



# THE DATA IS OUT

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The Annual Report on  
Leaving Haredi Society

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2024

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Editors: Zvika Deutsch,  
Adar Anisman



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## Preface

I am proud to present the 2024 edition of our annual report, "The Data is Out", now being published for the fourth consecutive year. The past year has been a particularly painful and challenging one, among the most difficult that Israeli society as a whole has endured, and in particular the Exit movement, which lost dozens of men and women, including officers and soldiers from the IDF and the police. This last year, Yotzim chose to shoulder a personal burden, actively contributing to the strengthening of Israeli society, despite not being raised to take on such a role.

The scope of the Exit movement is substantial and significant, and as the Haredi sector continues to grow, so does the movement. This issue can no longer be ignored - now is the time to take responsibility. Beyond the state's clear interest in addressing this matter, it also has a duty to ensure the successful integration of Yotzim into Israeli society.

The current annual report presents new, comprehensive, and up-to-date information about the Exit movement, the result of a year of dedicated research by the team at Out for Change. Within these pages, you will find a thorough and detailed analysis of the number of individuals leaving, emerging trends, various methods of identification, and the similarities and differences within this population.

As in previous years, the data presented in the annual report tell the complex story of Yotzim - the men and women who have left Haredi society. The data reveals that, in all areas within their control, these individuals are actively striving to integrate into Israeli society, much like the broader Israeli population. The data also shed light on the obstacles, challenges, and difficulties Yotzim face, but also highlight the immense potential within this group—their resilience, aspirations, and capabilities - which offers hope and demonstrates the achievements they bring to Israeli society as they chart a new path forward.

The data show us that the Exit movement is constantly growing, and the proportion of Yotzim successfully integrating into Israeli society is significantly greater than their relative share of the population. While there has been a positive trend in state institutions beginning to recognize this group's potential, there is still a long road ahead, and there is much work to be done. The data once again underscore how integrating Yotzim serves the State of Israel's vital interests - economically, in terms of security, and no less importantly, in fostering social resilience.

Finally, I would like to thank the dedicated team to the dedicated team that made this incredible achievement possible - Zvika Deutsch, Dr. Adar Anisman, and Shani Kaplan who worked tirelessly on text and formulas. I would also like to thank Keren Glicklich for her invaluable support throughout this journey.

Dr. Shmulik Hess  
Chairman, Out for Change

# Table of Contents

Introduction .....	5
A. Trends in Exiting from Haredi Society.....	11
A-1 Introduction.....	12
A-2 Overview - Methods for Identifying Affiliation with Haredi Society in the Past and Present .....	12
A-3 Rates of Exit from Haredi society .....	13
A-4 Trends in exit rates.....	14
A-4.1 Exit rates according to age and gender .....	15
A-4.2 Trends in exit rates by age over time (survey years) .....	16
A-4.3 Trends in exit rates based on age group.....	18
A-5 Religiosity levels among Yotzim .....	19
A-6 Age distribution by sub-groups.....	21
A - Sources .....	24
A-Appendices.....	25
Appendix A-1 Additional data.....	25
Appendix A-2 Rate of Exit from Haredi Society - Upper and Lower Range Estimation.....	28
 B. Characteristics of Yotzim.....	 32
B-1 Introduction.....	35
B-2 Areas of Residence .....	34
B-2.1 Residential Districts .....	35
B-2.2 Seniority within the locality and the apartment.....	37
B-2.3 Country of Origin .....	38
B-3 Family Status .....	39

<b>B-4 Military Service .....</b>	<b>42</b>
<b>Box B-1: Military service tracks among men from a Haredi background.....</b>	<b>44</b>
<b>B-5 Higher Education.....</b>	<b>48</b>
B-5.1 Highest certificate among women .....	48
B-5.2 Highest certificates among men .....	49
<b>B - Tables .....</b>	<b>52</b>
Table B-1: District of residence, broken down by gender and age group (%).....	53
Table B-2 Family status, broken down by gender, ages 25-64 (%) .....	54
Table B-3 Military or national service, broken down by gender and age group (%).....	54
Table B-4 Breakdown of highest diploma received - women aged 25 - 64 (%).....	55
Table B-5 - Breakdown of highest diploma received, men aged 25 - 64, according to data sources .....	55
Table B-6 Percentages of academic degree holders - men, divided by age group.....	56
<b>B-Sources.....</b>	<b>57</b>
<b>B - Appendices .....</b>	<b>58</b>
Appendix B-1: Supplementary data.....	58
 <b>C. Men's Employment .....</b>	 <b>59</b>
<b>C-1 Introduction.....</b>	<b>61</b>
<b>C-2 Labor force integration indicators.....</b>	<b>62</b>
C-2.1 Employment rate .....	62
C-2.2 Unemployment (job seekers).....	64
C-2.3 Full-time and part-time employment.....	66
<b>C-3 Occupations.....</b>	<b>69</b>
C-3.1 Skill levels of employees .....	69
C-3.2 Academic and liberal professions, and professional occupations.....	70
C-3.3 Work in High-tech.....	72

<b>Box C-1 The demand for high-tech training among Yotzim and Haredim today .....</b>	<b>75</b>
<b>C-4 Rate of Yotzim within the labor force of all men from a Haredi background .....</b>	<b>80</b>
<b>C-Tables.....</b>	<b>81</b>
Table C-1: Rate of Employment.....	81
Table C-2: Employment rate, by age groups (%).....	82
Table C-3: Job scope by age groups .....	83
Table C-4: Breakdown by professions - 2020-2023.....	84
Table C-5: Breakdown of economic sectors of the employed - 2020-2023 .....	85
Table 3-6: Rate of employment in the high-tech sector by age group - 2020-2023 .....	86
<b>C-Sources.....</b>	<b>87</b>
<b>C-Appendices.....</b>	<b>88</b>
Appendix C-1: Glossary of Employment Terms.....	88
Appendix C-2: Occupations by skill levels .....	90
 <b>D. Well-being indicators Definitions and data sources .....</b>	 <b>91</b>
<b>D-1 Introduction.....</b>	<b>93</b>
<b>D-2: Family relationships .....</b>	<b>93</b>
<b>D-3 Indicators of economic well-being .....</b>	<b>95</b>
D-3.1 Satisfaction with financial situation.....	95
D-3.2 General standard of living.....	99
D-3.3 Satisfaction with living conditions.....	102
<b>D-4 Emotional well-being indicators .....</b>	<b>103</b>
<b>Box D-1 Comparison of well-being indicators between the Social Survey and the Integration Survey.....</b>	<b>107</b>
<b>D-Tables.....</b>	<b>114</b>
Table D-1: Satisfaction with family relationships, breakdown by marital status (%) .....	115
Table D-2: General and economic satisfaction, broken down by gender and age groups (%)....	116
Table D-3: General standard of living, broken down by gender and age groups (%).....	117

Table D-4: Emotional well-being indicators, broken down by gender and age group (%) .....	118
<b>D-References .....</b>	<b>119</b>
<b>D-Appendices .....</b>	<b>120</b>
Appendix D-1 Data Completion .....	120
<b>E. The Haredi education system and the impact on women who leave haredi society .....</b>	<b>121</b>
<b>E-1 Introduction .....</b>	<b>123</b>
<b>E-2 The Haredi education system for girls.....</b>	<b>124</b>
E-2.1 Structure of the education system: background .....	124
E-2.2 Secondary Education .....	125
E-2.3 Post-secondary education .....	126
E-2.4 Summary of the Haredi education system for girls .....	127
<b>E-3 Education of Yotzot .....</b>	<b>128</b>
E-3.1 Comparison between subgroups.....	128
<b>E-4 The Connection Between the Track in the Haredi Education System and Education After Exiting.....</b>	<b>130</b>
E-4.1 Type of high school diploma and continuation of studies .....	130
E-4.2 The relationship between the stage of leaving haredi society and the acquisition of education.....	132
<b>E-5. Summary and discussion.....</b>	<b>135</b>
<b>E-Sources.....</b>	<b>136</b>

## Introduction

The Data is Out annual report aims to present a representative, comparative and comprehensive snapshot of former Haredim (also: "formerly Haredi"), concerning their demographic, educational and vocational characteristics. Existing research data is limited, since other than the data published each year in this annual report, which is based on the Central Bureau of Statistics' (CBS) representative databases almost no representative data on former Haredim has been published, and the little data that has been published does not present a comprehensive and comparative snapshot of their characteristics. This annual report serves to fill the gap by analyzing the Central Bureau of Statistics' data and comparing the data on former Haredim to other groups classified based on their past and present affiliation.

The term "former Haredim" is used rather than the commonly used term "those who went off the derech", both due to the desire to represent all those who left Haredi society, i.e. those who currently define themselves as secular, traditional, or otherwise religious, and because the term "those who went off the derech" is not used exclusively for those who left Haredi society. In this annual report, the term Yotzim, a shortened form of the term "former Haredim" ("yotzei hachevra haharedit", in Hebrew), will be used to refer to this population.

The groups analyzed in this report are defined based on their current affiliation (whether or not they are currently Haredi) and their past affiliation (whether or not they are from a Haredi background). Current affiliation is indicated using the term "today" (e.g., "Haredi today" or "degree of religiosity today"), while past affiliation refers to whether an individual has a Haredi background.

The intersection of past and present affiliations creates four distinct subgroups (see Table 1): **Yotzim** are individuals with a Haredi background who are not Haredi today (i.e., those who have left Haredi society); **Haredi from home (HFH)**: Individuals with a Haredi background who remain Haredi today (i.e., those raised in Haredi homes who continue to identify as Haredi); **Joiners (became Haredi)** are individuals with a non-Haredi background who are Haredi today, including ba'alei teshuva (returnees to religious observance) and those from non-Haredi religious backgrounds who have become Haredi; and **Non-Haredim**, individuals with a non-Haredi background who are not Haredi today (i.e., non-Haredi Jews).

**Table 1 | . Analysis of groups as a cross between present and past affiliation**

Current Groups			Past Groups
Currently Haredi	Not Haredi	All Jews	
HFH <sup>1</sup>	Yotzim <sup>2</sup>	Those with Haredi backgrounds	
Joiners <sup>3</sup>	Non-Haredim <sup>4</sup>	Those with non-Haredi backgrounds	

1. HFH - Short for haredim from Haredi homes
2. Yotzim (formerly Haredi) - short for those who have left the Haredi community
3. Joiners (became Haredi) - short for those who joined the Haredi community
4. Non-Haredim - short for Jews who are not Haredi



All of the analyses (except outliers) are based on data from the Central Bureau of Statistics - the Labor Force Survey for the years 2020 - 2023 and the Social Survey for the years 2017 - 2023. Two methods were used to identify past and present Haredi religiosity in the databases, based on the nature of the data contained within each of them. The first method, whose data was presented in the previous two yearbooks, is the Deutsch, Shenfeld, and Tirosh Method (the Dashat method), which uses the Labor Force Survey data to identify those with a Haredi background - those who self-report as graduates of Haredi yeshivas and current Haredim - Haredim by self-definition (self-definition in the LFS is at the household level). This method enables the identification of a Haredi background among men only and was primarily used by our team to analyze labor market integration and educational characteristics for men.

The second method relies on data from the Social Survey, and identifies individuals based on self-identification, including those with a Haredi background (raised in a Haredi family at age 15) and those who are currently Haredi, both men and women. This method was used to analyze trends in rates of exit from Haredi society, as well as to examine the demographic, economic, and emotional well-being of those who leave, compared to both Haredi and non-Haredi populations.

Chapter A outlines trends in the rates of individuals leaving Haredi society, including data on their current religiosity and the age at which they leave.

Chapter B examines the characteristics of those leaving Haredi society: areas of residence, family status, military or civilian service participation, and educational attainment.

Chapter C focuses on employment trends among men: trends in labor market integration indices such as employment and unemployment rates, as well as data on the vocations of those employed, with a particular emphasis on the high-tech sector.

Chapter D explores the broader characteristics of those leaving, including family-related factors, economic well-being indicators such as satisfaction with their financial situation and standard of living, and measures of emotional well-being, such as feelings of loneliness and depression.

Chapter E addresses women's education, offering an overview of the Haredi education system for girls and presenting data on the relationship between the stage at which women exit the Haredi education system and their subsequent educational achievements.


This yearbook is accompanied by an online appendix that includes an expanded glossary of terms, a methodological discussion on the identification method used in the Social Survey and the Labor Force Survey using the "Dashat" method, an overview of the Integration Survey conducted by Out for Change, and an explanation of the relative sampling error, which guided the decision on whether to publish certain data or not.

## Chapter A: Trends in exiting Haredi society

The rates of exit from Haredi society have fluctuated and changed over time. After the establishment of the State of Israel, many young people who grew up in Haredi families left their communities and assimilated into mainstream society. Since the 1970s, Haredi society has intensified its isolation and segregation, leading to a decline in the rate of exit. In recent decades, however, the rate of exit has once again risen among both men and women. The proportion of Yotzim among non-Haredi Jews has steadily increased, both due to demographic growth within Haredi society and rising rates of exit.



The exit from Haredi society is on the rise




**12%-14%**

of each Haredi cohort  
are Yotzim  
Aged 20 - 29



**13%-15%**

of men  
Aged 20 - 29



**11%-13%**

of women  
Aged 20 - 29

Percentage of Yotzim within  
the non-Haredi population  
Born between 1977 - 1981

**0.5%**



Percentage of Yotzim within  
the non-Haredi population  
Born between 1997 - 2001

**2.7%**

**51%**

of Yotzim are  
aged 20 - 29

HFH - 45%  
Non-Haredim - 30%



**66%**

of Yotzim are religious  
or traditional-religious

Aged 20 - 34 - 69%  
Aged 35 - 49 - 61%



## A. Trends in Exiting from Haredi Society

### Groups and Data Sources

#### Groups

The analysis groups are classified based on current affiliation (currently Haredi or not) versus past affiliation (whether they are from a Haredi background or not).

#### Subgroups

**Yotzim (formerly Haredi):** Those with a Haredi background who are not currently Haredi - short for those who have left the Haredi community.

**Haredi from home (HFH):** Those with a Haredi background who are currently Haredi - short for those from a Haredi home.

**Joiners (Became Haredim):** Those with a non-Haredi background who are currently Haredi - short for those who have joined the Haredi community.

**Non-Haredi:** Those with a non-Haredi background who are not currently Haredi - short for Jews who are not Haredi.

#### Data sources and identification methods (\*)

**The Central Bureau of Statistics Social Survey** - for the years 2007-2012 and 2017-2023, Jews (women and men) aged 20 - 64.

Identification of Haredi background: raised (at age 15) in a Haredi family by self-definition (this variable is not available in data before 2007 and in the years 2013-2016); Identification of Haredi today: by self-definition.

**The Central Bureau of Statistics Labor Force Survey (LFS)** - for the years 2020-2023, Jewish men born in Israel aged 25-64.

Identification of Haredi background: graduate of Haredi yeshiva according to self-reporting (Dashat method); Identification of Haredi today: by self-definition (household level).

(\*) For more on the data sources, see the online appendix.

## A-1 Introduction

The rates of leaving and joining Haredi society have fluctuated over time. After the establishment of the State of Israel, many young people raised in Haredi families left their communities and assimilated into mainstream society, while those from mainstream backgrounds chose to leave and join the Haredi community. Since the 1970s, Haredi society has intensified its processes of isolation and separation, leading to a decline in the rates of those leaving. In recent decades, these rates have started to rise again.

Identifying exit rates and trends over time can help offer an estimate of the number of young men and women who have graduated from Haredi education and wish to integrate into military service, higher education, and employment with the general population, rather than in segregated environments. This information can also assist stakeholders in pinpointing the necessary responses to support their optimal integration. However, aside from a pioneering study by Regev and Gordon (2021), to the best of our knowledge, there are currently no representative quantitative studies or large-scale surveys examining trends in exit rates over time. By combining administrative data with data from the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) Labor Force Survey (LFS), Regev and Gordon found that exit rates are particularly high among those born in the late 1990s, who were aged 18 to 24 at the time of the research (2017-2018). The researchers concluded from this that the current trend is one of increasing exit rates. Other studies have examined exit rates based on the CBS Social Survey, but these studies have not analyzed trends.

This chapter of the annual report builds on the analyses presented in last year's edition (Deutsch and Shenfeld, 2023), examining trends in the rates of individuals leaving Haredi society. The analysis is primarily based on data from the Central Bureau of Statistics' Social Survey for the years 2007-2023, which enables the identification of individuals who self-define as having a Haredi background (those raised in a Haredi family) and those who identify as Haredi today. The exit rate is defined as the proportion of individuals who have left Haredi society relative to the total number of people with a Haredi background, including both those who remain Haredi ("Haredim from home") and those who have left ("Yotzim").<sup>1</sup>

Section A-2 outlines the methods used to identify individuals with a Haredi background (past Haredim) and those currently identifying as Haredi. Section A-3 provides current estimates of exit rates, broken down by gender and age groups. Section A-4 explores trends in exit rates, examining variations by age, gender, time periods, and birth cohorts. Section A-5 presents the distribution of religiosity levels among those who have left Haredi society, while Section A-6 compares the age distribution of those leaving with other subgroups—non-Haredim, Haredim from home, and those who have joined. The appendix to the chapter (A-2) offers a comparison of exit rates between Regev and Gordon (2021) and the Labor Force Survey (LFS), utilizing the Dashat method (Deutsch, Shenfeld, and Tirosh, 2024).

## A-2 Overview – Methods for Identifying Affiliation with Haredi Society in the Past and Present

Using different data sources and methods to identify individuals with a Haredi background and those currently identifying as Haredi results in differing estimates of exit rates. The current estimates of exit rates are derived from two primary sources: the Social Survey data and the Labor Force Survey (LFS) data. Both sources enable the current identification of affiliation with Haredi society based on self-defi-

1. This method was used by Sarel and Gilboa (2017), Shenfeld (2020), and was also mentioned in Weinreb and Blass (2018). For further information on the method, see the online appendix.

inition, but the Social Survey identifies individuals at the personal level, while the LFS relies on self-definition at the household level.<sup>2</sup>

When it comes to identifying a Haredi background, different methods are employed. The Social Survey allows for the identification of a family's religiosity through self-definition<sup>3</sup>. In contrast, it is possible to use the LFS data without incorporating additional data, by utilizing the Dashat (Deutsch, Shenfeld, & Tirosh, 2024) method to identify a Haredi background among men only. This method is based on self-reported attendance of a Haredi yeshiva.<sup>4</sup>

In addition, Regev and Gordon (2021) developed an initial tool for estimating exit rates based on a combination of LFS data with other administrative data. They identified as having a Haredi background anyone who grew up in a family where most of the children were sent to educational institutions that they classified as Haredi<sup>5</sup>. Haredi classification is currently based on self-definition (at the household level), as described above.

Identification at the household level has disadvantages, as the assumption that all individuals are similar in terms of their lifestyle (Haredi or not) is mainly appropriate for adults and less so for young people under the age of 25, who sometimes live in their parents' homes despite differences in lifestyle. Another limitation concerns mainly those who are still Haredi: the data in the LFS do not include boarding school students, whose rates are high among Haredi men under the age of 25. This leads to an underrepresentation of Haredi men in this age group<sup>6</sup>. For this reason, we chose to include in the analyses based on the LFS only those aged 25 and over.

Moreover, with respect to estimates of the current numbers of Haredi Jews and of those with Haredi backgrounds, the LFS data presents unexplained trends, which were only found in that data and not in the Social Survey (Deutsch, Shenfeld, and Tirosh, 2024). This difference may be rooted in the survey's methodological structure, which is designed to track employment trends rather than changes in population sizes (see the online appendix for further details). These limitations are shared by both methods that rely on this dataset: the Regev and Gordon method and the Dashat method.

### A-3 Rates of Exit from Haredi society

In this section we present current estimates of exit rates from Haredi society, shown as upper and lower ranges and broken down by gender. These estimates are based on data from the LFS and the Social Survey, as well as the findings of Regev and Gordon (2021).

According to the data, the current exit rates for individuals aged 20-64 range from 10.7% (lower estimate)

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2. The question in the Social Survey was: "Do you consider yourself: Haredi, religious, traditional-religious, traditional and not so religious, not religious/secular." And in the LFS: "What is the main religious lifestyle of the people living in the household: secular, traditional, religious, very religious, Haredi, mixed lifestyle (household with at least two people with different religious lifestyles)?"

3. The question in the Social survey was: "When you were 15, was the household in which you grew up: Haredi, religious, traditional-religious, traditional and not so religious, or not religious/secular."


4. Since 2016, Jewish men have been asked: "What type of yeshiva does he or did he study in: *yeshiva ketana*, *yeshiva tichonit*, *yeshiva gedola*, *yeshiva gevoha*, *kollel*, *hesder yeshiva*." This method defines an "ultra-Orthodox yeshiva graduate" - that is, someone with a haredi background - as someone who reported studying in a *yeshiva ketana* or *yeshiva gedola*, but did not report studying in a *hesder yeshiva*

5. In cases where a family sends exactly half of its children to Haredi educational institutions, the authors applied a rule: if at least half of the children attended first grade in an institution under Haredi supervision, the family is classified as "Haredi"; otherwise, it is classified as "non-Haredi." If no information is available, the family's data is excluded from the database.

6. Thus, although in the 18-24 age group, Haredi men are supposed to make up 51% of the population (Fran and Klinger, 2018), in the LFS data for the years 2020-2022, the average percentage of men is only 40%.

to 14% (upper estimate). Exit rates are higher among men, ranging from 11.8% to 15%, and lower among women, ranging from 9.7% to 13%. When focusing on the younger age group (20-29), the upper range remains consistent, while the lower range shows an increase in exit rates.

Figure A-1 | Exit rates based on gender and age



Source: Estimates based on the Social Survey data for the years 2017-2023, the LFS using the Dashat method for the years 2020-2023, and estimates by Regev and Gordon (2021). For a presentation of the calculation method, see Appendix A-2.

The upper-range values are derived from the estimated exit rates based on the LFS (for men), while the lower-range values are also drawn from the Social Survey (for both men and women). Additional intermediate values are provided by the study conducted by Regev and Gordon (2021) (for both genders). The chart averages these ranges, taking into consideration that the overall exit rate for men and women combined is the average of the separate exit rates for each gender. For a detailed explanation of the calculation method and tables containing all estimates, refer to Appendix A-2.

## A-4 Trends in exit rates

So far, we have presented the most up-to-date estimates of exit rates. In this section, we shift our focus to examining trends in exit rates over time. While it may not yet be possible to determine which estimates from the various sources are the most reliable, the Social Survey data provides a dependable basis for identifying overall trends in exit rates.

This section analyzes trends in exit rates using the Social Survey data, categorized by gender. To examine these trends, we first present a descriptive overview of exit rates for the years 2017 - 2023, broken down by age groups. Next, we analyze how exit rates have changed over time, first by tracking exit rates across different age groups over the years in which the surveys were conducted, and then by examining trends based on year of birth<sup>7</sup>. In both analyses, we calculate two key metrics: (1) the exit rate, which represents the proportion of individuals leaving from the source population (all those with a Haredi background - Yotzim and HFH), and (2) the integration rate, which measures the proportion of individuals transitioning into the target population (all non-Haredim today - Yotzim and non-Haredim).

7. Analyzing exit trends based on birth data has the advantage of highlighting the periods in which changes occur. However, this approach is less reliable than analyzing exit rates by specific age groups, because in this approach, people who exit at a later age or return to Haredi society will be recorded as fluctuations in exit rates (even when the overall trend remains stable over time).

All analyses are based on Social Survey data from 2007 to 2023, excluding the years 2013-2016, when the relevant question was not asked <sup>8</sup>. Consequently, analyses spanning multiple calendar years are divided into two periods: 2007-2012 and 2017-2023. Additionally, data collected after October 7, 2023, were excluded due to anomalies observed in this quarter.


#### A-4.1 Exit rates according to age and gender

An analysis of recent Social Survey data by age group reveals that exit rates are higher among those in the younger age group compared to those in the mid-range age group.

Between 2020 and 2023, an average of 11.2% of individuals aged 20-49 with a Haredi background, both men and women, no longer identified as part of the Haredi community (Figure A-2). When broken down by age, exit rates were higher among younger adults: 11.6% for those aged 20-34, compared to 10.1% for those aged 35-49. This trend is observed in both men and women.

