlisted. This rate does not include those who have not enlisted but are expected to enlist in the future, in the tally of servicepeople. Thus, it represents those who already enlisted, and not the overall enlistment rate, which includes both the servicepeople and those expected to enlist in the future (henceforth: "anticipated enlistment rate"). There is, therefore, a gap, which stems from the fact that Haredim tend to enlist at later ages, such that among young adults, the military service rate does not include those who have not yet enlisted. When it comes to Haredim, among whom the proportion of young adults who are still able to enlist is still high, on account of this population's large natural growth rate, this gap is significant.[20]

The rate among adults, after enlistment age, could represent the anticipated enlistment rate, but only for those cohorts. We cannot infer enlistment rates in the younger cohorts from this data, because of the decline in the enlistment rates of HFBs and the increase in the enlistment rates of *Yotzim*.

20. The following example illustrates this. Let's assume that the disaffiliation (LHS) rate is 14% and the annual natural growth rate of Haredi Jews is 4%. Let's also assume that during any birth year cohort, the anticipated enlistment rate is 63% among *Yotzim*, and 6% among HFBs, whereby the enlistment age has the following distribution: among HFBs, 2% enlist at age 21 and another 4% enlist at age 25, and among *Yotzim*, 50% enlist at age 18, and another 13% enlist at age 21%. Under these assumptions, we would deduce that *Yotzim* constitute 63% of the total expected enlistment, but also constitute 70% of all those recruits.

E-4 The anticipated enlistment rate

As stated, because of possible changes to the rates of the *Yotzim*, to the rates of recruits within the population of *Yotzim*, and to the rates of recruits among HFBs, it would be hard to estimate the percentage of *Yotzim* within the overall anticipated recruit population (those who have served until now, and those expected to enlist in the future), in a cohort of young adults that still enlist. In this chapter, we'll provide an assessment of this figure, subject to a number of conservative assumptions. The findings will illustrate that Yotzim are the most dominant factor in the anticipated enlistment rate of all men from Haredi backgrounds.

E-4.1 The anticipated enlistment rate of men from Haredi backgrounds, and how many of them are *Yotzim*

To calculate the anticipated enlistment rate, figures from the previous section on the military service rate of *Yotzim* and of HFBs will be used, along with an assumption on the LHS rate (for a formal description, see Appendix E-3). With respect to *Yotzim*, assuming that the military service rate for the 20-39 age range represents the current anticipated enlistment rates (Figure E-3, above), the assumption is that the anticipated enlistment rate is 60-63%. With respect to HFBs, a conservative assumption was made, according to which the anticipated enlistment rate is 6.7%-7.5%, akin to the military service rates of those aged 30-54 during the years 2020-2021 (see Figure E-4A above). The assumption on LHS rates among men from Haredi backgrounds is that those rates are 14%, similar to the current findings of the Social Survey (see Chapter 1).

Factoring in those expected to enlist in the future, the percentage of Yotzim among servicepeople from a Haredi background stands at 60%

Figure 6-E presents the findings of this analysis, alongside the assumptions on the anticipated enlistment rates. The analysis indicates that the anticipated enlistment rate for the cohort of men from Haredi backgrounds stands at 15%, of whom 57%-60% are *Yotzim*. In other words, factoring in those expected to enlist in the future reduces the percentage of *Yotzim* among all servicepeople with Haredi backgrounds from about 70% to about 60%.

Figure E-6 | **Anticipated enlistment rate among those with Haredi backgrounds, and the percentage of *Yotzim* within this population**



At the upper threshold, the assumption is that the anticipated enlistment rate is 63% among *Yotzim* and 6.7% among HFBs. At the lower threshold, the assumptions are that the rates are 60.1% and 7.5%, respectively.

E-4.2 Simulation: The impact of changes in LHS rates on the anticipated enlistment of men with Haredi backgrounds

Figure E-7 | **Simulation: Anticipated enlistment rate among those with Haredi backgrounds, and the percentage of *Yotzim* within this population dependent upon LHS rates**





At the upper threshold, the assumption is that the anticipated enlistment rate is 63% among *Yotzim* and 6.7% among HFBs. At the lower threshold, the assumptions are that the rates are 60.1% and 7.5%, respectively.