A comparison based on gender shows that women have lower exit rates than men in both age groups. Among younger individuals, the gap between men and women is 2.3 percentage points (12.8% vs. 10.5%), while among older individuals, the difference widens to 2.7 percentage points (11.4% vs. 8.7%).

Figure A-2 | Exit rates from the Haredi community - according to gender and age



Source: Social Survey data (2020-2023) for individuals with a Haredi background (both men and women) aged 20-49. Data for 2023 includes only responses collected up to October 7.

Exit rate - The proportion of individuals who have left (Yotzim) out of the total population with a Haredi background (including Haredi from home and Yotzim).

These findings, which indicate higher exit rates among younger individuals, suggest a general increase in exit rates - assuming that return to Haredi society among those who have left is not a significant phenomenon. The next section examines trends in exit rates over time for these two age groups, helping to rule out the possibility that the observed differences are due to returning to Haredi society. If the age-related differences were primarily caused by individuals returning after having left, we would see a consistent gap over time rather than a gradual increase in exit rates within each age group.

8. The variable "Level of household religiosity at age 15," which allows for identification of those with a Haredi background, is not available before 2007 or from 2013-2016.

## A-4.2 Trends in exit rates by age over time (survey years)

In this section, due to the limited number of observations per year, we analyze trends in exit rates using a moving average with two-year time windows (Figure A-3). The analysis is presented separately for two age groups: younger adults (20-34) and mid-range aged adults (35-49).

### There is an increase in exit rates among both age groups.

The findings of the analysis indicate that in the first period (2007-2012) there is generally no significant change in exit rates, though the data for the mid-range age group showed some variability. In contrast, from 2017 onward, a clear upward trend in exit rates emerges in both age groups, particularly among individuals aged 35-49.


Throughout the analyzed period, exit rates were consistently higher among younger adults (20-34), ranging from 10.7% to 12.8%, compared to 5% to 11% in the mid-range age group. The lower exit rates in the mid-range age group were partly driven by a decline in exit rates among men and women born in the 1970s (see the next section for further details).

The rise in exit rates among the mid-range age group since 2017 further supports the notion of a general increase in exit rates. The data captures only the year in which the survey was answered, not the exact year of exit. Thus, individuals who were aged 25-34 in 2009-2010 and part of the younger age group (with an exit rate of approximately 7%-8%) moved into the mid-range age group by 2019-2020, where their exit rate remained relatively similar (around 8%-9%).




**Figure A-3 | Trends in exit rates throughout the years of the survey, according to age group (women and men)**

**A. Proportion of Yotzim among all of those from a Haredi background**



**B. Proportion of Yotzim among the general, non-Haredi population**



Source: Social Survey data for the years shown in the chart, for men and women. Data for 2023 are through October 7th. The variable "Level of household religiosity at age 15" is unavailable in the data prior to 2007 and for the years 2013-2016.

The red vertical line indicates a methodological change in the Social Survey regarding the Haredi sample (see the online appendix for details).

For data broken down by gender, see Figure A-N-1 in Appendix A-1.

**Yotzim aged 20-34  
comprise 2.7% of non-  
Haredi Jews their age.**


As the rate of Yotzim (both men and women) from all those with Haredi background increases, a corresponding rise can be observed in their proportion among the non-Haredi population today (rate of integration into the target population). Among mid-range aged individuals, the integration rate is approximately 1%, whereas in the younger age group, it approaches 3%. This rate is expected to continue growing over time.

### A-4.3 Trends in Exit rates based on age group


To provide a comprehensive picture, an analysis of exit rate trends across birth cohorts is presented, revealing a significant increase in the exit rate among both men and women (Figure A-4a). Compared to those born in the late 1960s and 1970s, who had an exit rate of approximately 7%, the rate rose to approximately 10% for those born in the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. Among individuals born in the second half of the 1990s and later, the exit rate has already reached approximately 12.5%.

Figure A-4 | Trends in exit rates across birth cohorts, by gender

#### A. Proportion of Yotzim amongst all those with a Haredi background



#### B. Proportion of Yotzim among the general, non-Haredi population



Source: Social Survey data from 2007-2012 and 2017-2023, Jewish men and women aged 20-64. Data for 2023 is through October 7. In the Social Survey, age data is categorized into quintiles. To estimate the year of birth, the median age within each age group was used as the reference point.

As the exit rate from the source population (individuals with a Haredi background) rises, a corresponding increase can be observed in the integration rate (the proportion of Yotzim within the target population – all those who are non-Haredi today) (Figure A-4b). Among individuals born in the 1970s or earlier, Yotzim make up less than 1% of the non-Haredi population. In contrast, among those born in 1997 or later, they account for approximately 2.7% of the population.

## A-5 Religiosity levels among Yotzim

Leaving Haredi society is widely regarded as a sociological phenomenon rather than merely a religious one (e.g., Horowitz, 2018). Indeed, the data show that most men and women who leave the Haredi community become traditional or religious. However, the data sources – the Social Survey and the LFS – differ in their classification of religiosity<sup>9</sup>, leading to some variation in estimates of the religiosity of those who leave. Nevertheless, when religiosity is grouped into two broad categories – religious and non-religious – these differences are minimal<sup>10</sup>. For clarity and consistency, most of the analysis in this section is based on data from the Social Survey, which includes both men and women, while the appendix provides supplementary findings using data from the LFS (Figures A-N-2 and A-N-3).


### Most Yotzim are traditional or religious

Overall, the data indicate that leaving Haredi society is not necessarily accompanied by abandoning religion (Figure A-5). About two-thirds of those who leave identify as religious or traditional-religious (66%), with the rate higher among the young (69%) and lower among older individuals (61%). Analyzing gender differences (Figure A-5b) reveals considerable similarity between men and women. On average, 46% of those leaving (both men and women) define themselves as religious, 36% as traditional-religious or traditionalists who are not very religious, and 18% as secular.

9. The Social Survey and the LFS differ primarily in their classification of religious and traditional identities. In the Social Survey, the categories are: religious, traditional-religious, and traditional but not very religious. In contrast, LFS classifies respondents as very religious, religious, and traditional. Another key difference arises from the fact that in the LFS, the question is asked at the household level, allowing for a unique category of mixed lifestyles (households in which at least two members follow different religious practices).

10. Despite differences in classification, both sources show a high degree of similarity in the proportion of individuals identified as religious. According to the Social Survey (Figure B-4), 66% are classified as religious or traditionally religious (69% among young people and 61% among adults). Data from the LFS (Figure A-N-3) indicate that 64% are categorized as religious or very religious (72% among young people and 58% among adults).

Figure A-5 | Distribution of religiosity levels of Yotzim (men and women), broken down by age group and gender (%)



Source: Data from the Social Survey for the years 2017-2023, Yotzim (women and men) aged 20-64.


### The percentage of religious Yotzim (men and women) is higher in the younger age group.

These findings, which show that young Yotzim are more religious, align with an analysis of the LFS data using the Dashat method for men (Figure A-6)<sup>11</sup>. Among young Yotzim (aged 25-34), 62% live in households with a religious or very religious lifestyle, compared to 28% who live in traditional or secular households. In contrast, among those aged 55-64, these proportions are 51% and 49%, respectively. In the mid-range-aged group (35-54), the percentage living in households with a religious or very religious lifestyle ranges from 56% to 64%, while 36% to 44% live in households with a traditional or secular lifestyle<sup>12</sup>.

11. Due to the methodology, which relies on data from Haredi educational institutions, the LFS data is available only for men. For further details, please refer to the online appendix.

12. Comparing the LFS data using the Dashat method (2024) with data from Regev and Gordon (2021), which are also based on LFS data, reveals a relative similarity in the distributions. However, according to the LFS data, Yotzim tend to be less religious. Specifically, Regev and Gordon report that 64% of Yotzim are religious or very religious, and 24% are traditional or secular, whereas the LFS data shows 58% and 34%, respectively (Figure A-N-2).

Figure A-6 | Distribution of the religiosity levels of male Yotzim, broken down by age group (%)



Source: LFS data for 2020-2023, Israeli-born Yotzim aged 25-64.  
 Level of religiosity - the religious lifestyle of those living in the household.  
 4%-9% of households with a mixed lifestyle (a household with more than one person who has more than one religious lifestyle) were omitted.

There are several explanations for the lower prevalence of religious households among older Yotzim. One possibility is that at later ages Yotzim tend to be less religious. Another explanation is that the characteristics of Yotzim have changed over time, meaning the difference may not necessarily reflect a change in religiosity as people age<sup>13</sup>. A thorough examination of these differences and their underlying causes would require more in-depth research.

## A-6 Age distribution by sub-groups


The age distribution of Yotzim is influenced by two trends. The first is demographic growth within Haredi society: when the exit rate remains constant, the number of individuals leaving will increase as the Haredi population grows. This trend impacts both Yotzim and HFH. The second trend affecting the age distribution of Yotzim is changes in the rates of exit.

### Yotzim, like HFH, are a relatively young group.

Figure A-7, which illustrates the age distribution across four sub-groups (Yotzim, HFH, non-Haredim, and Joiners) among individuals aged 20-54, reveals that Yotzim, like HFH, have a high proportion of young people, although the prevalence of young people is even higher among Yotzim. Approximately half (51%) of Yotzim are aged 20-29, a higher proportion than that of HFH (45%) and significantly higher than among non-Haredim (30%). On the other hand, only 16% of Yotzim are over 40, which is slightly lower than the 21% of HFH in this age group and much lower than the 41% among non-Haredim. The high percentage of young people among Haredi Jews, compared to non-Haredi Jews, is attributed to higher fertility rates. However, the relatively high proportion of young people among Yotzim, compared to HFH, aligns with data indicating an increase in exit rates.

13. In comparison to the LFS data, which examines religiosity at the household level, the larger difference may be explained by the fact that younger individuals are more likely to live in households where the primary lifestyle is more religious. In contrast, older individuals tend to live with others who share similar lifestyles.

Figure A-7 | Age distribution among 20-54 year olds (men and women) - by subgroups (%)



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).


Source: Data from the Social Survey, years 2017 - 2023, Jews (women and men) aged 20-54.

Note: The data do not add up to 100% due to rounding.

In contrast to Yotzim, Joiners tend to be older and less youthful even compared to the non-Haredi population. Like Yotzim, the age distribution among Joiners is influenced by the rates at which individuals from non-Haredi backgrounds join Haredi society, as well as demographic trends within non-Haredi populations. The low prevalence of young individuals among Joiners may suggest a decline in the rate of those joining Haredi society from non-Haredi backgrounds, if, indeed, most individuals join before the age of 25. However, an analysis of the age distribution of Joiners within the 25-54 age group reveals a notable similarity between the age distributions of Joiners and the non-Haredi population, indicating that the differences likely stem from the age at which individuals join (see Figure A-N-4 in Appendix A-1).

Comparing the age distribution by gender for individuals aged 20-64 (Figure A-8) reveals a fairly high degree of similarity between men and women across all four subgroups.

**Figure A-8 | Age distribution by gender and subgroup for individuals aged 20-64**



Values in parentheses indicate a category with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3. For more details, see the online appendix.

Source: Data from the Social Survey, years 2017-2023, for Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

The appendix also presents the age distribution of Yotzim and Joiners based on Regev and Gordon (2021), along with a comparison between the LFS data (Dashat method) and the Social Survey for men from 2017 to 2023 (Figure A-N-5). It is important to note that the sources differ in their representation of the age distribution of Yotzim and Joiners. This discrepancy arises because the LFS - which Regev and Gordon (2021) also rely on - is designed to represent the number of households in Israel rather than the number of individuals (as in the Social Survey). In our assessment, the Social Survey provides a more reliable representation of age group distribution. For more details, see the online appendix<sup>14</sup>.

14. The age distribution of Joiners, according to Social Survey data, closely aligns with the distribution based on LFS data using the Dashat method but differs significantly from the distribution reported by Regev and Gordon (2021) (Figure A-N-5). For male Yotzim, differences exist between the Social Survey data and the LFS (Dashat method), though they are smaller than the discrepancies between Regev and Gordon's findings and the Social Survey.

## A – Sources

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## A-Appendices


### Appendix A-1 Supplementary data

Figure A-N-1 | Trends in Haredi Exit Rates Over the Survey Years Among Individuals Aged 20-64, by Gender

A. The proportion of Yotzim compared to all those from a Haredi background



B. The proportion of Yotzim in relation to the non-Haredi population




Source: Data from the Social Survey for the years shown in the chart, for men and women. Data for 2023 are through October 7th.

The variable "Level of household religiosity at age 15" is unavailable in the data prior to 2007 and for the years 2013-2016. The red vertical line indicates a methodological change in the Social Survey regarding the Haredi sample (see the online appendix for details).

For data broken down by gender, see Figure A-N-1

Figure A-N-2 | Distribution of the religiosity levels of Yotzim, according to the Labor Force




Sources: Regev and Gordon analysis (2021) of data from the 2017 Labor Force Survey (Regev and Gordon, 2021) for women and men aged 20-64.

Dashat method, data from the Labor Force Survey for the years 2020 - 2023 for men aged 25-64.

Degree of religiosity - the religious lifestyle of those living in the household.

Mixed lifestyle - A household with at least two people of different religious lifestyles


Figure A-N-3 | Distribution of religiosity levels of Yotzim based on the LFS



Sources: Data from the Labor Force Survey for the years 2020-2023 Israeli-born men aged 25-64. Households with a mixed lifestyle—defined as having at least two members with different religious lifestyles—are excluded, accounting for 8% of the total (9% among young people and 7% among adults).

Degree of religiosity - the religious lifestyle of those living in the household.

Figure A-N-4 | Age distribution according to the LFS and the Social Survey, men aged 25-64 (%)




The Social Survey: Data from the Social Survey that identifies individuals with a Haredi background and current Haredim based on self-definition.

Labor Force Survey: Data from the LFS for Israeli-born individuals, identifying those with a Haredi background as graduates of Haredi yeshivas (self-reported) (Dashat, 2024) and current Haredim by self-definition.

Both sources are for men aged 25-64 for the years 2017-2023.

Figure A-N-5 | Age group distribution of Yotzim and Joiners aged 25 - 64, using three methods (%)



Sources: The Social Survey: Data from the 2017-2023 survey for women and men, identifying individuals with a Haredi background and current Haredim based on self-definition.

Labor Force Survey: Data from the 2017-2023 survey for Israeli-born men, identifying individuals with a Haredi background as graduates of Haredi yeshivas (self-reported) (Dashat, 2024) and current Haredim by self-definition.

Regev and Gordon: Analysis of LFS data for 2017 by Regev and Gordon (2021) for women and men.

## Appendix A-2 Rate of Exit from Haredi Society - Upper and Lower Range Estimation

Variations in data sources and identification methods for individuals with a Haredi background and those currently Haredi result in differing exit rate estimates. The current estimates are based on an analysis of three sources: Social Survey data, LFS data for men using the Dashat method (Deutsch, Shenfeld, and Tirosh, 2024), and the estimates presented by Regev and Gordon (2021).

The differences in findings between the sources are likely due to variations in sampling methods and group identification rather than sampling errors. While the Social Survey has a higher margin of error, the observed differences between age groups remain consistent even when data are averaged over multiple years, significantly reducing the margin of error<sup>15</sup>.

### The Social Survey

On average, for the years 2020-2023, the Social Survey reports an exit rate of 10.7% for individuals aged 20-64. Among young people (aged 20-29 or 20-34), the exit rate ranged from 11.6% to 11.8%, while among older individuals (aged 35-64), it was 9.2%.

A comparison between men and women reveals that women's exit rates are lower than men's in both age groups. Among young people, the gap between men and women ranges from 2.3 to 2.6 percentage points, while among older individuals, the gap is 1.6 percentage points.

**Table N-A-1 | Estimates of exit rates according to the social survey**

Age	Men and Women	Men	Women	Difference between Men and Women
Age 64-20	10.7	11.6	9.7	1.9
Age 29-20	11.8	13.1	10.5	2.6
Age 34-20	11.6	12.8	10.5	2.3
Age 64-35	9.2	10	8.4	1.6

Source: Social Survey data for the years 2020-2023, through October 7th, 2023.  
Rate of Yotzim amongst all those with a Haredi background (including both Yotzim and HFH).

### Exit Rates - Regev and Gordon Estimates (2021)

Regev and Gordon provided several estimates in their work, with differences arising in part from the survey year and in part from the methodology used (see Table 2-A-2).

As a primary estimate, Regev and Gordon presented exit rates for individuals aged 20-64 by gender, based on 2017 Labor Force Survey data: 13.3% overall, 13.8% for men, and 12.8% for women. These estimates reflect relatively high exit rates among adults nearing retirement age (born in the 1950s), while exit rates for young people aged 20-34 (born in the mid-1980s and later) are lower, averaging around 11.8%<sup>16</sup>. It is worth noting that based on 2018 LFS data, Regev and Gordon presented lower estimates,

15. In the Labor Force Survey, current level of religiosity is classified at the household level, whereas in the Social Survey, classification is at the individual level. Additionally, the LFS identifies an individual with a Haredi background based on self-reported yeshiva education (men only), while the Social Survey relies on self-definition.

16. For 2017, Regev and Gordon (2021) reported the following exit rates: 12.8% for those aged 20-24, 12% for those aged 25-29, and

with an overall exit rate of 11.1%. On average, for 2017-2018, the exit rate among young people was 11.5%.

Regev and Gordon presented two estimates for the exit rate among young people aged 19-25, ranging from 12.7% to 13.7%. These estimates differ based on the method used to identify Yotzim and the year of the data (see Table N-A-2). Additionally, they provided an estimate of 14.3% for 15-25-year-olds based solely on administrative data. In this estimate, a Haredi background was assigned to children of parents aged 35-49 who had graduated from Haredi education, while a non-Haredi background was assigned to graduates of non-Haredi education. Since this method identifies Haredi affiliation based on the children's education system, 35-49-year-olds without children aged 15-25 were excluded from the analysis. In other words, only parents who had children between the ages of 20 and 34 were included in the analysis (i.e., 20 years old for a 35-year-old parent and 34 years old for a 49-year-old parent). However, the likelihood of having children at such a young age is considerably lower among Yotzim. If we account for having children at older ages, this estimate of the exit rate could increase from 14.3% to as high as 17%, and potentially even 25%<sup>17</sup>.

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10.3% for those aged 30-34 (p. 29). For 2018, the reported rates were 12.7% for those aged 21-25, 10.8% for those aged 26-30, and 9.1% for those aged 31-35 (p. 35). Assuming a growth rate of 3.5%, this suggests that in 2017, the exit rate was 11.8% for those aged 20-34 and 14.8% for those aged 35-64, while in 2018, these rates were 11.1% and 11.8%, respectively.

17. According to the Social Survey data, the percentage of parents among 20-34-year-olds is 68% among HFH and 34% among Yotzim. At the age of 30-39, this rate rises to 94% and 75%, respectively.

**Table N-A-2 | Estimates of exit rates according to Regev and Gordon (2021)**

	Total	Men	Women	Identifying Haredi Back-ground	Identifying Haredi today	Year
Aged 20 - 64 <sup>a</sup>	13.3	13.8	12.8	Member of an ultra-Orthodox family as administratively defined	Self-identified	LFS 2017
Aged 19 - 25 <sup>b</sup>	12.7	14.5	10.9	Member of an ultra-Orthodox family as administratively defined	Self-identified	LFS 2019
Aged 19 - 25 <sup>c</sup>	13.7			Parents (aged 40 - 49) are graduates of Haredi education	Self-identified	LFS 2018
Aged 15 - 25 <sup>c</sup>	14.3			Parents (aged 35 - 49) are graduates of Haredi education	Graduates of non-Haredi education	Administrative 2018
Aged 20 - 34 <sup>d</sup>	11.5			Member of an ultra-Orthodox family as administratively defined	Self-identified	LFS 2017-2018
<b>Minimum young people</b>	<b>11.5</b>	<b>14.5</b>	<b>10.9</b>			
<b>Maximum young people</b>	<b>14.3</b>	<b>14.5</b>	<b>10.9</b>			

Source - Regev and Gordon (2021):

a. Figure 4 (p. 23).

b. Figure 5 (p. 25). The original presents six estimates for each year among 19-25-year-olds divided into men and women (total of 12 estimates). These data were weighted based on an assumed annual growth rate of 3.5%. The total value represents the average for both men and women.

d. Figure N-3 (p. 69).

e. Average estimate based on Figures 8 (p. 29). and 12 (p. 35). These data were weighted based on an assumed annual growth rate of 3.5%.

## Exit Rates - LFS Estimates

Exit rates based on LFS data using the Dashat method were calculated for the years 2020-2023 for individuals aged 25-54, categorized into two age groups: young men (25-34) and older men (35-54) (Table N-A-3)<sup>18</sup>. According to these estimates, the exit rate is 15% for young men and 15.5% for older men.

Since LFS data using the Dashat method is available only for men, an estimate for women and for the combined population (men and women) was calculated, assuming a gender gap in exit rates of 2 percentage points among younger individuals and 1 percentage point among older individuals<sup>19</sup>.

18. This analysis excludes data on individuals under the age of 25, since the LFS underrepresents young Haredi men (because many reside in boarding schools) and because there are limitations in identifying the religious affiliation of young people still living in their parents' homes (see Section A-2).

19. Regev and Gordon presented a 1 percentage point difference in exit rates among those aged 20-64 and a 3.9 percentage point difference among the youngest group (19-25). Beyond this, they did not provide exit rate estimates by age and gender, though the gap is likely much smaller for those aged 20-34.

The Social Survey data shows larger differences: 1.9 percentage points for those aged 20-64, 2.3 for young people, and 1.6 for older adults. Since the LFS is used to determine the upper range, an intermediate value was assumed, making this a conservative estimate for calculating the upper range.

**Table N-A-3 | Estimates of exit rates according to the Labor Force Survey using the Dashat method**

Age Group	Men	Women/Assumption	Total	Assumed Difference Between Men and Women
25-34	15.0	14.0	14.5	1
<b>35-54</b>	<b>15.5</b>	<b>14.5</b>	<b>15.0</b>	<b>1</b>
25-54	15.2	14.2	14.7	1
<b>25-34</b>	<b>15.0</b>	<b>13.0</b>	<b>14.0</b>	<b>2</b>
35-54	15.5	13.5	14.5	2
25-54	15.2	13.2	14.2	2
<b>25-54</b>	<b>15.2</b>	<b>13.6</b>	<b>14.4</b>	<b>1.6 - 2 for younger individuals, 1 for older individuals</b>

Source: LFS data for the years 2020-2023

### Calculating final values

Based on the data presented so far, the highest value derived from the LFS estimates is 14.4%, with the rate for men at 15.2% and the estimated rate for women at 13.6%. This assumes a 2-percentage-point difference between men and women among younger individuals and a 1-percentage-point difference among older people. In contrast, among younger individuals, both the maximum value (14.3%) and the minimum value (11.5%) are obtained from the Regev and Gordon estimates (Table N-A-4).








**Table N-A-4 | Summary of estimates from three sources - Social Survey, LFS Survey using the Dashat method), and Regev & Gordon (2021)**

		Men and Women	Men	Women
Total	Social Survey	10.7%	11.6%	9.7%
	LFS (Dashat method)	14.4%	15.2%	13.6%
	Regev & Gordon	13.3%	13.8%	12.8%
	<b>Lower Range</b>	<b>10.7%</b>	<b>11.6%</b>	<b>9.7%</b>
	<b>Upper Range</b>	<b>14.4%</b>	<b>15.2%</b>	<b>13.6%</b>
Younger Individuals	Social Survey	11.6%-11.8%	12.8%-13.1%	10.5%
	LFS (Dashat method)	14.0%	15.0%	13.0%
	Regev & Gordon	11.5%-14.3%	14.5%	10.9%
	<b>Lower Bound</b>	<b>11.5%</b>	<b>12.8%</b>	<b>10.5%</b>
	<b>Upper Bound</b>	<b>14.3%</b>	<b>15.0%</b>	<b>13.0%</b>

Source: Social Survey (Table 5-A-1); LFS (Dashat method): (Table 5-A-2); Regev & Gordon (Table 5-A-3)

## Chapter B: Characteristics

Those who leave Haredi society are a heterogeneous group in terms of their characteristics: they come from different Haredi communities, they leave for different reasons, and do so at different stages of life. To the extent that they can be considered a single group, their defining commonality is the transition from Haredi society to general society. As internal immigrants, they often find themselves in an intermediate position between the two worlds—Haredi and non-Haredi.





## B. Characteristics of Yotzim

### Groups and Data Sources

#### Groups

The analysis groups are categorized based on current affiliation (whether they are currently Haredi or not) and past affiliation (whether they come from a Haredi background or not).

#### Subgroups

Yotzim (formerly Haredi): Those with a Haredi background who are not currently Haredi - short for those who have left the Haredi community.

HFH - Haredi from home: Those with a Haredi background who are currently Haredi - short for those from a Haredi home.

Joiners ("Became Haredim"): Those with a non-Haredi background who are currently Haredi - short for those who have joined the Haredi community.

Non-Haredi: Those with a non-Haredi background who are not currently Haredi - short for non-Haredi Jews.

#### Data sources and identification methods (\*)

**The Central Bureau of Statistics Social Survey** for the years 2007-2012 and 2017-2023, Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.

Identification of a Haredi background: raised (at age 15) in a Haredi family by self-definition (this variable is not available in data before 2007 and in the years 2013-2016); Identification of Haredi today: by self-definition.

**The Central Bureau of Statistics' Labor Force Survey (LFS)** for the years 2020-2023, Jewish men born in Israel aged 25-64.

Identification of a Haredi background: graduate of a Haredi yeshiva through self-reporting (Dashat method);

Identification of Haredi today: Haredi by self-definition (household level).

(\*) For more on the data sources, see the online appendix.

## B-1 Introduction

People leaving Haredi society come from diverse backgrounds: they come from different groups within the community, and they left it for different reasons and at different stages of life. If they can be treated as a single group, the common characteristic for all of them is migration from Haredi society to mainstream society. As internal immigrants, they occupy an intermediate position between these two worlds, reflecting a blend of characteristics from both.

This chapter explores this diversity by comparing the fundamental traits of men and women who leave Haredi society with those who are Haredi from home ("HFH") and non-Haredi Jews ("Non-Haredi"). It examines their areas of residence, country of origin, and family status, as well as their participation in military or civilian service, with gender-based breakdowns. Additionally, this chapter presents data on levels of education, also broken down by gender, with further sub-analyses conducted specifically for men.

Most of the analyses in this chapter are based on data from the Social Survey, covering both men and women. However, for men's education data, the analysis also incorporates information from the Labor Force Survey (LFS) using the Dashat method (2024). The larger sample size in the LFS enables more in-depth analyses, but it only allows for the identification of men who have left Haredi society (according to the Dashat method).

Across all topics, data on those who leave Haredi society is presented in comparison to three other sub-groups: Haredim from home (HFH, individuals raised in a Haredi household), Joiners (those who have joined Haredi society), and non-Haredim (non-Haredi Jews). In some cases, the data is further segmented by age group and gender.

Section B-2 explores the residential distribution of Yotzim, including regional migration patterns and country of origin. Section B-3 examines their family status, and Section B-4 presents data on participation in national and military service. The box in this chapter highlights trends in military and reserve service, as well as participation in military units designed specifically for the Haredi population, including an analysis of the proportion of Yotzim among all individuals with a Haredi background currently serving in the army. Finally, Section B-5 provides insights into higher education, presenting key indicators and comparative analyses by gender.

## B-2 Areas of Residence


Many Haredim live in segregated areas with a distinct Haredi character, typically in neighborhoods within cities that have a high concentration of Haredi residents, or in cities where the majority of the population is Haredi, with a significant portion residing in Jerusalem. This residential pattern sets them apart from non-Haredi Jews, who primarily live in the Tel Aviv and central districts. Yotzim are a group that migrated from Haredi society to mainstream society, so concentrations of this group may be found in these two geographic areas: much like HFH, many Yotzim live in Jerusalem, while others, following a pattern similar to that of non-Haredi Jews, are concentrated in the central regions.

## B-2.1 Residential Districts

### A high concentration of Yotzim live in the Jerusalem district.

Like Non-Haredi Jews and HFH, approximately two-thirds of Yotzim reside in three main administrative districts in Israel: the Jerusalem District (which includes the cities of Jerusalem and Beit Shemesh, and the surrounding areas); the Tel Aviv District (covering central cities from Herzliya to Holon, including Bnei Brak), and the Central District (encompassing cities such as Petah Tikva, Rehovot, Lod, Elad, Modi'in, and Kfar Saba)<sup>20</sup>. The key difference between these groups lies in the proportion of residents in the Jerusalem District. Around 35% of HFH and 24% of Yotzim live there, compared to just 7% of non-Haredi Jews (Figure 1). Conversely, approximately one quarter (22%) of Yotzim and a third (32%) of non-Haredi Jews live in the central regions, whereas only about 10% of HFH reside in these areas. The Tel Aviv District, which includes Bnei Brak, is home to 22% of HFH, 21% of non-Haredi Jews and 15% of Yotzim.

Figure B-1 | Distribution of residential districts, broken down by sub-groups (%)



The values in parentheses indicate categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for further details, see the online appendix).

Source: Social Survey data for 2017-2023, Jews (both women and men) aged 20-64.


For data on additional groups and by gender, refer to Table B-1.

Note: The percentages may not total 100% due to rounding.

Since Yotzim were born in areas with a large concentration of Haredim, one might expect a significant migration between regions over time. It is reasonable to assume that a large proportion would live in Jerusalem at a young age, with the number of Yotzim in Jerusalem decreasing as they age. However, the data did not show any notable differences in the residential districts between younger Yotzim (aged 20-34) and older Yotzim (aged 35-64) (Figure B-2). In both age groups, slightly more than a third reside in the Tel Aviv and Central districts (37%-39%), while around a quarter live in the Jerusalem district (22%-24%).

20. A comparison between the LFS data and the Social Survey data reveals a similar picture (see Figure B-N-2 in the appendix).

Figure B-2 | Distribution of residential districts of Yotzim, broken down by age (%)



The values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for further details, see the online appendix).


Source: Social Survey data for 2017-2023, covering individuals aged 20-64 (both women and men).

## The percentage of Yotzim in the Tel Aviv and Central districts increases with age.

Despite the overall similarity in residential districts between these two age groups, a more detailed analysis reveals a trend of migration from the Jerusalem district to the Tel Aviv and

Central districts. However, given the relatively small number of observations in this analysis, further in-depth research is needed to better understand this phenomenon.

Figure B-3 | Percentage of Yotzim (women and men) living in the Jerusalem District and the Tel Aviv and Central Districts, broken down by age groups



The values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3. If no value is provided, the sampling error exceeds 0.3 (for further details, see the online appendix).

Source: Social Survey data for 2017-2023, Yotzim (women and men) aged 20-64.


## B-2.2 Seniority within the locality and the apartment

### Yotzim do not frequently move between localities, similar to non-Haredim.

Like other subgroups, Yotzim tend to stay in their current locality, with about 60% having lived in their locality for over a decade (Figure B-4).

The similarity between the residential areas of young Yotzim and Yotzim as a whole is also evident in the findings on movement between localities.


**Figure B-4 | Percentage of people (women and men) who have lived in the same locality for more than a decade, broken down by age group**



Source: Social Survey data for the years 2017-2023, Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.

Another analysis showed that more than a quarter of Yotzim aged 20-34 (26%) have lived in their current apartment for over a decade (Figure B-5). This is lower than the rate for those aged 35-54 (37%) and for non-Haredi individuals in these age groups (36%). This lower rate may be due to the fact that Yotzim can no longer live in their parents' home, as doing so would require them to maintain a Haredi lifestyle.

**Figure B-5 | Percentage of people living in the same apartment for more than a decade, broken down by age group**




The values in parentheses indicate categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more information, see the online appendix).

Source: Social Survey data for 2017-2023, Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.

## B-2.3 Country of Origin

Yotzim are similar to HFH in that about 90% of them were born in Israel, which is higher than the 77%-78% rate among non-Haredim and Joiners. While it has been suggested that exit rates from Haredi society are significantly higher among those born abroad (Horowitz, 2018), these data do not support that claim.

**Figure B-6 | Percentage of native-born Israelis**




Source: Social Survey data for the years 2017-2023, Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.

## B-3 Family Status

### The family characteristics of Yotzim are generally similar to those of non-Haredim.

Yotzim transition from a society in which it is customary to marry and have children at a young age, to one where the marriage age increases over time and the number of children tends to decrease. The data reveal that most Yotzim leave Haredi society at a young age and adopt the marriage and family norms of non-Haredi society (Figure B-7). About a quarter of Yotzim are single, which is similar to the non-Haredi population and significantly higher than the rate of singles among the Haredim. Despite the similarity within the unmarried groups, there may be differences between the groups of married individuals. For example, 55% of Yotzim are married, slightly less than the 67% of non-Haredi individuals, and much lower than the high marriage rates among the Haredim (94% among HFH and 89% among Joiners).

**Figure B-7 | Rate of non-singles (currently and formerly married) among 25-64 year olds**



Values in parentheses indicate a category with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).


Source: Social Survey data from 2017-2023, Jews (men and women) aged 25-64.

For data on additional groups and a breakdown by age group, see Table B-2.

Divorced or Widowed: Includes those who are separated.

These rates are influenced by the fact that those who leave tend to be younger on average (see Chapter A). An age-group analysis reveals that the percentage of non-singles (married, divorced, separated, or widowed) among Yotzim is higher than among non-Haredim in the younger age group (25-34), at 59% compared to 49%. In the older age group (35-64), the rates are nearly identical (91% vs. 90%) (Figure B-8a). However, despite this similarity, the percentage of divorced individuals among those leaving is higher in both age groups, possibly due to leaving after marriage and divorce.

Figure B-8 | Rate of non-singles (currently and formerly married) according to age and gender



Values in parentheses indicate a category with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).

Source: Social Survey data from 2017-2023, Jews (men and women) aged 25-64.


Divorced or Widowed: Includes those who are separated.

As shown in Figure B-8, the percentage of non-single individuals (married or divorced) among male Yotzim is lower than among non-Haredi men, whereas among female Yotzim (the feminine form of Yotzim in Hebrew), the rate is similar to that of Non-Haredi women. However, despite this similarity, the percentage of divorced female Yotzim is higher than among Non-Haredi women. As noted earlier, since Yotzim tend to be younger, adjusting for age reveals an even greater underlying gap. Possible explanations for this phenomenon are explored in Chapter 5. However, due to the small sample size, further research is needed.



The similarity between Yotzim and non-Haredim in all aspects of family status is also evident in an examination of the data on Yotzim based on their current level of religiosity (Figure B-9). The percentage of singles among religious Yotzim (79%) is relatively close to that of religious (non-Haredi) Jews (84%) and lower than that of HFH (96%) (Figure B-7 above).


**Figure B-9 | Rate of singles (currently and formerly married) among Yotzim and non-Haredim, broken down by current religiosity**



Source: Social Survey data for the years 2017-2023, Jews (women and men) aged 25-64.  
Divorced or widowed: Includes separated.

When comparing the subgroups, the proportion of parents with children is similar between Yotzim and non-Haredim (Figure B-10).

**Figure B-10 | Percentages of parents of children (women and men)**



Source: Social Survey data for the years 2017-2023, Jews (women and men) aged 25-64.  
For data broken down by gender and additional groups, see Table B-2.


## B-4 Military Service

**58% of male Yotzim served in the IDF – compared to 8% of Haredi men.**

In Haredi society, from which Yotzim originate, there is strong opposition to military service for both men and women. In contrast, in non-Haredi

society, military service is not only considered a national necessity and a significant milestone in the lives of young Israelis but is also often seen as a gateway into Israeli society, particularly for those on the social periphery. This desire for integration is reflected in the enlistment rates of male Yotzim (Figure B-11): 58% served in the IDF, a rate lower than in non-Haredi society (88%) but significantly higher than among HFH (8%). As expected, the enlistment rate among Joiners is also high, at 68%.

Figure B-11 | Percentage of men serving in the IDF or performing national service




Missing value - sampling error exceeds 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).  
Source: Social Survey data (2017-2023), Jewish men aged 20-64.  
For data on additional groups, see Table B-3.

**62% of male Yotzim and 28% of female Yotzot served in the IDF or performed national service**

Among women (Figure B-12), the proportion of female Yotzot who served in the IDF is relatively low. When combined with the percentage of women who performed national service, the total percentage of women who participated in military or national service reaches 28% (these

figures should be interpreted with caution due to a relatively high sampling error). The low conscription rate is primarily due to the exemption granted on religious basis to women who attended Haredi schools, as well as the broader reality that military service for women is not accepted in Haredi society.

Figure B-12 | Percentage of women serving in the IDF or performing national service



Values in parentheses indicate a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3. A missing value signifies a sampling error exceeding 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).


Source: Social Survey data (2017-2023), Jewish women aged 20-64.

For data on additional groups, see Table B-3.

## Box B-1: Military service tracks among men from a Haredi background

According to data from the CBS Social Survey, the annual IDF enlistment rate of men from a Haredi background is low, standing at approximately 12% among younger age groups. However, enlistment rates vary between the two subgroups that make up this population: among HFH, the rate is less than 10%, whereas among Yotzim, it reaches approximately 60% (Figure B-1).


**Figure T-B-1 | Rate of service in the IDF among men from an ultra-Orthodox background - by group and age**



Source: Social Survey data for the years 2017-2023, men from a Haredi background (Yotzim and HFH), aged 20-64. Haredi background and current religious status were identified through self-definition, while military service was determined by self-reporting.

An analysis by Deutsch and Shenfeld (2023) of the Social Survey data found that among younger age groups (20-29), Yotzim account for 60%-70% of all IDF enlistees from a Haredi background (Yotzim and HFH) (Figure T-B-2).<sup>21</sup>

**Figure T-B-2 | Proportion of Yotzim among all service members from an ultra-Orthodox background, by age group**




Source: Adapted from Deutsch and Shenfeld (2023) based on Social Survey data (2017-2021) for men aged 20-54 from a Haredi background (including both Yotzim and HFH). Haredi background and current religious status were identified through self-definition, while military service was determined by self-reporting.

21. The range reflects future enlistment at older ages among HFH

## Rate of military reservists

A similar pattern emerges when examining the proportion of Yotzim among all reservists from a Haredi background. A rough estimate of the weekly average reserve service rate among individuals aged 25-44<sup>22</sup> suggests that in the fourth quarter of 2023, during the Iron Swords War, the rate was approximately 13.4% among non-Haredim and 7.7% among Yotzim, compared to about 1% among Joiners and HFH.

**Figure T-B-3 | Rate of Military Reserve Service, October-December 2023, Men Aged 25-44**



Source: Data from the LFS, 2023, Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-44.

Haredi background identification is based on self-reported attendance at a Haredi yeshiva and current self-identification as Haredi. Reserve service refers to individuals who cited "reserve duty" as the reason for absence from work, reduced work hours, or not actively seeking employment.

## Percentage of individuals serving in designated Haredi IDF tracks versus general (undesigned) IDF tracks


According to several reports from the IDF over the years, approximately half of those with a Haredi background serve in designated tracks for the ultra-Orthodox, which require participants to maintain a Haredi lifestyle (Almasi, 2018; Kaplan and Deutsch, 2024). These tracks include both combat roles, such as service in the Netzach Yehuda Battalion and the Chetz Company in the Paratroopers Brigade, as well as technological programs, like the "Bina B'Yarok" program in the Intelligence Corps and the "Shahar Kahol" program in the Air Force, specifically designed for married Haredi men, or for Haredi men aged 21-26.

However, these reports often include individuals with a Haredi background who attended institutions not officially recognized as Haredi according to the legal definition. The IDF distinguishes between graduates of Haredi education recognized by law and those classified under broader definitions<sup>23</sup>. An analysis of data from a 2024 query to the IDF (IDF, 2024) (Figure T-B-5) reveals that the majority of individuals with a Haredi background, recognized as graduates of legally defined Haredi education, serve in tracks designated for the Haredi community. Only about one-third (37%) of them serve in general IDF tracks (not designated for Haredim), compared to 78%-92% of those categorized as graduates of Haredi education under broader definitions. The lower rate of service among those in the broader category in designated Haredi tracks supports the hypothesis that they have a weaker connection to Haredi society.

22. "Served in the reserves" refers to an individual citing "reserve duty" as the reason for absence from work, working fewer hours than usual, or not actively seeking employment. It's important to note that a student who participates in reserve duty but is not working due to their studies may not report reserve duty as the primary reason for not working, which may lead to an underreporting of reserve duty.

23. Legal definition: "Graduates of Haredi educational institutions" refers to individuals aged 14-18 who studied for at least two years at an educational institution classified administratively as a "unique cultural institution" for Haredim or at Haredi institutions included in an order by the Minister of Defense. An intermediate definition: graduates of Haredi institutions recommended by the IDF for inclusion in the Minister of Defense's reports. Broad definition: Graduates of education under Haredi supervision who do not fall under the two previous definitions (IDF, 2024).

**Figure T-B-4 | The proportion of men from a Haredi background serving in general IDF tracks, by definition type (2020–2021)**




Source: IDF response to queries within the framework of the High Court of Justice Recruitment Law (IDF, 2024).

Definition of the law: Those who have studied for at least two years at a Haredi institution defined as a "unique cultural institution" in accordance with the law or who appear in the order of the Minister of Defense; Intermediate definition: graduates of Haredi institutions that were recommended to the Minister of Defense and are not included in the "legal definition" group; Broad definition: graduates of institutions under Haredi supervision who are not included in the two previous groups.

When examining trends over time, IDF data from recent years has been inconsistent, making it unclear whether there is a definitive increase in the rate of men from a Haredi background serving in IDF general tracks that are not designated for Haredim: In 2020–2021, approximately 37% served in such tracks, while in 2022, the rate surged to 49%. However, this sharp increase appears to be an anomaly compared to data from previous years.<sup>24</sup>

**Figure T-B-5 | Percentage of men from a Haredi background who serve in general IDF tracks (non-designated)**



Source: IDF response to queries within the framework of the High Court of Justice Recruitment Law (IDF, 2024).


Legal definition: Individuals who have studied for at least two years at a Haredi institution classified as a "unique cultural institution" under the law or who are listed in the Minister of Defense's order. Intermediate definition: Graduates of Haredi institutions recommended to the Minister of Defense but not included in the "legal definition" category.

24. These findings join IDF data obtained from the query submitted to the IDF by Out for Change (Kaplan and Deutsch, 2024), which indicates that between 2019 and 2021, the proportion of individuals with a Haredi background (according to the broad definition) serving in IDF general tracks increased from 48% to 55%. However, this data also shows an increase in 2021, which contrasts with the IDF data provided in response to the request made under the Freedom of Information Act (IDF, 2024). The discrepancies between these two sources remain unexplained.

According to these data, if 60%-70% of all individuals with a Haredi background who enlist in the IDF are Yotzim, and until 2021, 40% of those with an ultra-Orthodox background served in general IDF tracks, then even if all those in general IDF tracks are Yotzim, 20%-30% of those with an Haredi background are still Yotzim serving in tracks specifically designated for the ultra-Orthodox.

These findings align with the results of a 2024 survey conducted by Out for Change regarding the integration of Yotzim into military service (hereinafter the "integration survey"; for more details, see the online appendix). Approximately half of the survey respondents (49%) reported serving in designated Haredi tracks (N=348). The rate was higher among those who enlisted before leaving Haredi society (62%) and lower among those who enlisted afterward (about 40%) (Figure T-B-6a). This indicates that even among Yotzim who enlisted after leaving the community, approximately 40% still served in tracks designated for Haredim. One possible explanation for this trend is the age of enlistment (Figure T-B-6b).

**Figure T-B-6 | Percentage of those serving in designated tracks for Haredim, according to time of exit and enlistment into the IDF (Integration survey)**



Source: Integration Survey, an online survey distributed by Out for Change in March-April 2024 among Yotzim (those from a Haredi background who are not currently Haredi, by self-definition). This includes men aged 18 and over who reported that they did military service (N=348).

Because there are designated tracks for Haredim who enlist at a relatively older age—offering opportunities to join technological units and acquire a profession during service (for example, according to the official policy of the Shachar track, this program accepts men who have completed Haredi education and are at least 21 years old (IDF, 2023)) - Yotzim enlisting at an older age may be more inclined to choose these specialized tracks.

## B-5 Higher Education

**Among both men and women, the percentage of individuals with academic degrees is relatively low, both among Yotzim and Haredim.**

Yotzim and HFH are graduates of an education system in which core subjects are rarely taught. In the yeshiva ketana, where most men attended high school, the curriculum is exclusively focused on religious studies, with no instruction in subjects like math or English<sup>25</sup>.

Unlike men, most girls in the Haredi education system study core subjects almost fully. However, their eligibility rate for a matriculation certificate remains significantly lower than that of graduates from the state education system. Most students take external exams, such as the matriculation or Szold exams, to a limited extent and receive a Szold certificate, which the Ministry of Education recognizes as equivalent to 11 units (for more details, see Chapter 5)<sup>26</sup>. After high school, the majority continue to grades 13-14 (seminary) for post-secondary certifications such as a teacher's certificate or engineering certificate from Mahat (the Governmental Training of Certified Practical Engineers and Technicians). Overall, data indicate that the percentage of academic degree holders among Yotzim – men and women – is very low compared to non-Haredi populations and closer to that of HFH.

### B-5.1 Highest certificate among women


A comparison of the education levels among women in the four subgroups (Figure B-13) reveals differences between those with an academic degree and those with other qualifications. The proportion of women with an academic degree is similar among both Yotzim and female HFH (30% vs. 31%). However, when it comes to higher post-secondary certificates (from either academic institutions or post-secondary institutions), 68% of female HFH reported holding such a certificate, compared to approximately 46% of Yotzim.

25. In 2020, only 14% of 12th grade boys in Haredi-supervised education took at least one matriculation exam, and just 4% met the requirements for a matriculation certificate, compared to 94% and 79%, respectively, in state education. The actual rates may be even lower, as some 12th grade boys in Haredi education are not registered with the State Ministry of Education (Cahaner & Malach, 2023).

26. Szold certificates are awarded based on external exams administered by the Henrietta Szold Institute at the Beit Yaakov Seminaries. The exact percentage of girls eligible for these certificates is unknown, but it is likely that a significant proportion of all girls who graduate from Haredi education receive them. Among graduates of Haredi education, 69% have taken at least one matriculation exam, but only 25% are eligible for a full matriculation certificate, compared to 89% of graduates from state education (Cahaner & Malach, 2023).



**Figure B-13 | Distribution of highest educational qualification among women aged 25-64 (%)**



Values in parentheses indicate a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3. For more details, see the online appendix.

Source: Social Survey data (2017-2023), Jewish women aged 25-64.

For data on additional groups and a breakdown by age group, refer to Table 4.

Note: The data may not add up to 100% due to rounding.


In addition, among HFH women, the percentage of those with a matriculation certificate as their highest qualification (7%) is lower than that among Yotzot (26%). This gap may be due to a combination of factors, including a higher rate of Yotzot among graduates of Haredi schools who attempt to complete a full matriculation, and a higher rate of Yotzot who leave Haredi educational institutions before finishing their seminary studies (grades 13-14), which typically lead to a vocational certificate. As a result, for many Yotzot, the matriculation certificate is the highest qualification, either from studies in a high school that offers matriculation exams or through completion after leaving the Haredi system. Chapter 5 presents data suggesting that a significant number of Yotzot likely leave before completing their seminary studies, which contributes to a lower rate of post-secondary certificates among them compared to HFH women, who have a higher rate of post-secondary certifications.

## B-5.2 Highest certificates among men

In contrast to the data on women, which are only available from the Social Survey, the data on education for men are derived from both the Social Survey and the LFS (Figure 14). The findings from both sources present a relatively similar picture: Yotzim have significantly lower levels of education compared to non-Haredi men but higher levels than HFH men: about 57% of Yotzim do not hold a post-secondary certificate, compared to approximately 80% of HFH men and about 25% of non-Haredi men.

Accordingly, the proportion of Yotzim who attain an academic degree is lower than among non-Haredi men (40%-42%) but higher than among HFH men (8%). However, there is a discrepancy between the sources: the LFS estimates that 12% of Yotzim have an academic degree, while the Social Survey estimates this figure at 21%. Notably, the LFS data indicate a higher rate of individuals with a high school diploma compared to the Social Survey. Despite these differences, the combined rate of individuals with either a high school diploma or an academic degree is quite similar between the two sources—31% according to the LFS and 32% according to the Social Survey.