An increase in the LHS rate would increase the enlistment rate among those with Haredi backgrounds

This analysis underscores the contribution of just the LHS rate to tempering the drop in the anticipated enlistment rate among men from Haredi backgrounds. Had the LHS rate remained at 8%, the anticipated enlistment rate would stand at 11-12%, compared to rates of 14%-15%, according to the current LHS rate (14%), which was presented in the previous section. Thus, the observed rise in the LHS rate increased the proportion of *Yotzim* among all recruits with Haredi backgrounds expected to enlist from 41%-45% under an LHS of 8% to 57%-60% under the current LHS rate of 14%. Looking to the future, if the LHS rate rises to 16%, and assuming that the anticipated enlistment rate of each group remains constant, the anticipated enlistment rate of men from Haredi backgrounds would rise to 16%, and the percentage of *Yotzim* within that group would rise to 60-64%.

E-5 Summary and discussion

The presented data indicates that over the years, the rate of military service among HFBs decreased significantly, and it seems as though the high military service rates among former Haredim alongside the increase in the LHS rates are what prevented the decrease in the military service rate among all men from Haredi backgrounds. Out of all young servicepeople with Haredi backgrounds, we found that about 70% of them are *Yotzim*. When we factor in the fact that HFBs enlist at a later age, that is, when we assess the anticipated enlistment rate, the percentage of *Yotzim* among all those who enlisted stands at 57-60%.

The IDF invests considerable resources to encourage Haredim to enlist, including creating adjusted tracks and service accommodations for those with Haredi backgrounds, and particularly for those who are currently Haredi. However, the data also indicate that the low response rate and a good part of the tempering of the decline in enlistment should be attributed to the enlistment of former Haredim. This implies that when the IDF decides to offer adjustments for recruits with Haredi backgrounds, it would be well-advised to adapt those solutions to *Yotzim* as well, since they constitute the majority of the recruits in this group. For the *Yotzim*, not only is it unnecessary to make a concerted effort to create gender segregation and sectoral segregation – to the contrary, efforts should be made to integrate them within general tracks, since ultimately, the segregation and religious supervision harms them.

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E-Appendices

Appendix E-1 Supplementary data

Figure E-A-1 | **Comparing the data in the IDF Reports, before and after the corrections due to the Numa Committee**



Table E-A-1 | **Military service rate and percentage of *Yotzim* among all those with Haredi backgrounds serving in the military, by age group**

Age groups	Statistic	The servicepeople (the data from Figure E-3)			*Yotzim* among all servicepeople with Haredi backgrounds (data from Figure E-5)
		Yotzim	HFBs	All those with Haredi backgrounds	
20-54	%	57.9	7.1	13.0	52.0
	±	8.4	1.6	2.0	8.0
	N	136	960	1,096	151
	N	239	38	277	
20-29	%	63.0	3.8	11.8	71.7
	±	11.2	1.8	2.8	11.0
	N	76	445	521	67
25-39	%	60.1	7.5	13.4	50.4
	±	11.6	2.3	2.7	10.8
	N	72	528	600	85
30-54	%	52.1	9.8	14.1	37.6
	±	13.0	2.6	2.9	10.5
	N	60	515	575	84

Appendix E-2 Calculation of the annual enlistment rate, based on IDF data

Table E-A-2 shows the number of recruits with Haredi backgrounds, based on the IDF's reports, broken down by legal definition and expansive definition. This data was normalized to the number of men who, in 11th grade, had studied at an educational institution under Haredi supervision. This normalization was done to 11th-grade graduates, since in that grade level, when boys transition to 12th grade, many drop out of institutions classified as institutions under Haredi supervision, and much of this drop-out rate merely involves the move from a *yeshiva ketana* to a *yeshiva gedolah* (The Central Bureau of Statistics, 2022).[21] The estimate of the enlistment rate was based on two assumptions (the age ranges assume that Haredi boys at the end of 11th grade are 16 or 17 years old).

- Lower threshold: The number of recruits, normalized to the number of 19-20-year-old men who graduated from Haredi educational institutions.
- Upper threshold: The number of recruits, normalized to the number of 24-25-year-old men.

For example, during the 2021 military service year, the number of 19-20-year-old graduates of Haredi educational institutions is the number of boys who, during the 2019 school year, were in 11th grade at schools under Haredi supervision, while the number of 24-25-year-olds is the number of students who were in 11th grade during the 2014 school year. In this calculation, an adjustment was made to account for the fact that the school year is higher than the enlistment year. The year for the school year corresponds with the year at the end of the calendar year, while the enlistment year is the calendar year at the beginning of the year (for example, the 2022 school year ended in June of 2022, while the 2022 enlistment year began in July of 2022).

21. Yeshiva Ketana is the term for a Haredi yeshiva for boys in 9th through 11th grade, which does not teach secular studies. A yeshiva gedola is a Haredi term for a Haredi yeshiva gevohah, which students move to after completing their studies at the yeshiva ketana. There are several Haredi high-school yeshivas at which studies continue until 12th grade.

Table E-A-2 | **The annual number of recruits with Haredi backgrounds, according to IDF data, and their (approximate) percentage among those with Haredi backgrounds**

	The number of recruits[1]		The number of recruits Lower threshold[2]		The number of recruits Upper threshold[2]		Number of graduates of Haredi educational institutions[4]	
	Legal definition	Expansive definition[5]	Legal definition	Expansive definition[5]	Legal definition	Expansive definition[5]	Ages 19-20	Ages 24-25
2010		898		10.0		12.0	8,961	7,489
2011		1,282		14.2		16.6	9,017	7,728
2012		1,447		15.7		16.9	9,228	8,557
2013		1,972		20.0		23.1	9,879	8,519
2014	2,076	2,203	21.5	22.8	23.6	25.0	9,664	8,807
2015	2,145	2,475	20.8	24.0	23.9	27.6	10,334	8,961
2016	1,906	2,459	17.9	23.1	21.1	27.3	10,638	9,017
2017	1,374	2,744	12.4	24.8	14.9	29.7	11.070	9,228
2018	1,988	2,444	17.3	21.2	20.1	24.7	11,517	9,879
2019	1,222	1,773	10.3	14.9	12.6	18.3	11,917	9,664
2020	1,193	1,710	9.7	13.9	11.5	16.5	12,291	10,334
2021	1,185	1,713	9.2	13.2	11.1	16.1	12,941	10,638

1. Number of recruits: Until 2018 – the Numa Report (IDF, 2020). For 2019-2021: The IDF Manpower Directorate's report to the Knesset (IDF 2023). We note that the IDF Manpower Directorate's report to the Knesset, according to the legal definition, is identical to the one appearing in the Publications Gazette (The Ministry of Justice, 2021, 2022).
2. Enlistment rate – lower threshold: The number of recruits, normalized to the number of 19-20-year-old men who graduated from Haredi educational institutions.
3. Enlistment rate – upper threshold: The number of recruits, normalized to the number of 24-25-year-old men who graduated from Haredi educational institutions.
4. The number of graduates of Haredi educational institutions: The records of the Ministry of Education for the years 2003-2019, out of "Taking a Broad View" (The Ministry of Education, no date).
5. The data on the years 2010-2013 relate to the period before the law, which was reported pursuant to the targets determined in the 2011 government decision, according to which the term "Haredi" included Haredi *yeshiva gedolah* students eligible for deferred enlistment under the Tal Law. During those years, the tallying method was substantially different from the tallying method after the law went into effect, and it also included those without any Haredi affiliation who had served in tracks designated for Haredim. This data is considered less reliable (IDF, 2020).

Appendix E-3 The calculation of the anticipated enlistment rate

The anticipated enlistment rate is the overall enlistment rate – which includes both servicepeople (who had served at any point) and those expected to enlist in the future, within the relevant age group or birth year cohort. With regard to adults after enlistment age, the military service rate is equal to the anticipated enlistment rate, whereas with regard to young adults, the data is not available to us, so assumptions were made on the anticipated enlistment rates among HFBs – , and *Yotzim* – , based on the military service rate data, and assumptions were also made regarding the percentage of *Yotzim* within the overall population of those with Haredi backgrounds (for an explanation on the assumptions, see Section 4.1 above).

Out of these, the anticipated enlistment rate of men from Haredi backgrounds was calculated:

$$D_{hb} = (1-p)D_h + pD_y$$

and the percentage of *Yotzim* within the entire anticipated population of recruits with Haredi backgrounds (HFBs and *Yotzim*).

$$\widehat{D}_{\mathrm{y}} = \frac{pD_y}{D_{hb}}$$

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