Figure B-14 | Distribution of highest educational qualification of men aged 25-64, according to two methods (%)



Values in parentheses indicate a category with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).

**Sources:** **Social Survey** - data from the Social Survey (2017-2023), identifying those from Haredi backgrounds and current Haredim based on self-definition; **LFS** - data from the LFS (2020-2023) on Jews born in Israel, identifying those from a Haredi background based on self-reported studies in a Haredi yeshiva and current Haredi status by self-definition.


For data on additional groups, see Table B-5.  
Percentages may not total 100% due to rounding.

A comparison of academic degree holders by age group, based on LFS data (Figure B-15a), shows that after age 30, approximately 15% of Yotzim hold an academic degree, compared to 5%-12% of HFH. When including individuals currently pursuing an academic degree (Figure B-15b)<sup>27</sup>, the percentage rises to 23% among male Yotzim aged 30-34.

This rate exceeds the percentage of academic degree holders in older age groups, which may suggest one of two possibilities: either a growing number of graduates are pursuing higher education, or there is a high dropout rate among Yotzim who enroll. In either case, it is important to note that this elevated rate is observed in a single age group (30-34), and further data are needed to confirm these findings.

27. The academic studies stage is defined as individuals who, in the labor force survey, reported both being currently enrolled in studies and that their most recent educational institution offers programs leading to an academic degree.

Figure B-15 | Men with an academic degree - broken down by age group



Source: 2020-2023 LFS data, Israeli-born Jewish men aged 25-64.

Students - those who reported that they are currently studying and also reported that their most recent educational institution was an institution leading to an academic degree.

## B – Tables

The following tables provide expanded data on the four subgroups discussed in the chapter: **Yotzim (formerly Haredi)** -those with a Haredi background who are no longer Haredi; **Haredi from home (HFH)** - those from a Haredi background who remained Haredi; **Joiners ("became Haredi")** - individuals with a non-Haredi background who have become Haredi; **Non-Haredim** - those from a non-Haredi background who are not currently Haredi.

Additionally, the tables include data for two broader analytical groups based on past and current affiliation:

- **All those with a Haredi background** (combining "HFH" and "Yotzim")
- **All those who are Haredi today** (combining "HFH" and "Joiners")

Values for the group "All non-Haredi today" (which includes "Non-Haredim" and "Joiners") are not presented, as they closely resemble those of the "Non-Haredi" group.

**Table B-1 | District of residence, broken down by gender and age group (%)**

	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with Haredi backgrounds	All those who are currently Haredi
<b>Men and Women</b>						
Tel Aviv	32	22	10	23	11	13
Central	21	15	22	18	22	21
Jerusalem	7	24	35	22	34	32
Haifa and the north	22	17	7	15	8	9
The south	15	12	11	16	11	12
Judea and Samaria	4	(10)	15	7	14	13
<b>Men</b>						
Tel Aviv and Central	52	37	32	43	32	35
Jerusalem	7	25	35	20	34	31
Haifa and the north	22	(16)	8	16	9	10
The south	15	(13)	10	16	10	12
Judea and Samaria	4	(10)	15	(6)	14	13
<b>Women</b>						
Tel Aviv and Central	53	38	33	38	33	34
Jerusalem	7	(22)	35	24	34	32
Haifa and the north	22	(18)	7	15	8	8
The south	15	(12)	11	16	11	12
Judea and Samaria	4	(10)	14	(8)	14	13
<b>Men and women aged 20 - 34</b>						
Tel Aviv and Central	51	37	32	38	32	33
Jerusalem	8	24	34	20	33	32
Haifa and the north	21	19	9	18	10	10
The south	16	(11)	11	16	11	12
Judea and Samaria	5	(9)	14	(7)	14	13

Values in parentheses indicate a category with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3(see the online appendix for details).  
Source: Social Survey data (2017-2023) for individuals aged 20-64.

**Table B-2 | Family status, broken down by gender, ages 25-64 (%)**

	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with Haredi backgrounds	All those who are currently Haredi
<b>Men and Women</b>						
Married	67	55	94	89	90	93
Single	21	27	4	5	6	5
Parents	77	69	93	91	90	92
<b>Men</b>						
Married	67	54	93	87	89	91
Single	24	34	5	(7)	8	5
Fathers	72	59	92	89	88	91
<b>Women</b>						
Married	67	57	95	92	91	94
Single	17	17	(4)	(3)	5	4
Mothers	81	81	94	94	93	94

Values in parentheses indicate a category with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (see the online appendix for more details). Source: Social Survey data (2017-2023).

**Table B-3 | Military or national service, broken down by gender and age group (%)**

	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with a Haredi background	All those who are currently Haredi
<b>Men and Women</b>						
Military service	76	37	4	49	7	15
National Service	7	(10)	3	9	4	4
Total military or national service	83	47	7	58	11	19
<b>Men</b>						
Military service	88	58	8	68	13	23
National Service	1	5<	5	2<	5	4
Total military or national service	88	62	12	69	18	27
<b>Women</b>						
Military service	64	(11)	1<	26	(1)	6
National Service	13	(18)	(1)	19	(3)	5
Total military or national service	77	28	(1)	45	4	11
<b>Ages 20-34 (men and women)</b>						
Military service	80	37	3	44	7	8
National Service	10	(11)	3	(11)	4	4
Total military or national service	91	48	5	54	10	12

Values in parentheses indicate a category where the relative sampling error ranges from 0.15 to 0.3. If no value is shown, the sampling error exceeds 0.3 (see the online appendix for details). Source: Social Survey data (2017-2023) for individuals aged 20-64.

**Table B-4 | Breakdown of highest diploma received - women aged 25 - 64 (%)**

	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with a Haredi background	All those who are currently Haredi
Up to completion of high school	19	(28)	25	25	26	25
Matriculation certificate	19	(26)	7	21	9	11
Post-secondary certificate	12	(16)	37	18	35	32
Academic degree	51	30	31	36	31	32

**Table B-5 | Breakdown of highest diploma received, men aged 25 - 64, according to data sources**

	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with a Haredi background	All those who are currently Haredi
<b>Social Survey<sup>1</sup></b>						
Up to completion of high school	26	57	81	46	78	70
Matriculation	18	(11)	4	21	5	10
Post-secondary and other	15	(12)	7	14	8	9
Academic degree	40	(21)	8	19	9	11
<b>Labor Force Survey<sup>2</sup></b>						
Up to completion of high school	24	57	77	55	74	72
Matriculation certificate	22	19	5	18	7	8
Post-secondary certificate	12	12	10	13	10	11
Academic degree	42	12	8	14	9	9

Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3.

Sources:

1. Social Survey data (2017-2023), identifying Haredi background and current Haredi status based on self-definition.
2. LFS data (2020-2023) for Israeli-born men, identifying Haredi background through self-reported studies in a Haredi yeshiva and current Haredi status based on self-definition.

**Table B-6 | Percentages of academic degree holders - men, divided by age group**

Age Group	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with a Haredi background	All those who are currently Haredi
<b>Those with an academic degree</b>						
25-29	23	5<	(2)	5<	(2)	(2)
30-34	49	(15)	(5)	(13)	6	6
35-44	51	(13)	12	20	12	14
45-54	46	(16)	11	15	12	12
25-29	42	12	8	14	9	9
<b>Students or those with an academic degree</b>						
25-29	47	(11)	(4)	(7)	5	5
30-34	52	(23)	7	(13)	9	8
35-44	52	(15)	13	21	13	15
45-54	46	(17)	11	16	12	12
25-29	46	16	9	15	10	11

Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3.)

Source: LFS data (2020-2023) for Israeli-born men.

Student: An individual who reported being currently enrolled in studies and indicated that their most recent educational institution was one leading to an academic degree.



## B – Sources

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
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## B – Appendices

### Appendix B-1: Supplementary data

Figure B-N-1 | Districts of residence of Yotzim (women and men) divided by age groups, according to two data sources (%)



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3.  
(For more details, see the online appendix.)

**Sources:** **Social Survey:** Data from 2017-2023 (men and women), identifying Haredi background and current Haredi status based on self-definition; **LFS:** Data from 2020-2023 (Israeli-born men), identifying Haredi background through self-reported studies in a Haredi yeshiva and current Haredi status based on self-definition.

## Chapter C: Employment among men


Male Yotzim are similar to non-Haredi men in all aspects of employment that are within their control, adopting the norms prevalent in the non-Haredi job market. Their labor supply is high and only slightly lower than that of non-Haredi men, as reflected in their strong labor force participation and high work scope over time. However, in terms of occupation, they remain more similar to HFH. Both Yotzim and HFH are graduates of Haredi yeshivas and, due to the absence of core studies, face educational gaps and a lack of essential skills—primarily in English and mathematics—needed to integrate into higher-quality employment.

Employment rate  
in 2023\*

52% of HFH

88% of non-Haredim

\*without the 4th quarter



**82%–88%**

of Yotzim  
work full-time

HFH – 62% – 64%

Non-Haredim 85% – 92%

### Unemployment rate

Yotzim – increases with age

year-olds: 5.4%–34 – 25




35 – 64-year-olds: **6.1%**

Non-Haredim – decreases with age

year-olds: 5.3%–34 – 25

35 – 64-year-olds: **3.1%**



**37%** of Yotzim  
interested  
in working in  
high-tech prefer an  
academic education  
Current Haredim – 19%


**58%**  
of Yotzim  
work in  
low-skill jobs



Yotzim comprise

**15%**

of all those with a  
Haredi background



**22%**

of all  
employees  
from a Haredi  
background

**26%**

of weekly work  
hours of people  
from a Haredi  
background

**29%**

of jobseekers  
from a Haredi  
background



**23%**

of academics  
from a Haredi  
background



## C. Men's Employment

### Groups and Data Sources

#### Groups

The analysis groups are classified based on current affiliation (currently Haredi or not) versus past affiliation (whether they are from a Haredi background or not).

#### Subgroups

**Yotzim (formerly Haredi):** Those with a Haredi background who are not currently Haredi - short for those who have left the Haredi community.

**Haredi from home (HFH):** Those with a Haredi background who are currently Haredi - short for those from a Haredi home.

**Joiners ("Became haredim"):** Those with a non-Haredi background who are currently Haredi - short for those who have joined the Haredi community.

**Non-Haredi:** Those with a non-Haredi background who are not currently Haredi - short for Jews who are not Haredi.

#### Data sources and identification methods (\*)

**Labor Force Survey (LFS)** Conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics - 2020-2023, Jewish men born in Israel aged 25-64.

**Haredi background identification:** Based on self-reported graduation from a Haredi yeshiva (Dashat method); **Currently Haredi identification:** Determined by self-definition at the household level.

(\*) For more details on data sources, see the online appendix.

## C-1 Introduction

This chapter presents representative and comparative data on employment indicators among individuals from Haredi society (former Haredim) and other groups. It examines trends in labor force participation and occupational fields, and provides an in-depth analysis of employment patterns among those with a Haredi background.

While the employment rate of Haredi women has already met the government's 2030 target and is comparable to that of non-Haredi Jewish women, the employment rate of Haredi men remains significantly below the government target<sup>28</sup>. Additionally, Haredi Jewish men are more likely to work part-time compared to non-Haredi Jewish men. The low employment rate among Haredi men, as well as the quality of their employment—reflected in factors such as weekly working hours and salary levels—can be attributed to both cultural differences and educational gaps (see Section B-5).

Yotzim, having been educated within the same system, also contend with educational gaps, particularly in the first years after leaving. This makes it especially important to analyze their employment characteristics. Although there is a lack of studies examining the employment patterns of both male and female Yotzim, data limitations necessitated reliance on the Labor Force Survey (LFS) conducted by the CBS for employment analysis, and therefore this report focuses exclusively on men (as noted, the LFS data, using the Dashat method (2024), allows only for the identification of men with a Haredi background, based on their yeshiva education).

This chapter presents employment data for male Yotzim, in comparison to three other subgroups: HFH (those raised in a Haredi household who are currently Haredi), Joiners (those who were not raised Haredi but have joined the Haredi community), and Non-Haredim. The findings indicate that Yotzim closely resemble Non-Haredim in all aspects under their control and generally adopt labor market norms prevalent among non-Haredi society. Overall, their labor indicators are high—only slightly lower than that of non-Haredi Jews— as reflected in their strong labor force participation and weekly working hours. However, male Yotzim also have notably high unemployment rates. Additionally, Yotzim tend to have lower levels of education and employee productivity, which is evident in their limited integration into high-skilled professions.

Section C-2 presents labor force integration indicators: rates of participation in the labor force, employment rates, unemployment levels, and weekly working hours. Section C-3 examines the primary fields of occupation among Yotzim, including academic professions and roles in scientific and high-tech sectors. Section C-4 analyzes the proportion of Yotzim in the workforce amongst all individuals with a Haredi background (Yotzim and HFH). Box C-1 provides insights into the demand for training programs aimed at helping Yotzim integrate into the high-tech industry.

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28. Pursuant to Government Decision 198, the government target is 65% for Haredi men and 81% for Haredi women, aged 25-66 (the 36th Government, 2021). In the first half of 2024, the updated employment rate for women who are currently Haredi was 80.1% and 82.4% for women who are not currently Haredi. The employment rate was 53.9% among men who are currently Haredi and 86.8% among men who are currently not Haredi (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2024).

## C-2 Labor force integration indicators

This section presents manpower data by examining labor force participation rates, employment and unemployment levels, and weekly working hours among employed individuals. The analysis is divided into four subgroups: non-Haredi, Yotzim, HFH, and Joiners. Additionally, the appendix provides supplementary tables for the broader categories of all individuals with a Haredi background and those who are currently Haredi.

### C-2.1 Employment rate

Labor market integration was assessed using two common indicators: **the employment rate and the labor force participation rate**. The employment rate reflects only those who are currently employed, while the labor force participation rate also includes individuals actively seeking work (for definitions, see Appendix C-2). First, trends in these indicators are analyzed over the years 2016-2023, followed by a comparison of these figures across two age groups, based on the average for 2020-2023.

**The employment rate of Yotzim is approximately 78%, compared to 89% among non-Haredim and 52% among HFH.**


As seen in Figure C-1A, the employment rate remained relatively stable throughout the period, with minor declines during the COVID-19 years (2020-2021). In 2023, there was an increase in employment among HFH individuals and a sharp rise among Joiners. Employment rates were highest among non-Haredim (approximately 88%)

and Yotzim (ranging from 77% to 81%). Among Yotzim, the employment rate declined in 2023, but only when the fourth quarter (Q4), impacted by the Iron Swords war, was included; otherwise, it remained stable. It is unclear from the data whether the decline in the employment rate of Yotzim in 2023 was directly caused by the war or if it resulted from a sampling error due to the sample size of this group<sup>29</sup>.

In comparison, employment rates among Haredim remain significantly lower than those of non-Haredim and Yotzim. By 2022, the employment rate among HFH ranged from 47% to 51%, while among Joiners, it stood at 60%-61%, with only a slight dip during the COVID-19 years. Over time, the gap between these two groups has remained consistent at 10-12 percentage points.

29. The war may have impacted labor demand in industries that employ a high number of Yotzim, similar to the rise in unemployment rates among Yotzim during the COVID-19 period (see Deutsch, Shenfeld, and Tirosh, 2024). Another possibility is that Yotzim who served in the military reserves had lower response rates to the LFS. Since employment calculations exclude those actively serving, a higher employment rate among reservists would result in a greater number being omitted from the data, thereby skewing the overall employment rate downward.

Table C-1 | Employment integration trends over time



The data within the square represents an estimate for the first three quarters of 2023, excluding the fourth quarter.

Source: LFS data (2016-2023) for Jewish men born in Israel, aged 25-64.

For additional demographic groups and a breakdown by age, see Table C-1.


In 2023, employment increased only among the two Haredi groups - the employment rate among Joiners saw a sharp rise of 6.2 percentage points (from 61.1% to 67.3%), while among HFH, it grew more modestly by 1.6 percentage points (from 50.7% to 52.3%). As a result, the gap between the employment rates of these two groups widened to 15 percentage points, surpassing the previous peak of 13 percentage points recorded in 2018.

**Yotzim enter the labor market at a relatively young age, and HFH at a relatively older age.**

As shown in Figure C-1b, trends in labor force participation rates closely mirror those observed in employment rates. An analysis of employment integration, divided into young adults (ages 25-34) and older adults (ages 35-64) (Figure C-2), reveals that young Haredim enter the labor market at even lower rates than their older counterparts, despite already low participation among older Haredim.

For example, among young Haredim, labor force participation and employment rates are 41-45 percentage points lower than those of non-Haredim, while among older Haredim, the gap narrows slightly to approximately 31 percentage points.

Figure C-2 | Employment integration by age group



Source: LFS data for 2020-2023, Jewish men born in Israel, ages 25-64.  
See Table C-2 for data on additional groups and by age group, see Table C-2.

The gap at a young age is due to the late entry of Haredim into the labor market, even among those who eventually join the workforce. In contrast to Non-Haredim and Yotzim, who have similar employment rates among younger and older adults, HFH have a labor force participation rate of 44% among young people, which is 17 percentage points lower than the 61% rate among older adults.


## C-2.2 Unemployment (job seekers)

A jobseeker is an unemployed person who has actively looked for work in the four weeks preceding the survey. Individuals in this group are interested in joining the labor market and are willing to invest effort to do so. The **unemployment rate** is typically calculated as the percentage of jobseekers among all labor force participants (both employed persons and jobseekers). This metric reflects the proportion of those who wish to work but are unable to integrate into the labor market (for more details, see Appendix C-2).

Given the low labor force participation rate among Haredi men, however, comparing their unemployment rate to that of other groups does not provide a complete picture, since their low participation rate increases the unemployment rate. To offer a more comprehensive picture, we also analyze **the rate of jobseekers as a share of the total population** (including both labor force participants and non-participants) and examine **the percentage of individuals within the entire population who have given up looking for work** (Figure C-3).



**Figure C-3 | Unemployment rates over time – comparison of unemployment indicators (displayed as a moving average, %)**



Source: LFS data for 2016-2023, Jewish men born in Israel, ages 25-64.  
 For definitions, see Appendix C-1.

**From 2021-2023, the unemployment rate decreased in all groups except Yotzim where it remained high.**

As shown in Figure C-3, over time, the highest unemployment rates are among Yotzim, particularly when measured as a share of the total population rather than just among labor force participants<sup>30</sup>.

Unemployment rates have also declined across all groups except for Yotzim, who have experienced a slight increase. In 2022-2023, the unemployment rate among Yotzim was 6.2%, compared to 2.9% among Non-Haredim and 3.4%-3.6% among those who are currently Haredi<sup>31</sup>.

**The rate of job seekers within the total population is highest among Yotzim, highlighting their significant potential for improved employment.**

The rate of job seekers within the population also declined across all groups except for Yotzim, where it remained at approxi-

30. Among Joiners, the unemployment rate fluctuates over time, with some years showing a higher rate in the labor force than Yotzim and other years a lower one.

31. These data differ from the data published in the 2023 "The Data is Out" report (Deutsch and Shenfeld, 2023), which reported higher unemployment levels in 2021-2022. The reason for the difference is the change in the age group, which this year was expanded to include 25-64 year-olds (compared to 25-54 year-olds in the previous year).


mately 5% in 2022-2023, compared to 2.7% among Non-Haredim and approximately 2% among those who are currently Haredi (both groups). This finding highlights that while the employment rate among Yotzim is significantly higher than that of Haredim, their potential for further improvement is still higher, as long as the willingness of Haredim to participate in the work force does not increase.

### Unemployment levels among older Yotzim are relatively high compared to all sub-groups.

An age-based analysis of these indicators reveals that among Yotzim, unemployment levels are higher among older adults, whereas among non-Haredim, they are higher among younger people. Since young adulthood is typically the stage of entry into the labor market, a higher proportion

of job seekers—and consequently higher unemployment rates—is expected in this group. In contrast, the elevated unemployment rate among older Yotzim suggests challenges in integrating into the labor force.

Figure C-4 | Unemployment rate, by age group




Source: Labor Force Survey data for 2020-2023, Jewish men born in Israel, ages 25-64.  
For data for additional groups and by age group, see Table C-2.

It is important to note that the estimates for Yotzim and Joiners are more susceptible to sampling errors due to the relatively small number of observations in these groups. However, the data align with previous trends, showing consistently high unemployment rates among Yotzim. Moreover, their reintegration into the labor market tends to be slower following periods of unemployment, as seen in the slow recovery of their employment rates following the COVID-19 pandemic.

### C-2.3 Full-time and part-time employment

The job scope of employed individuals was assessed by analyzing their average weekly working hours and the percentage of employed persons who typically work full-time. Full-time employment was defined in two ways: according to the CBS standard (35 or more hours per week) and the OECD standard (30 or more hours per week). For detailed definitions, see Appendix C-1.

Figure C-5 | Average working hours over time




Source: Labor Force Survey data for 2016-2023, Jewish men born in Israel, ages 25-64.  
Average working hours are measured among those actively employed.

### Yotzim have similar weekly work hours to non-Haredim, which are higher than Haredim

In general, Yotzim work slightly fewer hours than Non-Haredim but more than Haredim (Figure C-5). On average, Yotzim work 40-42 hours per week, which is slightly less than the average of 43-44 hours per week among Non-Haredim. The rate for Haredim is currently lower, with HFH working 34-35 hours per week and Joiners working about 37 hours per week on average (throughout most of the period).

An analysis of the differences by age group for the years 2020-2023 reveals that, on average, working hours are similar across both age groups, with the older age group tending to work slightly more hours (Figure C-6). For Non-Haredim, the average is three hours higher in the older age group, for Yotzim it is two hours higher, and for Haredim (both groups), it is one hour higher.


Figure C-6 | Average working hours per week by age group



Source: Labor Force survey data for the years 2020-2023, Jewish men born in Israel aged 25-64 who were actually employed. For data for additional groups and a breakdown by age group, see Table C-3.

An analysis of the rate of full-time employment (Figure C-7) reveals relatively low full-time worker rates among those who are currently Haredi, particularly HFH. While 82%-85% of young Yotzim and non-Haredi individuals work 35 hours or more per week (full-time according to the CBS definition), only 62% of HFH and 67% of Joiners work full-time. Among older adults across all groups, the full-time employment rates are 6-7 percentage points higher than those of young people, except for HFH, where the full-time worker rate is similar for both younger and older adults.

Figure C-7 | Rate of full-time employment, by age group



Source: Labor Force survey data for 2020-2023, Jewish men born in Israel aged 25-64 who were employed. For data for additional groups and a breakdown by age group, see Table C-3.  
Full-time work: Employed generally according to the OECD definition - at least 30 hours; according to the CBS definition - at least 35 hours.

## C-3 Occupations

This section presents data on the occupational fields of Yotzim compared to other groups, covering both job roles and economic sectors<sup>32</sup>. It begins with a general overview of employment by skill level, followed by a detailed breakdown of professions based on required skill levels, and concludes with an analysis of employment rates across economic sectors, including the high-tech industry<sup>33</sup>.

The data indicate that a significant proportion of Yotzim work as manual laborers and drivers, and in general in occupations that do not require academic or professional training. The percentage of Yotzim employed in professions requiring academic or professional training is similar to that of HFH, however Yotzim are more likely to work in technology and science, whereas HFH are more commonly employed in teaching and law. Among non-Haredim, employment in science and technology is particularly prominent.

### C-3.1 Skill levels of employees


**More than half of Yotzim work in low-skill professions associated with low wages, compared to about a third of HFH and Non-Haredim.**

In the first stage, occupations were classified into four levels based on the skill required for the job (see Appendix C-2). However, since a significant proportion of Haredim (23%, compared to just 4% among Yotzim and non-Haredim) work in teaching—a profession categorized as a high-level academic occupation (even though

teaching in a yeshiva does not require academic training)—this level was further divided into two subcategories: Level 4 - excluding teaching and Level 4 - teaching only.

A comparison of occupations by skill level (Figure C-8) reveals that 58% of Yotzim and 48% of Joiners were employed in professions classified within the two lower skill levels, whereas this was true for only 33% of HFH and 35% of all Non-Haredim.

**Figure C-8 | Distribution of employed individuals based on skill level required for the profession (%)**



**Source:** Labor Force Survey data for 2020-2023, Jewish men born in Israel, aged 25-64, who were employed in the two years preceding the survey and reported an occupation.

32. Data is also included for individuals who were not employed at the time of the survey but had worked within the two years prior and reported their occupational fields. This approach provides a more accurate reflection of occupational distribution, even during periods of employment decline, such as the COVID-19 years.

33. For a list of economic sectors and industries classified as high-tech, see Tables C-N-1 and C-N-2 in Appendix C-2.

The proportion of Yotzim employed in high-skill professions (excluding teaching) is 20%, comparable to that of HFH (22%) but significantly lower than that of non-Haredim (42%).


The data also indicate a correlation between employment in high-skill professions and education (Figure C-9). Among non-Haredim, approximately 40% work in high-skill occupations—a proportion closely aligned with the share of those holding an academic degree. In contrast, only about 20% of Yotzim are employed in such professions, while the percentage of those with an academic degree ranges from 10% to 15%. Among HFH, 21%-26% work in high-skill occupations, though only 7%-12% hold an academic degree.

**Only about a fifth of Yotzim and HFH are employed in high-skilled positions other than teaching, compared to about 40% among non-Haredim.**

Both Yotzim and HFH are graduates of Haredi yeshivas, where the absence of core studies creates educational gaps, particularly in English and mathematics,

that hinder their ability to enter high-tech fields. These gaps likely contribute to their lower participation in higher education and in professions requiring advanced skills.

**Figure C-9 | Proportion of people with an academic degree and employed at a high skill level - by age group**



**Source:** Labor Force Survey data for 2020-2023, Jewish men born in Israel aged 25-64.

The proportion of highly skilled employees is calculated based on individuals who were employed in the two years prior to the survey and reported their occupation.

**Definition of occupation with high-level skills:** Employment in managerial roles (excluding hospitality) or academic professions (excluding teaching).


### C-3.2 Academic and liberal professions, and professional occupations

Beyond educational differences, the groups also vary in the types of professions they work in, both at higher and lower skill levels. Among HFH, 22% of those employed in high-skill professions work in law and social sciences—a slightly higher proportion than among Joiners (15%) and significantly higher than among Yotzim (9%) and non-Haredim (8%).

In contrast, the opposite is true for representation in the science and technology professions: about 24% of employed non-Haredim work in these fields, compared to only 9% of both Yotzim and Joiners, and just 4% of HFH.

Among those working in high-skill professions outside of teaching and management, nearly half of non-Haredim and about a third of Yotzim are employed in science and technology, compared to about one quarter of Joiners and only an eighth of HFH.

**Figure C-10 | Employed in academic and liberal professions, by age groups (%)**




**Source:** Labor Force Survey data for 2020-2023, Jewish men born in Israel aged 25-64 who were employed in the two years prior to the survey and reported their occupation. The data represent a combination of individuals employed in academic professions (Level 4) and those working as engineers, technicians, and related fields (Level 3). For detailed breakdowns and additional groups, see Table C-4. Minor discrepancies in totals are due to rounding.

Regarding employment in lower-level jobs, nearly 60% of Yotzim work in professions that fall within the two lowest tiers, which paid a lower average wage (in 2021, the average salary in these jobs was less than NIS 10,000 per month). This is significantly higher than the percentage of HFH and non-Haredim in these roles (33%-36% in both groups). These professions are primarily divided into three categories: craftsmen (manual labor), drivers (including mobile machine operators), and basic office positions (including salespeople).

Approximately a quarter (24%) of Yotzim work as craftsmen, compared to just 10% of HFH and 13% of non-Haredim. The percentage of Yotzim employed as drivers (and machine operators) is also notably high (12%), whereas the share is much lower among HFH (3%) and slightly higher among non-Haredim and Joiners (both at 7%). In contrast, employment rates in sales and office work show little variation across the groups.

Figure C-11 | Employed as professional workers, by age group (%)



Source: Labor Force Survey data for 2020-2023, Jewish men born in Israel aged 25-64 who were employed in the two years preceding the survey and reported an occupation.  
The discrepancy between the numbers and Table C-4 is due to rounding of figures.

In summary, a relatively high percentage of Yotzim work as craftsmen, manual laborers, and drivers, as well as in professions that do not require academic or professional training. Among the Haredim in general and among the HFH in particular, employment in teaching and law is prominent. These employment patterns differ from those of non-Haredim, who are more prominently represented in science and technology-related professions. (For a more detailed breakdown of occupations and economic sectors, see Tables C-4 and C-5 below).

### C-3.3 Work in tech

The level of integration of Yotzim into high-tech businesses and professions (for definitions, see Appendix C-1) is low compared to non-Haredim but higher than that of HFH.

**Among Yotzim, the rate of those employed in high-tech is lower than the rate among non-Haredim and slightly higher than the rate among Haredim.**


As shown in Figure C-12, between 2020 and 2023, only 8.4% of Yotzim were employed in high-tech-related occupations—a significantly lower rate than among non-Haredim (21.3%), but relatively close to that of Joiners (7.3%) and notably higher than HFH (3.1%)<sup>34</sup>. Additionally,

the share of Yotzim working in high-tech economic sectors closely mirrors their share in high-tech occupations, in contrast to other groups, where the share is slightly lower.

34. These data differ from those published in The Data is Out 2022 (Deutsch [ed.], 2022), which suggested that the integration levels of Yotzim were similar to those of HFH. While there may have been an actual increase in the share of Yotzim employed in high-tech, it is likely that part of the discrepancy between the periods stems from statistical errors or the misclassification of older individuals within the population of Yotzim (see also the online appendix).




Figure C-12 | Rate of employment in high-tech occupations and sector



Source: Labor Force Survey data for the years 2020-2023, Jewish men born in Israel aged 25-64 who were employed in the two years preceding the survey and reported an occupation - according to the Economic Sector and Occupation Index. For data for additional groups and broken down by age group, see Table C-6.

The rate of employment in high-tech fields is higher among young people - among Yotzim, the rate among 25-34-year-olds was 10.3% compared to 7% among older adults, while among HFH it was 4.6% among young people compared to 2.2% among older adults. The rate among non-Haredim is also higher among young people (25.9% compared to 19.7%).

Figure C-13 | Rate of employment in high-tech occupations, by age groups



Source: Labor Force Survey data for 2020-2023, Jewish men born in Israel aged 25-64 who were employed in the two years preceding the survey and reported an occupation. For data for additional groups, see Table C-6.

In conclusion, the share of Yotzim employed in high-tech fields is higher than that estimated by the Labor Force Survey in previous years, with a sharper increase observed among Yotzim compared to HFH. While some of this change may be due to sampling errors, the consistent rise across all age groups suggests that the increase among Yotzim is genuine. However, the data indicates that the overall rate of individuals pursuing academic careers is similar in both groups. A closer look at common professions reveals that among HFH, most academic job seekers and those undergoing extensive training choose the field of law, while relatively few enter professions in science and technology. This trend helps explain the comparable rates of academic career pursuit in both groups.

Since all those from a Haredi background - Yotzim and HFH - share similar gaps in core education, which pose a barrier to integration in the high-tech sector, additional factors likely contribute to the lower representation of HFH in scientific and technological professions. One possible explanation is differences in weekly working hours: Yotzim tend to work longer hours, which may facilitate their entry into these fields.

## Box C-1 The demand for high-tech training among Yotzim and Haredim today<sup>35</sup>

Adar Anisman and Zvika Deutsch

### Background

Male Yotzim are employed in high-tech professions at a higher rate than the general Haredi population, but at a lower rate than non-Haredim. Specifically, 9% of young male Yotzim are employed in high-tech occupations, compared to 6% of current Haredim and 26% of non-Haredim (Table C-6). The gap between the rate of Yotzim and Haredim employed in high-tech, despite gaps in knowledge and skills, may suggest a high demand for these professions among Yotzim, while the gap between Yotzim and non-Haredim highlights the challenges of integration due to various barriers.

This study presents data about the awareness of and demand for employment-integration services and programs among Yotzim, compared to Haredim today. These insights will help assess the potential for Yotzim to join high-quality employment integration programs in general, and specifically in high-tech professions.

### Demand for integration into high-tech


The data presented in this chapter show high employment rates among Yotzim, and higher rates of integration into high-tech professions compared to current Haredim. In addition, updated data also reveal high unemployment rates and a significant portion of Yotzim working in low-skill professions, such as manual labor and driving. These findings raise an important question: What benefit can Yotzim gain from employment programs in general, and from programs designed to facilitate integration into quality employment in particular?

The survey conducted by the National Initiative for the Integration of Haredim in High-Tech (referred to as the "Integration of Haredim in High-Tech" survey) explored the demand for services such as vocational training, continuing education, career counseling, scholarships, and workshops among current Haredim and Yotzim. Among the Yotzim who responded, approximately 72% of both men and women are either currently studying or interested in pursuing education. In contrast, among current Haredi respondents, there is a noticeable difference between men and women: most men (64%) are either currently studying or interested in studying, similar to Yotzim, while most women (76%) are either seeking work or already employed (Figure 3-T-1).

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35. Data analysis was conducted by Shneior Shprintsin and Shani Kaplan. The authors thank Avigdor Rabinowitz for providing the data used in this study.


**Figure C-T-1 | Integration status in high-tech - by gender and population group (%)**



Source: Analysis by the research department of Out for Change, based on a survey conducted by the Askaria company in 2022 for the National Initiative for the Integration of Haredim in High-Tech. The study examined responses from 2,778 current Haredim and 368 Yotzim, both men and women. Yotzim were self-identified (as formerly Haredim).

Overall, Yotzim (men and women) make up approximately one fifth (18%) of all survey respondents who expressed interest in studying or are currently pursuing studies (Figure 3-T-2), a rate higher than their share of the population<sup>36</sup>. These findings indicate that even in programs primarily designed for Haredim, there is significant interest among Yotzim as well.

**Figure C-T-2 | Proportion of Yotzim among those with a Haredi affiliation who are studying or interested in studying - by gender.**




Source: Analysis by the research department of Out for Change, based on a survey conducted by the Askaria company in 2022 for the National Initiative for the Integration of Haredim in High-Tech. The study examined responses from 2,778 current Haredim and 368 Yotzim, both men and women. Yotzim were self-identified (as formerly Haredim).  
Those with a Haredi affiliation - currently Haredi (HFH and Joiners) or Yotzim

36. The rate of Yotzim amongst those with Haredi affiliation (HFH, Joiners and Yotzim) is 10%-12%.

When asked about their preferred training tracks for entering the high-tech sector (Figure C-T-3), respondents (both men and women) showed similar preferences, with one key exception: academic studies. Among Yotzim, 37% expressed interest in pursuing academic education, compared to just 19% of current Haredim. The relatively low interest in academic studies among current Haredim aligns with previous findings, which indicate that among Haredi men employed in high-tech, approximately two-thirds lack a matriculation certificate and an academic degree, and about 80% do not hold an academic degree (Axelrad et al., 2021).

**Figure C-T-3 | Preferred training tracks in the high-tech field (men and women) - by population groups**




Source: Analysis by the research department of Out for Change, based on a survey conducted by the Askaria company in 2022 for the National Initiative for the Integration of Haredim in High-Tech. The analysis included 690 current Haredim and 186 Yotzim, both men and women, interested in academic studies. Yotzim self-identified (as formerly Haredim).  
 Long-term intensive training: Intensive training lasting more than six months that does not permit work during the period of study.

Academic studies in high-tech fields are more demanding and challenging than fast-track training programs or engineering certificates, particularly due to the absence of core studies. However, they offer better opportunities for securing higher-quality employment in the industry.

These differences were also reflected among survey respondents (men and women) who have studied or are currently studying high-tech-related fields. Among Yotzim, 58% chose an academic program as their pathway into high-tech—twice the rate of current Haredim, only 30% of whom pursued this option. These consistent differences suggest that highly motivated Yotzim, both men and women, seek to enter tracks that lead to quality employment, even when they are more demanding.

Aligned with their aspirations to pursue academic studies, Yotzim also demonstrated a greater awareness of the educational gaps stemming from their lack of basic skills (Figure C-T-4). A higher proportion (51%) cited these gaps as a concern before beginning their studies, compared to 32% of current Haredim.


**Figure C-T-4 | Concerns of those interested (women and men) in high-tech studies**



Source: Analysis by the research department of Out for Change, based on a survey conducted by the Askaria company in 2022 for the National Initiative for the Integration of Haredim in High-Tech. The analysis included 690 current Haredim and 186 Yotzim, both men and women, who expressed interest in academic studies. Yotzim self-identified (as formerly Haredim).

The data also reveal that a smaller percentage of Yotzim, women and men, turned to employment programs (44%) compared to current Haredi women and men (61%). The rates of those who turned to holistic employment centers are significantly lower among Yotzim than among their currently Haredi counterparts (14% vs. 42%). However, the application rates for programs focused on distributing study scholarships (such as the Kemach Fund and the Yedidut Toronto Foundation), are relatively similar between the two groups.

**Figure C-T-5 | Rate of applicants to employment programs (men and women) - by population group**



Source: Analysis by the research department of Out for Change, based on a survey conducted by the Askaria company in 2022 for the National Initiative for the Integration of Haredim in High-Tech. The analysis included 2,766 current Haredim and 366 Yotzim, both men and women. Yotzim self-identified (as formerly Haredim). Kamatech - A center to help Haredim integrate into high-tech offering short training courses, workshops, lectures, and career guidance.

One possible explanation for this trend lies in the nature of the holistic employment centers. These centers are designed to accommodate Haredi society in various ways, including their physical location, the types of services they offer, and the community outreach events they host. As a result, they are not well-suited for Yotzim, who no longer belong to the Haredi community. In contrast, programs that do not incorporate community-based elements, such as scholarship funds, are suitable for Yotzim, which explains why the application rate for these programs is higher among Yotzim and comparable to that of current Haredi men and women.

It is important to note that until 2022, the Kemach Foundation managed the higher education scholarship program for graduates of Haredi education on behalf of the Council for Higher Education, and was therefore obligated to provide services to Yotzim as well (Avgar, 2018). In contrast, the scholarship offered by the Yedidut Toronto Foundation, (the "Haredim in Academia" program), was a private initiative specifically intended for Haredim. Despite this distinction, no significant difference was found in the application rates between Yotzim who applied to the Kemach Foundation and those who applied to the Yedidut Toronto Foundation.


## C-4 Rate of Yotzim within the labor force of all men from a Haredi background

Section C-2 presented data comparing the labor market integration of male Yotzim, over time, with that of non-Haredi men and HFH. The findings indicate that in all aspects under their control—employment rates, job search, and weekly working hours—Yotzim resemble non-Haredi men more closely than HFH. These findings have two key indirect implications. First, Yotzim contribute to higher overall employment rates among men with a Haredi background, that is, graduates of Haredi yeshivas. Second, their representation in the labor force and their overall labor input exceed their proportion within this group.

**Yotzim make up a quarter of the workforce of men from a Haredi background, even though they only account for about 15% of this group.**

This section provides a direct calculation of the relative share of Yotzim in the labor force among men from a Haredi background aged 25-54 (Figure C-14)<sup>37</sup>. The analysis reveals that although Yotzim comprise only 15% of this population, they account for 22% of all employed men from a Haredi background and 29% of all Haredi men actively seeking work. When factoring in working hours, Yotzim contribute 25% of the total labor input of men with a Haredi background and make up approximately 23% of all academics from a Haredi background.

Figure C-14 | Labor market integration indicators among men from a Haredi background - ages 25-54



Source: Labor Force Survey data for 2020-2023, Jewish men born in Israel, ages 25 - 54.

Among Joiners, the proportion within the overall Haredi population today (21%) is relatively similar to the share of Haredi men in the workforce (24% among those employed and 28% among job seekers). However, their representation is higher among those with an academic degree (33%).

37. In this analysis, which relates to the ratio between Haredim and Yotzim, a limited group of 25-54 year olds was used, because the ratio of Yotzim among those aged 54-64 is relatively high, and the reason for this is not sufficiently clear.



## C – Tables

The following tables provide expanded data on the four subgroups discussed in the chapter: **Yotzim (former Haredim)** - individuals with a Haredi background who are no longer Haredi; **HFH (Haredim from home)** - individuals with a Haredi background who remain Haredi; **Joiners (“became Haredi”)** - individuals with a non-Haredi background who have become Haredi; **Non-Haredi** - individuals with a non-Haredi background who are not currently Haredi.

Additionally, data are presented for two broader analytical groups based on past and present affiliation:

- **All those with a Haredi background** (HFH and Yotzim)
- **All Haredim today** (HFH and Joiners)

The tables do not include values for the group of **all non-Haredim today** (non-Haredi and Yotzim) because their data closely resemble those of the non-Haredi group.

**Table C-1 | Rate of Employment**

Year	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with a Haredi background	Currently Haredi
2016	87	77	48	60	55	52
2017	88	77	48	60	54	51
2018	88	82	47	60	54	51
2019	88	81	50	61	55	53
2020	87	81	50	59	55	52
2021	86	77	49	57	53	51
2022	88	78	51	61	55	53
2023	88	77	52	67	56	56

Labor Force Survey data for the years 2016-2023, Jewish men born in Israel, ages 25-64.

**Table C-2 | Employment rate, by age groups (%)**

	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with a Haredi background	Currently Haredi
<b>Ages 25 - 34</b>						
Participation in the labor force	89.1	84.6	43.7	52.5	49.9	45.2
Employment	84.4	80.1	41.4	49.3	47.2	42.7
Unemployment (from the labor force)	5.3	5.4	5.3	6.1	5.3	5.5
Job seekers (from the populations)	4.7	4.5	2.3	3.2	2.7	2.5
Jobs seekers or discouraged (from the population)	5	4.8	2.6	3.7	3	2.8
<b>Ages 35 - 64</b>						
Participation in the labor force	91.5	81.8	60.7	70	64.3	63.2
Employment	88.7	76.8	58.3	66.6	61.4	60.5
Unemployment (from the labor force)	3.1	6.1	4.1	4.9	4.5	4.3
Job seekers (from the populations)	2.8	5	2.5	3.4	2.9	2.7
Jobs seekers or discouraged (from the population)	3	5.5	2.8	3.7	3.3	3.1
<b>Ages 25 - 64</b>						
Participation in the labor force	90.9	83	52.9	64.5	57.8	55.5
Employment	87.5	78.2	50.5	61.1	55	52.9
Unemployment (from the labor force)	3.7	5.8	4.6	5.2	4.8	4.7
Job seekers (from the populations)	3.3	4.8	2.4	3.4	2.8	2.6
Jobs seekers or discouraged (from the population)	3.5	5.2	2.7	3.7	3.1	3

Labor Force Survey data for the years 2020-2023, Jewish men born in Israel, ages 25-64.

**Table C-3 | Job scope by age groups**

	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with a Haredi background	Currently Haredi
<b>Ages 25 - 34</b>						
Average work hours	41.4	40.1	33.4	36.3	35.1	34
30 hrs/week or more (%)	87.8	86.1	68.4	74.7	72.8	69.6
35 hrs/week or more (%)	85.2	82.3	62	67	67.2	63
<b>Ages 35 - 64</b>						
Average work hours	43.9	42.2	34.3	37.1	36.1	35.2
30 hrs/week or more (%)	94.2	91.5	70.4	77.2	74.7	72.4
35 hrs/week or more (%)	92.3	88	63.7	72.9	68.9	66.4
<b>Ages 25 - 64</b>						
Average work hours	43.3	41.3	34	36.9	35.7	34.7
30 hrs/week or more (%)	92.5	89.1	69.6	76.5	74	71.4
35 hrs/week or more (%)	90.4	85.5	63.1	71.4	68.2	65.3

Labor Force Survey data for 2020-2023, Jewish men born in Israel, ages 25-64.  
 Average working hours - average weekly working hours in the last week among those actually employed.  
 Worked 35/30 hours - proportion of those employed who usually work 35/30 hours per week.

**Table C-4 | Breakdown by professions - 2020-2023**

	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with a Haredi background	Currently Haredi
<b>Managers</b>	<b>14.4</b>	<b>10.7</b>	<b>7.7</b>	<b>8.4</b>	<b>8.3</b>	<b>7.8</b>
Of which:						
Legislators, officials and senior managers	2.8	2>	(1.2)	(1.6)	(1.2)	(1.3)
General managers <sup>1</sup>	9.4	(6.5)	4.5	(5.1)	5	4.7
Managers in hospitality, commerce and services	2.3	(3)	(1.9)	(1.7)	2.1	1.8
<b>Academic professionals</b>	<b>33.8</b>	<b>15.5</b>	<b>39.6</b>	<b>26.2</b>	<b>34.3</b>	<b>36.2</b>
Including:						
Information and communication technologies <sup>2</sup>	19.3	(5.6)	3.1	(5.6)	3.7	3.8
Teaching	3.6	(3.5)	23	9.5	18.8	19.5
Business, administration and other	5.6	2>	(1.6)	(3.1)	(1.5)	2
Legal, social and cultural	5.3	(5)	11.9	8	10.4	10.9
<b>Practical engineers, technicians, etc.</b>	<b>16.2</b>	<b>15.4</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>17.4</b>	<b>18.2</b>	<b>18.6</b>
Including:						
Information and communication Technologies <sup>2</sup>	5.6	(3.4)	(1.5)	(3.4)	1.9	2
Business, administration and other	8.2	8.4	7.9	7.1	8	7.7
Legal, social and cultural	2.4	(3.5)	9.7	6.9	8.3	8.9
<b>Clerical and office workers</b>	<b>4.4</b>	<b>7.1</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7.7</b>	<b>6.3</b>	<b>6.5</b>
<b>Service and sales people</b>	<b>11.5</b>	<b>15.5</b>	<b>13.9</b>	<b>15.3</b>	<b>14.2</b>	<b>14.2</b>
Including:						
Personal service workers	4.6	7.5	8.5	9.3	8.3	8.7
Sales people	3.6	(4.5)	4.9	4.8	4.8	4.9
Security	3.4	(3.5)	1>	2>	(1.1)	(1)
<b>Professionals</b>	<b>10.8</b>	<b>18.4</b>	<b>7.1</b>	<b>13.3</b>	<b>9.6</b>	<b>8.7</b>
Including:						
Agriculture and other laborers	2.8	(4.2)	2.8	(4.5)	3.1	3.2
Construction and related trades (other than electricians)	2.9	(5.7)	2.9	(3.6)	3.5	3.1
Steel, machinery and other Related trades	2.5	(4.2)	1>	(2.7)	(1.2)	(1)
Electrical and electronics	2.6	(4.3)	(1)	(2.5)	1.8	(1.4)
<b>Plant and machine operators and drivers</b>	<b>6.8</b>	<b>12.1</b>	<b>3.3</b>	<b>6.9</b>	<b>5.2</b>	<b>4.2</b>
<b>Non-professional workers</b>	<b>2.2</b>	<b>(5.3)</b>	<b>3.3</b>	<b>4.9</b>	<b>3.8</b>	<b>3.7</b>

Values in parentheses indicate a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3. Missing values indicate a sampling error greater than 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix). Labor Force Survey data for 2020-2023, Jewish men born in Israel aged 25-64.

1. Includes administrative, sales, marketing, development, production, and professional services managers.

2. Also includes science, engineering, and health.

**Table C-5 | Breakdown of economic sectors of the employed - 2020-2023**

	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with a Haredi background	Currently Haredi
Industry <sup>1</sup>	16.6	12.7	8	10.1	9	8.5
Construction	6.4	12.1	4	7.7	5.8	5
Retail and vehicle repair	11.8	17.8	11.5	11.5	12.9	11.5
Transportation, storage and courier services	6.1	7.7	4.1	6.7	4.9	4.8
Hospitality and food services	3.6	(4.1)	3.3	(2.8)	3.4	3.1
Information and communication	12.7	(6.7)	3	(4.4)	3.8	3.4
Finance and real estate	5.5	(3.5)	3.1	(3.5)	3.2	3.2
Professional scientific and technical services	11.1	(4.3)	3.4	6.7	3.6	4.2
Administrative and support services	3.9	(5.8)	(2)	6.1	2.9	3.1
Local and public administration	8.5	7.8	2.7	(5)	3.8	3.3
Education	5.6	7.4	36.1	17.7	29.8	31.4
Health, welfare and relief ser- vices	4	(3.7)	8.5	(5.8)	7.4	7.8
Other	4.3	(6.6)	10.2	12.1	9.4	10.7

Values in parentheses indicate a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more details, see the online appendix).

Labor Force Survey data for 2020-2023, Jewish men born in Israel, aged 25-64.

1. Includes agriculture, mining and quarrying, manufacturing and foundries, electricity, and water supply.

**Table 3-6 | Rate of employment in the high-tech sector by age group - 2020-2023**

Age	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with a Haredi background	Currently Haredi
<b>Tech industries</b>						
34-25	21.6	10.3	3.1	3.8	4.8	3.2
44-30	22.7	9.3	2.5	6.2	3.7	3.3
35-64	17.5	7.9	1.3	5.0	2.7	2.4
25-64	18.6	9.0	2.0	4.7	3.5	2.7
<b>Tech occupations</b>						
34-25	25.9	10.3	4.6	6.9	5.9	5.0
44-30	26.0	9.0	4.1	10.9	5.0	5.6
35-64	19.7	7.0	2.2	7.5	3.2	3.7
25-64	21.3	8.4	3.1	7.3	4.3	4.2
Labor Force Survey data for the years 2020-2023, Jewish men born in Israel, ages 25-64.						

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## C – Appendices

### Appendix C-1: Glossary of Employment Terms

#### 1. Labor force participant: employed or actively seeking work.

**1.1. Employed:** an individual who worked at least one hour in the week preceding the survey or was temporarily absent from work.

**1.1.1. Actively employed:** worked at least one hour in the week before the survey.

**1.1.2. Temporarily absent from work:** Temporarily absent due to illness, vacation, reserve duty, a reduction in work hours, a labor dispute, or a temporary work interruption (up to 30 days). Individuals absent for up to a month or up to a year with a guaranteed return to the same employer are still considered employed.

#### 1.2. Job seeker (Unemployed)

A person who did not work but actively sought employment in the four weeks preceding the survey and is available and willing to begin working if offered a suitable job.

#### 2. Not participating in the labor force

**2.1. Discouraged Job Seeker:** A person who searched for work within the past year but not in the past four weeks, believing they would not find a suitable job in their field or location. Despite this, they are still available and willing to work if offered a suitable position.

#### 3. Job Scope

**3.1. Weekly working hours:** The number of hours worked across all workplaces in the week before the survey, including preparation hours (for teachers and artists).

**3.2. Usual weekly working hours:** The average number of hours worked per week across all workplaces, including preparation hours (for teachers and artists).

#### 3.3. Work Scope (Based on usual weekly work hours):

**3.3.1. Full-time employee:** works 35 hours or more per week (CBS definition); 30 hours or more per week (OECD definition).

**3.3.2. Part-time employee:** works 1-34 hours per week (CBS definition); 1-30 hours per week (OECD definition).

#### 4. Areas of work

**4.1. Profession.** The set of activities and tasks an employee performs in the workplace, regardless of their field of study, if they are not working in it. Classification follows the 2011 Classification of Occupations (CBS, 2015a), based on the International Labour Organization's ISCO-08 standard.

**4.2. Economic sector.** The economic sector of the enterprise or institution ("classification unit") where the employee works, as defined by the 2011 Classification of Economic Industries (CBS, 2015b). This classification follows the UN's ISIC (Rev. 4) standard for the uniform categorization of economic industries.

#### 5. Employment in High-Tech Fields

**5.1. Employment in the high-tech sector:** employed in one of the economic industries listed in Table C-N-1.

**5.2. Employment in a high-tech occupation:** employed in one of the job categories listed in Table C-N-2.



**Table C-A-1 | List of economic activities classified as high-tech**

Classification Code	Category Description
21	Manufacture of medicines, including homeopathic medicines
26	Manufacture of computers, electronic and optical equipment
303	Manufacture of aircraft, spacecraft and related equipment
62	Computer programming, computer consulting and other related services
631	Data processing, storage and related services
720	Research and development centers
721	Engineering and natural science research and development centers

**Table C-A-2 | List of occupations classified as high-tech**

Classification code	Category description
133	Service managers in the information technology (ICT) industries
211	Physical and earth science professionals
212	Mathematicians, actuaries and statisticians
213	Life science professionals
214	Engineering professionals (except electrical and electronics engineering)
215	Electrical and Electronics Engineers
251	Software developers and application analysts
252	Database and network professionals
311	Practical engineers and technicians in physical sciences and engineering
314	Life science practical engineers and technicians and related associate professionals
315	Controllers, engineers and technicians of vessels and aircraft
351	Operations engineer and technician and user support engineer and technician in the information technology (ICT) industries

## Appendix C-2: Occupations by skill levels

The Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS, 2015a) classifies occupations into four skill levels, based on the expertise required for optimal task performance in a given occupation.

- **Level 1:** Jobs involving simple and routine physical or manual tasks. Examples include: cleaning, digging, manually carrying or transporting materials, sorting, storing, or manually assembling products, as well as manually picking fruits and vegetables.
- **Level 2:** Jobs requiring basic technical skills. For example: operating machinery and electronic equipment, driving vehicles, or maintaining and repairing electrical and mechanical equipment.
- **Level 3:** Jobs that involve complex technical tasks requiring extensive practical, technical, and procedural knowledge in the field. For example: preparing detailed estimates of quantities and costs of materials and labor for specific projects, coordinating, supervising, and overseeing the activities of other employees, or performing technical tasks under professional guidance.
- **Level 4:** Jobs that involve finding solutions to complex problems while using judgment and creativity. For example: analysis and research, diagnosing and treating diseases, educating others, or designing buildings, machines, and production processes. Examples of occupations at this level include sales and marketing managers, civil engineers, secondary education teachers, musicians, operating room nurses, and information systems analysts.

## Chapter D: Well-being indicators

Most people leaving Haredi society do so at a young age, and most exits occur before the age of 25. In the period immediately after exiting, Yotzim are generally not financially stable and often lack family support: most of them remain in contact with their families, but they cannot rely on them for financial assistance.

**49%**

of unmarried Yotzim are very satisfied with their connection with their families

Non-Haredim - 70%



**61%**

of married Yotzim are very satisfied with their connection with their families

Non-Haredim - 70%



**29%**

of Yotzim reported depression

Non-Haredim - 24%



Satisfaction with the relationship with the parents improves over time:

**45%**

of Yotzim in the first two years after exiting

vs  
>>

**59%**

of Yotzim a decade after exiting

**25%**

of Yotzim reported loneliness

Non-Haredim - 19%



**67%**

of Yotzim over the age of 35 own apartments

HFH - 88%

Non-Haredim - 77%



**69%**

of Yotzim have a driver's license

HFH - 23%

Non-Haredi women - 84%



Yotzim face financial difficulties throughout their lives

**26%**

of Yotzim perceived themselves as poor over the last five years

HFH - 17%

Non-Haredim - 12%



**54%**

of Yotzim are satisfied with their current financial situation

HFH - 73%

Non-Haredim - 65%

**67%**

of Yotzim between the ages of 20 - 29 are able to cover their monthly expenses

HFH - 74%

Non-Haredim - 79%



## D. Well-being indicators

### Groups and Data Sources

#### Groups

The analysis groups are categorized based on current affiliation (currently Haredi or not), against past affiliation (whether they come from a Haredi background or not).

#### Subgroups

**Yotzim (former Haredim):** individuals with a Haredi background who are no longer Haredi (short for those who left the Haredi community).

**HFH (Haredim from home):** individuals with a Haredi background who remain Haredi (short for those who are Haredi and came from a Haredi home).

**Joiners ("became Haredi"):** individuals with a non-Haredi background who have become Haredi (short for those who have joined the Haredi community).

**Non-Haredim:** individuals with a non-Haredi background who are not currently Haredi (short for Jews who are not Haredi).

#### Data sources and identification methods (\*)

The CBS Social Survey for the years 2007-2012 and 2017-2023, Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.

Identification of Haredi background: raised (at age 15) in a Haredi family by self-definition (this variable is not available in data before 2007 and in the years 2013-2016); Identification of Haredi today: by self-definition.

The Integration Survey - an online survey distributed by Out for Change in March-April 2024 among men and women who are Yotzim (those with a Haredi background who are not currently Haredi, by self-definition) aged 18 and over.

(\*) For more on the data sources, see the online appendix.

## D-1 Introduction

Leaving Haredi society typically occurs at a young age— a critical period for integrating into higher education and employment. During this transition, Yotzim often face financial insecurity and limited family support. While most maintain contact with their families, it is more limited compared to other groups and their reliance on their family for financial assistance is minimal. As a result, these young individuals find themselves navigating this crucial stage without the education that could facilitate entry into quality employment, and without familial support that could provide a buffer during the transition or allow them to enroll in higher education.

Consequently, compared to other subgroups, Yotzim are less able to cover their monthly expenses, less satisfied with their financial situation, and more of them perceive themselves as poor. Despite these challenges, Yotzim at the beginning of their transition remain optimistic about their ability to improve their circumstances.

This chapter examines indicators related to overall standard of living, financial satisfaction, and well-being among Yotzim (both women and men) in comparison with three other subgroups: Haredim from home (those raised Haredi and still identifying as such), Joiners (those who have joined Haredi society), and non-Haredi Jews. The analyses are based on data from the Social Survey and, unless otherwise specified, include both men and women.

Section D-2 explores indicators related to family relationships. Section D-3 analyzes economic well-being: subjective measures such as financial satisfaction, perceptions of poverty, and the ability to make ends meet; objective living standards, such as homeownership rates, rates of people with a driver's license and satisfaction with one's home and residential area. Section D-4 focuses on emotional well-being, examining feelings of loneliness, depression, and stress. Additionally, this section includes a special analysis comparing well-being indicators from the Social Survey with data from surveys conducted by organizations that support Yotzim.


## D-2 Family relationships

Most Yotzim leave Haredi society at a young age, with the majority doing so by the age of 25. During the period following their exit, Yotzim are not financially stable and frequently have limited family support – most maintain contact with their family but cannot rely on it for financial assistance. This reality is reflected in their satisfaction with family relationships (Figure D-1a).

Since married individuals or those with children may base their responses on the family they have built rather than their family of origin, the analysis distinguishes between singles (including divorcees and widowers without children) and non-singles.

Overall, although Yotzim (both women and men) report satisfaction with their family relationships, their level of satisfaction is lower compared to other subgroups. Among single Yotzim, only about half (49%) express high satisfaction with their family relationships—a lower rate than both non-Haredim and HFH. However, non-singles report slightly higher satisfaction levels, at 61%.

Figure D-1 | Family relationships indicators - by current family status



Values in parentheses indicate a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3. (For more details, see the online appendix.)

Source: Social Survey data (2017-2023), Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.

Singles - including divorced or widowed individuals without children.

Satisfaction with family relationships: High: Very satisfied; Medium: Satisfied

Feeling appreciated by family: High: To a great extent; Medium: To a certain extent

For data on additional groups and breakdowns by age, see Table D-1.

The differences between Yotzim and other subgroups are also evident in how valued they feel by their families (Figure D-1b). About two-thirds (65%) of single Yotzim report feeling highly valued by their family, compared to 85% of non-Haredim and 89% of HFH. On this measure, married Yotzim also reported a higher sense of appreciation from their families.

Generally, the distinction between singles and married individuals is more pronounced among Yotzim than in other subgroups. As mentioned, singles necessarily refer to their family of origin, whereas married individuals or those with children may be reflecting on the family they have built rather than their

family of origin. It is also possible that married individuals experience greater overall satisfaction with their family of origin, either as a result of the passage of time since they left or a shift in their family's attitude after they established their own household.

## D-3 Indicators of economic well-being

As noted, leaving Haredi society typically occurs at a young age, a critical period for integrating into education and employment. Yotzim often find themselves in this transition without the educational background that would enable them to secure quality employment and without family support that could provide a buffer during this transition period or entry into higher education. This reality is reflected in the findings, which show that young Yotzim report a greater sense of poverty and more difficulty covering monthly expenses. Over time, these economic disparities are also evident in lower homeownership rates among Yotzim compared to other groups.

### D-3.1 Satisfaction with financial situation

Overall, Yotzim report higher levels of financial hardship, reflected in several ways: fewer report being able to cover their monthly expenses, they express less satisfaction with their economic situation, and they are more likely to describe themselves as experiencing poverty. However, despite these challenges, Yotzim tend to be optimistic about their financial future, perhaps because they view their current struggles as a temporary phase in their transition, undertaken to improve their long-term prospects. Another possible explanation may have to do with age: within each age group, Yotzim tend to be younger on average than the same age group in other subgroups, and this young age may be the source of their optimism.


#### Yotzim report higher rates of financial hardship and greater difficulty covering their ongoing monthly expenses.

Looking at income and expenses (Figure D-2) by age group, only 67% of young Yotzim (ages 20-29), 64% of those in the middle group (ages 30-44), and 57% of those in the older group (ages 45-64) reported being able

to cover their household's monthly expenses. These rates are notably lower than those among non-Haredim, where 79% of young adults and 72% of those in the middle and older age groups reported managing their expenses. Compared to HFH, in the younger age groups the rate of Yotzim who are able to cover their monthly expenses is lower than that of the HFH (74%). However, in the middle and older age groups, the rates among Yotzim (60%-67%) are similar to those of HFH<sup>37</sup>.

37. Data on Joiners is not presented, as their average age of joining is relatively high, and the younger age group (20-34) within this subgroup differs in key characteristics from the rest of the Joiners. For further details, see Chapter 1.

Figure D-2 | Percentage of those who manage to cover monthly expenses -by age group




Source: Social Survey data for 2017-2023, Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.  
Successful - responded "I succeed without any difficulty" or "succeed" in covering all monthly household expenses (including expenses for food, electricity, telephone, etc.).

## Yotzim report higher rates of perceived poverty compared to both Haredim and non-Haredim

In addition to the lower percentage of Yotzim who successfully cover their monthly expenses, their self-perception of poverty is also notably higher (Figure D-3), a finding which supports their claim that they face significant financial difficulties. Approximately half of Yotzim (51%) considered themselves poor at some point in their adult lives (from age 15 onward), compared to about a third of non-Haredim (30%) and HFH (31%), and slightly more than a third of Joiners (37%).

Figure D-3 | Rate of self-perceived poverty (women and men) - at various time points



Source: The Social Survey data from 2017-2023, Jewish men and women aged 20-64.


It is possible that poverty within the family increases the likelihood of leaving the Haredi community, or that leaving the Haredi community may influence one's perception of past poverty. However, a significant portion of the disparity likely stems from how Yotzim perceive their current economic situation.



This is evident from the persistent gap in perceptions of poverty over the past five years and the past year (although the difference has somewhat narrowed).

Regarding the experience of poverty over the past five years, it is notably higher among Yotzim, both in the younger age group (20-29) and in the older group (30-44). This finding reinforces the idea that the sense of poverty is primarily a post-departure phenomenon (Figure D-4).

**Figure D-4 | Rate of people who perceived themselves as poor in the last five years - by age group**



Values in parentheses represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3.

For further details, see the online appendix.

Source: Social Survey data (2017-2023), Jewish men and women aged 20-64<sup>38</sup>.

In addition to the data on experiences of poverty and difficulties in covering monthly expenses, only about half of Yotzim (54%) are satisfied with their financial situation. This is lower than the satisfaction rates among non-Haredim (65%) and Haredim (73%) (Figure D-5)<sup>39</sup>.

**Despite their dissatisfaction with their economic situation, Yotzim are optimistic and believe that their economic situation will improve in the coming years.**


However, despite their economic hardships, heightened sense of poverty, and greater financial dissatisfaction, Yotzim exhibit a high level of optimism about improving their financial situation in the coming years (74%), compared to non-Haredim (59%) and HFH (66%). Part of this gap may be attributed to the fact that Yotzim

tend to be younger on average, and since younger individuals generally have greater potential for financial change, their optimism is likely higher.

38. Each respondent, both male and female, was asked whether there had been periods since the age of 15 when they considered themselves poor (from 2022, responses ranged from "often" to "never"). Those who responded affirmatively (until 2022, those who did not answer "never") were then asked when they last perceived themselves as poor. The chart presents cumulative rates: the group that reported experiencing poverty since the age of 15 includes those who reported experiencing it in the last five years, and the group that reported experiencing poverty in the last five years includes those who perceived themselves as poor in the past year.

39. The phenomenon of reported satisfaction is prevalent among Haredim (Rier et al., 2008), probably due to cultural characteristics of social desirability. This bias has been noted in classic studies on the subject (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Edwards, 1953), which suggest that the more a behavior is deemed socially desirable, the more respondents are inclined to attribute it to themselves.


**Figure D-5 | Percentage of those satisfied with their financial situation and optimistic about the future**



Source: Social Survey data for 2017-2023, Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.  
 Believe that their financial situation will improve in the coming years - estimate that in the coming years, compared to today, their economic situation will be better (respondents who said "don't know" were defined as those who do not estimate an improvement). Satisfied - Responded as "very satisfied" or "satisfied" with their economic situation.

An analysis of optimism rates regarding future economic improvement among young people (Figure D-6) reveals that the rate among Yotzim (83%) is similar to that of non-Haredim (78%). In both groups, this optimism exceeds that of HFH (71%).


**Figure D-6 | Percentage of young men and women who believe their financial and overall situation will improve in the future.**



Source: Social Survey data (2017-2023), Jewish men and women aged 20-34.  
 Believe that their lives/economic situation will improve in the coming years - estimate that, compared to today, their lives (economic situation) will be better. (Respondents who answered "don't know" were classified as those not expecting an improvement).

Among Yotzim, economic dissatisfaction does not appear to impact their overall life satisfaction, which remains high at 90% (Figure D-7), similar to the rate among non-Haredim (92%). In terms of general optimism, Yotzim also report a high rate (82%), comparable to HFH (78%) and significantly higher than non-Haredim (65%). Even among younger individuals (Figure D-6), Yotzim exhibit slightly higher optimism levels (88%) compared to both non-Haredim (81%) and HFH (81%).

**Figure D-7 | Percentage of people who are satisfied with their lives and who say their situation will improve in the future**



Source: Social Survey data (2017-2023), Jewish men and women aged 20-64.  
 Expect life to improve: expect that, compared to today, their lives will be better in the coming years. Respondents who answered "don't know" were classified as not expecting improvement.  
 Satisfied: responded "very satisfied" or "satisfied" with life.

### D-3.2 General standard of living

#### The rate of homeownership among Yotzim is lower than the corresponding rates among non-Haredim and HFH.


20-34) reported owning an apartment—slightly lower than non-Haredim (60%) and significantly lower than HFH (70%).

Among the older age group (35-64), the gap between Yotzim (67%) and non-Haredim (77%) remains similar, but grew in comparison to HFH (88%)<sup>40</sup>.

The economic disparities among Yotzim over the years are also reflected in objective indicators, such as homeownership rates, which are lower than those of other subgroups (Figure D-8). Approximately half (53%) of young Yotzim (aged

40. This figure requires some qualification. First, "owned apartment" includes ownership by any household member. This means that a young person living with their parents in a home they own would be classified as a homeowner, potentially inflating the rate among non-Haredim. Additionally, in both age groups, the rate of young people among Yotzim tends to be higher compared to non-Haredim and HFH. A full adjustment for age would likely narrow the gap between Yotzim and the other groups. (For further discussion, see the online appendix, The Social Survey.)

Figure D-8 | Rate of homeownership (women and men) - by age group



Source: Social Survey data for 2017-2023, Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.  
Owned apartment - ownership of the apartment by one of the household members or ownership of another apartment (the question is formulated at the household level).

These disparities may stem from the loss of family and community support among Yotzim. Unlike their Haredi peers, who can rely on parental assistance and communal resources (such as gemachim) for purchasing homes and supporting their families, Yotzim must provide for themselves without the safety net of family and community support.


**69% of Yotzim have a driver's license, compared to 23% of female HFH and 84% of non-Haredi women.**

Another notable gap appears in the rate of driver's license holders. In Haredi society, many refrain from learning to drive for ideological reasons, particularly women. In contrast, among non-Haredim, driving is a basic skill essential for integrating into education and

employment. Yotzim fall between these two groups: their rate of driver's license ownership is slightly lower than that of non-Haredim but significantly higher than that of HFH. For full data on all groups, see Table D-1 at the end of the chapter.

A gender-based analysis (Figure D-9) reveals that 88% of male Yotzim hold a driver's license—a rate slightly lower than that of non-Haredi men (93%). However, among female Yotzim, the rate is significantly lower at just 69%, compared to 84% among non-Haredi women. Among HFH, driver's license ownership is considerably lower, with only 52% of men and just 23% of women holding a license.


Figure D-9 | Rate of driver's license holders - by gender



Source: Social Survey data (2017-2023), Jews aged 20-64.

The low rate of driver's license holders among Yotzim in general and particularly among women is likely influenced by the historically low prevalence of driver's licenses in the Haredi community, as well as the time and financial costs associated with obtaining one. This trend is illustrated in Figure D-10, which compares the percentage of licensed drivers across three age groups—young (20-29), middle (35-44), and older (45-64)—without a breakdown by gender. Among the youngest group, fewer than a third of HFH (30%) hold a driver's license, compared to more than two-thirds of Yotzim (74%) and 86% of non-Haredim. In the two older age groups, the gap narrows, with 83%-86% of Yotzim holding a driver's license, slightly below non-Haredim (87%-92%) but significantly higher than HFH (42%-45%).

Figure D-10 | Rate of driver's license holders (women and men) - by age group




Source: Social Survey data for the years 2017-2023, Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.

### D-3.3 Satisfaction with living conditions

The economic situation of Yotzim is also reflected in their satisfaction with their living conditions (Figure D-11). Overall, Yotzim report slightly lower satisfaction with their apartments and residential areas compared to non-Haredim. For instance, around 80% of Yotzim expressed satisfaction with their apartment, neighborhood, and relationships with neighbors, compared to approximately 90% among both non-Haredim and HFH. It is worth noting that lower satisfaction in these areas is generally associated with lower-income populations (CBS, 2022). It is likely that the financial constraints faced by Yotzim compel them to live in apartments and neighborhoods with poorer conditions, which in turn affects their overall satisfaction.

Figure D-11 | Satisfaction with home and residential area



Source: Social Survey data for 2017-2023, Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.  
Satisfied - responded "very satisfied" or "satisfied."


## D-4 Emotional well-being indicators

**Yotzim report loneliness and depression at a similar frequency to those who are not Haredi, contrary to the widespread perception that presents Yotzim as having emotional difficulties.**

One of the recurring questions regarding the well-being of Yotzim is the prevalence of emotional challenges such as depression. As highlighted in previous editions of this annual report (Deutsch & Shenfeld [eds.], 2023), studies based on non-representative samples - which are often found by respondents through aid organizations or social media groups dedicated to Yotzim - consistently indicate high rates of depression and loneliness among this population.

However, an analysis of CBS Social Survey data presents a more nuanced picture. For instance, when comparing the frequency of reported emotional difficulties between Yotzim and non-Haredim, 29% of Yotzim reported experiencing feelings of depression in the past year, only slightly higher than the 24% reported among non-Haredim (Figure D-12). Similarly, the gap in reported stress levels is modest (70% vs. 64%), as is the difference in those experiencing sleep-disrupting worries (42% vs. 45%)<sup>41</sup>.

**Figure D-12 | Percentage of individuals experiencing stress, worry, and depression (men and women)**




Source: Social Survey data for 2017-2023, Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.  
Feeling stressed, worried and depressed - Answer "always or often" or "sometimes, occasionally" to the questions "In the last 12 months, have you felt stressed / felt depressed / worried about your sleep?"

It is reasonable to assume that emotional distress among Yotzim intensifies in the years leading up to their exit. To explore this, the prevalence of these feelings was analyzed among younger individuals (ages 20-34) in comparison to older individuals (ages 35-64) (Figure D-13a). The findings indicate that even at younger ages, the gap between Yotzim and non-Haredim remains relatively small. Differences were also examined by gender (Figure D-13b).

41. At this stage, it is not yet possible to assess how the events of October 7 and the subsequent war impacted Yotzim. However, among non-Haredi Jews, there is no significant difference in these indicators between the first and last quarters of the year.

**Figure D-13 | Percentage of individuals experiencing stress, worry, and depression among Yotzim and non-Haredim, by age and gender**



Values in parentheses indicate a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3. (For more details, see the online appendix.)

Source: Social Survey data (2017-2023), Jews (men and women) aged 20-64.

Experience stress, worry and depression - responded "always or often" or "sometimes, occasionally" to the questions "In the past 12 months, have you felt stressed? / Have you felt depressed? / Have you experienced worries that kept you from sleeping?"

In general, women report higher levels of emotional distress than men. Among non-Haredim, women are more likely than men to experience feelings of depression (28% vs. 20%), worries that disrupt sleep (48% vs. 35%), and stress (71% vs. 58%). A similar pattern is observed among Yotzim, with women reporting these difficulties more frequently than men. However, unlike male Yotzim, whose reported rates of emotional distress are relatively similar to those of non-Haredi men, female Yotzim report these challenges at even higher rates than non-Haredi women.


The only significant difference between Yotzim and non-Haredim appears in feelings of loneliness. Leaving the Haredi community involves social disengagement, so high levels of loneliness might be expected. However, while there is a difference in loneliness between Yotzim and non-Haredim, it is relatively small (Figure D-14a). About a quarter of Yotzim reported experiencing loneliness at least sometimes, only slightly higher than the 19% reported among non-Haredim. This pattern is also consistent



among younger individuals (ages 20-34). Nevertheless, it is possible that feelings of loneliness are more pronounced in the first years after leaving, which may not be reflected in the younger age group. Since the Social Survey only includes individuals aged 20 and older, assessing this hypothesis is challenging.

This finding is also reflected in the gender-based analysis (Figure D-14b). While women generally report higher rates of loneliness than men (22% vs. 16%), both female and male Yotzim experience loneliness at rates 6-7 percentage points higher than their non-Haredi counterparts of the same gender.

**Figure D-14 | Rate of people experiencing loneliness - by age group and gender**



Values in parentheses indicate a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3. (For more details, see the online appendix.)

Source: Social Survey data (2017-2023), Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.

Feeling lonely - responded "often" or "occasionally" to the question: "Are there situations in which you ever feel lonely?"

Based on the findings presented above, it can be cautiously suggested that studies reporting a high prevalence of depression among Yotzim may not accurately reflect the average for this population as a whole. The prevalence of emotional difficulties among Yotzim appears to be only slightly higher than that of non-Haredi individuals, which can be expected, given the educational gaps, challenges in secur-

ing quality employment, and other difficulties faced by Yotzim, many of which are more pronounced in the initial stages of their transition.

However, it is reasonable to assume that within the Yotzim population, there is a distinct subgroup that differs from the rest in these aspects—one that may not be fully reflected in the averages reported in the Social Survey. This subgroup may be characterized by unique family backgrounds as well as specific social and psychological conditions in the immediate post-exit phase. This issue is explored in greater depth in Box D-1 of this chapter. Additionally, further research is needed to identify specific groups within the CBS data that exhibit a higher prevalence of loneliness and depression. Another important area of study is the potential impact of social desirability bias in surveys conducted within aid organizations for Yotzim. This includes examining whether the overall survey environment and preliminary questions influence the likelihood of respondents reporting such emotional difficulties.

## Box D-1 Comparison of well-being indicators between the Social Survey and the Integration Survey

### Introduction

Studies based on questionnaires distributed among individuals seeking assistance from organizations that support Yotzim have reported a high prevalence of emotional challenges, such as depression, among this population (e.g., Lasri, 2020; Kaiser Sugarman et al., 2022; David & Trachtenberg, 2022).

Some of these surveys conducted this way may encourage participation through personal outreach by service providers or financial incentives, which likely lead to higher response rates among Yotzim facing financial hardship. It is reasonable to assume that those experiencing strained family relationships are more inclined to seek out services and communities specifically for Yotzim, as well as to take advantage of financial incentives for participation. It can also be assumed that the proportion of respondents reporting emotional difficulties in these surveys may be significantly higher than the actual average among all Yotzim.

Additionally, responses about emotional experiences may be influenced by social desirability bias (a bias that considers that some respondents may answer in ways they believe are expected of them). For example, participants in programs specifically designed for Yotzim might assume they are expected to report feelings of hardship, leading to reports of higher rates of emotional difficulties. An alternative explanation is that these respondents belong to a group in the earlier stages of the exit process.

To examine these hypotheses, a comparison was conducted between data from the CBS Social Survey and a survey distributed by Out for Change (hereinafter, the "Integration Survey") regarding indicators of emotional well-being and the strength of family connections<sup>42</sup>. These measures were also analyzed based on the number of years since exiting (hereinafter, the "exit period") and the degree of connection between Yotzim and their parents.


### Emotional well-being indicators - comparison of sources

A comparison between the Social Survey data and the Integration Survey data reveals significant differences across all emotional well-being indicators: feelings of loneliness and depression, worries that interfered with sleep, and feelings of stress (Figure D-T-1). The most striking discrepancies appear in reports of loneliness and depression: approximately three-quarters of respondents in the Integration Survey reported experiencing loneliness (75%), and about two-thirds reported feelings of depression (66%). In contrast, among those surveyed in the Social Survey, less than a third reported experiencing loneliness (25%) or depression (29%).

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42. The questions in the Integration Survey are worded identically to those in the CBS Social Survey.

**Figure D-T-1 | Emotional well-being indicators among Yotzim (women and men) - comparison between the social survey and the integration survey (%)**




Values in parentheses are categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3. (For more details, see the online appendix).  
 Sources: Social Survey data (2017-2023), Jews (women and men) aged 20-64; Integration Survey - an online survey conducted by Out for Change in March-April 2024 among Yotzim (individuals with a Haredi background who no longer identify as Haredi, based on self-definition) aged 18 and older (N = 1,206).

Respondents who answered "often" or "occasionally" to the question: "Are there situations in which you feel lonely?"

The estimated rate of loneliness in the Integration Survey remained consistently high across both gender (Figure D-T-2a) and age group analyses (Figure D-T-2b), which suggests that the primary factor driving these differences is unlikely to be the time elapsed since exiting<sup>43</sup>.

43. The age of the respondents at the time of the survey was correlated with the age of exit.

**Figure D-T-2 | Emotional well-being indicators among those leaving, by age and gender - comparison between the social survey and the integration survey (%)**



Values in parentheses indicate categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3.  
(For more details, see the online appendix).

Sources: Social Survey, data from 2017-2023, Jews (men and women) aged 20-64.


Integration Survey: An online survey conducted by Out for Change in March-April 2024 among individuals (men and women) with a Haredi background who no longer identify as Haredi, based on self-definition. The survey included respondents aged 18 and over (N=1,206).

### Family relationships - comparing sources

Finally, to assess the extent to which relationships with one's family of origin might explain the findings, a comparison was made between the two surveys regarding satisfaction with family relationships. The analysis was conducted based on marital status, since some married individuals or parents may report on the family they have built rather than their family of origin (Figure D-T-3).

The findings reveal a significant difference between the two sources in the proportion of Yotzim who express satisfaction with their family relationships. Among respondents to the Integration Survey, about half reported being satisfied with their family relationships (51% of singles and 56% of non-singles), compared to approximately 90% of respondents in the Social Survey. The most striking difference was in the proportion of those who reported high satisfaction—49%-61% in the social survey versus only 13%-18% in the integration survey. These results support the hypothesis that respondents to the Integration Survey tend to have weaker family ties, which may contribute to greater emotional difficulties.

**Figure T-D-3 | Satisfaction with family ties among Yotzim - comparison between the Social Survey and the Integration Survey (%)**




Source: Social Survey data for the years 2017-2023, Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.

Integration Survey: An online survey distributed by Out for Change in March-April 2024 among Yotzim (individuals with a Haredi background who are not currently Haredi, by self-definition) aged 18 and over (N=1,206).

### Well-being and family relationship indicators by length of time since exiting

Deutsch and Shenfeld (2023) suggested that respondents to these surveys are in the early stages of exit. An analysis of these indicators shows an improvement among long-time Yotzim, though a gap remains compared to the Social Survey data (Figure D-T-4). For instance, around 90% of those who left within the past two years reported experiencing loneliness, whereas this figure drops to approximately 70% among those who left a decade ago. The proportion of respondents who experienced depression also declined, albeit more gradually (from 73% to 66%). Despite these reductions, a significant gap persists compared to Yotzim in the Social Survey, where 25% reported feelings of loneliness and 29% experienced depression.


Figure D-T-4 | Feelings of depression and loneliness among Yotzim - comparison by length of time since exiting (Integration Survey)<sup>44</sup>



Integration Survey: An online survey distributed by the “Out for Change” organization in March–April 2024 among Yotzim (individuals with a Haredi background who are not currently Haredi, by self-definition) aged 18 and over (N=1,206).

A similar pattern emerges when analyzing changes in satisfaction with family relationships over time (Figure D-T-5). Only 45% of those who left within the past two years reported satisfaction with their family ties, compared to 59% of those who left a decade or more ago. However, even among long-time Yotzim, the satisfaction rate remains significantly lower than that of Yotzim in the Social Survey, where it was approximately 90%.

Figure D-T-5 | Satisfaction with family relationships - comparison by years since exiting (Integration Survey)



Source: Integration Survey: An online survey distributed by Out for Change in March–April 2024 among Yotzim (men and women with a Haredi background who are not currently Haredi, by self-definition) aged 18 and over (N=1,206).  
Satisfaction with family relationships: High - very satisfied; Medium - satisfied.

44. Some of the improvement among long-time Yotzim may be attributed to changes in family status.


### Relationship with Parents

Beyond general satisfaction with family ties, the Integration Survey provides insight into the quality of the relationship between Yotzim and their parents (Figure D-T-6). The findings indicate that approximately 90% of Yotzim maintain some level of contact with their parents, while only about 10% report being completely disconnected (see Figure D-N-1 in the appendix). These results align with the findings of Deutsch and Kaplan (2023).

However, unlike Deutsch and Kaplan's study, which found that around a quarter of Yotzim reported being disconnected from their parents during their first year after leaving, the Integration Survey shows a lower rate of disconnection in the first year and is comparable to the rate reported in later years.

While most Yotzim remain in contact with their parents, only about two-thirds reported having a strong or moderate connection, while the remaining third described their relationship as weak or non-existent. Among Yotzim who exited within the past two years, 63% reported a good relationship with their parents, compared to 68% of those who left over a decade ago. These findings are consistent with data presented by Kaiser-Sugarman et al. (2022).

Figure D-T-6 | Level of connection between Yotzim and their parents, comparison by time since exiting (Integration Survey)



Integration Survey: An online survey conducted by the "Out for Change" organization in March-April 2024 among Yotzim (men and women with a Haredi background who no longer identify as Haredi, by self-definition), aged 18 and over (N=1,206).  
High: Respondents who rated their relationship with their parents as "good" or "very good." For the full distribution, see Figure N-D-1.

### Summary

In the Integration Survey, Yotzim were also asked how they felt about their financial situations. Compared to the Social Survey data, a lower proportion of Yotzim reported being satisfied with their financial situation (38% in the Integration Survey versus 54% in the Social Survey, see Deutsch and Shenfeld, 2023). There may be a link between financial satisfaction and well-being indicators.



The findings also indicate a correlation between these well-being indicators and the time elapsed since exiting, although this factor alone does not fully account for the observed differences. To better understand and define this phenomenon, an in-depth study is needed to identify specific groups within the CBS data that are linked to a higher prevalence of loneliness and depression.

## D - Tables

The following tables provide expanded data on the four subgroups discussed in the chapter:

**Yotzim (Former Haredim)** - individuals with a Haredi background who are no longer Haredi; **HFH (Haredim from home)** - individuals with a Haredi background who are still Haredi; **Joiners ("Became Haredi")** - individuals with a non-Haredi background who have become Haredi; **Non-Haredim** - individuals with a non-Haredi background who are not currently Haredi.

Additionally, data are presented for two broader analytical groups based on past and present affiliation:

- **All those with a Haredi background** (HFH and Yotzim)
- **All those who are currently Haredi** (HFH and Joiners)

Values for the group of all those who are currently non-Haredi (Non-Haredi and Yotzim) are not included in the tables, as their data closely resemble those of the non-Haredi group.

**Table D-1 | Satisfaction with family relationships, breakdown by marital status (%)**

	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those with a Haredi background	All those currently Haredi
<b>Satisfaction with the family connection</b>						
<b>Total</b>						
Moderate <sup>1</sup>	26	34	13	26	15	16
High <sup>2</sup>	70	56	85	71	82	82
<b>Total satisfied</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>98</b>
<b>Singles<sup>5</sup></b>						
Moderate <sup>1</sup>	25	39	14		21	15
High <sup>2</sup>	70	49	83		74	82
<b>Total satisfied</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>97</b>		<b>95</b>	<b>97</b>
<b>Non-singles</b>						
Moderate <sup>1</sup>	27	30	13	26	14	16
High <sup>2</sup>	69	61	86	71	84	82
<b>Total satisfied</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>98</b>
<b>Extent to which family members appreciate them</b>						
<b>Total</b>						
Moderate <sup>3</sup>	11	20	7	13	8	8
High <sup>4</sup>	87	73	92	85	90	91
<b>Total appreciation</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>99</b>
<b>Singles<sup>5</sup></b>						
Moderate <sup>3</sup>	13	(24)	(10)		14	13
High <sup>4</sup>	85	65	89		83	86
<b>Total appreciation</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>99</b>		<b>97</b>	<b>99</b>
<b>Non-singles</b>						
Moderate <sup>3</sup>	11	(17)	6	12	7	8
High <sup>4</sup>	88	79	93	86	92	91
<b>Total appreciation</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>99</b>

Values in parentheses have a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3. The values for Joiners who are single have been omitted due to a low number of observations (for more information, see the online appendix).

Source: Social Survey data for 2017-2023, Jews (women and men) aged 20-64.

1. Moderate Satisfaction - Satisfied with family relationships.
2. High Satisfaction - Very satisfied with family relationships.
3. Moderate Appreciation - Feel appreciated by family to some extent.
4. High Appreciation - Feel appreciated by family to a great extent.
5. Singles - Includes divorced or widowed individuals without children.

**Table D-2 | General and economic satisfaction, broken down by gender and age groups (%)**

	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	All those from a Haredi background	All those who are Haredi today
<b>Men and women</b>						
Satisfied with their lives <sup>1</sup>	92	90	98	97	97	98
Assume their lives will improve <sup>2</sup>	65	82	78	70	79	76
Satisfied with their financial situation <sup>1</sup>	65	54	73	69	71	72
Assume their financial situation will improve <sup>3</sup>	59	74	66	62	67	65
Manage to cover their monthly expenses <sup>4</sup>	74	64	69	60	68	67
<b>Men</b>						
Satisfied with their lives <sup>1</sup>	74	64	69	60	68	67
Assume their lives will improve <sup>2</sup>	92	88	98	97	96	97
Satisfied with their financial situation <sup>1</sup>	64	77	79	69	79	76
Assume their financial situation will improve <sup>3</sup>	68	56	76	71	74	75
Manage to cover their monthly expenses <sup>4</sup>	61	72	66	60	67	64
<b>Women</b>						
Satisfied with their lives <sup>1</sup>	93	92	98	97	98	98
Assume their lives will improve <sup>2</sup>	66	88	78	72	79	77
Satisfied with their financial situation <sup>1</sup>	63	52	69	66	67	68
Assume their financial situation will improve <sup>3</sup>	57	77	67	64	68	66
Manage to cover their monthly expenses <sup>4</sup>	72	63	67	59	66	65
<b>Young adults aged 20 - 29 (men and women)</b>						
Satisfied with their lives <sup>1</sup>	94	91	98	98	97	98
Assume their lives will improve <sup>2</sup>	81	88	81	84	82	82
Satisfied with their financial situation <sup>1</sup>	63	54	72	72	70	72
Assume their financial situation will improve <sup>3</sup>	78	83	71	78	72	72
Manage to cover their monthly expenses <sup>4</sup>	78	67	72	63	71	71

Source: Social Survey data for 2017-2023, Jews aged 20-64.

1. Responded "very satisfied" or "satisfied".

2. Estimate that their lives will be better in the coming years.

3. Estimate that their financial situation will be better in the coming years.

4. Responded "succeeds without any difficulty" or "succeeds" in covering all monthly household expenses (including expenses for food, electricity, telephone, etc.).

**Table D-3 | General standard of living, broken down by gender and age groups (%)**

	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	Those from a Haredi background	Those who are Haredi today
<b>Men and Women</b>						
Homeowners <sup>1</sup>	71	57	77	67	75	75
Car owners <sup>2</sup>	87	73	38	71	42	47
Vacationed abroad in the last year	46	34	16	13	18	15
Have a driver's license	88	80	38	76	42	47
<b>Men</b>						
Homeowners <sup>1</sup>	71	59	79	64	76	75
Car owners <sup>2</sup>	87	74	38	72	42	47
Vacationed abroad in the last year	46	35	16	15	18	16
Have a driver's license	93	88	52	86	56	61
<b>Women</b>						
Homeowners <sup>1</sup>	71	56	76	70	74	74
Car owners <sup>2</sup>	86	71	39	70	42	47
Vacationed abroad in the last year	46	33	15	(11)	17	14
Have a driver's license	84	69	23	63	28	32
<b>Young adults aged 20-34</b>						
Homeowners <sup>1</sup>	60	53	70	47	68	67
Car owners <sup>2</sup>	84	67	36	70	39	40
Vacationed abroad in the last year	47	34	16	11	18	15
Have a driver's license	88	77	34	77	39	40

Values in parentheses have a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more information, see the online appendix).

Source: Social Survey data for 2017-2023, Jews aged 20-64.

1. Lives in an apartment owned by one of the household members or owns another apartment (household-level question)

2. Has a private or commercial car at their disposal, not including trucks over 4 tons or two-wheeled vehicles (household-level question)

**Table D-4 | Emotional well-being indicators, broken down by gender and age group (%)**

	Non-Haredim	Yotzim	HFH	Joiners	Those from a Haredi background	Those who are Haredi today
<b>Men and Women</b>						
Loneliness <sup>1</sup>	19	25	9	14	11	10
Felt stressed <sup>2</sup>	64	70	50	54	52	51
Felt depressed <sup>2</sup>	24	29	10	17	12	12
Experienced concerns that kept them from sleeping <sup>2</sup>	42	45	22	31	24	24
Facing difficulties <sup>2</sup>	95	93	96	94	96	95
Felt full of energy <sup>2</sup>	84	83	92	85	91	90
<b>Men</b>						
Loneliness <sup>1</sup>	16	23	9	10	11	9
Felt stressed <sup>2</sup>	58	63	42	48	45	44
Felt depressed <sup>2</sup>	20	23	10	16	11	11
Experienced concerns that kept them from sleeping <sup>2</sup>	35	35	19	25	21	20
Facing difficulties <sup>2</sup>	94	89	95	93	95	95
Felt full of energy <sup>2</sup>	84	83	91	85	90	89
<b>Women</b>						
Loneliness <sup>1</sup>	22	28	9	18	11	11
Felt stressed <sup>2</sup>	71	80	57	61	59	58
Felt depressed <sup>2</sup>	28	36	10	18	12	12
Experienced concerns that kept them from sleeping <sup>2</sup>	48	56	24	39	27	28
Facing difficulties <sup>2</sup>	95	97	96	96	97	96
Felt full of energy <sup>2</sup>	83	84	93	86	92	91
<b>Young adults aged 20-34 (men and women)</b>						
Loneliness <sup>1</sup>	19	26	9	(13)	11	9
Felt stressed <sup>2</sup>	68	73	49	54	51	49
Felt depressed <sup>2</sup>	25	30	10	(13)	12	10
Experienced concerns that kept them from sleeping <sup>2</sup>	36	41	19	25	21	20
Facing difficulties <sup>2</sup>	95	94	96	95	96	96
Felt full of energy <sup>2</sup>	86	87	93	88	92	92

Values in parentheses have a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3 (for more information, see the online appendix).

Source: Social Survey data for 2017-2023, Jews aged 20-64.

1. Answered "often" or "occasionally" to the question "Are there situations in which you feel lonely?"

2. Feel stressed, depressed, concerns that interfered with your sleep, coped with problems, or felt full of energy - Answered "always or often" or "sometimes, occasionally" to the questions "In the past 12 months, have you felt stressed / felt depressed / had worries that interfered with your sleep / coped with problems / were full of energy?"


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## D-Appendices

### Appendix D-1 Data Completion

Figure D-N-1 | Distribution of degree of contact with parents



Integration Survey: an online survey distributed by the "Out for Change" organization in March-April 2024 among Yotzim (individuals with a Haredi background who are not currently Haredi, by self-definition) aged 18 and over (N=1,206).  
 High - responded that the quality of the relationship with their parents was "good" or "very good."



## Chapter E: The Haredi education system and the education of Yotzot

The Haredi education system for girls consists of three stages: elementary school (grades 1-8), high school (grades 9-12), and seminary (grades 13-14). High schools differ in the type of certification they award - some grant a full matriculation certificate, while others provide a Szold certificate ("hotzim") or an internal graduation certificate.

The current study found that the rate of post-secondary education among Yotzot is significantly lower compared to both Haredi and non-Haredi women. Many Yotzot leave the Haredi education system without earning a matriculation certificate and do not continue to seminary programs that offer post-secondary certification. The lack of dedicated financial support and academic support that matches their needs may further hinder their ability to bridge educational gaps and integrate into high-quality employment.

### 3 paths for girls in the Haredi secondary education system

1



The majority of girls  
Szold certificate or partial matriculation

2

approximately 25% of girls  
Full matriculation



3



A minority of girls  
High school diploma only

After high school, most  
Haredi girls study for a  
post-secondary certificate

24% of Yotzot studied for a  
post-secondary certificate  
compared to 63% of HFH women



46%

of Yotzot have an academic or  
post-secondary school degree  
68% of HFH women  
63% non-Haredi women



32%

of Yotzot studied in  
professional training  
courses  
HFH - 16%



61%

of women who exited  
**with** children have a  
post-secondary education  
or are currently students



76%

of women who exited  
**without** children have a  
post-secondary education  
or are currently students



## E. The Haredi education system and the impact on women who leave Haredi society

Written by: Shani Kaplan and Adar Anisman

### Groups and Data Sources

#### Groups

The analysis groups are categorized based on both current affiliation (Haredi or non-Haredi) and past affiliation (whether or not they come from a Haredi background).

#### Subgroups

**Yotzot (Former Haredi):** Women with a Haredi background who are no longer Haredi.

**Harediot from Home (HFH):** Women with a Haredi background who remain Haredi.

**Joiners (Became Haredi):** Women with a non-Haredi background who have become Haredi.

**Non-Haredim:** Women with a non-Haredi background who are not currently Haredi.

#### Data sources and identification methods (\*)

**CBS Social Survey** - Data from 2007-2012 and 2017-2023, covering Jewish women aged 20-64.

Identification of Haredi background: Defined as women who, at age 15, were raised in a Haredi family (self-reported). This variable is unavailable in the data for years prior to 2007 and for 2013-2016. Identification as currently Haredi: Based on self-definition.

**Integration Survey** - An online survey conducted by Out for Change in March-April 2024, targeting Yotzot (women with a Haredi background who are no longer Haredi, based on self-definition) aged 18 and older.

(\*) For more details on the data sources, see the online appendix.

## E-1 Introduction

Due to the demographic characteristics of the Haredi population in Israel, the Haredi education system has expanded rapidly. Although the Haredi community comprises approximately 12% of Israel's total population, students in Haredi educational institutions account for about one-fifth of all students in the national education system<sup>45</sup>. As a result, the structure and characteristics of this education system increasingly impact a growing number of students, including those who later choose to leave the Haredi community as adults. This study focuses on a specific subgroup—Yotzot (women who have left the Haredi community).

When it comes to education, female graduates of Haredi schools are not a homogeneous group. The quality of their education and the certifications they hold depend on the type of institution they attended and the stage at which they left the education system. While most girls in the Haredi education system study core subjects to a similar extent as students in the state education system, only about a quarter obtain a matriculation certificate, which may impact their employment opportunities as adults.

Although the employment rates of Haredi women are comparable to those of non-Haredi women, their weekly working hours, job quality, and salaries tend to be lower (Axelrad & Kalisher, 2023). These differences stem partly from the preference of Haredi women to work in culturally adapted environments, but also from barriers to pursuing higher education, such as the lack of a matriculation certificate.

Research on post-secondary education among those with a Haredi background has primarily focused on men, due to gaps in core studies and the assumption that knowledge and skill barriers are less relevant for women. However, in recent years, several studies have examined Haredi women's integration into academia and the labor market, as well as the unique challenges they face (e.g., Dagan-Buzgalo et al., 2021; Axelrad & Kalisher, 2023).

Despite the significant influence of the Haredi education system on all women from a Haredi background, including those who later choose to leave, to the best of our knowledge, no quantitative research has been conducted specifically on Yotzot regarding employment and higher education—aside from the data presented in this annual report for the third consecutive year. These findings indicate low rates of post-secondary education among Yotzot, both in comparison to non-Haredi women and to Haredi women who remain in the community (Haredi women from home). This suggests that Yotzot face significant challenges in accessing higher education.

Using a combination of data from the CBS Social Survey and the 2024 Out for Change Survey (hereinafter: the "Integration Survey"), this chapter examines the level of secondary education acquired among Yotzot and explores the relationship between the structure of the Haredi education system, the stage at which these women left it, and their low rate of integration into post-secondary education—an outcome that may impact their future opportunities. A significant portion of the chapter focuses on non-academic post-secondary education, for which data is only available up to 2019, limiting some analyses for that period.

The findings presented in this chapter, consistent with previous data, show that the rate of post-secondary education among Yotzot is low compared to both Haredi and non-Haredi women. One possible reason for this gap is that many Yotzot leave the Haredi education system without a matriculation certificate, which is necessary for higher education, or a post-secondary certificate, which facilitates access

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45. Approximately 390,000 students are currently enrolled in Haredi-supervised education, accounting for about 20% of all students in the national education system (Regev & Miletsky, 2024).

to quality employment. This situation is a result of both the structure of the Haredi education system and the stage at which these women left it.

Moreover, while the Israeli government allocates resources to support the integration of Haredi women into quality employment, its funding is primarily directed toward subsidizing studies in grades 13-14 at Haredi seminaries (Almo Capital, 2020). Haredi women are also eligible for financial support through the Mahat vocational training voucher program, but this program serves a broad range of populations, making competition for support high. As a result, Yotzot fall between the cracks: the majority leave the Haredi education system without a post-secondary certificate that would enable them to pursue higher education or quality employment, and they have limited access to financial assistance to bridge their educational gaps.

Section 2 provides an overview of the Haredi education system for girls. Section 3 presents data from the Social Survey on women's education, highlighting gaps between Yotzot, non-Haredi women, and HFH women. Using data from the Integration Survey, this section also explores possible explanations for these gaps. Section 4 examines the connection between the stage at which women leave the Haredi education system and their integration into higher education, and also presents preliminary data on women who leave the Haredi community after marriage. Section 5 summarizes the chapter.

## E-2 The Haredi education system for girls

### E-2.1 Structure of the education system: background

The Haredi education system is gender-segregated, with distinct emphases for each gender<sup>46</sup>. The girls' education system consists of two main stages: primary education, which spans eight years (grades 1-8), and secondary education, which lasts six years—four years of high school (grades 9-12) followed by two years of post-secondary education at a Haredi seminary (grades 13-14), aimed at obtaining a post-secondary certificate.

The core subjects taught in the Haredi girls' education system are similar to those in the general education system. However, students typically do not take full matriculation exams (Barth, Spiegel, and Malach, 2020), and in some cases, the level of study is lower compared to state and state-religious education (Bank of Israel, 2021).

This section first outlines the structure of the Haredi education system and the various supervisory frameworks governing it. It then provides an overview of the different high school graduation certificates available to Haredi women, primarily the matriculation certificate and the Szold certificate. The final section discusses post-secondary education frameworks, with a particular focus on teacher training seminars and Mahat training.

#### Schools under Haredi supervision

The Israeli education system is divided into three streams, each with different supervision: state supervision, responsible for Jewish and Arab state schools; state-religious supervision, overseeing Jewish religious schools; and Haredi supervision, which since 2014 has operated under the "Haredi District."

46. The boys' curriculum is largely standardized, focusing primarily on religious studies. Core subjects are included to a limited extent in elementary education (grades 1-8), but secondary education (yeshiva ketana) consists exclusively of religious studies (Deutsch, Shenfeld, and Tirosh, 2024).

This supervisory body represents the Ministry of Education in dealings with educational institutions and serves as a liaison between schools, local authorities, and the Ministry. It also evaluates institutions, supports school principals, and handles institutional inquiries (State Comptroller, 2017).

### **Most Haredi schools are not state-run, but private or semi-private.**

Most schools under Haredi supervision are private and classified as “unofficial and recognized” (“mukshar”). These schools are required to teach core subjects to a lesser extent than state schools and receive funding accordingly<sup>47</sup>. The majority belong to two private Haredi education networks: the Independent Education Network, affiliated with United Torah Judaism; and the Bnei Yosef Network (formerly Ma’ayan HaChinuch HaTorani), affiliated with Shas. Although these networks officially have a mukshar legal status, they receive full government funding, similar to official schools. The other educational institutions are classified as “exempt”, and are required to teach only about half of the core curriculum and receive funding in proportion to this requirement.

### **In 2014, Haredi State Education (Mamah) was established for the first time.**

In 2014, the supervision model for Haredi schools changed with the establishment of the Haredi District within the Ministry of Education, which encompasses all Haredi schools officially recognized by the Ministry (Barth, Spiegel, & Malach, 2020). However, in practice, the District struggles to oversee these schools due to limited cooperation with the inspectors (Friedman, 2021; Shahino-Kessler, 2024). In parallel with the creation of the Haredi District, an official state-Haredi stream (Mamah) was introduced, intended to parallel state and state-religious education by fully incorporating the core curriculum. However, a decade later, this stream remains limited to elementary schools, with only about 4% of Haredi female students enrolled in them (Regev & Miletsky, 2024).

Alongside the officially recognized Haredi schools supervised by the Ministry, private schools affiliated with anti-Zionist Haredi communities operate independently of the state. There is little available data about these schools. Additionally, some high schools under state-religious supervision also serve Haredi students.

## **E-2.2 Secondary Education**

### **Secondary education for Haredi girls consists of two stages: high school (9-12) and seminary studies (13-14).**

Although all secondary education institutions for girls are often referred to as “seminaries,” they actually consist of two distinct stages: high school (grades 9-12) and seminary studies (grades 13-14). This section focuses on high school education, while the next section will cover seminary studies.

Approximately 80% of female students in secondary education are enrolled in the two major Haredi educational networks, a smaller proportion attend privately owned schools, and an even smaller number study in state-religious schools (primarily Chabad and Sanz Hasidic girls' high schools) (Barth, Spiegel, & Malach, 2020).

The high school tracks can be divided into three categories based on the type of certificate awarded: full matriculation certificate, Szold certificate (Hotzim), and schools without external certificates, including schools that are not recognized at all by the Ministry of Education.

47. Schools belonging to Shas and the Independent Education network are 100% funded, similar to official schools, even though they have a recognized, unofficial legal status.

**Schools awarding a full matriculation certificate:** A matriculation certificate is issued by the Ministry of Education based on a standardized curriculum approved by the Ministry. In 2023, approximately 25%

## Most female graduates of Haredi education are not eligible for a matriculation certificate.

of girls under Haredi supervision were eligible for a matriculation certificate (Kahaner & Malach, 2023). While the data is not entirely clear, it is believed that many students in schools offering a full matriculation come from families on the “Haredi periphery<sup>48</sup>” or

alternatively, from families who understand the value of education. For example, the proportion of girls taking matriculation exams is lower in more insular Haredi cities and increases in schools located in the Haredi periphery or mixed cities<sup>49</sup>.

**Schools awarding a Szold certificate:** The Szold exams (Hotzim) are standardized tests created specifically for Haredi girls' high schools, serving as a substitute for the matriculation exams, with the approval of Haredi rabbis. The Ministry of Education recognizes the Szold certificate as equivalent to 11 units of study (Barth, Spiegel, & Malach, 2020). While these certificates do not enable admission to higher education without additional qualifications, they do allow for further studies in Haredi seminaries, leading to teaching or engineering certificates within the Mahat framework. Most Haredi female students attend high schools that offer the Szold certificate, and some also take part of the matriculation exams. The exact percentage of students earning a Szold certificate is unknown, but it is believed to be high among all girls graduating from Haredi education. Some schools may offer both the Szold certificate and matriculation exams.

**Conservative schools without external certificates:** A small percentage of female students do not pursue any external certificate. These students attend high schools that serve particularly conservative communities, where no standardized exams are taken. Often, these schools are not registered with the Ministry of Education, and the level of core studies may be lower than that of other institutions<sup>50</sup>.

In conclusion, upon graduating from high school, approximately a quarter of Haredi girls earn a matriculation certificate, more than 40% take at least one matriculation exam but are not eligible for a full certificate, and around a third do not take any matriculation exams at all. The number of Haredi girls who qualify for a Szold certificate is not known, and some of them attend schools that only award a graduation certificate without any external certification.

## E-2.3 Post-secondary education

After graduating from high school, most Haredi girls continue their studies in grades 13-14 (seminary). Although the majority of Haredi high school graduates do not obtain a matriculation certificate, they can still be admitted to a Haredi seminary without it, which is not the case for academic studies.

48. As Morgenstern, Gal, and Elimelech (2017) explain, the term pertains to the level of openness versus conservatism among different Haredi communities, rather than to their geographic location on the periphery.

49. For example, in Netanya, Haifa, Rehovot and Petah Tikva, the Haredi high schools offer full matriculation exams (see Gal, Morgenstern and Elimelech, 2017).

50. The exact number of girls studying in these institutions is unknown, but administrative data indicates that in 2021, approximately 4,500 teenagers (boys and girls aged 13-18) were not previously registered in any recognized educational setting (Wininger, 2022), and it is likely that the majority belong to these Haredi schools.

## The seminary awards a post-secondary certificate that facilitates entry into the workforce.

At the end of this track, students receive a recognized post-secondary certificate, such as a senior teacher certificate from the Ministry of Education, an engineering certificate from Mahat (Government Institute for Training in Technology), or another professional qualification, all of which can facilitate entry into the workforce. In recent years, the rate of women obtaining technological certificates subsidized by Mahat has increased compared to those receiving teaching certificates (Axelrad & Kalisher, 2023). Some seminaries, which belong to the more modern Haredi factions, also offer academic degrees. However, some girls do not continue to seminary studies, mainly those from extremely conservative communities where post-secondary education for women is not accepted, or from very modern communities that prioritize academic education.

Over time, the focus of secondary education for girls has shifted, and the content of studies and the types of certificates awarded have evolved in response to both societal needs and community constraints. As a result, secondary education institutions, particularly the post-secondary component, have become an important foundation for professional training and the development of the Haredi female workforce (Reiman, 2017). Consequently, the state's primary investment in integrating Haredi women into employment is focused on subsidizing studies in the seminary (grades 13-14) through the Ministry of Education or Mahat.

## E-2.4 Summary of the Haredi education system for girls

Table 1 outlines the structure of the Haredi education system for girls, highlighting the range of educational options available, the quality of education, and the legal status of the institutions.

**Table 1 | Structure of the Haredi Education System for Girls**

Grades	External Exams <sup>51</sup>	Legal Status
Elementary (Grades 1-8)	National test in mother tongue (replacing Meitzav tests), excluding independent education network (Wieninger, 2024)	State-Haredi (from 2014), Education Networks (recognized, unofficial) private schools not in education networks (recognized, unofficial), exempt institutions, state-religious (Chabad and Sanz)
High School (Grades 9-12)	PISA <sup>52</sup> Test, Szold Tests ("Chutzim"), Matriculation (Partial/Full)	Education networks - recognized but unofficial, private schools not in education networks (recognized but unofficial), state-religious (Chabad and Sanz)
Seminary (Grades 13-14)	Teaching certificate, Engineering certificate (Mahat), additional trainings	Ministry of Education budget, Mahat budget

Yotzot and future Yotzot also study in this education system, which is common to all Haredi women. The next section will compare the educational characteristics of Yotzot with two relevant subgroups: Haredi women from home and non-Haredi women. We will examine indicators of post-secondary education and compare the outcomes for women leaving Haredi society with those of Haredi women from home.

51. For external exams, see above, Section 2.2.

52. The Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) exam is an international test that takes place every three years and tests reading, math, and science literacy among 15-year-old students.



## E-3 Education of Yotzot


### E-3.1 Comparison between subgroups

As mentioned in the previous section, there is significant variation between the Haredi schools and the diplomas they award. In addition to these variations, women leaving Haredi society do so at different stages: some leave after graduating from high school, with a matriculation certificate, a Szold certificate, or an internal high school diploma, while others leave after completing grades 13-14, and a vocational diploma from a seminary. A certain proportion leave before finishing high school, without earning any diploma at all.

The data comparing the distribution of the highest diploma among the subgroups (Figure 1) shows that more than a third (37%) of HFH women have a non-academic post-secondary diploma, but only 16% of Yotzot have such a diploma. This suggests that many Yotzot leave the Haredi education system before completing their seminary studies (grades 13-14). However, the proportion of HFH women with a matriculation certificate as their highest qualification (7%) is lower than the proportion among Yotzot (26%).

This gap may be due to a combination of a higher rate of exit among female Haredi high school graduates pursuing a full matriculation and a large proportion of Yotzot who leave Haredi institutions before completing their seminary studies (grades 13-14), which award a vocational certificate. As a result, the matriculation certificate is their highest qualification. As noted, post-secondary seminary studies (unlike academic studies) can be pursued without a matriculation certificate.

Figure E-1 | Distribution of the highest certificate, ages 25-64, divided into subgroups (%)



(Values in parentheses indicate categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3; see the online appendix for more details.)


Source: Social Survey data for 2017-2023, Jewish women aged 25-64.

Note: The data do not add up to 100% due to rounding.



Among Yotzot, it is common to leave the Haredi education system after twelfth grade without continuing to seminary. So, in contrast to two-thirds (64%) of HFH women who have attended a non-academic post-secondary institution, only about a quarter (22%) of Yotzot have attended such an institution (Figure 2).

**Figure E-2 | Rate of those attending academic or post-secondary institution, ages 20-64, by subgroups**




Source: Social Survey data for 2007-2012 and 2017-2019, Jewish women aged 20-64.  
The variable "Have you ever attended a high school/academic institution" is not available after 2019. The variable "Level of religiosity at home at age 15" is not available for data before 2007 or for the years 2013-2016.

Analysis of the data from a survey distributed among Yotzot (referred to here as "the Integration Survey") revealed that 59% of the respondents did not attend seminary. This figure supports the hypothesis that a high proportion of Yotzot leave the Haredi education system without continuing to seminary studies.

Additionally, the rate of academic degree holders among both HFH women and Yotzot is the same (approximately 30%), which is significantly lower than the rate among non-Haredi women (51%) (Figure 1). This gap is also evident in the low percentage of women who have ever attended an academic institution (Figure 2). While nearly half (48%) of non-Haredi women aged 20-64 have pursued higher education, the rates are significantly lower among HFH women (22%) and Yotzot (28%).

Moreover, Yotzot tend to pursue educational paths that require less investment (Figure E-3). A high proportion (35%) of Yotzot who study non-academic subjects focus on vocational training courses, which typically last only a few months and cost less (e.g., accounting, programming, carpentry). This contrasts with a significantly higher proportion of HFH women who graduated from a seminary (61%) and a low proportion (12%) who pursued vocational courses only.

**Figure E-3 | Distribution of non-academic studies among women with an Haredi background aged 25-64 (%)**



(Values in parentheses indicate categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3.)

Source: Social Survey data for 2007-2019, excluding 2011 (which did not include a question on vocational training) and 2013-2016 (when no Haredi background could be identified).

Post-secondary school: Attended a non-academic post-secondary school (e.g., school for technicians and engineers, teacher training, nursing).

Vocational training: Attended vocational training courses (e.g., accounting, programming, carpentry).

The discrepancy between Figure E-2 and Figure E-3 is due to the choice of years.

It is likely that the financial challenges young Yotzot face, as youth lacking family support, make it difficult for them to overcome educational gaps and acquire an education. The rate of Yotzot who report experiencing poverty and an inability to cover expenses is similar to the rate among male Yotzim, and higher than that of non-Haredi women (see data in Chapter 4).

It should be noted that these data are valid up to 2019 for the broad age group (20-64 years), because after that year, the Social Survey did not include questions on professional training. At the same time, changes in post-secondary education over the years (Reiman, 2017) may mean that these data do not fully reflect the current situation among female Haredi high school graduates.


## E-4 The Connection Between the Track in the Haredi Education System and Education After Exiting

### E-4.1 Type of high school diploma and continuation of studies

As mentioned earlier, the rate of academic degree holders or those with a post-secondary diploma among Yotzot is lower compared to HFH women and non-Haredi women (Figure E-1). However, this data does not allow us to draw conclusions about the level of education at the time of exiting the Haredi community, as it does not include information about the specific stage at which they exited. Additionally, it does not answer the question of whether women from Haredi backgrounds who attend high schools offering a full matriculation are less likely to continue their studies at a seminary.

In contrast to the data from the Social Survey, the Integration Survey specifically asked about the type of Haredi high school attended by respondents, based on the certificate granted by the school. Figure E-4 shows the distribution of respondents' external certificates (Szold or matriculation certificate) based on whether they continued to seminary studies - what is the proportion of Yotzot who attended a seminary and hold a Szold or matriculation certificate in comparison to the proportion of Yotzot who did not attend a seminary but hold the same certificates. The data clearly shows a negative relationship between holding a matriculation certificate and attending seminary: 37% of women who did not attend a seminary have a matriculation certificate, compared to 25% of those who did attend a seminary.

**Figure E-4 | Proportion of women who hold a high school diploma or matriculation certificate by seminary studies - Integration Survey (%)**




Source: Integration Survey - an online survey distributed by the "Out for Change" organization in March-April 2024, among Yotzot aged 25-54 (N=435).

According to the directives of the Council for Higher Education, a Szold certificate combined with a teaching certificate or an engineering certificate is considered equivalent to a matriculation certificate as a requirement for admission to academic studies. Thus, graduates who attended a seminary and graduated with a post-secondary certificate can be admitted to academic studies as if they had a full matriculation certificate.

However, as stated above, a high percentage of Yotzot do not continue to the seminary and do not have a matriculation certificate or post-secondary certificate, and therefore, before being admitted to academic studies, they are required to complete additional courses. An analysis of the distribution of highest certificates (Figure 5) compares respondents who attended a seminary with those who did not. The results show that 69% of Yotzot who attended a seminary have post-secondary education, with the majority holding an academic degree (44% compared to 25% post-secondary). Among those who did not attend seminary, in contrast, the rate of obtaining a post-secondary education drops to only 44% (34% academic degree compared to 10% post-secondary).

Figure E-5 | Distribution of highest certificate by seminary studies (%) - Integration Survey




Source: Integration Survey - An online survey conducted by Out for Change in March-April 2024, among Yotzot aged 25-54 who have left the Haredi community (N=435).

#### E-4.2 The relationship between the stage of leaving haredi society and the acquisition of education

According to Horowitz (2018), most individuals leave Haredi society by the age of 25, a statistic that aligns with trends in exit patterns (for more details, see Chapter A of this annual report). However, in Haredi society, the average age of marriage for women is relatively young, around 20 years old (Gordon, 2022). This age tends to be higher among Litvak and Sephardic women and lower among Hasidic women. These characteristics may influence the marital status of Yotzot.

An analysis of marital status data from the Social Survey reveals that the proportion of women who have left the Haredi community and are divorced, widowed, or separated (26%) is higher than the corresponding proportion among non-Haredi women (16%) (Figure E-6) and the proportion of mothers among Yotzot is the same (81%) as among non-Haredi women. These differences may be linked to the timing of their exit and their stage of life when they left, suggesting that a significant number of women leave Haredi society after marrying and having children.

**Figure E-6 | Proportion of divorced women and mothers of children among Yotzot and non-Haredi women aged 25-64**




Values in parenthesis represent categories with a relative sampling error between 0.15 and 0.3.

Source: Social Survey data, 2017-2023, women aged 25-64.

Divorced: Including divorced, separated, and widowed.

According to the Integration Survey data, there is a difference in the educational status of respondents who exited as mothers with children compared to those who left without children: 40% of women who left as mothers with children hold a certificate lower than a matriculation certificate, compared to 25% of women who left without children (Figure E-7).


**Figure E-7 | Distribution of the highest certificate, by parental status at the time of exit (%)**



Source: Integration Survey - an online survey conducted by the Out for Change organization between March and April 2024, among Yotzot aged 25-54 (N=384). Of the respondents, 264 women exited without children, while 120 left with children.

Both groups—women who left as mothers and those who left without children—have similar rates of not holding an academic degree or post-secondary certificate (44%-47%) but differ in the proportion of those without certificates who are currently studying (Figure E-8). Among women who left as mothers with children, 39% neither hold a certificate nor are currently studying, compared to 24% of those who left without children. Consequently, 76% of women who left without children are either students or have an academic or post-secondary certificate, compared to 61% of those who left as mothers of children.

**Figure E-8 | Current educational status - percentage of women lacking academic and post-secondary certificates (%)**



Source: Integration Survey - an online survey conducted by the Out for Change organization between March and April 2024, among Yotzot aged 25-54 (N=384). Of the respondents, 264 women exited without children, while 120 left with children.

Women who left the Haredi community as mothers likely face a double burden when pursuing higher education. Like those who left without children, most do not have a matriculation certificate, but in contrast to them, those who left with children must also care for and financially support their children.

## E-5 Summary and discussion

Among Yotzot, the proportion with post-secondary education is low compared to both HFH women and non-Haredi women, despite the fact that the majority study most of the core subjects in school. This low rate is likely due to the fact that, like most Haredi women, many Yotzot leave the Haredi education system without a matriculation certificate, which is required for entry into higher education. However, unlike most Haredi women, they also lack a post-secondary certificate, which could grant them access to higher-quality employment opportunities.

As a result, these women find themselves in a precarious position: the majority leave the Haredi education system without a certificate that could improve their financial prospects, yet many do not qualify for financial assistance to complete their studies. From the perspective of Mahat, they are eligible for the Mahat voucher program, which provides partial tuition funding for professional certification. However, because of limited allocation of vouchers across all eligible populations, competition is high, and the percentage of recipients is low. Mahat scholarships, on the other hand, are available to all who meet the criteria without allocation restrictions, but they are intended exclusively for male graduates of Haredi education. Additionally, the low rate of Yotzot who enlist to the military impacts their eligibility for scholarships designated for discharged soldiers—funding that many male Yotzim rely on to finance their studies in academic preparatory programs.

Beyond financial assistance, a lack of suitable educational pathways poses a significant challenge. In academic institutions, most pre-academic preparatory programs for Haredi graduates are gender-segregated and maintain a Haredi character. In many cases, these programs are available only to men and assume a complete absence of core studies. Another barrier exists for women who exited after marrying and having children. Many of these women come from more conservative backgrounds and marry at a young age, contributing to the high rate of educational gaps among them. In addition to supporting their children, many struggle to find the time needed for post-secondary studies. Similarly, women who leave at a young age without family support face significant financial hardships, making it difficult for them to bridge educational gaps and acquire an education: the percentage of women who reported experiencing poverty and an inability to cover basic expenses is similar to that of male Yotzim significantly higher than that of non-Haredi women (Chapter D).

Today, there is a growing recognition of the need for programs tailored to graduates of Haredi education in general, and Yotzim and Yotzot in particular, to help bridge educational gaps and facilitate access to post-secondary education for both men and women. In 2024, the Council of Higher Education recommended establishing pre-academic preparatory programs specifically for Yotzim and Yotzot, and the first such program opened at Hebrew University in the summer of 2024. However, these programs must be designed to address the unique needs of Yotzot, rather than focusing solely on male Yotzim graduates of Haredi education, because Yotzot vary and face different educational gaps, depending on the type of Haredi high school they attended and the stage at which they left the Haredi education system. A critical component of such programs must be financial assistance, in addition to academic support. Investing in Yotzot will help reduce educational disparities in this group and facilitate their integration into high-quality employment without requiring cultural or structural adjustments.

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